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From Kemalism to Ozalism the ideological evolution of Turkish foreign policy.

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FROM KEMALISM TO ÖZALISM, THE IDEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

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**Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Mediterranean Studies Programme
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis argues that Turkish foreign policy has not demonstrated an unbroken continuity and that drastic changes in Turkish foreign policy positions cannot be explained simply by looking to the Kemalist model. Rather, this study argues that there have been at least seven different schools of thought relating to foreign policy in the seventy-five years of the Turkish Republic. These range from Kemalist isolationism to Özalist neo-Ottomanism.

It further claims that even the Kemalist foreign policy approach can be divided into several (often contradictory) branches ranging from İnönism to Ecevit's leftist-Kemalism. As such, this dissertation attempts to set out and analyse the evolution of the various ideologies and motives responsible for Turkish foreign policy over the aforementioned time-frame.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABD	<i>Amerika Birleşik Devletleri</i> (United States of America)
ANAP	<i>Anavatan Partisi</i> (Motherland Party)
AÜ	<i>Ankara Üniversitesi</i> (Ankara University)
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Co-operation
DP	Democrat Party (<i>Demokrat Parti</i>)
CENTO	Central Treaty Organisation
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
<i>ed.</i>	edited
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FO	Foreign Office
GNP	Grand National Parliament
IJMES	International Journal of Middle East Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund.
IU	Istanbul University.
IUFFD	The Journal of the Istanbul University Science Faculty
JP	Justice Party (<i>Adalet Partisi</i>)
LN	League of Nations
LSE	London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London
METU	Middle East Technical University, Ankara (<i>Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi</i>)
MKP	<i>Milli Kalkınma Partisi</i> (National Development Party)
MP	Member of Parliament
NAP	Nationalist Action Party (<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i>)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
<i>n.d.</i>	no date
NDP	National Development Party
No.	Number
NOP	National Order Party (<i>Milli Nizam Partisi</i>)
<i>n.p.</i>	no place
NP	Nation Party (<i>Millet Partisi</i>)
NSC	National Security Council
NSP	National Salvation Party (<i>Milli Selamet Partisi</i>)

NTP	New Turkey Party (<i>Yeni Türkiye Partisi</i>)
NUC	National Unity Committee (<i>Ulusal Birlik Komitesi</i>)
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Conference
OYAK	<i>Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu</i> (The Army Mutual Assistance Association)
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation.
RPP	Republican People's Party (<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i>)
RTP	Republican Thrust Party (<i>Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi</i>)
SBF	<i>Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi</i> (The Faculty of Political Sciences, Ankara University)
SBFY	<i>Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları</i> (SBF Publications)
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
SPO	State Planning Organisation
SU	Soviet Union
TBMM	<i>Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi</i> (Turkish Grand National Assembly)
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly (<i>Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi</i>)
TIKKA	<i>Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansı</i> (Turkish Co-operation and Development Agency)
TIP	<i>Türkiye İşçi Partisi</i> (Turkish Workers' Party)
TIY	<i>Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları</i> (Turkey İş Bank Publications)
TRT	Turkish Radio Television Broadcasting
TTK	<i>Türk Tarih Kurumu</i> (Turkish History Institution)
TYIR	Turkish Yearbook of International Relations
UAR	United Arab Republic
UIOY	<i>Uluslararası İlişkilerde Olaylar ve Yorumlar Dergisi</i> (The Journal of Events and Comments in International Relations).
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
Vol.	Volume

INTRODUCTION

Aims and Objectives

The main subject of this thesis is Turkish foreign policy and its ideological evolution. There are two basic reasons to make this thesis: The situation in the Turkish foreign policy literature and the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy which could not be explained fully by using solely the variables other than ideology and domestic developments.

First this study assumes that ideology's and domestic factors' role is an understudied subject. Since the end of the Ottoman Empire 'change' has been the key note of Turkish domestic policies.¹ First the country changed its political regime from monarchy to one-party-republican system, and then to a multi-party democracy. In the republican period, Turkey has seen three military coups (27 May 1960, 12 March 1971 and 12 September 1980 Coup),² social and political turmoil and violence (like the clashes between the radical leftist and the rightist political groups in the 1970s),³ economic depressions as witnessed in the 1930s, 1970s and 1980s, many ethnic (Kurdish), sectarian (Alevi-Sunni) and religious conflicts and uprisings especially in the 1920s, 1930s, 1970s and in

¹ Oya Akgönenç, **A Study of Political Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy with Particular Reference to New Trends in Turco-Arab Relations, 1960-1975**, unpublished PhD thesis, The American University, 1975, p. 1.

² Works on the Turkish military coups in the republican years include: George S. Harris, 'The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics I-II', **Middle East Journal**, Vol. 19, Spring and Winter 1965; William Hale, **Turkish Politics and the Military**, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); Mehmet Ali Birand, **The Generals' Coup in Turkey, An Inside Story of 12 September 1980**, (trans.: M. A. Dikerdem), (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987); James Brown, 'Military and Politics in Turkey', **Armed Forces and Society**, Vol. 13, No. 2, Winter 1987; Kenneth Fidel, **Social Structure and Military Intervention: The 1960 Turkish Revolution**, unpublished PhD thesis, Washington University, 1969; Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), **State, Democracy and the Military**, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988); Türkkaya Ataöv, 'The 27th of May Revolution and Its Aftermath', **Turkish Yearbook of International Relations**, 1960-1961, pp. 13-22.

³ For the political violence and radical movements (leftist or rightist) there are lots of standard works. Some of them are: Jacob M. Landau, **Radical Politics in Modern Turkey**, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974); Feroz Ahmad, **The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975**, (London: Hurst, 1977); Serif Mardin, 'Youth and Violence in Turkey', **International Social Science Journal**, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1977, pp. 229-254; D. Orlow, 'Political Violence in Pre-Coup Turkey', **Terrorism, An International Journal**, 1982, Vol. 6, No.1; Jacob M. Landau, **Pan-Turkism, From Irredentism to Cooperation**, (London: Hurst&Company, 1995); Ihsan Bal, **Prevention of Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: The Case Study of Turkey**, PhD thesis, the University of Leicester, 1999; I. P. Lipovsky, **The Socialist Movement in Turkey, 1960-1980**, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992).

the 1980s.⁴ Relatively undeveloped economy, poor democratisation and poor human rights record⁵ have always been serious problems for the Turkish people and these problems prevented a stable political life as the political, social and economic stability has always been a desired aim for Turkey.⁶

In these years apart from the unstable picture of the Turkish social, political and the economic structures, the international system has also dramatically changed; the 19th century's economic and political world order collapsed and many empires, like the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire and the Austria-Hungarian Empire, were disintegrated, two devastating world wars changed the world map, and the world politics once more changed under the bipolar Cold War tension, and finally the world saw the disintegration of the communist block and the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. Turkey, thanks to its location, has been very close to all these changes, and because it lies directly at the centre of an area of great conflicts,⁷ both actual and potential, Turkey has been exposed to the bad effects of the changes in the international arena. However, despite the radical changes in the domestic politics and the international relations, it is frequently argued by the Turkish policy-makers⁸ and by

⁴ For the ethnic uprisings see: Bal, **Prevention...**; Martin Van Bruinessen, **Agha, Sheikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan**, (London: Zed Press, 1992); Gerard Chaliand, **Kurdish Tragedy**, (London: Zed Books, 1994); Michael M. Günter, **The Kurds and the Future of Turkey**, (London: Macmillan, 1997); David McDowell, **A Modern History of the Kurds**, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996); Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, **The Kurdish Question and Turkey, An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict**, (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

⁵ **Human Rights in Turkey's Transition to Democracy**, (New York: Helsinki Watch Committee, 1983); Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), **Turkey Between east and West, New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power**, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. xi.

⁶ For comprehensive analysis of Turkish domestic politics in the republican period, in addition to the studies mentioned above, also see: C. H. Dodd, **The Crisis of Turkish Democracy**, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1990); Feroz Ahmad, **The Making of Modern Turkey**, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996); William Hale, **The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey**, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1981); George S. Harris, **Turkey: Coping with Crisis**, (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1985); Metin Heper, **State Tradition in Turkey**, (Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1985); Kemal H. Karpat, **Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis**, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973); Erik J. Zürcher, **Turkey, A Modern History**, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993); Bernard Lewis, **The Emergence of Modern Turkey**, (London: I. B. Tauris&Co. Ltd., 1968); Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, **History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II**, (Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 340-437.

⁷ Like Arab-Israeli Wars, the sectarian conflicts in Lebanon, the Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Iraq-Iran Wars, Azerbaijan-Armenia Conflicts and the other ethnic and religious conflicts in the Middle East, Caucasia and the Balkans,

⁸ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for instance describes Turkish foreign policy as a set of Kemalist ideas which has not changed since 1923: 'The Goals and Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy', via internet, [www://mfa.gov.tr](http://mfa.gov.tr). Similarly the Turkish foreign ministers and the prime ministers, except Turgut Özal, argued that the main character of Turkish foreign policy has been its continuity: For the examples see Ercüment Yavuzalp, **Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika, Bir Diplomat Gözüyle**, (*Our Leaders and Foreign Policy, From Diplomat's Perspective*), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), pp.74, 88, 144, 191,

many respected Turkish foreign policy scholars⁹ that Turkish foreign policy has shown a remarkable continuity. Andrew Mango for example, claims ‘The political crisis had little effect on foreign policy until the July 1996 advent to power of a coalition with the Islamist Refah Party (...)’¹⁰ Dankwart Rustow similarly defends that traditional policies (Kemalist policies) have been carried out without interruption, and continuity has been the most significant feature of Turkish foreign policy,¹¹ and it with this feature is distinguished from many other countries, including some of the Western democracies:

‘In contrast to the frequent internal changes on the Turkish domestic scene, Ankara’s foreign policy has displayed remarkable continuity. Indeed, Turkey’s external relations have been marked by a long-term perspective, by a sense of responsibility, and by realism that is found in few developing countries and is far from universal even among the democracies of the West.’¹²

Şaban Çalış’s argument in a more recent study is not so different:

‘Turkish foreign policy displays an unbroken continuity in its conventional understanding which has been developed and applied since the establishment of the

196 and 244.

⁹ Though these scholars’ ideas will be detailed below, some of them who defends a continuity in Turkish foreign policy can be summarised as follow: Ferenc A. Vali, **Bridge Across the Bosphorus, The Foreign Policy of Turkey**, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 68; Altemur Kılıç, **Turkey and the World**, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 205-206; Oral Sander, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity and of Change’, **Turkish Review Quarterly Digest**, Vol. 7, No. 34, Winter 1993, pp. 31-46; Oral Sander, ‘Türk Dış Politikasında Sürekliliğin Nedenleri’, **AÜSBF Dergisi**, September-December 1982, Vol. 37, Nos. 3-4, pp. 105-106; James Brown, **Delicately Poised Allies, Greece and Turkey**, (London: Brassey’s, 1991), p. 61-61; Nuri Eren, **Turkey Today and Tomorrow**, (New York: 1963), pp. 244-250; Nuri Eren, ‘The Foreign Policy of Turkey’, in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (eds.), **Foreign Policies in a World of Change**, (New York: 1963), p. 310; Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Turkey’s Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective’, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), **State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s**, (Berlin: 1988), pp. 239-248, p. 247; Yasemin Çelik, **Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy**, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999).; Mustafa Aydın, ‘Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War’, **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 36, No. 1, January 2000, pp. 103-105; Mustafa Aydın, ‘determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs’, in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), **Seventy-Five Years of Turkish Republic**, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 152-186; Şaban Çalış, **The Role of Identity in the Making of Modern Turkish Foreign Policy**, unpublished PhD thesis, the University of Nottingham, 1996; Mahmut B. Aykan, **Ideology and National Interest in Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Muslim World: 1960-1987**, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Virginia, Virginia, 1988; Selim Deringil, ‘Aspects and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy Abdulhamid II and Ismet İnönü’, **International Journal of Turkish Studies**, Vol. 4, Nol. 1, 1987; Gencer Özcan, ‘Türk Dış Politikasında Süreklilik ve Değişim: Balkanlar Örneği’, (*The Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Balkan Case*), in Kemali Saybaşlı and Gencer Özcan (eds.), **Yeni Balkanlar, Eski Sorunlar (The New Balkans, The Old Problems)**, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997).

¹⁰ Andrew Mango, ‘Reflections on the Atatürkist Origins of Turkish Foreign Policy and Domestic Linkages’, in Makovsky and Sayari, **Turkey’s...**, p. 9.

¹¹ Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Turkey’s Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective’, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), **State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s**, (Berlin: 1988), pp. 239-248, p. 247.

¹² Dankwart A. Rustow, **Turkey: America’s Forgotten Ally**, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), p. 84 cited in Brown, **Delicately...**, p. 61.

Çalış, in his thesis, recognises that there are other foreign policy approaches apart from the Kemalist one, yet he argues that their effect on foreign policy issues has been very limited, and 'traditional Kemalist foreign policy' as the dominant approach has been unchallenged and this has served to the continuity in Turkish foreign policy since 1923.¹⁴ Mahmut Aykan, a Turkish scholar who focuses on Turkey's role in the Middle East, also claims that 'Turkish foreign policy has exhibited a remarkable continuity during the Republican era, despite the radical changes in the global context', such as the First and the Second World Wars and the Cold War.¹⁵ Aykan does not give the 'secret' of this continuity in his thesis, yet his study implies that all Turkish governments adopted Kemalist ideas and never challenged to the main tenets of Turkish foreign policy set by Mustafa Kemal.¹⁶ Yasemin Çelik, in one of the most recent studies published in 1999, argues that even the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the communist block could not shift Turkey's foreign policy aims, and continuity maintained in the post-Cold War era.¹⁷ Çelik, similar to the previous scholars, further assumes that there have no major alterations in Turkey's foreign policy orientation in the eight decades.¹⁸

Meanwhile some scholars defends that there have been attempts to change some of the main tenets of Turkish foreign policy, yet they argue that most of these attempts had failed or had been ineffective on the overall direction of policies. For instance, William Hale claims that despite some critics, there was no serious challenge to the Kemalist foreign policy in the Atatürk and İnönü periods, and he further continues 'Kemal Atatürk enjoyed a virtually unchangeable national authority, and took a direct and crucial interest in shaping Turkey's foreign policy' and 'his policies were effectively continued by Ismet İnönü'.¹⁹ For Hale, even after the accession of Adnan Menderes's Democrat Party, 'there was no change in foreign policies', and in the 1970s Ecevit and

¹³ Çalış, *The Role of...*, p. 418.

¹⁴ Çalış, *The Role of...*, pp. 418-419.

¹⁵ Aykan, *Ideology...*, p. iv.

¹⁶ Aykan, *Ideology...*, p. iv.

¹⁷ Çelik, *Contemporary...*, pp. 1-10.

¹⁸ Çelik, *Contemporary...*, pp. 1-24 and *Conclusion* section.

¹⁹ William Hale, 'Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics', in David Shankland (ed.), *The Turkish Republic at Seventy-Five Years, Progress-Development-Change*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1999), p. 93.

Demirel co-alition governments's 'more multi-faceted foreign policies in practice had relatively little effect on the overall direction of policies'²⁰ Likewise, the leftist scholar Haluk Gerger in his *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası* claims that there have been serious challenges to the traditional foreign policy understanding represented by the Kemalists.²¹ Gerger focuses on the socialist and the leftist alternatives in particular, however he says that even the leftists in government could not challenge the American hegemony and had to rely on the Western security system, and as a result of this the main direction of Turkish foreign policy could not be shifted.²² According to David Kushner, the most important indication of the continuity since the Atatürk period has been Turkey's Westernism and 'it was left to Atatürk's successors to take the further step of making Turkey an actual ally of the West', and this process was not broken until the 1960s.²³ According to Kushner, the leftist and the Islamist political groups seriously challenged the traditional policies in the 1960s and 1970s by calling for a radical revision of Turkish foreign policy, yet they could not shift the main direction and traditional foreign policy understanding was maintained.²⁴ In summary, despite a few exceptional works,²⁵ it is generally accepted that there have been a remarkable uninterrupted ideological continuity in Turkish foreign policy since Atatürk to Özal.

In the light of this information the first task of this thesis is to examine this continuity legacy in Turkish foreign policy. In another words the study attempts to answer whether there has been a serious continuity, and if there has been continuity what are the reasons behind it.

Secondly, the study focuses on the ideology's, ideas' and domestic politics' impact on Turkish foreign policy, because it assumes that those, who claims continuity in Turkish foreign policy, underestimated ideology's and ideas' role in the policies, or mainly focuses on the other variables of Turkish foreign policy, such as Turkey's location, history, Turkey's economic and political capabilities etc.; George S. Harris,²⁶ Richard

²⁰ Hale, 'Foreign...', p. 94.

²¹ Haluk Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası*, (*The Political Economy of Turkish Foreign Policy*), (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1998).

²² Gerger, *Türk...*, pp. 93-148.

²³ David Kushner, 'Atatürk's Legacy: Westernism in Contemporary Turkey', in Jacob M. Landau (ed.), *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), p. 234.

²⁴ Kushner, 'Atatürk's...', pp. 234-235.

²⁵ These exceptional works will be further detailed below.

²⁶ For Harris Turkey's location, natural-resource deficit and the Turkish straits imposed Turkey certain

D. Robinson²⁷, Oral Sander²⁸ and John Robertson,²⁹ for instance see Turkey's unique location as the main reason for continuity. As a matter of fact that, Turkey's location has always been considered as an important variable of Turkish foreign policy, and this study also accepts its crucial role in making of Turkish foreign policy,³⁰ the listed authors however saw it as the main motive behind the continuity by claiming the geopolitical realities imposed some unchangeable policies to the policy-makers.³¹ Meanwhile, some of the scholars,³² who consider Turkey as a small country, argue that the international events, like the Second World War and the Cold War, with Turkey's location have imposed certain policies to Turkey, which could not be easily changed by the domestic actors, like the political parties, governments, parliament etc. Makovsky and Sayari for instance argue that 'the Cold War imposed a certain amount of order, regularity, and predictability'³³ and the Soviet Union's unfriendly attitude towards Turkey made Westernism as a permanent feature of Turkish foreign policy.³⁴ Finally it is frequently claimed that most of the Turkish policies has rooted in the past, and Turkish policy - makers had little manoeuvre room on many foreign policy issues like Turkish - Russian and Turkish-Greek problematic relations. For instance G. L. Lewis argued that no Turkish politician can restore Turkish - Russian relations, because the problem has not been ideology but history.³⁵ He further literately claims;

policies and Turkey has not been able to change these determinants: George S. Harris, **Turkey, Coping with Crisis**, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1985), pp. 175-176.

²⁷ Richard D. Robinson, **The First Turkish Republic, A Case Study in National Development**, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 164-168.

²⁸ Sander, 'Turkish...', pp. 38-42; Sander, *Türk...*, 111-118.

²⁹ John Robertson, **Turkey and Allied Strategy, 1941-1945**, (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1986), p. xiv.

³⁰ Geographical foundations of Turkish foreign policy with the historical ones are discussed in the **Chapter I** of this thesis. For the role of the geographical factors also see: Vali, **Bridge...**, pp. 43-48; Patricia Carley, 'Turkey's Place in the World', in Henri J. Barkey (ed.), **Reluctant Neighbor, Turkey's Role in the Middle East**, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996); Oral Sander, **Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy)**, (Ankara: İmge, 1998); Sander, 'Türk...', pp. 111-117; Mahmut N. Laçin, **The Importance of the Straits in the Foreign Relations of Turkish Republic**, PhD thesis, University of Southern California, 1948; Harry N. Howard, **Turkey, the Straits and US Policy**, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974).

³¹ For an example see Sander, 'Turkish...', pp. 38-42.

³² Some of them include: Edward Weisband, **Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics**, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds.), **Turkey's New World, Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy**, (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), esp. pp. 1-8 (*Introduction* section); Annette Baker Fox, **The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II**, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1959); Robertson, **Turkey...**

³³ Makovsky and Sayari (eds.), **Turkey's...**, p. 1.

³⁴ Makovsky and Sayari (eds.), **Turkey's...**, p. 1. For a similar view see Aydin, 'Determinants of...', pp. 103-109.

³⁵ G. L. Lewis, **Turkey**, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1955), p. 146.

'Turkey's ancient enemy is Russia, not communism, and so it is likely to remain until some cosmic upheaval alters the configuration of the earth.'³⁶

As mentioned ideology's and domestic factors' role are mostly neglected or underestimated because it is frequently assumed that the main structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy (geography, history, international developments, Turkey's economic and military capabilities etc.)³⁷ left little room to the ideological elements to change the main tenets of Turkish foreign policy. It is also accepted that, thanks to its special location, past and Kemalism's respected position as a state ideology, Turkish foreign policy has been one of the most immune area to non-Kemalist currents and changes, as a result of this, Kemalism has dominated Turkish foreign policy since Atatürk until the present.³⁸ In this framework Lewis saw ideology's role in Turkish foreign policy as 'a secondary importance',³⁹ while Mango vividly claimed ideology and domestic political crisis had little effect on foreign policy, except Kemalism's dominant role.⁴⁰ According to Ferenc A. Vali's *Bridge Across Bosphorus, The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, which is one of the exceptional books that devoted a huge section to ideology's effect of Turkish foreign policy,⁴¹ Mustafa Kemal's ideas have guided Turkish foreign policy without any break, and Kemalism is not only the ideology of the state but 'the state philosophy of the Turkish Republic'.⁴² Vali implies that Kemalist foreign policy has not been challenged and his set of ideas have been adopted by all the Turkish governments:

³⁶ Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 146.

³⁷ For the term of 'structural determinants' see Aydın, 'Determinants of...', p. 133.

³⁸ Rustow, 'Transitions...', p. 247; Vali, *Bridge...*, pp. 54-63; Sander, 'Türk...', pp. 106-111; Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, *Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası (Ataturk and Turkey's Foreign Policy)*, (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1963); A. L. Karaosmanoğlu, 'Turkey's Security and the Middle East', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 62, No. 1, Fall 1983, pp. 157-175; George Harris, *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*, (London: Groom Helm, 1985), pp. 180-203; Mustafa Yılmaz and others, *Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi, (Atatürk and the History of Turkish Republic)*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1998), p. 245, and *Foreign Policy* section, (pp. 244-280).

³⁹ Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 146.

⁴⁰ Mango, 'Reflections...', p. 9.

⁴¹ The works which focused on the ideological elements of Turkish foreign policy include: Eric Rouleau, *Turkey: Beyond Atatürk*, (New York: 1997); Mustafa Aydın, *Foreign Policy Formation and the Interaction Between Domestic and International Environments: A Study of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1980-1991*, PhD thesis, Lancaster University, 1994; Hakan M. Yavuz, 'Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism', *Critique*, Spring 1998, pp. 19-41; Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, 'Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region', in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), *Turkey Between East and West, New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 78-81 (*Ideological Considerations* section); Hale, 'Foreign...'; Çalış, *The Role...*; Saban Çalış, 'The Turkish State's Identity and Decision Making Process', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 6, no.2, Spring 1995; Aykan, *Ideology...*; Gerger, *Türk...*

⁴² Vali, *Bridge...*, p. 54.

‘The fundamental goals of national policy, as determined under Atatürk, have not changed, although they have become better defined and updated to meet the more exacting requirements of the world today.’⁴³

Similarly Richard Robinson argues that ideology’s impact on foreign policy can be ignored and further continues:

‘...Relative immunity to emotion and ideology in setting foreign policy has given Turkish leaders enviable latitude. Public opinion... is not nearly as involved in formulating foreign policy in Turkey, as involved in the United States. Indeed, the very absence of an ideological basis in Turkish society has made it possible for the leadership to shape policies to meet specific situations.’⁴⁴

This study of course does not claim that there is no critique of Kemalism in general⁴⁵ or Kemalist foreign policy in particular. On the contrary, particularly the leftist and socialist authors provide a wide-range of critics of traditional Kemalist foreign policy perspective.⁴⁶ However even the leftist and other critiques of Kemalism do accept that Kemalism has dominated Turkish foreign policy and the other political groups have had little effect on Turkey’s external relations.⁴⁷ Similarly even though the Islamists, another opposition group, have heavily criticised the Kemalist foreign policy understanding even they claim that all republican foreign policies have been Kemalist and no other group could shake the Kemalist hegemony on the foreign policy issues

⁴³ Vali, **Bridge...**, p. 68.

⁴⁴ Robinson, **The First...**, pp. 162-163.

⁴⁵ Criticisms about Kemalism and Kemalist policies mainly focus on the social and economic issue and Kemalism has heavily been criticised by the leftist, Islamist and the liberal authors on these issues. Though it is impossible to list all these studies here because of the scope and the size limitations of this thesis, some of them can be given as an example: Taha Parla, **Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Kaynakları, Atatürk’ün Nutku**, (*The Sources of the Political Culture in Turkey*), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991); Yalçın Küçük, **Türkiye Üzerine Tezler, 1908-1978**, (*The Thesis on Turkey, 1908-1978*), (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1989); Çaglar Keyder, **Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar**, (*The State and the Classes in Turkey*), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989); Mete Tuncay, **Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, 1923-1931**, (*The Establishment of the One-Party Regime in Turkish Republic*), (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1981); Gencay Saylan, ‘Ordu ve Siyaset: Bonapartizmin Siyasal Kültürü’, (*The Army and Politics: The Political Culture of Bonapartism*), in Sadun Aren’e Armagan, (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Yayınları, 1989). For an Islamist critique see Abdurrahman Dilipak, **Bir Baska Açidan Atatürk**, (*Atatürk, From a Different Perspective*), (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1991).

⁴⁶ These works include: Türkkaya Ataöv, **Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye**, (*America, NATO and Turkey*), (Ankara: Aydınlık Yayınevi, 1969); Mehmet Ali Aybar, **Bagimsizlik, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm**, (*Independence, Democracy, Socialism*), (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1968); Dogan Avcioğlu, **Türkiye’nin Düzeni**, (*Turkey’s Order*), (Ankara: Bilgi, 1969); Gerger, **Türk...**; Küçük, **Türkiye...**

⁴⁷ For example Gerger argues that leftist İnönü and Ecevit’s policies cannot be considered as deviation from the traditional foreign policy. He even claims that Özalp’s approach in general is an extension of ‘the traditional capitalist understanding’, not a challenge to the official policies: Gerger, **Türk...**, pp. 24-64, 103-121 and 161-229.

claiming the reason for the 'failure of Turkish foreign policy' is this Kemalist continuity.⁴⁸

Furthermore it must be noted that of course there are some exceptional studies which argue that there have been some serious deviations from the traditional Turkish foreign policy, and ideology with other domestic factors have played an important role in shaping Turkey's foreign relations. Selim Deringil for instance does not see an unbroken ideological continuity in Turkish foreign policy: Deringil considers Kemalism as a part of the Ottoman tradition, and underscores continuity in the Ottoman and republican politics, either domestic or foreign,⁴⁹ yet, by seeing Kemalism as an extension of the Ottoman traditions, Deringil implies that the old competition between the ideological groups continued in the republican years, and though Kemalism dominated the Turkish politics for a long time, Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism and their branches emerged in politics in time, and this naturally reflected on foreign policy area. For example Deringil considers Özalist policies as a deviation from the traditional policies, and says that 'since 1983 Turgut Özal and the Motherland Party increasingly diverged from the traditional non-adventurist line of Turkish foreign policy'.⁵⁰ He further argues that the increasing identity crisis in Turkish foreign policy after the İnönü period have been one of the important determinants.⁵¹ Similar to Deringil, Bülent Gökay shows that there were some other important political groups even in the early period of the 1920s, who represented alternative approaches in Turkish foreign and domestic politics.⁵² Apart from these studies, another scholar, Eric Zürcher provides the background of the close ideological connection between the Ottoman ideological currents and the Kemalist understanding, and he further emphasises the competition between the Kemalist and the other ideological groups in domestic and foreign

⁴⁸ Kadir Misiroglu, *Musul Meselesi ve Irak Türkleri*, (*The Mosul Dispute and the Iraqi Turks*), (İstanbul: Sebil Yayinevi, 1976), p. 145; Kadir Misiroglu, *Lozan, Zafer mi Hezimet mi?*, (*Lausanne: Victory or Crushing Defeat?*), (İstanbul: 1992), esp. *Introduction* section of the book; Dilipak, *Bir Baska...*

⁴⁹ Selim Deringil, 'Turkish Foreign Policy Since Atatürk', in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy, New Prospects*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), p. 1; also see Selim Deringil, 'Aspects and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdulhamid II and İsmet İnönü', *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1987; Selim Deringil, 'Ottoman Origins of Kemalist Nationalism: From Namik Kemal to Mustafa Kemal', *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 23, 1993.

⁵⁰ Deringil, 'Turkish...', p. 5.

⁵¹ Deringil, 'Turkish...', p. 7.

⁵² Bülent Gökay, 'Historiography of the Post-War Turkish Settlement', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Fall 1992, No. 8, pp. 27-48.

policies.⁵³ In addition to the historians, Hakan Yavuz, is one of the exceptional scholars who directly and fully focused on the ideological competition on Turkish foreign policy issues. Yavuz perceived the changes in the Özal era as a clash of Kemalism and neo-Ottomanism and argued that Turkey's new identity produced a new foreign policy understanding which is different from the previous understandings.⁵⁴ Cengiz Çandar, who is one of the representatives of the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy approach, also argue that Özal represented a clear deviation from the Kemalist understanding in domestic and foreign policies, though he is reluctant to accept that there were some more deviations from the traditional policies before Özal.⁵⁵ Despite all these exceptional studies,⁵⁶ still it can be argued that the ideological competition on implementation of Turkish foreign policy has remained relatively an understudied area.

In this framework one of the main aim of this study is to examine whether Kemalist foreign policy has dominated the official Turkish foreign policy since the foundation of the republic without any break, and whether Kemalism can be a foreign policy ideology for such a long time. The thesis, without denying Atatürk's towering role, assumes that no foreign policy ideology can survive for almost eight decades in a changing world without any change or evolution, and it seems impossible to persist in the same policies while the world and society are changing without a pause. Moreover the thesis accepts

⁵³ There is no doubt that Zürcher's studies have been very useful for this thesis, and some of them are heavily used in this study, yet these studies mainly focus on the last days of the Ottoman Empire and the early years of the republican history, rather than modern Turkish foreign policy. Zürcher in his *Turkey, A Modern History* book, in particular pointed out the challenge of the other ideological groups to the Kemalist orthodoxy, yet this book is mainly on the social, political and the economic changes in modern Turkey rather than Turkish foreign policy: Zürcher, *Turkey... For the Ottoman roots of Kemalism and the modern Turkish political ideologies and the competition between the Kemalist groups and the opposition see also the same authors' following studies: Erik J. Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984); Erik J. Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991); Zürcher, Erik Jan, 'Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics, 1908-1938', in Karpas, Kemal H. (ed.), *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 150-173.

⁵⁴ Hakan Yavuz, 'Değişen Türk Kimliği ve Dış Politika: Neo-Osmanlıcılığın Yükselişi', *Liberal Düşünce*, Vol. 4, Winter 1999, pp. 25-38.

⁵⁵ Çandar in Sever, Metin and Cem Dizdar, *2. Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları (Second Republic Debates)*, (Ankara: Başak, 1993), pp. 62-73 and personal interview with Çandar, 20 August 1999, İstanbul, Turkey.

⁵⁶ Also see Nevin Ateş, 'Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası ve Hükümet Programları', *İktisat Dergisi*, No. 537, May-June 1996, pp. 71-86; Sever, *2. Cumhuriyet...*; also partly Mustafa Aydın, 'Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures During the Cold War', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1, January 2000, pp. 103-139. It is certain that in addition to the studies mentioned above there are more exceptional studies, which question the Kemalist continuity in Turkish politics, especially in the sociology and history disciplines. However it is hardly possible to list all these studies in this thesis because of the scope and page limitations. As a result of these limitations the thesis has to focus on the Turkish foreign policy literature.

that ‘a common policy can only be produced on the basis of an ideological consensus’,⁵⁷ and in the light of this assumption it argues that a stable foreign policy or continuity is hardly possible in such a politically instable country and in Turkey’s geographic location which is surrounded by the most volatile and unstable regions, like the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. The differences between Atatürk’s, Menderes’ and Özal’s Middle East policies or differences between İnönü’s, Ecevit’s and Demirel’s Soviet Union policies also causes some doubts about the continuity and the claim of that Turkish foreign policy has been solely a set of Kemal’s ideas. In this context, this thesis primarily will focus upon ideological evolution of Turkish foreign and will try to find the answer of whether there has been an ideological continuity since 1923 to the end of the Özal period.

As mentioned, the second reason to study this subject is the recent debates on Turkish policies in the post Cold War era. Foreign observers who have commented on the recent policies of the Turkish government after the end of the Cold war have raised the point as whether Turkish foreign policy was changing its orientation and its traditional pacific and peacefull policies.⁵⁸ Even some foreign observers perceived these policies as an indication of resurrection of the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁹ In this context this study argues that the international changes and Turkey’s reactions to them in the recent years in particular has increased the necessity to focus on ideology and domestic developments as determinants of Turkish foreign policy, and the thesis also aims to make contribution to understand whether there has been a serious deviation from the previous policies.

In summary the main focus of this thesis is the ideological evolution of Turkish foreign policy and it endeavours to find the answers of whether there has been an uninterrupted ideological continuity in Turkish foreign policy and whether Kemalism has dominated

⁵⁷ Gabriel A. Almond, ‘The Elites and Foreign Policy’, in James Barber and Michael Smith (eds.), **The Nature of Foreign Policy**, (Edinburg: The Open University Press, 1974), p. 245.

⁵⁸ Graham E. Fuller, ‘Turkey’s New Eastern Orientation’, in Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, **Turkey’s New Geopolitics, From the Balkans to Western China**, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1993), pp. 37-97; N. A. Stavrou, ‘The Dismantling of the Balkan Security System: Consequences for Greece, Europe and NATO’, **Mediterranean Quarterly**, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 1995; Yavuz, ‘Turkish...’, pp. 19-41; Sezer, ‘Turkey in...’, pp.72-83; Heath Lowry, ‘Challenges to Turkish Democracy in the Decades of the Nineties’, **Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. V, Fall 1996, pp. 89-111, p. 104.

⁵⁹ Stephanos Constantinides, ‘Turkey: Emergence of a New Foreign Policy the Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model’, **Journal of Political and Military Sociology**, Vol. 24, 1996, pp. 323-334; O. Tunander, ‘A New Ottoman Empire – The Chooice for Turkey-Euro-Asian vs. National Fortress’, **Security Dialogue**, Vol.

Turkish foreign policy without serious challenge. The thesis' main aims are to make humble contribution to understand the reasons behind the great changes in Turkish foreign policy in the republican history, and to the existing literature on ideological and domestic elements' role in Turkish foreign policy.

Limitations

In order to examine the above questions, this study will discuss a relatively long historical period from Atatürk to Özal. Yet, since it is not a chronological history of Turkish foreign policy, it will not detail all the developments in this period but will rather focus on the developments most pertinent to its thesis. As said this study does not claim to explain all events and / or developments during these years.

Another problem lies with the delimitation of the time-frame to the last year of Özal, 1993. Of course evolution of Turkish foreign policy did not stop in 1993. On the contrary, between 1993 and 1999 the debates on identity crisis of Turkish foreign policy reached a peak, and at the present time a suitable ideological framework is still foremost problem for Turkish foreign policy. However, despite the importance of this period, two factors hinder its examination: First, there is not enough source-material to explore the current evolution. Most of the works written on this era are popular books. Moreover, newspaper and magazine articles are not enough for such a research. Unfortunately, with a few exceptions, Turkish political leaders do not write their memoirs and the archives are not open to researchers. Secondly, in the period of 1993-1999 no new school of thought appeared. The competition was between the old schools of thought; Erbakan's Islamism; Demirel's, Yılmaz's and Çiller's Democratic approach; Türkeş's Turkism; Ecevit's and RPP's Kemalism, and Özalist Ottomanism.

Third, this thesis is a case study of foreign policy, more than a study on international relations or foreign policy theories. Hence, it discusses mainly the special circumstances peculiar to Turkish foreign policy, avoiding general theoretical debates; and concentrating instead on the historical and ideological background of Turkish foreign policy.

26, No. 4, 1995, pp. 413-426; Stavrau, 'The Dismantling...'.

A fourth limitation is that, as will be seen, the Republican era has witnessed many different foreign policy currents, with different concepts and theories. For example there are huge differences between Kemalist nationalism (*ulusçuluk*) and Islamist nationalism (*milliyetçilik-ümmetçilik*). There are about seven different ideologies, which the thesis deals with. To give definitions to all the concepts according to each of the ideologies is a formidable task. Hence, the study seeks to provide the meanings of the main concepts in each political school focusing on the transformation of the general concepts in Turkish political life, such as secularism's changing role in Turkish political thought.

Another problem is that of objectivity. Because each of the ideologies claims to be right and the others to be wrong, ideological sources were not very reliable. From Kemalism to socialism each of the currents has blamed the others of being a 'liar' or false. Apart from this general problem, the exploration of ideologies and ideas in Turkey is much more difficult than in many other countries. Because, in the Turkish case Kemalist ideology has no guiding book and orderly laid-down principles, many different groups have claimed to be the real Kemalists. Hence, this study, to clearly distinguish between the ideologies, is exercising caution in the use of ideological sources, such as memoirs and party programs.

Sources

The sources used in this thesis can be separated into five different categories: a) archival studies; b) primary documents, such as memoirs and collections of speeches, texts of agreements etc; c) interviews; d) books and e) periodicals.

Archival Studies: There is no doubt that the most useful archive for a study like this would be those of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, they are not open to researchers and the public. Despite this, I have benefited extensively from the Ministry's publications and leaked archive materials. Particularly useful were the memoirs of the former diplomats who have reached the Ministry documents. Also the Ministry's *Bulletin* was one of the important sources for this thesis, as was *TBMM Kütüphanesi ve Dökümantasyon Merkezi* (The TGNA Library and Documentation Centre) in Ankara. Particularly, parliamentary debates were very helpful in examining

domestic debates on foreign policy issues. Also the TGNA's publications, like *Tutanak Dergisi* (The Journal of Proceedings) are among the primary sources of this study. Another archive used was *Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri* (Archives of Turkish Prime Ministry). For the Ottoman period the Istanbul branch of this archive was used while its Ankara branch helped with the Republican period.

Other Primary Documents (Speeches, Memoirs, and Agreements): Certainly for this kind of study the memoirs and speeches of key figures, like Atatürk and İnönü, are highly important. Many of these documents can be found at the Atatürk Library and the İnönü Foundation in Ankara. Also Turkish National Library's Ankara and İzmir branches have good collections on this subject, as does the Middle East Technical University's Atatürk Library. Özal's speeches were found in Turkish newspaper archives, like *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Zaman*, and interviews. On the other hand, because most Turkish diplomats wrote their memoirs it was easy to trace their ideas and observations on foreign policy. The most useful publications to find the official agreements are the TGNA's publications. Moreover some ideological books and articles can also be considered as primary source because they set the main principles of a political current. In this context I made efforts to reach the primary books and journals of the ideological groups, like *Yön*, *Akis* and *Forum* collections.

Interviews: These were used particularly for the Özal period because there is no sufficient study of the Özal period and the archives are still closed.

Books: The books used in this study have been written mainly by Turkish, British and American authors. These were mainly found in the Turkish National Library (Ankara and İzmir), Ankara University SBF Library, METU and Bilkent libraries (Ankara), Marmara Documentation Centre and Library (Istanbul) in Turkey; and King's College London Library, Library of School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Library, RUSI Library, British Library and the Library of Senate House of London University in Britain.

Articles: Newspaper and journal articles are among the most important sources for this study because the newspaper collections clearly show the evolution in Turkish foreign policy. Many articles can qualify as primary source since the newspapers and some

magazines have been the base of the ideologies and political currents, like *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Zaman*, *Akis*, *Forum* and *Yön*. Particularly *Milliyet* collections (Ankara and Istanbul), *Cumhuriyet* collections (Istanbul) and *Zaman* collection (Ankara) provided most useful articles. To reach the older papers I benefited from the Turkish National Library (Ankara), Ankara Adnan Ötüken Provincial Library, Ankara University SBF Library, Istanbul Beyazıd Library and some private collections. For the British and American newspaper collections I used the British Library and London University libraries and American Culture Library, Ankara. In addition, I also benefited from the internet pages of Turkish and British newspapers.

Structure and Plan

Mainly, an historical – analytical approach has been used throughout this thesis. As noted above, it had to describe ideological-historical background and the practices in order to place the changes in Turkish foreign policy in their wider context. Therefore each chapter discusses the historical and ideological sources before focusing on the course and changes in policy.

Apart from **Introduction** and **Conclusion**, the study is divided into ten chapters. The thesis begins with the geographical and historical background of Turkish foreign policy. After discussing the geographical determinants, **Chapter I** argues that the Ottoman years are crucial in exploring modern Turkey's foreign policy because modern schools of thought are rooted in the Ottoman period. Almost all schools, like Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkism were established by the Ottomans and they can be regarded as the preludes of the modern successors. Moreover, Kemalism is also rooted in the Ottoman past. Particularly the Young Turks and their secular Westernism and nationalism provided an ideological ground for Kemalism. Furthermore, the Ottoman tradition continued to affect the Republican era, and since the 1950s the old Ottoman currents have reappeared under different names.

Five chapters (II, III, IV, V, VI) are devoted to the Atatürk and the İnönü periods, because Kemalism is considered to be the most influential school of the republican era. It can be said that none of the republican decades can be understood without referring to

Atatürk. In this context, this study also aims at providing the ideological and historical background to Kemalism. It also attempts to find the answer to whether there is a Kemalist foreign policy, or if it is just a fiction. In this framework, **Chapter II** provides the impact of the War of Independence on Kemalism, and the republican foreign policy understanding. It particularly focuses on the Sevres and Lausanne Agreements. **Chapter III** deals with the rise of Kemalism as the regime of the new Turkey. The internal reforms are also discussed from the foreign policy perspective. **Chapter IV** looks at the ideological background of Kemalist foreign policy and explores its foreign policy principles and aims, notably Westernism, nationalism and scepticism, before discussing the methodological principles of this policy. Having provided the historical and ideological backgrounds, the study applies the Kemalist understanding to its implementation. In this context, **Chapter V** looks at the Kemalist policies carried out by Atatürk himself. With **Chapter VI**, the thesis moves to the post-Atatürk era, and first of all, looks at the İnönü years. Although İnönü is generally considered as one of the leading Kemalists, **Chapter VI** takes issue with this opinion and claims that in the İnönü years the Kemalist policies were transformed and became more isolationist. **Chapter VI** further argues that while Atatürk was a pragmatic leader and avoided from institutionalising his principles, in the İnönü era the Kemalist class created a new kind of Kemalism, which was more sceptical and isolationist.

Chapter VII, VIII, IX and Chapter X are devoted to the Cold War and the Özal years (1950-1993). In this period of the republican history, Kemalism faced serious challenges from the right, left and Islamism. Particularly the right-wing democrats posed the greatest challenge to Kemalism and became a serious alternative in foreign policy. **Chapter VII** focuses on the Menderes years and claims that the Menderes government followed a very different foreign policy from Atatürk and İnönü. In his policies two factors were vital, namely the Cold War as the ideology of Turkish foreign policy and Menderes' liberal-conservative worldview. Therefore the chapter tries to trace the connection between the Democratic policies and these two sources of the ideology, concentrating on Menderes' Middle Eastern and US policies to prove the change in foreign policy.

Chapter VIII looks at the post – Democratic Party years, namely the 1960s. In this decade Turkish foreign policy confronted enormous challenges and dramatic ideological

changes were witnessed, particularly in the Kemalist and leftist schools. Kemalism became leftist - Kemalism and Kemalist foreign policy orientation was radically transformed by the new elements. Similarly the neo - Democrats (Justice Party and the others) made efforts to find a new way in foreign policy, and Demirel suggested a multi-dimensional foreign policy orientation. **Chapter VIII** explores all these changes and examines the role of these ideas in Turkish foreign policy.

Chapter IX focuses on the 1970s and the dramatic changes in Turkish foreign policy of that era. Particularly Ecevit's foreign policy shows a clear deviation from Atatürk's pragmatism and Westernism. **Chapter IX** looks at the reasons behind Ecevit's ideology-oriented Third Worldist foreign policy approach, and also deals with the return of the old Ottoman schools of Ottomanism and Islamism. The study also explores the Cyprus Crisis and the anti-Turkish Western policies because of their effects on Turkish foreign policy making. Also Turkey's policies toward the West in these years shows the certain deviation from the tradition.

Finally, **Chapter X** looks at the Özal years. There is no doubt that Özalism is a turning-point for Turkish foreign policy because with Özal's neo-Ottomanism the challenge against Kemalism became more clear than ever. The chapter looks at the preludes of Özalism and the ideological foundations of its foreign policy orientation.

CHAPTER I

Geographical and Historical Foundations of Turkish Foreign Policy and the Ottoman Legacy

‘If the English entered Egypt, they did so to pre-empt the French who had occupied Tunisia. England did not have to do so; yet it granted new freedoms to our Egyptian Muslim brothers. There is abundant evidence that England is a friend of Turkey and the Muslims... Under these circumstances, the best thing to do is to invite the English to Anatolia and re-organise our country according to English recommendations. We have no alternative but this. As they reformed Egypt, they can improve our country as well.’¹

Jöntürk Hoca Mehmet Kadri Nash’s solution to the decline of the Empire

‘We were such an ignorant people. We saw the English as a protector and defender of freedoms. For us, the English give the nations their independence, freedom and oppress and annihilate the cruel dictators, like the Hamid.’²

Rıza Nur

Geography and History

As noted by Carley, few countries occupy Turkey’s exceptional position,³ it is between the three most volatile regions of the world: the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. It also bridges two continents, Europe and Asia, and three seas the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Aegean. Moreover, Anatolia and Thrace, which have been the heart of the Turkish states throughout history, have been the centre of the greatest civilisations, including the ancient Greek civilisation, the Roman, Hittite, Urartu, Byzantine and Ottoman. Similarly, the neighbouring regions are also the inheritors of the greatest civilisations, notably Egyptian, Persian and Mesopotamian. Furthermore, the region where Turkey is located is home to all three monotheistic religions, namely Judaism Christianity and Islam. These civilisations and religions have inevitably left their marks on how people look, think and define their feelings about the past and future.⁴ When the Turks came to the region from the Central Asia, unlike the Mongols, they did not destroy or reject the existing cultures, but blended them with their own, which was already a mixture of Turkish, Islamic, Persian, Chinese and Indian cultures. Turks were Muslim, but not Arab or Middle Eastern. Their language, race,

¹ Mehmet Kadri Nash, *Serayih*, (Paris: 1912), cited in Ali Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İhtilaf Fırkası*, (Istanbul: 1990), p. 59.

² Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım (My Life and Memoirs)*, (Istanbul: Altındağ Yayınevi, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 100.

³ Patricia Carley, ‘Turkey’s Place in the World’, in Henri J. Barkey (ed.), *Reluctant Neighbor, Turkey’s Role in the Middle East*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 3.

historical-cultural background were completely different. Although they mixed with the Greeks and other Balkan and Caucasian ethnic groups they were not Christian. In other words, Turkey is at a religious and cultural crossroads, blending Christian, Muslim and Jewish populations at the border of the Judeo-Christian West and the Muslim East.⁵ As a result of these, Turkey's location and past have left it with something like an identity crisis, or at least an identity dilemma, which continues to mark not only its national character but also how it views itself and its place in the world.⁶ This disadvantage (or advantage) has determined the Ottoman and modern Turkey's foreign policies, although their ideologies and aims have been almost diametrically opposed.

Secondly, Turkey's topography and location have generated some unalterable foreign policy behavioural patterns. Though Anatolia has natural boundaries and a fortress-like interior - it is surrounded by the Black, Aegean and Mediterranean Seas and by high mountains - it has some vulnerabilities. Located on several international highways, a state based on Anatolia and Eastern Thrace was seen as incapable of defending itself without friends on the European and Asian sides or without control of the main entrances to these territories, namely the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, the neighbouring islands (such as Cyprus and the Aegean) and the Straits. Therefore, when the Ottomans aimed to establish a powerful state, as Byzantium had done before, they first tried to unite the Anatolian and Thrace territories and to control the Straits. The next step in maintaining the Empire's security was to control the islands surrounding Anatolia and to create barriers between the Empire and the neighbouring powers like Persia, Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The Straits figured prominently in Turkey's security and foreign policy.⁷ Thanks to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, Turkey can control the naval traffic between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as they constitute the only outlet for many Black Sea countries, like Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldavia. This is also the most vital seaway for Russia's economy and security. However, these advantages have triggered many foreign attacks on Turkish territories. For Russia, for example, control of the Straits came to mean more than a secure outlet to the Mediterranean and a

⁴ Yüksel Söylemez, 'Turkey: Western or Muslim?', *Turkish Review*, Autumn 1992, pp. 45-46, p. 46.

⁵ Arthur Cyr, 'Turkey and the West', *Perceptions*, September-November 1996, pp. 108-119, p. 109.

⁶ Cyr, 'Turkey...', p. 109.

forward defensive position against an attack along its southern flank. By controlling the Straits and the commercial centre of Istanbul, Russia would enhance its prestige and secure the geopolitical domination of the Middle East.⁸ Hence, it is arguable that a state in Anatolia and Thrace must control the passes from these straits, lest otherwise its security be in danger by losing the most strategic lands in the region.

The Aegean islands have a similar role in Turkey's security. They not only control the sea routes between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean but also provide excellent bases for an attack on the Anatolian mainland. Therefore, it can be argued that an Anatolian power has to control these islands or at least ensure that they be disarmed and friendly towards Turkey.

Indeed, past experience has proved that the loss of control of any of these regions and seas is detrimental for a state located in Asia Minor. As a result, location determined the friends and enemies of the people inhabiting these territories. Geography, together with history has thus given Turkey permanent problems and rivals. For example, the Turks always have kept one eye on their northern neighbour. The Ottoman Empire and Russia, from the 16th century to the end of the Ottoman Empire, engaged in 29 great wars over the region.⁹ This rivalry continued after the Second World War, when Stalin demanded some Turkish territories; indeed the Soviet threat lasted until the end of the Cold War. In another word, with history, 'geography has predisposed Russia and Turkey to a history of conflict. Their cooperation was never free from suspicion.'¹⁰

Likewise, the rivalry between the Greeks and the Turks is also a direct result of geography and history. As witnessed throughout their history, when one side was weaker, the stronger one attempted to dominate the other. For instance during the last years of the Byzantine Empire, the Turks expanded at the declining Empire's expense. In the same way, Greece grew four-fold by taking over Turkish territory, and finally

⁷ Vali, *Bridge...*, pp. 44-45.

⁸ Harry N. Howard, 'The Straits After World War II: Problems and Prospects', *Balkan Studies*, 11, No. 1, 1970, 38 and David Alvarez, *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1943-1946*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies-190, 1980), p. 32.

⁹ Alvarez, p. 34; Sander, *Türkiye'nin...*, p. 130

¹⁰ Bülent Gökay and Richard Langhorne, *Turkey and the New States of the Caucasus and Central Asia*, (London: HMSO, Wilton Park, 1996), p. 24.

occupying Western Anatolia in order to create its new Byzantium Empire ideal.¹¹ Similar to the Russian case, the antagonism and scepticism between these two nations, still continue. Even now many Greeks fear a possible Turkish occupation, and for Greek nationalism Anatolia still is the home of the great Greek civilisation and they hope will become a part of Greece some day. As a result, the Turkish-Greek rivalry is still one of the most important determinants of these countries' foreign policies.

Turkey's relations with other neighbours are also shadowed or determined by territorial needs and a common past. For example, Arabs largely hold the Turks responsible for their economic, military and political backwardness.¹² As Graham Fuller put it, the Arab sense of 'victimisation' in history played a crucial role in Turkish-Arab relations and created structural problems in the relationship¹³. Despite these negative examples, the common past also produced natural friends, like the Albanians, Bosnians, Azerbaijanis and so on.

In short, 'foreign policy does not spring spontaneously from the minds of decision makers. Rather, it is a product of the past experiences of a nation and the specific political beliefs and ideologies that have come to be accepted over the years.'¹⁴ Turkey is no exception. Despite all the Kemalist efforts, the Ottoman years deeply affected the Republican foreign policy understandings. These years even can be considered as the prelude to Kemalist ideology. In the words of Kazancigil 'Kemalism built on the reform movements which started at the beginning of the 19th century'.¹⁵ In this framework, the next section traces the Ottoman years and the impact of the Ottoman experience in shaping the Kemalist approach.

¹¹ Şükrü Sina Gürel, 'Turkey and Greece: Difficult Aegean Relationship', in C. Balkır and A. M. Williams (eds.), *Turkey and Europe*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1996), pp. 161-188, p. 161.

¹² Norman Itzkowitz, 'The Problem of Perceptions', in L. Carl Brown (ed.), *Imperial Legacy, The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 35.

¹³ Graham E. Fuller, 'Turkey's New Eastern Orientation' in G. E. Fuller and I. O. Lesser, *Turkey's New Geopolitics, From the Balkans to Western China*, p. 49.

¹⁴ Lloyd Jensen, *Explaining Foreign Policy*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p.71.

¹⁵ Ali Kazancigil, 'The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism', in Ali Kazancigil and Ergün Özbudun (eds.), *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1997), p. 37. For another useful analysis of the connection between Kemalism and the Ottoman reform currents see: Erik Jan Zürcher, 'Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics, 1908-1938', in Kemal H.

The Ottoman Legacy

Ideological and Practical Foundations of the Empire

The Ottoman Empire was one of the greatest powers in history. When it was established in 1299, nobody could guess that it would defeat the Byzantine Empire and conquer almost a third of the European continent. The Ottomans, for centuries, dominated the Mediterranean and the Black Sea rims. When compared with their European and Asian counterparts, the Ottoman armies were better organised, the imperial political and economic systems were more centralised and relatively stronger. The main reason of this success was its unique combination of economic, social, political and military elements.

Islam as the Legitimising Ideology: First of all, the Ottoman Empire was a leader of the Islamic world. Having taken the caliphate during Selim's reign, there was no rival for the leadership of the Islamic world. This provided an ideological framework for Ottoman foreign relations, whereby the non-Muslim territories were *dar-ul-harb*, land of war, while the Muslim territories were *dar-ul-Islam*, land of peace. As Robins pointed out:

'The Ottoman Empire was not typical of the European Empires of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, whose underlying characteristic was that of a distinct people of the metropolitan core, motivated by a nationalist ideology, seeking the subjugation of peoples in a geographical periphery.... The Ottoman Empire, by contrast, was not a Turkish Empire in which the ideological motivation was Turkish nationalism. In many respects rural Anatolia was as much a domain of the empire as parts of the Balkans or the Middle East. The chief motivating ideology of the empire was Islam, especially as the profile of the empire in Christian Europe receded... The Ottoman elite was an evolving one based on a culture of empire, rather than on a narrow and exclusive notion of ethnicity or race.'¹⁶

The Ottoman-Islamic Synthesis: While Islam determined the ideology of the state,¹⁷ Ottoman political social structure was a blend of Iranian, Byzantium, Arab and the Turkish traditions. The members of the ruling class were 'the slaves' of the sultan/caliph whose position was unassailable. The *devşirme* (collection) was the prime source of administrative and military recruits. According to this system, children, mainly Christians, were taken by the Ottomans, converted to Islam and educated as

Karpat (ed.), *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 150-173.

¹⁶ Robins, *Turkey...*, pp. 17-18

¹⁷ For Islam's role in the Ottoman state system and society see: Norman Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and*

member of the ruling class.¹⁸ *Devşirme* provided probably the most loyal bureaucrats for the Ottoman state.

The Millet System: The third secret of Ottoman power was the *millet* system.¹⁹ Religious tolerance both practical and a legal necessity.²⁰ According to this system, each main religious group (or *millet*) enjoyed generous autonomy in many fields, including education, welfare, and the personal law of its members. The *millet* leaders represented the interests of their people at the palace. Over time, more religious sects were officially recognised as separate *millets*, such as the Greek Catholics and Bulgarian Orthodox. That is to say, contrary to the European experience there was no Ottoman national identity shared by all the *millets*. Diversity was the hidden power of the Ottoman Empire, however as will be discussed this power would turn a weakness in the 19th century.²¹

Military's State, State's Military: Another characteristic feature of the Ottoman Empire was the role of the military in the state structure. In the words of Hale 'no distinction was drawn between the civilian and military arms of the state, since both functions were frequently combined in the duties of a single individual.'²² Conquests in terms of economy were important sources for the Empire which owed its dominance to its 'invincible' armies. The military was 'the God's army' spreading 'the true religion', Islam. Therefore the army and the security apparatus had privileges over the civilian institutions. In the words of the historian Lybyer, 'The Ottoman government had been an army before it was anything else'.²³ That is to say the most powerful institution in the Ottoman State was the army. Even, during the era of decline the army had power to change the sultans. As a result, the army saw itself as the protector of the state.

Islamic Tradition, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972).

¹⁸ Justin McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks, An Introduction History to 1923*, (London: Longman, 1997), p.55.

¹⁹ For a survey of the millet system see: Looty Levonian, 'The Millet System in the Middle East', *The Muslim World*, April 1952; B. Brade and B. Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Helmes and Meier, 1982).

²⁰ McCarthy, *The Ottoman...*, p.55.

²¹ For the role of the nations in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire see Clement H. Dodd, *Nations in the Ottoman Empire: A Case Study in Devolution*, Hull Papers in Politics, University of Hull, No. 18, April 1980

²² Hale, *Turkish...*, p.2.

²³ Cited in Hale, *Turkish...*, p.2.

‘Father State’ Understanding: The Ottoman State machine had a ‘holy aim’: *cihat*, to spread the ‘true religion.’ The source of the power of the state and the executives was not the people but the religion. According to Islam, so long as the sultan is fair and Muslim, the people cannot oppose his acts but have rather to obey the *emirul-muminin*, who in turn looks after the people in the name of God. The second reason for the emergence of the ‘father state’ understanding was the circumstances in which the Ottoman Empire was established. After the disintegration of the Selcuk Empire, the Turkish tribes suffered from lack of unity. Therefore, as successors to the Selcuks, the Ottomans viewed the unity of the state as the most important issue; otherwise, intensive strife between the tribes and the sects would be inevitable. As a result, despite the autonomy of the main religions, the Ottoman subjects were not able to join the political process. They were free as long as they did not threaten the unity of the state. There was only one way for ordinary people to participate political life: to become a *kul* (literally, servant) of the Sultan, in other words to become a bureaucrat. Therefore the bureaucrats identified themselves with the state. After the modernisation of the Ottoman bureaucracy, the bureaucrats, like the army, came to see themselves as the protectors of the state, its unity and ideology.

External Factors: In addition to these internal factors the international balance of power favoured the Ottoman Empire. First the Ottomans controlled the international trade routes during the centuries. Thus, together with military conquests, international trade was one of the main economic sources of the Empire. Also, during the classical era, the Ottomans had no serious rivals, as Russia and many other European countries were still principalities. The Black Sea was an Ottoman lake, and the Mediterranean was under its control. This provided relative security and immunity. Therefore, for a long time, the Ottoman Sultans did not recognise their European counterparts as heads of state and did not send permanent ambassadors to the European countries until the 18th century.

Decline and Idea of Reform²⁴

In the 18th and 19th centuries this picture dramatically changed. International trade had shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. The Western powers were sharing the entire world among themselves, while the Ottomans were trying to hold onto their existing territories. In addition, the economic and cultural transformation of European society created a gap between the Ottomans and the Western powers. This resulted in great technological advancements in Europe, which in turn changed the international political balance. Some historians, like Arnold Toynbee, consider the Russian-Turkish Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) as the beginning of Ottoman decline.²⁵ Others put it a century earlier at the Russian-Ottoman Treaty of Carlowitz (1699). The truth, however, is that it is virtually impossible to determine the exact date of the beginning of the decline of Ottoman power, because even after the disastrous wars against the western coalitions the Ottoman Empire remained a formidable power in south-eastern Europe, the Black Sea, the Middle East and North Africa.²⁶ However, the rise of the Western powers was palpable and the Ottoman Empire could hardly resist them. Moreover, the emergence of Russia as the main power in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus caused a major shift in the balance of power against the Ottomans. Yet the most deadly stroke for the Ottomans was the emergence of nationalism. It can be argued the French Revolution constituted one of the starting dates of the Ottoman decline.²⁷ In a nation-states-age, almost all the advantages the Ottomans had, such as the *millets*, *devsirme* or the unique Ottoman bureaucratic systems became a liability. As a result, the Ottoman governments could not halt the disintegration of the empire.²⁸ The Ottoman government was in fact

²⁴ For the decline process in the Ottoman Empire see D. C. Blaisdell, **European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire**, (New York: 1929); Halil, Inalcik, 'The Heyday and Decline of the Ottoman Empire', in P. M. Holt and others (eds.), **The Cambridge History of Islam**, I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 324-353; C. Issawi, **The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914**, (London and Chicago: 1980); V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds.), **War, Technology and Society in the Middle East**, (London: 1975);

²⁵ Also the British historian Anderson starts its book with Küçük Kaynarca Treaty: Mathew S. Anderson, **The Eastern Question 1774-1923, A Study in International Relations**, (London: Macmillan, 1972).

²⁶ Vali, **Bridge...**, pp. 7-8.

²⁷ The French Revolution was not only one of the greatest forces of disintegration but also as will be seen in the next sections a strong inspiration source for the Ottoman reformists who would affect Kemalism. For the details of the effects of the revolution in the Ottoman Empire see: Bernard Lewis, 'Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey', **Journal of World History**, July 1953; Halil Inalcik, 'Tanzimat ve Türkiye', (*Tanzimat and Turkey*), **Tarih Vesikaları**, II, 8 August 1942.

²⁸ For a general discussion of the disintegration process and the role of the Christian minorities and the Western powers in the decline see: Mathew Anderson, **The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations**, (London: 1972).

aware of all these changes.²⁹ They knew that the Empire had to change, but did not know 'how'. Of course, some military reforms were made during the Selim III reign, but these were not comprehensive social, political and economic reforms. The first efforts to restore Ottoman power were superficial and based on the copying of Western institutions and the importation of Western technology, notably military technology. In a short time, it was understood that the problem was structural and that Ottoman economic and political systems were need to be restructured.

Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism

To stop the decline, three main political approaches were articulated during the 19th century: **Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism**. They would deeply affect and shape the Republican era. There were of course other political groups, and the debates were multifaceted. Socialism, for instance, appeared as an alternative approach in the late 19th century yet it was relatively weak despite its influence among the Christian and the Jewish minorities.³⁰ However, this categorisation helps us to understand the roots of Republican external and internal politics. As will be shown later, these movements formed three different schools of thought in foreign policy. Indeed, foreign policy issues became at times more distinctive features of these groups than internal matters. While almost all political groups saw westernisation and modernisation as an instrument to halt the collapse, their perceptions of modernisation and methodologies were different. The Turkish intelligentsia was torn between Ottomanist liberalism, Turkish nationalism and Islamism, and the Kemalist turning point was a result of this dilemma.

New Bureaucrats and the Emergence of Westernist, Secular Nationalists

As a traditional empire the most urgent problem for the Ottoman Empire in implementing the reforms was the question of manpower. Almost all of the bureaucrats had been trained in the old system, and most of them had no idea about the reforms needed to turn the Empire into a modern state. The number of people with adequate

²⁹ Kemal Melek, *Doğu Sorunu ve Milli Mücadele'nin Dış Politikası*, (*The Eastern Question and Foreign Policy of the National Struggle*), (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayını, 1978), p. 7.

³⁰ See Mete Tunçay and Erik J. Zürcher (eds.), *Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1923*, (London: British Academic Press, 1994); Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar, 1908-1925* (*The Left Currents in Turkey*); A. Sayılğan, 'Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar, 1908-1925', (*The Left Currents in Turkey*), in P. Dumont and G. Haupt (eds.), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyalist Hareketler*, (*The Socialist Currents in the Ottoman Empire*), (İstanbul: 1977).

knowledge of new military and political techniques could be counted in hundreds, even as late as 1850.³¹ The Foreign Ministry played a vital role in solving this problem.

As noted earlier, the Ottomans had not send permanent ambassadors to the European countries which they had considered inferior. When diplomacy became one of the main tools of the Ottoman westernisation effort, they needed a comprehensive diplomatic core and a foreign ministry. The first permanent ambassador was sent to London in 1793, during Selim III's reign,³² though no further diplomatic appointments were made until the 1830s. After the Greek revolution made Greek interpreters unreliable for the Ottoman State, a new office, *Bab-i Ali Tercüme Odası* (Translation Room) was established. This was not just a Foreign Ministry department, but also a school for statesmen and diplomats. Those, who worked there were able to follow European developments and could easily see the weakness of their own Empire. In the words of McCarthy: 'language became a door opening onto European culture for Ottoman bureaucrats and high officials, and graduates of the Translation Office soon became the leading executives of the state.'³³ Thus the importance of the Translation Room dramatically increased, and in the following years the Foreign Ministry became one of the sources of the Ottoman reforms. In addition to its nominal duties it handled a number of matters that would have normally been left to other ministries, including internal reform legislation, the status and regulation of foreign subjects and non-Muslims in the Empire, and foreign commercial as well as political relations.³⁴ Especially during the *Tanzimat*, Reform Era (1839-1876), the power of the Foreign Ministry peaked. The main reason for this was the diplomatic balance in the European political system after the rise of the Russian power. The Russians were driving the Ottomans out of the northern and western coasts of the Black Sea both by encouraging the Orthodox minorities in the Balkans and by defeating the Ottoman armies. This in turn brought the Ottomans the support of Britain, anxious for its Indian possession. Both British leaders Palmerston and Disraeli committed Britain to a policy of containing Russia. In this strategy the survival of the Ottoman Empire had a vital role. Thus Britain did not threaten to take large stretches of the Turkish territory as did Russia, Austria and

³¹ Zürcher, *Turkey...*, p. 47.

³² Carter V. Findley, (Trans. Latif Boyacı, İzzet Akyol), *Osmanlı Devletinde Bürokratik Reform, Babiali (1789-1922) (The Bureaucratic Reforms in the Ottoman State)*, (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1994), p. 108-109.

³³ McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks*, (New York: Longman, 1997), p. 295.

even France³⁵ and gave conditional support to the Ottomans by pursuing the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire³⁶ as an important part of their strategy. Moreover, the European powers' interests were incompatible and the appearance of German and even Italian interest in the area by the end of the century made any partition impossible.³⁷

In addition to this political support, it can be argued that the British believed that the only way to save the Ottoman Empire against the Russians was its modernisation because with its traditional structure the Empire could not defend itself against the Russian attacks,³⁸ and as a result the Ottoman weakness might collapse the British Russia policy. Under these circumstances, the new Ottoman bureaucrats were seen as the only people capable of achieving this goal. As will be seen, these people were very vulnerable vis-à-vis the Palace since they did not enjoy public support, and hence warmly welcomed the British support for their policies. In time the French and the Russians also established very close relations with the Ottoman bureaucracy.

This is not to say that the bureaucrats were acting as foreign agents. On the contrary, they were patriots who sincerely believed that the only way to save the Empire was to get the Western powers' support in the Empire's modernisation. However, their occasional misperception of international relations tended to badly affect their ideas. The well-known Jöntürk Hoca Mehmet Kadri Nash's ideas about the British occupation of Egypt offered an excellent example of this:

'If the English entered Egypt, they did so to pre-empt the French who had occupied Tunisia. England did not have to do so, yet it granted new freedoms to our Egyptian Muslim brothers. There is abundant evidence that England is a friend of Turkey and the Muslims... Under these circumstances, the best thing to do is to invite the English to Anatolia to re-organise our country according to English recommendations. We have no alternative but this. As they reformed Egypt, they can improve our country as well.'³⁹

³⁴ Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 72.

³⁵ C. D. Clayton, *Britain and the Eastern Question*, (London: University of London Press, 1971), p. 15-16 and 35.

³⁶ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, 'Turco - British Relations since the 1920s', in William Hale and Ali İhsan Bağış (eds.), *Four Centuries of Turco - British Relations*, (Beverley, North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1984), p. 80.

³⁷ For the Europeans the future of the Ottoman problem was 'Eastern question' and thanks to the divergence among the great European powers, the problem remained unsolved until the end of the Ottoman Empire, 1923. For the Eastern question in addition to Anderson, *The Eastern...* also see John A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1917);

³⁸ In the words of Clayton, 'the Britain became pro-Turk in order to be anti-Russian': Clayton, *Britain...*, p. 36.

³⁹ Mehmet Kadri Nash, *Serayih*, (Paris: 1912), cited in Birinci, *Hürriyet...*, p. 59. Also for this perspective: Ali Birinci, 'Türk Siyasi Düşüncesinde İngilizperestlik', (*English-Admirers in Turkish*

The bureaucrats were also mainly inspired by secular ideas more than religious ones. They were also westernised themselves and thus did not have the support of the Ottoman public. Besides, since they defended the European political and social systems they could not get the support of the Palace, which needed their skills but was opposed to their political ideas. So, they had to create coalitions to protect themselves and to constantly preserve the balance between the political actors. A unique symbiosis thus evolved between the bureaucrats and the Europeans, with each party manipulating the other. In the end, the Europeans turned out to be right, progressively weakening Ottoman power and increasing their dominance over the Empire. The rivalry among the Western powers and Russia thus saved the Ottoman political entity, but not its military or economic power. As will be seen later, Europe's attitude towards the reforms was one of the main handicaps of Ottoman reformers, which resulted in the evolution of Ottoman political ideologies. In this environment, the role of Ottoman diplomats and the Foreign Ministry was vital. They were the only ones who knew Western methods, languages, and ways of life. Also, the Foreign Ministry handled all foreign loans, so critical for boosting the ailing Ottoman economy and finances.⁴⁰ Finally, many bureaucrats, ministers and Grand Viziers were educated in this office,⁴¹ such as Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800-1858), Ali Pasha (1815-1871) and Fuat Pasha (1815-1869) and these people increased the Ministry's power vis-à-vis other ministries.⁴²

The new bureaucracy's perception of Ottomanism was highly pragmatic. That is why it was dramatically transformed in a very short period. The main trend was westernisation as the new bureaucrats copied the western way of life in education, military, industry, transportation and so on. However they still hoped to be able to prevent the Empire's collapse without cultural westernisation. Some of them, like Namik Kemal were

Thought), *Yeni Türkiye*, 3, March-April 1995, 1, 3, p.558-564.

⁴⁰ This financial relations resulted in the bankruptcy of the Empire in 1879, and following the bankruptcy, the creditors succeeded in reorganising the country's finances and some of the Ottoman revenue-producing areas of the economy through the medium of the Ottoman Public Debt, set up in 1881. (Kent, *The Great...*, p. 2).

⁴¹ Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor, The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), p. 3.

⁴² The relations with some of the ministries were among the tasks of the Foreign Ministry. Even translation of the books and articles in the European languages was its duty during the first years. As a direct result of these translations, the Foreign Ministry became a school for many Ottoman novelists, journalists and poets.

defending Islamist ideas in practice.⁴³ They were no doubt modernists but also eastern and Ottoman, believing in Ottoman ability to modernise and westernise while retaining their identity and culture. As the 19th century came to an end, and Ottoman decline gained momentum, the reformists were divided into three main schools: those who identified themselves with religious and other local concepts; seculars, purely Westernist Ottomanists (then Turkists); and those who sought a synthesis of western technology and science with Islamic and Ottoman values. During the Hamidian era, in particular, this division became deeper.

Abdülhamid II and ‘Pan-Islamist Foreign Policy’

For the traditionalists, Islam was the best prescription to slow down Ottoman decline. In this view, the Empire was collapsing because of its deviance from Islamic policies. Yet while the traditional Islamists totally refuted Western ideas, many reformist and modernist Islamists/Ottomanists viewed Islam as a cultural value and a legitimising ideology for the unity of the Empire.⁴⁴ Their Islamism was pragmatic and inspired by local problems more than universal issues, and it is difficult to be certain whether they used Islam to realise their Ottomanist ideas or were sincere about the Islamic aims. As Jacob Landau put it, Pan-Islamism was a response to the clash between the new and the old, and the foreign attacks.⁴⁵

Abdulhamid’s reign was a turning point for Islamist policies and this dramatically affected the Ottoman foreign policy. The Hamidian era also included many important changes in comparison with previous eras.⁴⁶ The first change was institutional, notably a dramatic decline in the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Hariciye Nezareti*) and its substitution by the Sultan and his advisers who became the main pillar of Ottoman foreign policy. The reason behind this was the Sultan’s distrust towards the

⁴³ Mümtaz’er Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, (*The Emerge of the Islamism as a Political Idea*) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991); İsmail Kara, *İslamcılarının Siyasi Görüşleri*, (*The Political Ideas of the Islamists*), (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1994).

⁴⁴ For example Namık Kemal, in his *‘İttihad-ı İslam’* (Islamic Unity) argued that only a union of all the Muslims, led by the Ottomans, could save the Empire. Also see Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, (Princeton, NJ: 1962), p.60 and Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam, Ideology and Organization*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p.3;

⁴⁵ Landau, *The Politics...*, p.9.

⁴⁶ M. Sükrü Hanioglu, ‘Jön Türkler ve Osmanlı’da İç - Dış Politika Bağlantısı’ (*Jon Turks and the Connection Between the Foreign and Domestic Politics in the Ottomans*), in Faruk Sönmezoglu (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (*The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy*), (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994), pp. 333-355, p. 333. Rıfka Salim Burçak, *Türk - İngiliz Münasebetleri, 1791-1941*, (*Turkish -*

bureaucracy. Secondly, there was a theoretical and ideological shift in Ottoman foreign policy. During the Hamidian era, state policies were oriented toward the Muslims. Abdülhamid explained the reason for this new policy in his memoirs;

‘in new order of things-that is, in a state based upon the individual- the government must abide by the cultural tendencies of the majority of its subjects. The Ottoman State is being made up mostly of Muslims, its government should abide Islam, very much as the French government abided by the Catholic culture.’⁴⁷

Like the Ottomanist prescription, there were pragmatic reasons behind ‘Islamist foreign policy’. During the first years of Abdulhamid’s rule, the Empire had lost its best provinces and much of the army. Having lost its most Christian populated provinces the Empire became predominantly Muslim. Secondly, in addition to the military defeats, Abdulhamid II inherited a heavy foreign debt and in 1882 had to accept the authority of the Foreign Debt Administration set up by the European debtor countries to collect their loans. Thirdly, the sultan thought that he had only one tool to prevent what he considered the British plans to put an end to the Ottoman Empire: Islam. For Abdulhamid II the Muslims under British rule would change the British mind about Ottoman survival. That is to say, the Empire had lost almost all its foreign policy instruments, except Islam as a foreign policy ideology.⁴⁸

Furthermore, the Russian Empire dominated the Black Sea rim by capturing huge Ottoman territories. The Russians were militarily stronger and also enjoyed the support of the Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. Abdulhamid II, who understood that it would be very difficult to defeat the Russians in combat, thought that the same strategy the Russians had used could be used against them. Hence he viewed the Muslims under Russian rule as a useful card. Finally, it was understood that international law or agreements could not prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. For example, despite the 1856 Paris Agreement, which guaranteed the Ottoman State’s territorial unity, the European powers, *de facto* or *de jure*, undermined Ottoman rule and then occupied their territories step by step. This in turn led to a more active Ottoman

English Relations, 1791-1941), (İstanbul: 1946).

⁴⁷ Kemal H. Karpat, ‘The Ottoman Rule in Europe From the Perspective of 1994’, in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), *Turkey Between East and West*, (Oxford: Westview Press, Inc., 1996), pp. 1-44.

⁴⁸ Although some thought that pan-Turkism could be the most effective solution to the collapse, the Sultan did not favour such an alternative. Yusuf Akçuraoglu, *Türkçülük ve Dış Türkler*, (*Turkism and the Turkish Abroad*), (İstanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1990), pp. 96-109 (the section of ‘Abdülhamid Döneminde Türkçülüğe Karşı Alınan Tavırlar’ - *The Policies Against Turkism During The Hamidian Period*).

foreign policy based on the Pan-Islamist approach. As a result, as leaders of all Muslims, the Ottomans gained four practical benefits:⁴⁹ the halting of possible Muslim riots in Ottoman territories; getting a new and strong card against the European powers and Russia all of which had millions of Muslims in their colonies; maintaining political, strategic and economic support of the overseas Muslims in some issues; responding to Christian propaganda.

Though Islam was seen as the best, indeed **the only** tool in foreign policy by Abdulhamid II, as noted earlier, his Islamist policies did not mean that Abdulhamid was a traditionalist sultan. On the contrary he was one of the most enthusiastic sultans for reforms and modernisation,⁵⁰ keen on Western culture, art (especially opera and theatre) and literature. His main aim was not to build a purely Islamic and traditional society, but rather a modern, Westernised Islamic country.⁵¹ That is to say, on the one hand he carried out Islamist foreign policy and used Islam to legitimise his policies, while on the other he continued to carry out the reforms and westernisation process.

In addition, Abdulhamid's Islamist policies also focused on Muslims who lived outside Ottoman rule. He sent emissaries to overseas, such as Japan, China and Indonesia⁵² however a special emphasis was placed on British India and Russian Central Asia.⁵³ Newspapers and leaflets were published in Urdu (e.g. *Peyk-i Islam*), Arabic and Persian (like *El Gayret*) languages⁵⁴; the number of the Ottoman counsellors in India was increased and meetings were organised to unite the Indian Muslims. As a result, the British, French and Russian governments were always careful to treat the sultan-caliph

⁴⁹ Abdulhamid II, in his memoirs, accepts only two of these reasons: to forge the Islamic unity and to respond the Christian propaganda. Abdulhamid II, *Sultan, Siyasi Hatıratım (My Political Memoirs)* (Istanbul: 1974); İsmet Bozdağ (ed.), *Abdülhamid'in Hatıra Defteri, Belgeler ve Resimler (Abdülhamid's Memoirs Notebook, the Documents and the Pictures)*, (Istanbul: 1975).

⁵⁰ Lewis, *The Emergence...*

⁵¹ Contrary to the general opinion Abdulhamid was not very strict on the Islamic rules even in everyday life of his subjects. Mayokan observed that most of the staff in Yıldız Palace was not fasting in Ramadan period. I. M. Mayokan, *Yıldızda Neler Gördüm (What I Saw in Yıldız)*, (Istanbul: 1940), pp. 22-25.

⁵² Abdulhamid II even sent permanent diplomatic representatives to some small African countries and the Far Eastern countries like Philippines. For the some examples of the appointment documents: *Istanbul Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry*, No. 21/33 (4351)/22/26.B.1328/1 (on the appointment of the Şehbender (Consular) Necib Hacı Efendi); *Istanbul Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry*, No: 2634 (4372)/16/29. S(h).1328/1, Hariciye İradeleri Kataloğu (on the appointment of Şehbender (Consular) Ohannes Efendi to Africa Consulate).

⁵³ Anthony Hyman, 'Turkestan and Pan-Turkism Revisited', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol 16, No. 3, 1997, pp. 341-342.

⁵⁴ İlber Ortaylı, '19. Yüzyılda Panislamizm ve Osmanlı Hilafeti' (*Pan-Islamism in 19. Century and the Ottoman Caliphate*), *Türkiye Günlüğü*, No. 31, November-December 1994, pp. 25-31.

in such a way as to avoid mass protest among the millions of Muslims in their empires.⁵⁵ Some of the Ottoman counsellors were declared *persona non grata*, like Hüseyin Kamil Bey, counsellor for Karachi, India.⁵⁶ Yet despite these European apprehension, Abdulhamid never sought disturbances or *jihad* in these territories. His aim was simply to save the Empire by holding the Islam card against the British and Russians.⁵⁷ Moreover, despite its Islamic characteristics, Hamidian foreign policy was not aggressive. Nor could it escape historical Ottoman attitudes. Similar to the earlier 19th century Ottoman diplomacy, it aimed at exploiting the competition among the great powers. Since the British and French were obviously against his Islamist policies, Abdulhamid saw the Germans as a balancing power, since his Islamist policies perfectly matched Kaiser Wilhelm II's *Weltpolitik* (the Kaiser visited Istanbul three times, a record for any European monarch).⁵⁸ The co-operation with the Germans was based on mutual interests. The Kaiser hoped to use the sultan/caliph's influence among Muslims against his European rivals. Also the Ottoman territories could be used as a source of raw materials for a growing German industry. For the Sultan the anticipated gains were clear: to put an end to Ottoman isolation in Europe; to defend the Empire's territorial integrity with German support; to counter balance Russian and British power and influence; and to speed up the economic and technological development with German training and technological aid. Thus while Germany was defending the Ottoman interests in the region and Europe, the Ottoman Empire gave German companies in its territories preferential treatment.⁵⁹ As a result, the Turkish-German friendship that was started by Abdul Hamid and the Kaiser, was to continue for a century, through the Young Turks, Mustafa Kemal, İnönü and the DP periods.

⁵⁵ Roderic H. Davison, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and Its Legacy', in L. Carl Brown (ed.), **Imperial Legacy, The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East**, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p.190.

⁵⁶ Azmi Özcan, **Panislamizm, Osmanlı Devleti, Hindistan Müslümanları ve İngiltere, 1877-1914** (*Pan-Islamism, Ottoman State, Indian Muslims and Britain*), (Istanbul: 1992).

⁵⁷ Interestingly, most of the Western academics considered Pan-Islamism as a plan to collapse the British Empire. Most of the Turkish academics, on the other hand, like İlber Ortaylı and Azmi Özcan, perceive Pan-Islamism as an extension of the internal balance and the weakness of the Empire.

⁵⁸ Landau, **The Politics...**, p. 46.

⁵⁹ One of the best examples for the German-Ottoman co-operation is the Anatolia-Baghdad Railway Project. This project increased the co-operation between these countries while Britain and France opposed it. Murat Özyüksel, **Osmanlı - Alman İlişkilerinin Gelişim Sürecinde Anadolu ve Bağdat Demiryolları**, (*Anatolia and Baghdad Railways in the Development of the Ottoman-German Relations*), (Istanbul: 1988).

In brief, Abdulhamid's Islamism can be considered an ideology of self-defence rather than of aggression aimed at preserving the integrity and the unity of the Empire. His diplomacy relied on the balance of forces between the great powers of Europe, seeking to avoid new wars and to recover lost territories. German support was supposed to close the gap between the West and the Empire in military and economy term. When he understood that the Empire could not cope with British superiority, Abdulhamid used the religious and ethnic cards against the British Empire. However he never publicly attacked British or French interests as the Young Turks would do in future.

Another method used by Abdulhamid II in his foreign policy was to support international law,⁶⁰ which at times proved more effective than the Ottoman army. In fact before the Hamidian era Ottoman diplomats had frequently referred to international law. For example, Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha, in condemnation of actions by Greece during a period of tension wrote that 'No country is allowed to make its own laws superior to what is called the law of nations'.⁶¹ The ultimate aim was to become an equal part of the European state system and to guarantee the Empire's territorial integrity by using international law and Abdulhamid II continued this policy.

Though they failed to prevent Ottoman collapse, and were discarded by his successors, 'the domestic and foreign policies of the reign of Abdulhamid II (1878-1909) have left a permanent remark on Turkish society and the Muslim world as a whole.'⁶² Even Atatürk, in spite of the fundamental difference between his and Hamidian ideologies, used similar foreign and domestic policies.

Abdülhamid II and the Rise of the Secularist - Positivist Philosophy

One of the significant effects of the Hamidian era was the creation of a modern education system and the attendant development of a secularist-positivist philosophy among Ottoman civil-military officers. This development left its mark permanently on Ottoman institutions and political life. Secular westernist political groups were a direct result of this development and the army and the foreign ministry were shaped by the impact of this ideology.

⁶⁰ Bozdağ, *Abdülhamid'in...*, pp. 72-105.

⁶¹ Davison, 'Ottoman...', p. 185.

⁶² Karpas, 'The Ottoman...', p.26.

Almost all Ottoman political groups had accepted the need for Westernisation, but secular Westernism was not a result of necessity but a product of a secularist-positivist education system. Although most of them were traditional observant Muslims, the Ottoman Sultans had no alternative, but to use Western education methods, because the Islamic/Ottoman *medrese* system was corrupt and bankrupt. Even the most religious sultans, like Abdulhamid II, encouraged Western-style schools. As Göçek pointed out, Western –style education was introduced to unite and modernise society, yet it instead deepened the existing gaps between segments into chasms.⁶³ These schools, for instance imported a secularist philosophy, and trained the Ottoman pupils as ideologically fanatic Westernists:

‘The secularist-positivist philosophy embodied in the Ottoman reform movement found itself in direct opposition to the religious spirit of the traditional school system. The “modern” school system that emerged after 1839 was the antithesis of the old Ottoman system and gradually undermined and replaced it, a process that culminated in the *Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu* (Law for the Unification of Education) in the Republic.’⁶⁴

The secularist education system was supported by the European powers, and was at times imposed upon the Ottoman State. For example, during the Abdülaziz reign France sent a diplomatic note to reform the education system according to the European system.⁶⁵ The languages of learning in these modern schools were French and Turkish. Most teachers and academics were educated in the French, German or Italian missionary schools or in one of these countries, and were fanatically Westernist and secularist; some were atheist in a country which was the political leader of the Muslim world. As witnessed during the Second Meşrutiyet events, the teachers in the universities served to politicise the students against the Palace.⁶⁶ For example, in the Military Medicine School the veteran students were telling new students that ‘this school is a home of freedom. Here you must study for science and to protect the country from “*esaret*” (Abdülhamid regime)... The *hocas* (teachers) are “*hürriyetperver*” (lover of freedom / anti Hamidian regime). They are like us.’⁶⁷

⁶³ Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 140.

⁶⁴ Kemal H. Karpat, ‘Reinterpreting Ottoman History: A Note on the Condition of Education in 1874’ *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Winter 1981-82, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 93-100, p. 95.

⁶⁵ Yücel Aktar, *İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi Öğrenci Olayları (1908-1918) (The Student Movements in the Second Mesrutiyet Era)*, (İstanbul: İletisim Yayınları, 1990), p. 17.

⁶⁶ Aktar, *İkinci...*, p. 27.

⁶⁷ Nur, *Hayat...*, p. 100.

Institutional Impact of the Western-Styled Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

With the decline of the old system, these newly established schools began to feed vital official institutions. Most of the Foreign Ministry officials for example, originally came from either the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (The School of Political Science) or foreign schools. Galatasaray Lisesi - Secondary and High School (French - medium), Saint Joseph College (French), Robert College (English), Italian Boy-Girl Schools (Italian), Tarsus American (English) were the most successful schools in the Empire and all carried out a foreign curriculum in foreign languages.⁶⁸ Similarly, Ottoman military officers were educated in the *Harbiye* (The Military High School) or in foreign states, notably Germany. Other significant 'modern' schools were the Law and the Medicine faculties of the *Darülfünun* (University). These schools would play a similar role in the Republic, by continuing to educate its civil servants.⁶⁹ Thus the army and the Foreign Ministry became largely pro-Western, though their Westernism was extremely naïve and saw the European powers as a panacea. As Dr. Rıza Nur, one of the important westernist Ottomans admitted,

⁶⁸ Many teachers in these schools were foreigners, and the difference between the Turkish and the foreigners was limited. Tevfik Fikret, one of the most famous Ottoman poet and the director of the French-medium Galatasaray High School, whose students have dominated the Foreign Ministry entrance examinations since the 19th century, is a very good example to explain the ideological situation in these schools and how the future-Ottoman officers were educated. Fikret in his 'Haluk'un Amentüsü' expressed his secularist positivist understanding:

‘...
There is neither Satan, nor angel,
We are the Satan, we are the gin,
I believe in,
Only the man will change the world into paradise
I believe in
...
One day science will make the soil gold, I believe in
Everything will be possible with the power of intelligence
I believe in...’

When Fikret sent his son Haluk to Royal Technical College in Scotland he advised: ‘Go and bring some light to our country.’ For Fikret civilisation was in the West, not in his country. Naturally he also advised his students and the Ottoman nation to do the same thing as Haluk did. Haluk, having graduated from the American Robert College, Royal Technical College and the Michigan University converted to Christianity. For the most comprehensive study on the Tevfik Fikret and the Haluk cases see Cüneyd Okay’s article in *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 30, June 1996.

⁶⁹ This similarity confirms the continuity of the Ottoman modernisation process in the Republican era.

‘We were such a ignorant people. We saw the English as a protector and defender of freedoms. For us, the English give the nations their independence, freedom and oppress and annihilate the cruel dictators, like the Hamid.’⁷⁰

The impact of foreign education on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was even more alarming. Most officials in this ministry graduated from the Christian missionary primary and secondary schools in the Empire or from European schools. Most of them also continued their education in a European college, university or Western-styled *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* in Istanbul. Almost all of them came from wealthy Ottoman families, and had visited the European capitals before taking their post in the ministry. Therefore they were admirers of the West, which represented in their eyes an advance civilisational system, whereas the Ottoman Empire, without any doubt, was an undeveloped state. Their civilisational perception naturally determined their position on foreign policy issues, yet they also came from the Ottoman state tradition and respected the hierarchy of that state. As a result, they served the system while trying to manipulate it wherever they could. However, since the regime was aware of this tendency, it sought to bypass the Foreign Ministry and take direct control over foreign affairs. This applied not only to Abdulhamid but also to secularist Westernist political groups, like the CUP and the Kemalists.

Despite the ‘soft resistance’ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Palace, the main impact of Western education came to be exerted through the army. The secular-positivist philosophy had dominated the military schools and most of the officers were anti-religious and anti-Palace. They were better organised and more confident than other opposition groups. Therefore, unlike the Foreign Ministry, when they felt strong enough they attempted to seize power.

Ottomanists

This group’s ideology was based on creating an Ottoman nation and it identified nationalism mainly with religion and a shared past. They believed that the Ottoman State would survive by unifying the peoples who lived or had lived in the classic Ottoman territories, namely Anatolia, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa. They thought that to unite these greatly diverse peoples the State had to

⁷⁰ Nur, *Hayat...*

find a new citizenship concept which relied on mutual responsibilities and rights between the Sultan/State and his subjects. They also suggested the adoption of Western democratic institutions, a parliament and a written constitution. Therefore, it can be said that the new Ottomanism was more liberal and democratic than Palace Ottomanism had been. At the beginning of the 20th century, in particular they represented the liberal wing of Ottoman politics. While in domestic politics they defended decentralisation, ethnic autonomy, a free market economy and a democratic system,⁷¹ their foreign policy was very similar to Hamidian foreign policy. They knew the Empire's weakness and sought to avoid any involvement in war or conflict, arguing that its only chance of survival lay with the exploitation of competition between the great powers. These 'liberal Ottomanists' were supported by the ethnic and religious minorities and from time to time by the Palace. However, they could not meet the demands of the middle class and the bureaucracy, and thus could not become a major power in Ottoman politics. Yet they affected all political groups in one form or another and sometimes these groups carried out Ottomanist policies. Therefore it is difficult to classify certain policies and the politicians as Islamist, Westernist or Ottomanist. For example most Hamidian policies were Ottomanist rather than Islamist. The liberal Ottomanists failed in the Imperial time, but, as will be shown later in the Republic Turkish conservatism and liberalism would rise out of the ashes of this liberal Ottomanism.

Secular Westernists

Finally, the most radical school of thought was the secular westernist nationalists. They were very active during the Hamidian era, blaming the Sultan's Islamist policies for the Empire's economic and military failures.⁷² A predominant role was played by the Young Turks (Young Turks)⁷³ to organise a secret organisation *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (the Committee of Union and Progress-CUP).⁷⁴ Its primary preoccupation was similar to the

⁷¹ Feroz Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizm'e*, (From *İttihatçılık* to *Kemalism*), Second Edition, (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1986), p.13.

⁷² M. Sukru Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Zürcher, 'Young Turks...', p. 151.

⁷³ The Young Turks and their role in Turkish politics are discussed in Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914*, (Oxford: 1969); Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İnkılap Hareketleri ve Milli Mücadele*, (*The Revolutionary Movements in the Ottoman Empire and the National Struggle*), (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1956).

⁷⁴ During the first years the organisation was a base for the opposition against the authoritarian Hamidian regime (*istibdat*), even some Islamists were the members of the organisation, like Bediuzzaman Said-i Nursi. İsmail Kara, *İslamcılar'ın Siyasi Görüşleri*, (*The Ideas of the Islamists*), (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık,

earlier schools of thought: how to save the Ottoman Empire and what political system should be adopted to modernise the country.⁷⁵ However, contrary to these schools of thought, the CUP, which came to dominate Ottoman politics after the 1908 'revolution', viewed technological and scientific developments as insufficient for saving the Empire, and instead insisted on cultural reforms as well. They identified nationalism with such secular concepts as race and culture, and especially during the *Mesrutiyet* (constitutional) era, became the most enthusiastic westerners and modernisers. Their understanding was that Europe should serve as a model for development in every aspect of Ottoman life.⁷⁶ The journalist Abdullah Cevdet described the essence of this ideology in one sentence in 1913:

'There is no second civilization; civilization means European civilization, and it must be imported with both its roses and its thorns.'⁷⁷

According to this outlook the Ottoman Empire had to change its civilisational track. As will be seen, at the end of the 19th century this worldview was the most popular ideological movement among military students and officers. The Westernist and civilisational perceptions of the party inevitably affected its internal and foreign policy.

Another significant feature of the CUP was the army's role in the policy-making process. There had been no clear distinction between the civilian and military arms of the state and military matters had always had a priority. When the Empire entered the era of decline, military reform was more acceptable than reform in any other aspect of national life, since the need to defend the empire was universally accepted. Therefore, the reconstruction of the Empire's military machine nearly came to the fore in the minds of the reformers.⁷⁸ In spite of resistance from the traditional units the nature of the army helped the success of the reforms. During the first years European arms and techniques were transferred to the Ottoman army. Then, the Palace confronted the same problem it had faced in the reform of the civil bureaucracy: shortage of manpower. As a result new

1994), p.127. However, later it evolved to a purely secular-Westernist political party.

⁷⁵ Tarık Z. Tunaya, 'Türkiye'nin Siyasi Gelişme Seyri İçinde Jön Türk Hareketinin Fikri Esasları', (*The Foundations of the Jon Turk Movement in Turkey's Political Development*) in Prof. Dr. Tahrir Taner'e Armağan, (İstanbul: İÜFFD, 1956); Muammer Göçmen, *İsviçre'de Jöntürk Basını ve Türk Siyasal Hayatına Etkileri, 1889-1902*, (*The Jon Turk Press in Switzerland and Its Impact on Turkish Political Life, 1889-1902*), (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 1995), p. 23.

⁷⁶ Abdullah al-Ahsan, *Ummah or Nation? Identity Crisis in Contemporary Muslim Society*, (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1992), p. 33.

⁷⁷ Quoted in Dankwart A. Rustow, *Turkey, America's Forgotten Ally*, (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, p. 14.

military schools were established, and became 'a way to acquire a modern education and open doors to upward mobility in a society which had become highly stratified with limited opportunities for Muslims'.⁷⁹ As a result, these schools inculcated Western ideas into the Ottoman military. The foremost books military students were reading were French, and the dominant ideologies in the schools were positivism, secularism and the French revolution's Jacobin understanding.⁸⁰ As noted above, the leaders of the Ottoman army had power over civilian matters and they always saw themselves as guardians of the state. When this tradition was blended with French revolutionary ideology, the military schools and the military itself became the bases for the reforms and opposition to the Palace. Although the army, for a while, did not engage in political matters, many young officers dreamt of establishing a secular-positivist-European country instead of the traditional Ottoman Empire. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the most influential leaders of the 1908 movement were officers, like Mustafa Kemal. As a result the army became deeply involved in Ottoman internal and foreign affairs.

The third feature of the CUP period is the Jacobin co-operation between civil and military bureaucrats against the liberals, Palace, religious institutions and the people. For the Young Turks, these groups had been used by external forces to destroy the Empire.⁸¹ The Young Turks believed their ideas about reform, secularisation and modernisation to be absolute, unconditional truths for the salvation of the Empire, and, from this perspective the policies could not be debated and tested before their implementation. They did not have public support, and alienated the Europeans through their aggressive policies. The only support for their policy thus came from the bureaucracy. Thus the CUP lost an important tool in diplomacy: public support and flexibility. As a result, the CUP found it difficult to change its policies when it was necessary. Worst of all, Ottoman foreign policy lost its pragmatism and framework, and the party ideology came to supersede external relations.

⁷⁸ Hale, *Turkish...*, p. 13.

⁷⁹ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p.104.

⁸⁰ Officer Rahmi Apak claims that there was no moral education in War Academy, and the students were thought with a different belief system that the ordinary people have. See Rahmi Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları*, (*The Memories of a Seventy-Years-Old Officer*), (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1988), p. 13-14.

⁸¹ Sina Aksin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihak ve Terakki*, (Jon Turks and Ittihak and Terakki), (Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınları, 1980), p. 111.

Another characteristic of CUP policies was its Turkism, then pan-Turkism. Obviously, without a nation it was difficult to create a European nation-state. Hence, the main aim of the CUP was to create a nation. According to their view, Islam and Ottomanism had failed to unite the Ottoman peoples, and the only way to save the Empire was to create a Turkish-led Empire. As a matter of fact, 'Turk' since the beginning of the Ottoman Empire, had meant 'rude, common villager' and the Palace never defined itself as Turkish. Even among commoners, 'Turk' was used as an insult.⁸² For many Ottomans, the term 'Turk' had a somewhat derogatory connotation even at the end of the 19th century.⁸³

Hence seeking to create a 'Turkish nation' was contrary to the popular mood. This nourished the Young Turks' belief in a Jacobean approach and made them more radical. For them, Turkification and modernisation had to descend from the top to down. They did not see the people as a source of power since for them the people's values were responsible for the backwardness of the Empire. Thus, although they had accused Abdulhamid II for being authoritarian they followed his footsteps. Yet though the CUP was Turkist, there was no consensus on a possible Turkish empire. The nationalists split into three different groups: Pan-Turanists, Pan-Turkists, and Turkists. The first group sought unification of all 'Turanic races' which includes the Magyars and Finns as well as the Turks. Pan-Turkism, in contrast aimed at the unification of all the Turkic peoples (Turkish race) namely the Turks of Central Asia, China, what is now the Russian Federation, Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan (Iran and Azerbaijan), Bulgaria, Crimea, Moldavia, Western Thrace, Cyprus. Turkism was the most moderate of these and advocated a cultural nationalism rather than a racial one. It was not irredentist and was not very enthusiastic about the unification of the Turkish peoples.⁸⁴ As the Empire suffered territorial losses, the radical-romantic nationalists, like Enver, gained more power in the CUP and eventually in government. As a result, the Empire came to pursue foreign policy goals that were beyond its power.

The Young Turks in Foreign Policy and the Emergence of the Contra-

⁸² The Ottomans depicted the Turks as *etrak-i idrak* (One does not use his brain) while the Arabs were called as *kavm-i necib* (noble race). Ortayli, p. 54.

⁸³ Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism, From Irredentism to Cooperation*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), p. 29.

⁸⁴ Ayse Neviye Çağlar, 'The Greywolves as Metaphor', in Andrew Finkel and Nukhet Sirman (eds.),

Nationalisms

Despite their enormously different political aims and principles, being continuously engaged in war or suppression of rebellion, the Young Turks had little time for internal reforms. Likewise, even in foreign policy they had few options and were forced to toe the Ottomanist policies of their predecessors.⁸⁵ Ironically, the Young Turks continued to use Islam as a foreign policy tool and German influence became much deeper. For example, the army founded by Enver Pasha to rescue the Caucasus, was called the 'Islamic Army'. Pan-Islam's expansionist character suited the Young Turks' aims and mood. Also the 'outside Turks' were also Muslim and most of them were not aware of their nationality, therefore the only common unifying subject to unite the Turks was Islam. Similarly the Young Turks saw Germany as the only country supporting the restoration of Ottoman loses. However, the Young Turks were not well-equipped to continue the Hamidian policies. They were not Islamists - some of their leaders were atheists who regarded Islam as a reactionary factor – and consequently did not grasp the core values of such an ideology.⁸⁶

Hence, when their brief flirtation with Islam soured, the Young Turks looked to the Turkic world as their source of power and a way to end isolation. But there was no such Turkic world out there: only Turkish tribe which could help the Ottomans was themselves when they need help. Still, the Turkists could not see that, because their policy was a prisoner of their ideology. Enver Pasha, the most influential CUP leader, was a perfect example of the failure of the Young Turks' adventurist policies bringing the Empire into the First World War and eventually leading to the imperial collapse.⁸⁷ This failure cannot be explained by only Enver's inexperience or incompetence, because

Turkish State, Turkish Society, (London: Routledge 1990), pp.79-101, p.81

⁸⁵ David Kushner, **The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908**, (London: Frank Cass, 1977), p. 101.

⁸⁶ Harry Luke, **The Old and the New Turkey: From Byzantium to Ankara** (London: 1955), p. 143; Landau, **The Politics**, p. 87; Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Turkic Nationalities: Turkish-Soviet and Turkish-Chinese Relations', in W. O. McCagg and B. D. Silver (eds.), **Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers** (New York: 1979), p. 124.

⁸⁷ When the outside Turks did not rescue the Ottomans, Enver decided to free them from the 'Russian yoke'. Ironically to reach his Pan-Turkist ideal Enver and Talat Pasha carried out a Pan-Islamist campaign in the Caucasus. They were not Islamist and their aim was to Turkify the Caucasus. Baran Dural, **Milliyetçiliğe Farklı Bir Bakış ve Turan İdealinin Doğuşu** (*A Different Perspective to Nationalism and the Emerge of the Turan Ideal*), (İstanbul: Kamer Yayinlari, 1992), p. 116; Serif Bey's newly published memoirs clearly shows that Turkish armies had no chance to win the war: Kurmay Yarbay Köprülülü Serif Bey, **Sarıkamış, Anı** (*Sarıkamış, Memoirs*), (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1999); also see Sevkett Süreyya Aydemir, **Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Paşa, 1914-1922** (*Enver Pasha, from Macedonia to Central Asia*), (İstanbul: Remzi, 1972).

he was one of the Empire's most capable leaders. But he did not give up his ideological precepts until the final territory of the Empire was lost.

This experience was one of the most instructive lessons for Kemal and his Republican friends. That is to say, not only the CUP's ideology, but its actual failures formed Kemalist ideology. The first effect of this failure on Kemalist Turkey was pragmatism and realism. Another effect was a more moderate nationalist approach, namely Ziya Gökalp's nationalism. For Gökalp, before conquering other territories, all Ottomans must be Turkified. His prescription was based on a secular, Westernist and Muslim Ottoman nation-state.⁸⁸ Kemal understood that the first priority was not to create a Turkish Empire, but rather a homogeneous Turkish nation. For Kemal, Turkey needed stability not war. Hence it had to sacrifice some territories to establish a healthy nation-state. Already at the time when the Turkists were defending a Turkish empire, Kemal argued that the Empire had to leave some of the territories in the Balkans:

'Rumeli (the Balkans) cannot be defended now. If we do not want a disaster we must make peace with Greece. Let give up all our rights over the Crete, and let give our Aegean islands give the Greeks except the closest ones...'⁸⁹

Nor could the Young Turks use the German factor as efficiently as had Abdulhamid since they did not know their enemies and friends well, and had no control over their relations with these powers. Their romantic Turkism led to an aggressive foreign policy orientation and mistrust of the European powers.⁹⁰ As a result, CUP's foreign policy exhibited a marked hostility towards Britain and France,⁹¹ and was heavily dependant on one power: Germany. Again, Kemal was against the CUP's Germany-based foreign policy:

'We should not sacrifice any of our soldiers for a foreign country's interests. Turks should not be used in the German military plans... We should not trust the Germans for

⁸⁸ Gökalp's *Türkçülüğün Esasları* book provides all the differences between the adventurist Turkism and Gökalp's nationalism. As a sociologist he saw the Western-type nation-state as the solution while the pan-Turkists did not mind so much the political system the Turkish state had.

⁸⁹ Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Yakin Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, 1888-1918*, (*My Memoirs for the Near Past, 1888-1918*), (Istanbul: n.d.), p. 184.

⁹⁰ Abdulhamid II also did not trust any European powers, yet, as Ünal pointed out, Abdülhamid's anti Europeanism and his fundamental mistrust of all the Powers were rooted in a sense of his own Empire's weakness. In contrast, in the words of Ünal, '*the anti-Europeanism of the CUP was rooted in an aggrieved and assertive nationalism some of whose implications in international affairs were potentially revolutionary.*' Hasan Ünal, 'Young Turk Assessments of International Politics, 1906-9', in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), *Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics*, (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p.36.

⁹¹ *ibid.*, p. 31-32.

the thousands of Turks. We should not give the Germans the opportunity to colonise our country.’⁹²

Thus, the lessons from the failure of the CUP’s German policy would become the essence of Atatürk’s non-alignment policy in the Republican era.

Conclusion

Despite the autocratic structure of the Empire, its foreign policy making was a pluralistic process. There were many orientations, and decision-makers were open to suggestions. Almost all foreign policy schools in these years were influenced by the decline of the Empire. The Empire was declining and the question preoccupying all political groups was what were the causes of this decline and why were the Ottomans relatively underdeveloped in comparison with the West? The first attempts were institutional more than structural, yet resulted in a modernist elite. Thus by the mid-nineteenth century some Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals started to distinguish themselves as a group of dissidents; Young Turks.⁹³ The first Young Turks were also modernist and westernist, yet their modernism was moderate, looking for religious grounds for the adoption of western institutions.⁹⁴ Yet these attempts failed to explain the cause of backwardness and military defeats. Therefore the Ottoman intellectuals began to question the role of religion and tradition in this backwardness. Thus, westernism split into different schools of thought while the religious groups were evolving into political Islamism, traditionalism etc. The new westernists viewed Islam and tradition as responsible for the Empire’s decline. Ottomanism had evolved to moderate westernism, and now it was evolving to a positivist, secularist westernism, which perceived religion as a ‘primitive mode of thought.’⁹⁵ This misperception was nourished by the Ottoman intellectuals, bureaucrats and army officers who began to see their society as uncivilised and underdeveloped. For them, modernisation, westernisation and secularisation were identical concepts. After the 1908 revolution they dominated Ottoman political life until the collapse of the Empire. These political changes inevitably reflected on the Empire’s foreign policy.

⁹² Yalman, *Yakın...*, pp. 291-292.

⁹³ Mert, ‘Children’, pp. 70-71.

⁹⁴ Türköne, *Siyasi...*

⁹⁵ Nuray Mert, *The Early Republican’s Secularism, A Theoretical Approach*, unpublished PhD thesis, the University of Bosphorus, İstanbul, 1992.

The second point is that Ottoman foreign policy turned from an offensive to a defensive policy. Internally the Empire made efforts to modernise its army, state institutions and education system. During these years the main aims of foreign policy were to gain time for internal reforms; regain the territories that had been lost; protect the remaining territories; creating a new link between subjects and the state by keeping different ethnic and religious groups, who shared similar aims; and to prevent nationalist movements and revolts. Almost all schools of thought sought to save the Empire, yet had different prescriptions to this end, like secularism, authoritarian westernisation, liberal westernisation, Islamisation, Islamic modernisation, Turkism, pan-Turkism, pan-Turanism etc. The attempts to create an Ottoman nation failed, and the Empire lost most of its non-Muslim subjects by the end of the 19th century. Although Abdulhamid's Islamist policies slowed down the decline the Ottoman anachronistic state system was decaying. Hamidian foreign policies aims were similar to the previous ones. Despite the significant role of ideology, it was not a determining factor but one of the tools of foreign policy. Abdulhamid was autocratic in foreign policy making and implementation, yet pragmatic in its goals. Like his predecessors, he used the competition between the great powers to the Empire's advantage.

After the 1908 revolution, the in-experienced Young Turks dominated Ottoman foreign policy. Their radical policies made foreign policy more ideological and accelerated the Empire's decline. In other words, foreign policy goals were sacrificed to ideology. The Empire lost vast territories in a short time and eventually disappeared after the First World War.

As will be seen in the next chapter, Kemalism and its foreign policy orientation were products of the Ottoman years. Even Göçek argues that the Turkish nation –state was created by the labours of the Ottoman bureaucratic bourgeoisie under the guidance of Kemal.⁹⁶ Although Kemalists, like Taner Timur⁹⁷, argue that the Kemalist movement was largely independent of previous Westernisation attempts, it is arguable that Kemalist foreign policy was a correction or a continuation of these policies. Mustafa

⁹⁶ Göçek, *Rise of the...*, p. 139.

⁹⁷ Taner Timur, 'The Ottoman Heritage', in Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (eds.), *Turkey in Transition, New Perspectives*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 17.

Kemal witnessed the agonies of a crippling Empire and saw the failure of all these approaches. Although he shared similar ideas with the CUP, Kemal realised the limits of Turkey and its international circumstances. In this framework, these three approaches, notably the secularist westernist nationalists, and the lessons from Ottoman collapse can be seen as a prelude to Kemalist foreign policy. As a former *İttihatçı*, Kemal had dreams of a secular, modern, positivist, European, Turkish state, yet as an eyewitness to the failure of the CUP he also grasped the logic of the Hamidian foreign policy. In addition to the ideological and historical lessons, Mustafa Kemal observed the attitudes of Europeans and other ethnic and religious groups towards the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. For him culpability for this failure lay with the old Ottoman political-cultural system, European hostility towards the Turks and the betrayal of the Ottoman minorities of their country. All of these deeply shaped the Kemalist foreign policy orientation.

CHAPTER II

The War of Independence and Imperial Foreign Policy vs. Kemalist Foreign Policy

‘This agreement (the Lausanne Agreement) confirms that we left Egypt, Sudan, Cyprus, the Aegean Islands and other territories. You, friends, have struggled very hard to defend these territories. But our loses were not only the territories. This agreement declares the end of a magnificent Empire. This agreement declares that we gave Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Arabistan.¹

Niyazi Bey (Mersin MP)

It can be argued that the War of Independence is the most important development in contemporary Turkish history. It marked the end of the Empire and the emergence of a nation-state. It not only shaped the future of Turkey but also the 20th century Turkish mind. The solidarity in the war and the foreign attacks determined internal and external Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, the war was the environment in which Kemalist ideology was shaped. This chapter, in this framework, focuses on the significant developments which deeply affected Turkish foreign policy in Atatürk period and the following years, however it must be noted that the details of the period and many important events during these years fall into the scope and limits of this study. That is to say the main aim of this chapter is not to provide the details of one of the well-known periods of Turkish history, or just summarise the events of the period but to show the impact of the Independence War on Kemalism and Turkey’s foreign policy and to examine the differences between Kemal and the Ottomanists’ foreign policy by discussing the most significant developments in these years, like the Lausanne Agreement.²

¹ Niyazi Bey’s speech, **T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi**, Cilt: I, 8. 205-217.

² For the detailed history of the War of Independence period see: Mahmut Gologlu, **Milli Mücadele Tarihi**, (*The History of the National Struggle*), five volumes, (Ankara: 1969); Kazım Özalp, **Milli Mücadele, 1919-1922**, (*The National Struggle*), two volumes, (Ankara: 1971, 1972); Enver Ziya Karal, **Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi: 1918-1960**, (*History of the Republic of Turkey, 1918-1960*), (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1963); Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, **Tek Adam, Mustafa Kemal, 1919-1922**, (*One Man: Mustafa Kemal*), (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1969); Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, **A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk**, (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981); Bilal N. Şimsir, **Sakarya’dan İzmir’e, İngiliz Belgeleriyle** (*From Sakarya to İzmir, with the British Documents*), (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1972); Laurance Evanse, **Türkiye’nin Paylaşılması, 1914-1924** (*Sharing Turkey*), (trn.: Tefik Alanay), (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1972); Paul Dumont, **Mustafa Kemal**, (trn: Zeki Çelikkol), (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1999)

At the time of the Armistice of Mudros, 1918, the Ottoman Empire was utterly destroyed and its territories had been occupied: The French troops landed to occupy the Cilicia region (south and south-eastern Turkey) including Adana, Mersin, Tarsus and the neighbouring region. The French were in co-operation with the Armenians to fully complete the occupation.³ The British, thanks to the secret agreements, which had been signed during the First World War took the oil-region, namely Musul, today's Northern Iraq. In the north-eastern Black Sea coasts the Greeks' plan was to establish a Greek state, *Pontus*, while the Armenians dreamed of a greater Armenia from the south-eastern Turkish - Kurdish provinces to the eastern borders of Turkey, and they had the Allies support in their plans.⁴ In the Southwest there was a disagreement between the Italians and Greeks; both claimed that these Turkish territories were historically their right. While Italians occupied the Antalya, Burdur, Konya and the Western coasts of Mugla, the Greeks would occupy the biggest city in the region, Izmir (Smyrna). Finally, on 13 November Istanbul was occupied by the Allies, mainly by the British and the French troops and the war-ships. Moreover, 'the minorities intended to use the Allied occupation for their own benefit'⁵, as witnessed in the Greek, Armenian and the Arab cases. Under these circumstances the sultan's government was not free in its foreign and internal relations and many politicians saw co-operation with the Allies as the only solution.

The government's indifferent policy to the Allied occupation and the intentions to divide Turkey into many small states evoked a wide range reactions within Muslim the society, especially among the Turk and the Kurds. When they realised that the country is under occupation and the government was unable to change the situation, the leading members of the Young Turks and other nationalists sought an alternative to Istanbul government in order to create a resistance against the foreign occupiers. As a result of these efforts Societies for the Defence of the National Rights were founded in many different provinces with co-operation between the former CUP and the *esraf* (local

³ For the French - Armenian co-operation in the occupation see Yahya Akyüz, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Fransız Kamuoyu, 1919-1922 (The French Public Opinion and the Turkish Independence War)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XVI Series, 1975), pp. 122-123.

⁴ Six provinces had been mentioned in the Mondros Armistice and as will be seen the Sevres Agreement would allocate the region to the Armenians. Also see Mim Kemal Öke, *The Armenian Question, 1914 - 1923*, (London: K. Rustem & Brother, 1988).

⁵ Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 329.

elite).⁶ Societies' main aim was to organise local and regional congresses and many just focused on the regional liberation movements, instead of a national resistance movement. For instance the Erzurum Congress's official main aim was liberate and protect the Eastern provinces against the Russians and Armenians⁷ while the congresses in the West concentrated on the Greek occupation. After the Erzurum, the Sivas Congress (September 1919) is considered one of the most important ones since for Mustafa Kemal it was the most important step towards the national independence war and finally the proclamation of the republic. Kemal was not the only leader who organise congresses and meetings and in fact before his departure from Istanbul to Anatolia many local congress had been hold, however Kemal and his friends increased the national character of the resistance. Mustafa Kemal, who was one of the greatest Ottoman war heroes at that time, landed Samsun in May 1919, and then he actively joined or organised the resistance meetings, including the Havza, Erzurum and the Sivas. As a n influential leader he in a short time became one of the most powerful leaders of the movement by getting the support of the potential leaders like Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Kazim Karabekir. Kemal as discussed and as will be seen in the next chapters was a secular, Westernist and a Turkish nationalist. However in order to attract the other groups and the ordinary people and as a result of this to organise a strong national resistance movement he had to unite use a different rhetoric than his own ideas. So, Kemal and his friends like the others declared the aims of the movement as to liberate the nation⁸, territory, caliphate and sultanate.⁹ Actually we understand that Mustafa Kemal did not share the aim of liberation of sultanate and caliphate, instead of that he saw both as responsible for the invasion as he clearly declared his real intentions after the proclamation of the republic:

‘The enemy powers were openly attacking the Ottoman Empire and the country itself morally and materially. They were determined to dismember and annihilate both. The

⁶ Erik Jan Zürcher, ‘Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: identity Politics, 1908-1938’, in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 161; Zekai Güner, *Milli Mücadele Başlarken Türk Kamuoyu, Basın, Siyasi Partiler, Cemiyetler*, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1999).

⁷ For the Erzurum Congress see Cevat Dursunoğlu, *Mili Mücadelede Erzurum (Erzurum in the National Struggle)*, (Ankara: 1946); Baykal Bekir Sitki, *Erzurum Kongresi ile İlgili Belgeler (The Documents on Erzurum Congress)*, (Ankara: 1955); Dursun Ali Akbulut (ed.), *Erzurum Kongresi Hakkında Belgeler, (The Documents About the Erzurum Congress)*, (Erzurum: Erzurum Valiliği, 1989); Mahmut Goloğlu, *Erzurum Kongresi, (The Erzurum Congress)*, (Ankara: Nüve Matbaası, 1968); Bülent Tanör, *Türkiye’de Yerel Kongre İktidarları (1918-1920), (The Local Congress Powers in Turkey)*, (Istanbul: 1992), pp. 20-35.

⁸ ‘Nation’ (*millet*) meant Muslim peoples of the Empire, mainly Turks and Kurds. Dursunoğlu, *Milli...*, p. 151.

⁹ Zürcher, ‘Young...’, p. 164-165.

Padisah (sultan) – Caliph had one sole anxiety, namely to save his own life and to secure tranquillity for himself and government.’¹⁰

Also the Amasya Protocol, which was prepared by Kemal and his friends on 19 June 1919, implied the essence of Kemal’s understanding:

‘1. The unity of the Fatherland and national independence are in danger. 2. The Istanbul government is unable to carry out its responsibilities. 3. It is only through the nation’s effort and determination that national independence will be won...’¹¹

Despite the divergence between Kemal and the other groups, Mustafa Kemal in these years only underlined independence principle to unite the different political groups against the foreign occupiers. The Greek invasion campaign helped Kemal and his friends by stimulating the national resistance, particularly in the Western parts of the Empire. The invasion of Izmir by the Greek troops with the help of the local Greek minorities and the support of the British, French and the Americans¹² in particular and the general slaughter of the Turkish population in the following days¹³ in the region caused a great reaction in Anatolia. The Sivas Congress took place under these circumstances on 4-12 September 1919. Before the Congress the Istanbul government and the Allied occupation forces realised Kemal’s resistance plans and as a result Kemal resigned from the army. Now he was a civilian leader. In the Sivas the resolutions of the Erzurum Congress were accepted and accepted more radical resolutions. Kemal and his friends’ influence was clear over the congress; The congress conducted its works under the chairmanship of Mustafa Kemal. In the Sivas all Defence and Rights Societies of Anatolia and Rumelia (Thrace) were united and became one body, and a Representative Committee (*Heyeti-i Temsiliye*), which would be act as the headquarter of the resistance movement until the formation of the Grand National Assembly in April 1920, was formed to implement the decisions taken by the congress.¹⁴ Representative Committee’s foreign policy, as Sonyel pointed out, was in its primary stages, and based on getting external (from the Muslim world, Soviet Union etc.) and people’s support.¹⁵

¹⁰ Atatürk in M. Emin Hekimgil, *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*, (Ankara: Ministry of Culture, 1998), p. 2.

¹¹ Kili, *Kemalism*, p. 11-12.

¹² Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 342.

¹³ Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 342.

¹⁴ Kili, *Kemalism*, p. 14;

¹⁵ Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923, Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement*, (London: SAGE, 1975), p. 21.

The Istanbul government considering the developments in Anatolia took initiative at the end of 1919 and held the national elections opening the Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul while Mustafa Kemal moved his headquarters from Sivas to Ankara. The competition was clear, both Kemal and Istanbul were making efforts to take the people's support to legitimate their power. The last Ottoman parliament (*Meclis-i Mebusan*) after the elections met on 12 January 1920, however, the nationalists dominated it. As a matter of fact that Kemal did not expect a radical decisions from this parliaments since Istanbul was under the control of the Allies. That's why he stayed in Ankara and waited the result. When the last parliament with the efforts of the nationalists accepted *Misak-ı Milli* (National Pact)¹⁶, which declared that Anatolia (article 1), Thrace (article 3), the Aegean Sea, the Northern Iraq were part of the Ottoman state (article 1,4 and 5), and suggested a referendum in the rest of the Ottoman territories, like Western Thrace and some Arab territories (article 3 and 5). The Pact was also rejecting the foreign control over the Turkish territories and demanded fully independence:

'It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development may so be rendered possible, and that it should be possible to conduct our affairs in the form of a more modern and regular administration (article 6). For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial, and other fields.'¹⁷

As a result, the Allied forces dissolved the Parliament, and many parliamentarians were sent to prison or to exile (mostly to Malta). The Allies hoped to destroy the nationalist movement with this, however the dissolution of the parliament increased the importance of Kemal as the leader of the movement and many more people, including influential soldiers, joined the Ankara movement. Also the dissolution of the Istanbul Parliament led to the establishment of a new parliament in Ankara by the 'rebel' Mustafa Kemal and his friends, who considered the Pact the essence of its ultimate aims and its foreign policy.¹⁸ Henceforth the National Pact became the *Magna Carta* of the nationalists.

¹⁶ Kili claims that the National pact was based on the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses' resolutions: Kili, *Kemalism*, p. 17.

¹⁷ For the English text of the National Pact see: Nuri Eren, 'The Foreign Policy of Turkey', in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (eds.), *Foreign Policy in a World of Change*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).

¹⁸ It is not clear that Kemal accepted the Pacts territorial aim including the islands, some Arab territories, and Western Thrace. We have no evidence whether Mustafa Kemal shared this view of point or not although Kemal publicly defend the Pact. However, it is certain that Kemal strictly defended the national sovereignty and independence principles of the Pact: 'We regard those who accept the National pact in the material and moral field who approve of our complete independence at once as friends. We recognise

Now there were two governments in Turkey claiming to represent the people: Ankara and Istanbul. Hence the nationalist Ankara government strove to remove this competition and to gain domestic and international recognition, and this became one of the aims of the foreign policy of the nationalists. To this end, however, it needed financial support to get arms and other necessities. Thus defence matters and financial help became the most important priorities of Turkish foreign policy. In this framework the most important objectives can be summarised as:

- a. implementation of the National Pact,
- b. recognition of the Ankara Parliament as the legal representative of the Turkish nation,
- c. to establish alliances in order to get military, financial, diplomatic and moral support.

The First Parliament and Kemalist Strategy

Before discussing the war, we must look at the main characteristics of the first Ankara Parliament, because its unique features determined the success in the war and then the nature of the Kemalist revolution.

The Ankara parliament opened on 20 May 1920 and Kemal was elected the first president of the parliament on 24 April. No single group dominated the Ankara Parliament, that is Mustafa Kemal and his adherents were far from controlling the first parliament. As a matter of fact, the Kemalists were in a minority in the Assembly when they began the political struggle. The leadership of Kemal and the prestige he enjoyed as the hero of the war of liberation gave the Kemalists a great advantage.¹⁹ But that is all. There was a pluralistic and democratic environment in the parliament. In addition to the secular Westernists, the Islamists and the Ottomanists were also strong.²⁰ There was no political party but groups, namely *Birinci* and *İkinci Grup* (First and Second groups).

the right proposed in the international relations of settled and civilised societies, namely, "Every nation should have control over its own destiny" as the quintessence of the most sublime and noble ideals and ideas for the community of all nations. We demand the unconditional recognition of this right for ourselves.' Atatürk in M. Emin Hekimgil, *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*, (Ankara: Ministry of Culture, 1998), p. 7.

¹⁹ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 53.

²⁰ İhsan Güneş, *Birinci T.B.M.M.'nin Düşünce Yapısı, 1920-1923*, (*The Thinking Style of the First*

The First Group came from the Young Turk's tradition and was secularist Westernist, while the Second Group was a wider coalition of Islamists, Ottomanists, traditionalists and the liberals. The First Group was revolutionary, the Second evolutionary. The First Group was autocratic looking to the French revolution as an example, but the Second was more liberal. Ali Sükrü Bey, Second Group, MP for Trabzon, summarised their liberalism:

'If a nation cannot insist on its due, if that nation cannot maintain and preserve its freedom that nation would be a slave. We must give the people personality and self-respect. If the people know that they are free, they would have the ability to do more things...' ²¹

The only common denominator between these groups was their aim for full-independence and hostility towards the occupying powers. Therefore both were concerned by each other and made efforts to preserve the coalition until independence day. Especially, Kemal knew that he could not create a secular nation-state with this Parliament. For him, such a revolution needed an autocratic powerful government, but the First Parliament's governing body was a parliamentary government. The Parliament had all means of control over the government, and was so zealous in defending its rights and responsibilities, particularly external affairs. Therefore until the end of the War Kemal did not attempt any reform but manipulated the groups in the Parliament by using his heroic charisma in order to get absolute power in the post-war era.²² As Mango pointed out

'his formulas could be interpreted to give satisfaction to both conservatives and radicals... Through the Grand National Assembly he mobilized all Muslims willing to resist. As long as the war lasted he refused to discuss permanent constitutional arrangements. Against supporters of the Istanbul government, he used irregulars, then threw his new army against them. He even organised his own tame Bolshevik Party to stop genuine Bolshevik infiltration.' ²³

The Parliament had been created in order to put an end to the occupation of Turkey. Therefore Turkey's foreign relations were its *raison d'état*. As a natural extension of that, the Parliament had absolute power in its legislation and execution of foreign policy matters. Because the first priority was to win independence and end the occupation, therefore as discussed above, the differences in the Parliament did not appear for a

Turkish Parliament), (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1997), p. 381-389.

²¹ Ali Sükrü Bey (Second Group, MP for Trabzon), cited in İhsan Güneş, p.185.

²² Similar to Kemal, the Second Group also delayed its ultimate aims, and waited until the end of the war. Hüseyin Avni Bey (MP for Erzurum), *Tevhid-i Efkar* (daily), 29 April 1339, p. 3.

²³ Andrew Mango, *Turkey*, (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1968), pp. 46-47.

while. However the real picture was different than the appearance since liberating the nation and the fatherland was not the only aims of the parliament:

‘To liberate the caliphate and the sultanate, the fatherland and the nation, within the framework of the principle of national sovereignty...’²⁴

In fact, there were these sometimes contradictory aims which united people and the different political groups against the foreign occupation. Even Mustafa Kemal pretended to accept liberating sultan and caliphate as an ultimate aim of the national resistance although it would be understood after the war he was a sincere republican and against monarchy and the Islamic state. Therefore it can be argued that in the first Ankara Parliament there were at least two different foreign policy understandings: republican and imperial. As will be seen in the Lausanne agreement, both had different inspirations, considerations and ultimate aims. While the imperial approach saw territory and population as a sign of the power of the state, republicans’ priority was a homogenous population with a defensible and limited territory. However, as mentioned, these differences did not cause formidable troubles as the urgent problem was to stop the aliens from the country. Yet immediately after the military victory, the divergence would appear over the Lausanne negotiations.

During these years the foreign policy bureaucracy under the strict control of the parliament was not so effective: it included just three persons when the Ministry was established.²⁵ The Ministry was not perceived as an actor in the decision-making process, because the Parliament viewed itself as the only foreign policy maker and did not want to share its extraordinary power with any other organ. Moreover the Ministry had not been designed for such a task. Anyone who knew French or any other foreign language could easily become a diplomat in the Ministry.²⁶ The most important duty of the Ministry was to translate speeches and documents.

²⁴ Elaine Diana Smith, **Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly, 1919-1923**, (Washington, D.C.: 1959), p. 44.

²⁵ Kemal Girgin, **Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemleri Hariciye Tarihimiz, Teşkilat ve Protokol** (*The Foreign Ministry History in the Ottoman and Republican Periods*), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994), p. 118.

²⁶ Girgin, **Osmanlı...**, p. 119.

The War of Independence²⁷ and the Sevres Syndrome

The nationalist movement was direct threat not only for the Allied occupiers but also for the Sultanate because the nationalists for the first time claimed the only source of the sovereignty was the people and they had sole right to rule the Turkish people and the sultan was asked to recognise the parliament's authority²⁸:

'Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation. The Grand National Assembly is the true and sole representative of the nation. Legislative authority and executive power are manifested and concentrated in the Grand National Assembly.'²⁹

On the other hand the Istanbul was making efforts to undermine the Ankara parliament by declaring Kemal and his friends 'rebel, traitor' and even 'infidel'.³⁰ The Istanbul's efforts gave its fruits as a civil war and the nationalists had to deal with supporters of the Sultan (Green Army etc.) while it was in a severe conflict against the Greeks in the West, Armenians in the East and the French in the southern fronts.³¹

During these days the voluntary Turkish forces were fighting against the Greeks in the Aegean and Thrace provinces while the Kurdish and Turkish were in conflict against the French occupation forces in the south-eastern Turkey. Thanks to the voluntary armed forces attacks, the French was in a serious trouble in the region. For instance, the French forces were driven out of Urfa by the nationalists. The military victory and heavy loses forced the French to negotiate with the Ankara movement and an armistice for 20 days was signed on 30 May 1920. The Ankara parliament was against such an armistice, but Kemal persuaded the members by arguing that an armistice would not only provide the time necessary for the re-organisation of the Turkish forces in the region, but would also bring some more political advantages.³² Although no Allied

²⁷ As mentioned for the chapter in general, it must be noted that the aim of this section is not explaining the events before Sevres Agreement or the details of the agreement, but to examine its impact on Turkish foreign policy in future years. The section particularly looks at the Kemal and his friend's reaction to the agreement and its effects on shaping Turkish scepticism about the West and the outer world in general. For the details of the agreement, in addition to the general sources mentioned above for the 1919-1923 period, also see Paul Helmreich, *From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920*, (Columbia, Ohio: 1974).

²⁸ Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 349.

²⁹ Atatürk in Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 61.

³⁰ Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 349.

³¹ Atatürk, *Speech...*, pp. 400-404.

³² Kemal's plan was to create disagreement between the British and the French with such an armistice: Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy...*, p. 75. In a short time Kemal's plans worked and the Turkish-French armistice annoyed the British and damaged the Allies' prestige in controlling Anatolia as it was

states officially recognised Ankara government, with this armistice France *de facto* recognised the Ankara as the representative of the Turkish nation by disregarding the Istanbul government.³³ After the armistice the conflicts between the Turks and the French were stopped for a while³⁴ and some of the Turkish nationalists found an opportunity to move some troops to the West.³⁵

In contrast to the successes on the eastern fronts, the situation in the west was not bright. In the spring of 1920, the French had occupied Zonguldak province and on 16 March 1920 Istanbul had officially been occupied by the allied forces as a punishment for the nationalist activities in Cilicia.³⁶ This followed the Greek advance in most of Western Anatolia. The Greeks had landed İzmir with the approval of the Allies and under British, French and US naval protection on 15 May 1919, and they were advancing in the region since that date.³⁷

Sevres and the Nationalists' Strategy

Under these circumstances, the aim of the Allied occupiers was to force the Turks to sign a peace agreement like all other defeated countries.³⁸ On 18 June 1920 the Ankara Parliament declared that it would abide by the National Pact and would not accept any occupation. However on 10 August 1920, the Istanbul government signed the Sevres Agreement, which stipulated the occupation of Turkey by the French, British, Russian, Greek and Italian forces. The agreement suggested an independent state for the Armenians in Eastern Turkey and an autonomous administration for the Kurds in south-eastern Turkey. Western Turkey, İzmir and many Aegean islands would be annexed to the Greek mainland, while Turkish majority-territories would be shared between the other allied forces. The Turks would have no control of the straits zone, including

considered as a first step to a final peace agreement between France and Turkey.

³³ Bayur, *Türk...*, pp. 90-94; Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy...*, p. 75.

³⁴ Except Antep and some parts of the Adana province.

³⁵ On 28 May 1920 Kemal immediately issued a withdrawal command to the Turkish forces: Mustafa Kemal's Command Telegram, 28 May 1920, Ankara, Document No. 873, *Atatürk'ün Kurtuluş Savaşı Yazışmaları (Atatürk's Writings in the War of Independence)*, Volume II, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1995), pp. 145-147.

³⁶ As a matter of fact that Istanbul was practically under the control of the Allied forces. On 16 March 1920 this control turned to an official occupation. Robinson, *The First...*, p. 286; Sonyel, *Turkish...*, p. 28.

³⁷ Robinson, *First...*, p.283-284.

³⁸ For the official text see Reha Parla (ed.), *Belgelerle Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Uluslararası Temelleri, (The International Foundations of the Republic of Turkey With the Documents)*, (Lefkoşe, TRNC: 1985), pp. 297-324.

Istanbul. The Capitulations and other privileges for Western companies and citizens would be restored. In practice, the agreement meant not only the end of the Ottoman Empire but also destruction of any Turkish political existence. Interestingly, although other defeated countries preserved their independence and much of their territorial integrity, like Germany and Bulgaria, there was a visible wish among the British-led alliance to erase the Turks from history. Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary made no secret of his feelings about the Turks:

‘...where they had been for centuries as a source of distraction, intrigue and corruption of unmitigated evil to everybody concerned.’³⁹

In the Turkish view, therefore, the Sevres agreement confirmed the Western intention to put an end to the Turkish state. Even the United States was against a strong Turkey, supporting many mini-states in Anatolia instead of a strong Turkish state. Worst of all, the ‘loyal’ Ottoman minorities were helping the allied forces against the Muslim population of Anatolia. Even the Muslim Arabs were in co-operation with the British against the Turks in the Arabic speaking territories. The Armenians sought an independent state in eastern Turkey⁴⁰ the Greeks in the Western Anatolia and the Black Sea regions were planning to set up a Greek Anatolian state, to be annexed to mainland Greece.

These anti-Turkish agendas in the Sevres nourished Turkish scepticism of the West, minority groups and democratisation. For Necati Bey, deputy for Erzurum province, the Sevres was ‘the ugly and satanic face of Europe’, while Nebil Efendi, deputy for Karahisarisahip, sarcastically commented on the agreement: ‘They have taken too much trouble. It would have been better had they said that Turkey existed no more’.⁴¹ All these experiences left permanent marks on the Turkish public and on the minds of Turkish decision-makers in the Republican era. Hereafter Turks were obsessed with the idea that the Turks were isolated, and had no friends; the West and most of the foreigners were viewed as involved in a conspiracy to weaken and divide Turkey and eventually destroy the Turks as a nation. These fears were not new; even in the Ottoman Empire the Turkish people and elite were suspicious about the West’s reliability.

³⁹ Lord Kinross, *The Rebirth of a Nation*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 139.

⁴⁰ For Akyüz the Armenians were supported and encouraged by the French. In the Turkish territories occupied by French where the Turks were majority *Armenyfication* was started by the French occupation forces: Akyüz, *Türk...*, pp. 122-123.

⁴¹ Both cited in Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy...*, p. 79.

However, with the Sevres Agreement and the Western aggressive and ‘partial’ attitude in the War of Independence these fears became a paranoia which can be called the ‘Sevres paranoia’ or the ‘Sevres phobia’. Not only in Atatürk’s times but also in later years this paranoia was to re-appear from time to time.

Kemal and his followers vehemently rejected the Sevres Agreement and the Ankara Parliament immediately declared all those who signed the Sevres, including the Ottoman Prime Minister, to be traitors.⁴² However the struggle against the Istanbul and the Allies would not be easy: As Atatürk later described ‘the Army existed in name only’.⁴³ The army was effectively disbanded and the economy collapsed.⁴⁴ the economy had collapsed. After the war, most CUP politicians and military officers had been taken prisoner and the people were fed up with the war. The occupiers were organised military forces while the Turkish voluntary groups and bands lacked of sufficient gun and financial support. As witnessed in the Sevres agreement the great powers were planning to divide Turkish territories to many small countries. The United States for instance de facto recognised the Armenian Republic and gave a clear support for a greater Armenia including the Eastern Turkey.⁴⁵

Under these circumstances, the nationalist movement first of all tried to strengthen the army, on the other it looked for aid and support against the occupation. For external support there were only two potential allies: the United States and Soviet Union. Though US President Woodrow Wilson had supported an independent Armenian state in Turkey,⁴⁶ Kemal implied to General Harbord, the American representative, that the nationalist movement could accept an American mandate.⁴⁷

Relations with the Soviet Union:⁴⁸ Apart from the Muslim countries, ‘the major international support for the Turkish national struggle came from the Soviet Union.’⁴⁹

⁴² Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 356.

⁴³ Hekimgil, *Mustafa....*, p. 3.

⁴⁴ Kruger, *Kemalist...*, p. 23.

⁴⁵ Robinson, *The First...*, p. 286.

⁴⁶ With the Monroe Doctrine an isolationist foreign policy started to dominate the US foreign policy. Thus Wilson’s suggestions could not be carried out.

⁴⁷ Although Atatürk clearly stated his intention for an American mandate Kemalist academics claim that this was a strategy, he was using the US against the allied states.

⁴⁸ For Turkish – Soviet relations during the War of Turkish Independence see Bülent Gökay, *A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918-1923*, (London: Tauris, 1997); Halil Ibrahim Karal, *Turkish Relations with Soviet Russia During the National*

the nationalists perceived that the only country from which the nationalists could get support was the Soviet Union. Both faced a common threat: the allied forces. (Like Turkey, some Soviet territories were under the allied forces occupation and the Soviet government faced external and internal threats). Also, the Turkish straits, a historically crucial zone for Russian security, were now under the control of the allied states. Thus, the Soviet Union saw the nationalist Turks as a 'natural ally' against the British and other Western powers. In the words of Gökay, 'British sponsorship of the Greek army in Anatolia and the Allied support of the anti-Bolshevik Russian armies in Russia drove the Turkish nationalists and the Bolsheviks into each other's arms.'⁵⁰ The Soviet Politburo publicly stressed that the government was ready to assist the Turks in their struggle against the Allies.⁵¹ Likewise, the Ankara parliament attached a great importance to Soviet friendship realising that its goal could be achieved only if the Bolsheviks and the British were balanced against each other.⁵² As a result Ankara sent a delegation, headed by the newly elected Turkish Foreign Minister Bekir Sami Bey, to Moscow on 11 May 1920. Kemal stated his desire for close co-operation between the two countries against 'imperialist countries' threatening both of them in his letter⁵³ to the Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin, in 26 April 1920. He hoped that an official agreement with the Soviets would provide Ankara much needed help and financial support.⁵⁴ In response Chicherin expressed his country's support for the Turkish National Pact and its readiness for diplomatic relations.⁵⁵

In the summer of 1920, both the Greeks from the West and the Armenians from the East attacked the Turkish forces while the negotiations with Moscow deadlocked because of

Liberation War of Turkey, 1918-1922, A Study in the Diplomacy of the Kemalist Revolution, PhD thesis, University of California, 1967; Suat Bilge, **Türkiye Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri, 1920-1964, Güç Komşuluk**, (*Turkey-Soviet Union Relations, 1920-1964, The Difficult Neighbourhood*), (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1992), pp. 25-60; Sonyel, **Turkish Diplomacy...**, pp. 39-65; Haluk F. Gürsel, **Tarih Boyunca Türk - Rus İlişkileri, Bir Siyasi Tarih İncelemesi**, (*The Turkish-Russian Relations in History, A Political History*), (Istanbul: Buha Matbaası, 1968), pp. 181-192.

⁴⁹ Bülent Gökay, 'The Turkish Communist Party: The Fate of the Founders', **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 29, No. 2, April 1993, p. 222.

⁵⁰ Gökay, **A Clash...**, p. 2. For a similar view see Gürsel, **Tarih...**, p. 182.

⁵¹ Gökay, **A Clash...**, p. 81.

⁵² Gökay, **A Clash...**, p. 168; Taner Timur, **Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası**, (*The Turkish Revolution and Aftermath*), (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1997), p. 23.

⁵³ For Kemal's letter see: Bilge, **Güç...**, pp. 34-35.

⁵⁴ Gökay, **A Clash...**, p. 102.

⁵⁵ For Chicherin's letter see: Kazım Karabekir, **İstiklal Harbimiz**, (*Our War of Independence*), (Istanbul: 1960), pp. 784-785.

Armenia and the Soviets' wait-and-see Turkey policy.⁵⁶ The Turks realised that to break the deadlock a military operation was inevitable. In fact the developments in the Caucasus were of interest to the nationalist Turks because Turkish troops had captured many places in the region during the First World War, and General Karabekir with his relatively strong troops gave a clear support to Mustafa Kemal. The most important factor helped the Turks was the fact that the Russians were beset by the internal problems and the Soviet Union was unable to follow an active policy beyond its frontiers at least for a while.⁵⁷ Thanks to this suitable environment, in the autumn, the Turkish nationalists moved onto the offensive to secure the Eastern border and to persuade the Russians. In September the Turkish forces under General Kazım Karabekir's command began an attack from Erzurum province on 28 September 1920. Turkish forces on 2 November took Kars and as a result of the operations the Turkish nationalists totally defeated the Armenians. On 3 December 1920 a Soviet government was established at Erivan, capital of Armenia and on 2-3 December the Gümrü (Alexandropol) Peace Agreement, Ankara's first international treaty, was agreed by two sides - the first official agreement signed by Ankara.⁵⁸ Thus Armenia and Turkey declared the Sevres Agreement invalid (article 10). The agreement also saved the future Turkish governments from a potential problem, namely the greater Armenia issue as the Armenian government accepted that there was no Armenian majority in any Turkish provinces (article 3). The agreement, moreover, increased the prestige of the Ankara parliament. Another importance of the agreement was that it allowed Kemal to concentrate on the conflicts in the Western front.

Several months later, after the problems were solved in the Armenian front, on 16 March 1921, The Turco – Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood Agreement was signed. As mentioned, both sides were aware that their ultimate aims were different. The French scholar Paul Dumont names Turkish-Russian co-operation as a 'friendship based on interest'.⁵⁹ For example, the Chair of the Baku Congress stated: 'We do not forget that the Mustafa Kemal government is not communist. Yet we are ready to help a

⁵⁶ For the Turkish-Soviet negotiations in Moscow see Gökay, *A Clash...*; Bilge, *Türkiye...*, pp. 60-78; I. Karal, *Turkish Relations with Soviet Union during Liberation War of Turkey, 1918-1922*, (California: 1967).

⁵⁷ Elaine Diana Smith, *Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly, 1919-1923*, (Washington, D.C.: 1959), p. 108.

⁵⁸ For the agreement see GKB, *Türk İstiklal Harbi, (Turkish Independence War)*, Volume III, (Ankara: 1965), pp. 308-311.

revolution movement against the British.’⁶⁰ Similarly Kemal sought to exploit the situation in Russia and the antagonism between Russia and the Allied states to his advantage. The agreement removed Russian demands for Turkish territories and guaranteed the eastern Turkish borders giving Kars and Ardahan to Turkey. The Soviets accepted the abolition of the capitulations and officially recognised the Ankara government.⁶¹ The treaty also eased Turkey’s difficulties and gave it a free hand toward the West. Furthermore, as Shaws pointed out the Turkish-Soviet Treaty provided a legal justification for Mustafa Kemal to suppress the Turkish communists in Turkey,⁶² as ‘both parties promised to refrain from supporting “seditious groups and activities on the other’s territory”’.⁶³ Moreover, the Soviet Union, although it was not mentioned in the text, sent military and economic aid to Ankara. The amount of the aid is still not clear. The Soviets’ main aim was to strengthen the Turks against the Western powers, in particular to protect the Turkish straits since the Russians saw the straits as the most strategic location for the Soviet national security. Despite the agreement, however, the Ankara government still remained very suspicious of Soviet sincerity. For example, Bekir Sami Bey, head of the delegation to Moscow, had doubts about the Soviet aims regarding Turkey and favoured immediate peace with the Western countries.⁶⁴

Relations with the Muslim World: As discussed and as will be detailed in the next two chapters of this thesis Kemal and his circle were secular, and their aim in the War of Independence was not to save the caliph or sultan, although they never declared their sincere aims until they assured the full support of the other political groups. Also they saw the other Muslim countries as a source of financial, diplomatic and moral support against the Allies. Kemal even gave religious speeches to gain support of the Muslims in Anatolia and the Muslims under the British rule. In another words Kemal and the Ankara government attached great importance to these societies during the Independence War, hoping to reap two benefits: influence over the British Empire and the other powers which had Muslim colonies; and financial support from other Muslim communities. Ankara’s ‘Islamic foreign policy’ worked and in India in particular the

⁵⁹ Dumont, *Mustafa...*, pp. 109-115.

⁶⁰ Gönlübol and others, *Olaylarla...*, p. 27.

⁶¹ Gökay, *A Clash of...*, p. 109.

⁶² When Kemal gained the benefits he expected from the Soviets, he would suppressed the communists. For Kemal’s attitude towards the Turkish communists see Gökay, ‘The Turkish...’, pp. 220-235.

⁶³ Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 359.

⁶⁴ Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 31.

Muslims protested to the British government over its Turkey policy.⁶⁵ Also India's Muslim financial support for Turkish Independence War was significant.⁶⁶

In addition, the Ankara parliament's first official international treaty was with a Muslim country, Afghanistan.⁶⁷ When the Turkish delegate was in Moscow for a possible peace treaty negotiations they found a fully authorised Afghan mission ready to negotiate a treaty.⁶⁸ After the negotiations the Turco-Afghan Treaty was signed on 1 March 1921. In fact, according to the text, the treaty was a defence and co-operation agreement. With the treaty Turkey and Afghanistan recognised each other as an independent state, and the Turks promised to help some of the social problems of Afghanistan.⁶⁹

To summarise, Turkey manipulated the friendly solidarity feelings in the East towards the Turkish resistance movement to get material and diplomatic support. However, as will be seen in the next chapter this policy would radically change after the military victory.⁷⁰

The Greek - Turkish War: The Turkish-Soviet agreement and the subsequent victories against the Greek forces convinced the allies of the Ankara's power. Also, there was a serious divergence among the Allies on Turkish territories. France, for instance perceived the British as the main beneficiary of the Sevres Agreement although French losses were relatively higher than the British's.⁷¹ With all these factor, Turkish victories

⁶⁵ M. Lütfullah Karaman, 'Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika Bağlamında Din Ögesi ve Hindistan Müslümanları', (*The Religious Factor and the Indian Muslims from the Perspective of the Independence War and Foreign Policy*), in Sönmezoğlu (ed.), *Türk* p. 234. As Sonyel put it, the British thought that the Turkish nationalists might set up 'a great Muslim Republic': Sonyel, *Turkish...*, p. 31.

⁶⁶ Although there is no consensus on amount of the Indian aid to Turkey it is clear that the aid was very important for Ankara. For Kinross and Dumont the aid was about £125,000: Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: Rebirth of a Nation* (London: Weidenfeld, 1964), p. 298; Dumont, *Mustafa...*, p. 115. For Söylemezoğlu, who was a diplomat during these years, £50,000 was sent by the Indian Muslims just in 1922: G. Kemali Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde 30 Sene, 1892-1922, (30 Years in the Service of Foreign Office)*, (Istanbul: Maarif Kitabevi, 1955), p. 89. For other guesses see Karaman, pp. 231-241.

⁶⁷ İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları, (Turkey's Political Agreements)*, I. Volume (1920-1945), (Ankara: TTK, 1989), p. 25.

⁶⁸ The Afghan delegation was also seeking the Soviet support in Moscow for the newly independent Afghan state: Sonyel, *Turkish...*, p. 66; Dilan, *Türkiye'nin...*, p. 73.

⁶⁹ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin...*, p. 25.

⁷⁰ Turkey maintained friendly relations with Afghanistan after the proclamation of the republic, yet the relations with any Muslim country would not be based on religious solidarity and Turkey would refuse to join any religious meeting in the Atatürk era. For the details see Chapter IV of this study.

⁷¹ Toktamış Ateş, 'Ulusal Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Türk Dış Politikası', in Ateş and others, *Türk Dış Politikasında Sorunlar*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınevi, 1989), p. 5.

in the battles against the Greeks increased Turkish government's prestige in the eyes of the Allies.

As mentioned the Greeks had occupied the Western Aegean provinces and the Eastern Thrace. They were moreover planning to advance into the inner Anatolia. For the Greeks the Turkish territories were historically Greek and the end of this operation had to be all of the Anatolian territories (Megali Idea).⁷² The first Turkish nationalist resistance groups and the local bands, like Çerkes Ethem and his followers, slowed down the Greek advance yet to completely stop the invasion Ankara realised the necessity of organised military forces. For a long time the problems in the eastern and southern fronts with the lack of financial source, manpower and equipment had hindered an effective nationalist resistance, and as a result of these problems in the winter of 1919 Ankara forces had withdrawn near to Ankara. The Greek in this period continued their occupation with the British support⁷³ until very near to the Ankara Parliament. This advance made panicked the Turks and even the members of the parliament debated moving the parliament from Ankara to a more eastern province, namely Sivas. Under this tensioned environment Chief of the General Ismet (Inönü) was put in charge of the Western front and this changed the picture in favour of the Turks. On the other hand Kemal made efforts to eliminate the potential leader candidates, like Çerkes Ethem and other religious, separatist and liberal opposing leaders, without damaging the harmony against the foreign occupiers. The Green Army, which was formed by some religious and religious-communist opposing groups with the help of the foreign elements, was also another trouble; when Çerkes Ethem joined the organisation, the Green Army became a serious threat to Kemal and his friends and wasted the energy of nationalist forces.⁷⁴ As a result of the First Inönü Battle the Greeks retreated toward Bursa on 10 January 1921.

Thanks to the successful Turkish resistance, the attacks in the Inönü and finally the Turkish nationalists' good relations with the Soviets and the French, the Ankara

⁷² For the Greek irredentism see: Michael L. Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922*, (London: Allen Lane, 1973).

⁷³ Sükrü Sina Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri, 1821-1923*, (*Turkish Greek Relations in a Historical Dimension, 1821-1923*), (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), p. 33-34; Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, pp. 357-358.

⁷⁴ Gökay, 'The Turkish...', p. 222. Kemal in his Speech argued that Çerkes Ethem's troops with Tevfik Bey practically formed the nucleus of the Green Army: Atatürk, *Speech...*, p. 403.

government was invited to the London Peace Conference to discuss possible amendments to the Sevres Agreement on 6 January 1921. The Conference failed and no agreement was reached because the Allied forces did not accept Turkey's demands, and in its wake the Greek forces attacked once more, yet these new attacks also failed. In light of these setbacks the Italians withdrew their forces from Southern Anatolia and looked for an agreement with Ankara when they realised their Anatolia adventure would end up with heavy losses. Similarly the French were also seeking to stop the conflict in southern Turkey because their casualties and the cost of the war reached its peak and they had serious problems in Syria and the Greeks and the British could not end the Turkish resistance in the West.⁷⁵ First the French hoped to obtain some capitulatory privileges for France in exchange for the withdrawal of the troops. The negotiations between Franklin-Bouillon of France and Bekir Sami Bey of Turkey had been concluded on this base during the London Conference. However neither the Ankara parliament nor Kemal approved it because it ignored the national sovereignty principle. Thanks to the influence of the Sakarya Battle (13 September 1921), France would be convinced in a later date and on 20 October 1921 the Ankara Agreement (*İtilafname*) or Bouillon Agreement would be signed between France and Turkey with this treaty ended the state of war between these two countries (article 1), and France became the first Western power which concluded a treaty with the Turks. With the agreement the southern borders of Turkey were also guaranteed (article 10), and the Anglo-French alliance was broken.⁷⁶ France with the agreement accepted the National Pact instead of the Sevres. Furthermore the Ankara Agreement enabled some Turkish troops to move the Western front against the Greeks while the French in turn moved their forces into Syria. Consequently, the only countries at war with the Ankara movement remained Great Britain and Greece.

In the summer of 1921, the Greeks and Kemal had political difficulties at home, therefore they had to prove their power in a short time. In Greece the romantic and reactionary Royalists were now in charge while the religious people, liberals,

⁷⁵ For the other reasons of the changes in the French Turkish policy see İsmail Soysal, 'Türk - Fransız İlişkileri, 1919-1984', (*Turkish - French Relations, 1919-1984*), *Siyasal Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1984, pp. 230-321.

⁷⁶ For the full text of the agreement: *League of Nations Treaty Series*, No. 1284 (1926-27), Vol. 54, pp. 178-193 and for the Turkish version see GKB, *Türk İstiklal Harbi, Doğu Cephesi 1919-1921* (*Turkish Independence War, The Eastern Front*), Vol. III, (Ankara: Genelkurmay, Turkish Head of the General Staff, Department of the War History, 1965), p. 250-252; Parla (ed.), *Belgelerle...*, pp. 139-146.

Ottomanists and leftists in Ankara Parliament were blaming Kemal for the difficulties in the war and other aspects of the political life. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, Kemal and his friend had no absolute control over the parliament: Some groups in the parliament had no patient for victory and they could not understand Kemal's flexible policies. On the other hand the Islamists and Ottomanists had doubts about Kemal's ultimate aim, because they perceived the main aim of the War of Independence as to save Sultan, caliphate and finally the Turkish people and territories while as would be seen after the war, Kemal was a secular republican. Furthermore, Kemal had some personal enemies in the parliament.⁷⁷ The opposition in particular pressed Kemal in his re-appointment as the Commander-in-Chief and in each of the renewals of the related act. In the third renewal, after a long debate the necessary majority to renew the act was not obtained. This greatly annoyed Kemal and next day in a secret session he severely challenged the opposition:

'I am not superfluous office or a superfluous authority, and still less of an Act that would give full powers to an authority without responsibility.(...) Salih Efendi, deputy for Erzurum, has said that I desired to usurp the rights of the Assembly and that I had done so, and he shouted out: We shall not abandon our good rights.(...) I entirely rejected Salih Efendi's remark about my alleged usurpation of the full powers of the Assembly.(...) The army has no commander-in-chief at the present moment. If I continue to carry on my command I shall be doing so illegally. According to the opinion expressed by the assembly I ought to have already laid down my command. I had previously told the Government that my authority as chief-in-command had expired. I felt, however, obliged not to admit that an irreparable disaster could happen. Our army at the front could not be left without a commander. Consequently, I did not leave, and refused to; I shall never leave it in this way.'⁷⁸

In the secret sessions violent discussions took place and the opposition forced Kemal to resign yet could not success, and three months later the Act relating to the chief command was approved. Kemal's the most important advantage was the foreign occupation, and he largely used this card as seen in these debates:

'...Our real task and our main objective does not concern politics. Our only duty, and that of the whole country and the whole nation, is to drive the enemy out of the country by the force of our bayonets. Until we have done that, politics is an empty word.'⁷⁹

Under these circumstances the Greek advance began on 13 August 1921 toward the Sakarya river, near Ankara. This attack once more panicked the Ankara parliament

⁷⁷ Günes, *Birinci...*, p. 380.

⁷⁸ Atatürk, *A Speech...*, pp.551-556.

⁷⁹ Atatürk, *A Speech...*, pp. 552-553.

because the thunder of the battle was plainly heard in Ankara.⁸⁰ After a preparation period, however, the picture was completely changed by the Turkish counter attacks in August 1922, and the Turks in these conflicts eventually won the war. The Greek forces broke and fled to the Aegean Sea while their⁸¹ commanding general was captured. Ankara recaptured the territories under the Greek occupation and the entrance of the Turkish forces into İzmir marked the Turkish final victory on 9 September 1922. Shortly afterwards, on 11 October 1922, the Mudanya Armistice between Turkey and Britain ended the war. The Ankara government had achieved its military aims. Furthermore, the Turkish victory made Mustafa Kemal a national hero in the people's eyes. In the words of Ward, 'he was now in the prime of life'.⁸²

The Lausanne Agreement: Founding Agreement of Turkish Foreign Policy

After the War of Independence, Ankara was ready to change the Sevres Agreement. As a matter of fact that Mustafa Kemal sought close relations with the Allies after the war.⁸³ However, although the nationalists had won the War of Independence, the Western strategy still recognised both the Istanbul and the Ankara governments. To put an end this, the Ankara Parliament abolished the sultanate on 1 November 1922, and in so doing it became the only representative of the Turkish people. Sultan Vahdettin escaped from Turkey on 17 November 1922. Turkey did not, nevertheless, abolish the caliphate and Abdülmecid, Vahdettin's cousin, became caliph by a vote of the Grand National Assembly. As leader of the Islamic world community, the Caliph and by extension, Turkey enjoyed Muslim political and financial support. Indeed, as will be shown later Mustafa Kemal used Islam as a foreign policy tool.

Having eliminated the Istanbul government, the nationalists selected their representatives to the Lausanne Conference: İsmet İnönü and Rıza Nur. Kemal had personally selected İnönü though he was not a diplomat, and was partly deaf. This in turn caused a stir in the Parliament, but Kemal would not budge.⁸⁴ Despite all these things, İnönü was his confidant. In the words of Rıza Nur, 'İnönü could not even go to

⁸⁰ Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 36.

⁸¹ Ates, 'Ulusal...', pp. 9-14; Davison, *Turkey...*, p. 124; Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 360.

⁸² Ward, *Turkey...*, p. 51.

⁸³ For Kemal's efforts see Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy...*, pp. 122-159.

⁸⁴ Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy...*, p. 187.

toilet without asking Mustafa Kemal.⁸⁵ For another thing, Kemal did not share Parliament's expectations of Lausanne. The latter dreamt of establishing a new Ottoman Empire on a vast territory. For most parliamentarians, Turkey had won the war and could now get the maximum territories lost before the world war. Certainly that approach reflected an imperial foreign policy understanding. Yet Kemal's plans were totally different. He sought to set up a nation-state, and hence did not need any more territory but rather a homogeneous population, a strong and independent economy and Western support for his new regime. Although he did not mention this idea too often Kemal favoured a minimal territory which could be protected by the existing Turkish forces. It will be recalled that Kemal had suggested the same prescription for the Ottoman Empire earlier.⁸⁶ In other words, despite the Grand National Parliament's (GNP) imperial perspective, Kemal's aims were Republican and the best person to defend these aims in Lausanne was İsmet İnönü. İnönü assured the GNP members that he would take his inspiration from the National Pact,⁸⁷ yet he and Kemal were ready to sacrifice any territory to maintain the Republican aims. Kemal knew that winning a war was not enough to be recognised as an independent political entity. Turkey had to persuade the Western powers of this point, notably Great Britain.

The conference opened on 21 November 1922, however as a result of the Turkish insist on an absolute national sovereignty over the political and economic matters of Turkey and the Allies' unacceptable demands the conference broke off on 4 February 1923. It reopened in two months. The Turkish delegate made many territorial concessions including the Musul oil region. The aim was simply to get Western support for future years. As a result, the Lausanne Agreement was signed on 24 July 1923, and is considered the most important agreement in Turkish foreign policy. In the following years, Turkish policy-makers made efforts to either amend some of its articles or to protect some of them. The agreement also provided a suitable environment for Kemalist policies both inside and outside. It confirmed the Turkish victory and recognised Turkey as an independent state by the allied powers.⁸⁸ Despite some compromises, the

⁸⁵ Nur, *Hayat...*

⁸⁶ For Mustafa Kemal's minimised territorial aims see Yalman's memoirs: Yalman, *Yakın...*, p. 184.

⁸⁷ İsmet İnönü's speech, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, V. 24, 3 November 1922, 330-376.

⁸⁸ For full text of the agreement see *Lozan Sulh Muahedenamesi, Mukavelat ve Senedati Saire, 24 Temmuz 1923-1339*, (*The Lausanne Peace Agreement*), (Ankara: Türkiye B.M.M. Hariciye Vekaleti, The GNP Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1923); Şeha Meray, *Lozan Barış Konferansı* (Lausanne Peace Agreement), Vol. II, (Ankara: Ankara University SBF Yayınları, 1973) and for the English version:

sovereignty of the Turkish government over Anatolia and Eastern Thrace was accepted and the economic capitulations were abolished (Article 28).⁸⁹ To achieve this, Turkey gave up some of the aims of the National Pact. The Aegean Islands, Western Thrace, Hatay and Northern Iraq remained outside of Turkish borders (Article 13). Although Turkey insisted on keeping Northern Iraq because of its oil reserves⁹⁰ and its Turkish - Kurdish majority, Britain, with the internal revolt, prevented any unification between Turkey and Northern Iraq. Turkey also recognised the British annexation of Cyprus (Article 21) and gave up all its rights in Libya (Article 22). Turkey did try in the conference, to obtain recognition of its unlimited rights of ownership over the Turkish Straits, but the joint Anglo-French-Italian point of view prevailed though the Soviet Union supported the Turkish side,⁹¹ and Turkey had to accept restrictions on its sovereignty rights to the straits. The straits area was demilitarised and an international commission was entrusted with supervision of the navigation. On the other hand, passage of warships, both in time of peace and war was restricted.⁹² Until the 1936 Montreux Convention the status of the Straits remained as stipulated in Lausanne.

Atatürk and İnönü were satisfied with the agreement because they had got what they had wanted. Atatürk had hoped to gain a fully independent homogeneous state and to end the wars and the antagonism between Turkey and the West.⁹³ With the Lausanne agreement, the world recognised a fully independent Turkey, put an end to the war between Turkey and the European powers, and abolished the economic capitulations. Moreover, for Atatürk and İnönü, Lausanne put an end to the antagonism between Turkey and the West. In other words, the Lausanne Agreement laid the suitable ground for co-operation with the West. Now Turkey was ready to join the European family. Therefore, the Kemalists put the agreement at the heart of Kemalist foreign policy, viewing any criticism as an attack on Kemalism.

League of Nations Treaty Series, XXVIII (1924).

⁸⁹ In fact the Ottoman government had annulled the capitulations on 1 October 1914, however that decision was not recognised by the other sides, even by the Germans, Turk's ally. The Lausanne agreement was the first international agreement confirming the abolition of the capitulations.

⁹⁰ Kemal Melek, 'Türk - İngiliz İlişkileri (1890-1926) ve Musul Petrolleri', (*Turkish - British Relations and the Musul Oil*), in East Çam (eds.), *Türk Dış Politikasında Sorunlar (The Issues in Turkish Foreign Policy)*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınevi, 1989), p.36.

⁹¹ Gürsel, *Tarih...*, pp. 192-193.

⁹² Eren, 'The Foreign', p. 292-293.

⁹³ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, 'An Analysis of Atatürk's Foreign Policy, 1919-1938', *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, Vol. 20, 1980-1981, pp. 157-160.

For İsmet İnönü, as head of the Turkish delegation, the agreement was a personal and national victory. He described what he had won for Turkey at Lausanne:

‘A homogenous, unified homeland; within it, freedom from the obligations imposed by foreigners and from privileges of a nature creating a state within a state; freedom from imposed financial obligations; a free, rich homeland with a recognised absolute right of self-defence.’⁹⁴

Rıza Nur, the second Turkish delegate in Lausanne, wrote in his memoirs that he had made efforts to Turkify all the peoples living in Turkey through the Lausanne agreement: The most important thing to do is to clear from our country the other races, other languages and other religions.⁹⁵ İnönü accepted that he had to make certain territorial concessions, such as Musul, Aegean Islands and Hatay (Alexandretta) but for him these concessions were for peace and stability: ‘Our only consolation over the loss of certain territories is that with the Lausanne Treaty we have gained a long-standing peace’.⁹⁶

For his part, Mustafa described the Lausanne agreement as ‘the greatest diplomatic victory in history’. For most of the Kemalist authors, like Mehmet Cemil Bilsel⁹⁷, Ali Naci Karacan⁹⁸ and Toktamiş Ateş⁹⁹ also, the Lausanne is a great victory while some others claim that it was a disaster because Turkey lost many Turkish territories mentioned in the National Pact.¹⁰⁰ Ambassador Abdülhat Akşin argued that Turkey had to compromise in order to avoid war with the allied powers. For Akşin, Turkey was not ready for such war and desperately needed time for westernising reforms.¹⁰¹ Similarly, Nevin Ateş has argued that Turkey made serious concessions to Britain about the status of the Turkish Straits. For Ateş, the reason for compromise was Turkey’s desire to gain British support against the French and Russians.¹⁰² Likewise, Ülman and

⁹⁴ Cited in Salahi R. Sonyel, *Atatürk - The Founder of Modern Turkey*, (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 1989), p.100.

⁹⁵ Nur, *Hayat...*, Vol. III, p. 252.

⁹⁶ Abdülhat Akşin, *Atatürk’ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi*, (*Atatürk’s Foreign Policy Principles and Diplomacy*), Volume II, (Istanbul: İnkılap ve Aka, 1966), p. 3.

⁹⁷ Mehmet Cemil Bilsel, *Lozan*, (*Lausanne*), (Istanbul: A. İhsan Tokgöz Matbaası, 1933).

⁹⁸ Ali Naci Karacan, *Lozan* (*Lausanne*), second edition, (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1971).

⁹⁹ Ateş, ‘Ulusal...’, esp. pp. 18-24.

¹⁰⁰ The authors, who claim that the agreement was a disaster, are mainly Islamist, such as Abdurrahman Dilipak and Kadir Mısırlıoğlu. Mısırlıoğlu argues that the Lausanne was a complete failure (*hezimet*) instead of a victory: Kadir Mısırlıoğlu, *Lozan, Zafer mi, Hezimet mi?* (*Lausanne, Victory or Disaster?*), (Istanbul: Sebil Yayınları, 1971).

¹⁰¹ Akşin, *Atatürk’ün...*, pp. 5-9.

¹⁰² Nevin Ateş, ‘Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası ve Hükümet Programları’, (*Republican Turkish Foreign Policy and the Government Programs*), *İktisat Dergisi*, May-June 1996, pp. 71-86, p. 72.

Sander say that Turkey made concessions in solving the Mosul problem though this territory was a part of the National Pact.¹⁰³

After the conference the GNP heavily criticised the agreement and the Turkish delegation. For parliamentarians like Sırrı Bey (İzmir) and Ali Sükrü Bey (Trabzon), the İnönü delegation had sacrificed the National Pact and therefore the agreement was unacceptable. As noted earlier they sought to restore imperial Ottoman glory while Kemal and his followers attempted to create a modern nation-state. Hence what Kemal considered a victory was a disaster for the Ottomanists and the Islamists. As Niyazi Bey (Mersin MP) stated, Lausanne had put an official end to the Ottoman Empire:

‘This agreement confirms that we left Egypt, Sudan, Cyprus, the Aegean Islands and other territories. You, friends, have struggled very hard to defend these territories. But our loses were not only the territories. This agreement declares the end of a magnificent Empire. This agreement declares that we gave Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Arabistan.’¹⁰⁴

For Niyazi Bey the end of the Empire was a disaster, for Kemal it was a victory. Still, Kemal needed the GNP’s ratification of the agreement. Rıza Nur and Mısıroğlu claim that the leading opponent, Ali Sükrü Bey, was murdered in order to ‘persuade the other parliamentarians to approve the Lausanne Agreement’.¹⁰⁵ It was also implied that the *Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu* which had been passed for internal reasons, could be used against the opponents of Lausanne. Moreover, as noted by many observers, Kemal went to elections to renew the ‘reluctant parliament on Lausanne’.¹⁰⁶ It seems that the Kemalist regime had made Lausanne its own, and its opponents traitors to the regime and the nation. With this agreement Kemal had gained Western support for his regime and precious time for his reforms. That was all he had wanted and hereafter the Lausanne became one of the Kemalist taboos.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ A. Haluk Ülman and Oral Sander, ‘Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler, 1923-1968, II’, (*The Factors Determining Affecting Turkish Foreign Policy*), A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 1972, p.3.

¹⁰⁴ Niyazi Bey’s speech, T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, Cilt: I, 8. 205-217.

¹⁰⁵ Mısırlıoğlu, *Lozan...*, p. 346.

¹⁰⁶ Murat Çulcu, *Hilafetin Kaldırılması Sürecinde Cumhuriyetin İlanı ve Lutfi Fikri Davası* (*The Declaration of Republic and Lutfi Fikri Case in the Process of Abolition of Caliphate*), (Istanbul: Kestas, 1992), p. 281; Mete Tunçay, *T.C.’de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, 1923-1931*, (*One-Party Regime in Turkey*), (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1981), p. 50; Kemal Zeki Geçosman, *Devleti Kuran Meclis* (*Parliament which Established the State*), (Istanbul: Hür Yayın, 1981), p. 59; TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Vol. 28, p. 29.

¹⁰⁷ The Lausanne can be considered as a triumph for Turkey in international arena, because Turkey was the only defeated of the First World War, which secured peace and stability by negotiations instead of a dictated peace. All other countries, notably Germany, would have to use military tools to take their lost in the future years. Thus Turkey guaranteed stability and gained time for the internal reforms by signing the

After the Lausanne, the last Allied forces completely left the Turkish territories, including Istanbul, and the Turkish troops re-captured all these provinces. The approval of the Treaty by the Ankara officially closed the Ottoman era, and when the Turkish Parliament made Ankara the new capital of the new Turkish state, it underlined the shift from empire to republic.¹⁰⁸

Conclusion

During the Independence War years no single ideology dominated Turkish political life. All Muslim groups (Turkish and Kurdish) were united against the occupiers. The priority was to gain independence. Foreign policy therefore was designed to reach that aim. The agreements signed during this period, Sevres and Lausanne, can be considered the most important effects of the War years for future Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, Sevres certainly showed the close collaboration between the Ottoman minorities (Armenians, Ottoman Greeks etc.) and the European powers to destroy the Empire. Islamists, Ottomanists or Turkists, all understood that only the Turkish and the Kurdish subjects of the Empire could be seen as loyal to the Empire.¹⁰⁹ Many thousands of Turks were killed or wounded by their neighbours. The effect of that was long-lasting and traumatic. The Allied forces could not carry out the Sevres agreement, and the French, Greek, Italian, British and Russian armies could not continue their occupation of Turkish territories. However, the effect of their policies would last for decades. The lesson was that the Turks had no friend but the Turks. As a result, suspicion of foreigners and the ethnic-religious minorities became the salient characteristic of Turkish foreign policy. No less important, as the founding agreement of contemporary Turkey, Lausanne marked Turkish victory over Western anti-Turkish policies, guaranteeing Turkish borders and economic and political independence. Turkish policy in Lausanne was formed by the Kemalists, hence it can provide a clue for Kemalist

Lausanne agreement. In the words of Zürcher 'Turkey emerged from Lausanne as a nation whose national aspirations generally speaking, had been satisfied. This allowed Turkey to concentrate on domestic problems.' Zürcher, 'Young...', p. 119. However, it cannot be the greatest victory in Turkish history as the Kemalists argue. Yet it was one of the greatest victories for the Kemalist regime.

¹⁰⁸ G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1957), p. 76; Smith, *Turkey...*, p. 57.

¹⁰⁹ In addition to the Turkish and the Kurdish people, the Jewish Ottomans were also loyal to the Empire, and most of them refused to play any role in separation of the country. However, the Jewish population most of time did not claim a separate identity, instead of that they supported the liberal, Ottomanist or Turkist political groups.

foreign policy and the main differences between this policy and other foreign policy understandings in Turkey. Atatürk's ultimate aim was to join European society, therefore he and his friends sacrificed imperial aims in Lausanne without hesitation. They sought to establish an independent, sovereign, secular, Western state on a relatively small territory and end the historical antagonism between Turks and Europeans. Atatürk knew that if the Turks did not give up the idea of an empire, the Europeans would not allow them to establish a developed stable state. On the other hand, the Ottomanists and the Islamists tried to maintain Turkey's imperial character. During the 20th century, therefore, Turkish foreign policy would shift between the desire to protect the Lausanne legacy or to change it. Lausanne would remain at the heart of Turkish foreign policy.

CHAPTER III

Rise of Kemalism

The Young Turks had not trusted the people, but the coalition behind their power was wider than Kemalist regime. Though based on a Westernist, modernist, secularist core ideology, the Young Turks current was a composition of many diverse ideologies and economic and political groups, including a pan-Islamic one. In contrast, the Kemalist regime was ideologically monolithic. Some of its opponents had been killed in the continues wars, whereas the Independence War enabled Kemal to subdue the opposition. When the opposition in the Parliament rejected his position as Head of the Turkish Army, for example, he threatened that ‘I think, it is very likely that some heads will be cut off.’ Despite this famous incident, the Kemalist revolution lacked systematic and widespread violence, characterising the French and the Russian revolution. Instead, Kemal followed a pragmatic way clearing the obstacles step by step. Because his secular and Westernist revolution lacked popular support,¹ Kemal had to create a new class, namely the Kemalist class, to maintain the future of the regime. This process, inevitably, determined the main characters of the regime and the decision-making process.

Kemalist Reforms²

Immediately after the War of Independence, Kemal annulled the wide coalition, set against the occupiers, and wiped out the opposition by force, by law or by sending them into exile. The first Parliament was relatively pluralistic and democratically elected, therefore they were able to challenge Kemal’s policies. The conservatives and the liberals derived their legitimacy and power from parliament. Therefore, Kemal immediately after the military victory made enormous efforts to prevent the opposition (mainly the Second Group) winning the elections for the second parliament held in

¹ Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, (Atatürk Nationalism)*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), pp. 66-75; Frank Tachau, ‘The Political Culture of Kemalist Turkey’, in Jacob M. Landau, *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, Westview Press, p. 66).

² For the Kemalist reforms see Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası, 1919-1946, (Turkish Revolution and Its Aftermath)*, (Ankara: Doğan Yayınevi, 1971); Sami N. Özerdim, *Atatürk Devrimi Kronolojisi (The Chronology of the Atatürk Revolution)*, (Ankara: Halkevleri, 1974); Suna Kili, *Türk Devrim Tarihi, (Turkish Revolution History)*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1980); Artun Ünsal, ‘Atatürk’s Reforms: realization of an Utopia by a Realist’, *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, Vol. XXIII, 1979, pp. 27-57.

August 1923, and with this operation he successfully eliminated most of the representatives of the Islamists, Ottomanists and the liberals.³ In addition, the Caliphate constituted another focal point of opposition. Even after the proclamation of the republic, the conservatives did not abandon the struggle against the Kemalists, using the Caliphate as a symbol of both the country's and the anti-Kemalist opposition. Moreover, despite he was elected and appointed by the Turkish Parliament, the Caliph had a power which exceeded the Turkish borders being the head of all Muslims, including Mustafa Kemal. Apart from the Parliament and the Caliphate, another opposition focal point was the liberal Istanbul intelligentsia and bourgeoisie (tradesmen, businessmen etc.). The Istanbul bourgeoisie, as the beneficiary of the old order, did not sanction the radical transformation of the political and especially the economic state structures. The intelligentsia, which consisted of liberal Turkists, Ottomanists and the minorities, like Jews and Greeks, also resisted Kemalist autocratic methods. Another serious opposition came from the Kurds, but the character of this resistance was different in essence. The Kurdish claim was partly ethnic, partly Islamic. However, the Kurdish rebellions were ill-equipped compared with the other oppositions groups, and were not able to found an independent Kurdish state or to endanger the Ankara government because there was no united Kurdish political movement. The only tools available to the Kurdish opposition and the separatist groups were religion and foreign support.⁴ Finally, the Soviet Union and Marxist groups were dangerous focal points against the Kemalists. Thanks to the internal problems in the Soviet Union, Kemal was not so alarmed by the Marxists at the time, he had even allowed the Marxists to establish their own party to get the Soviet support during the War of Independence;⁵ but when he had suppressed other opposition groups, he wiped out the Marxists as well.

Mustafa Kemal knew that if he could obviate all these sources of opposition there would be no obstacles to his reforms. In this way he demolished them in a *salami*

³ Sabahattin Selek, *Anadolu İhtilali*, (*Anatolian Revolution*), (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaası, 1968), pp. 601-602.

⁴ For more see: Erol Kurubaş, *Kürt Sorununun Uluslararası Boyutları* (*The International Dimension of the Kurdish Problem*), (Ankara: Ümit, 1997).

⁵ Even some Turkish socialists claim Mustafa Kemal was socialist, but they have no proof for this argument. Feridun Kandemir, *Atatürk'ün Kurduğu Türkiye Komünist Partisi ve Sonrası*, (*The Communist Party Atatürk Founded and Aftermath*), (Istanbul: Yakin Tarihimiz Yayınları, 1965). For Kemal's sceptical attitude towards the Turkish communist during the War of Independence see Gökay, 'The Turkish...', pp. 220-235.

tactic.⁶ The first move was to change the country's capital from Istanbul to Ankara to underscore the essence of the change from the old regime to a new state and understanding. Then, on 29 October 1923 a republican regime was declared when most of the influential liberal and conservative members of Parliament, like Hüseyin Rauf, Ali Fuat (Ceibesoy), Adnan (Adivar), Refet (Bele) and Kazım (Karabekir), were out of the capital. They reacted angrily, underlining the fact that the Republic did not itself bring freedom, and that despotism was still possible under a republic as it was under a monarchy.⁷ They were right. Kemal's aim, at least for the moment, was not more freedom or democracy⁸ but rather to clear the way for his reforms and to clean up the debris of the Ottoman order. After the declaration of the republic, anti-Kemalist feelings grew in Istanbul. When Lütfi Fikri's, the president of the Istanbul bar association, suggestion for a more influential position for Caliph was published, tension between Ankara and Istanbul increased dramatically. The most formidable public critics came from Kemal's military rivals. Hence the first thing Kemal had to do was to cut the connection with the army, and to neutralise them. On 19 December 1923 a law was passed obliging military officers who wanted to be in politics to resign their commissions. Some generals left parliament and returned to their military posts, while others resigned their army commissions. In both cases Kemal's opponents were neutralised. A more drastic measure was the abolition of the Caliphate. In the first sessions of Parliament the Caliphate was abolished and all members of the Ottoman house were sent into exile immediately after the decision, a new constitution, *1924 Anayasası*, replaced the 1876 Ottoman Constitution.⁹

With these Kemalist moves and the opposition's reaction, led by Hüseyin Rauf, the tension reached its high point. Rauf and 31 deputies left the Republican People's Party, (RPP - *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) and founded the Progressive Republican Party, PRP - *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) on 17 November 1924. The PRP programme was based on Western European liberalism and was far way from the French revolutionary tradition. It was Westernist, secularist and modernist, but against Kemalist radicalism

⁶ The strategy of taking very thin slices from something (opposition, enemy etc.) or dividing it to many thin slices before a complete confrontation. The analogy is often used in international politics.

⁷ Zürcher, *Turkey...*, p. 174.

⁸ Atatürk explained his excuse as: No country is free unless it is democratic. (...) but democracy does not ripen overnight.' Atatürk, quoted in Emil Langyel, *Turkey*, (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 142.

and authoritarianism. Similar to the liberal Ottomanists of the late Ottoman period, it advocated decentralisation, separation of powers and an evolutionary political development rather than a revolutionary one. The new party was warmly welcomed in Istanbul, Izmir and the conservative parts of the country. This alarmed the Kemalists. Discipline was tightened in RPP and in the Parliament, and Kemal even replaced the moderate cabinet members with radical ones, like Recep (Peker).¹⁰ Finally the rebellion in the Kurdish region (*Şeyh Sait İsyanı*) provided a great opportunity to the radical Kemalists to destroy this new party and the Kurdish resistance.¹¹ In March 1925 Kemal gave clear support to the hawks in the Party. PM Fethi was forced to resign, and İsmet İnönü took his place. The first act of the new Prime Minister was to have Parliament pass an extraordinary law - Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*). The law empowered the government for two years to ban any organisation or publication, which might disturb public order. This legitimated the military operations in the suppression of the Kurdish rebellion.¹² However, as expected, the law was not only used against the Kurds but also against the liberals, the Marxists and the conservatives. Many important newspapers were closed down in Istanbul and Anatolia. All the leading liberals were arrested and the PRP was closed down. Contrary to Ottoman authoritarianism, the new regime could not endure any opposition, or any dissenting voice.

Kemalist Reforms and the Establishment of the Kemalist State Machinery

Once Kemalist domination over political life was ensured, Kemal embarked on an extensive reform programme. Now he had the power to re-create the state machinery and society. There was no opposition, and all institutions declared their loyalty to him. All religious institutions, *türbes*, *tekkes*, *medreses* were closed down. All religious symbols, like the *fez*,¹³ *cüppe* and so on were banned. Under the Law on the Maintenance of Order, about 7,500 people were arrested and 660 were executed by the

⁹ Before the 1924 Constitution there was a *de facto* constitution, the Law on Fundamental Organisation (*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu*); *Düstur*, Vol. 1, Üçüncü Tertib, p. 196; Kanun No. 85, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Vol. 1, pp. 214-223.

¹⁰ E. J. Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991).

¹¹ İsmail, Göldaş, *Takrir-i Sükun Görüşmeleri (Takrir-i Sükun Negotiations)*, (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1997).

¹² Betçet Cemal, *Şeyh Sait İsyanı, (Şeyh Sait Revolt)*, (Istanbul: 1955), pp. 55-60.

¹³ In fact, *fez* is not a religious symbol, but Sultan Mahmut II had replaced the traditional *başlık* (hat) with *fez*, as a symbol of the modern wear. Kemalists banned *fez*, because it was the symbol of the Ottoman past.

İstiklal Mahkemeleri (The Independence Tribunals) for opposing these reforms.¹⁴ In 1926, the European calendar was adopted. The Swiss civil code and Mussolini's Italian penal code were adopted. The family law, trade law and other codes were secularised and westernised. All these reforms were considered by the Kemalist administration as the steps to make the society more westernised or, from the Kemalist perspective more civilised.

A last-ditch attempt to obstruct the reforms failed miserably. The security forces arrested alleged conspirators planning to assassinate Kemal. The Islamists and some of the liberals claimed that there was no assassination attempt, but that there was a Kemalist conspiracy to blame the opposition. Be that as it may, Kemal used this attempt to suppress the surviving opposition. Almost all Unionists, PRP members - except for Hüseyin Rauf (Orbay) and Adnan (Adıvar) - were arrested. Most of them were charged of having planned a coup d'état, and sixteen were sentenced to death. Although the leading military heroes Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), Cafer Tayyar (Eğilmez) and Refet (Bele) were pardoned under the pressure of public opinion, they no longer could pose a challenge to Kemal.

The Kemalist reforms continued in the 1930s, almost unchallenged. In this period Kemal stiffened the solidarity among the Kemalist groups, namely the Party (RPP), the army, the bureaucracy and the intellectuals. He also tried to set the main tenets of his ideology, *Atatürkçülük* or *Kemalizm* - not as a detailed and elaborate ideology but rather as an indication of the spirit behind his ideals. The basic principles of Atatürkçülük were laid down in the RPP programme of 1931: Republicanism (*cumhuriyetçilik*), secularism (*laiklik*), nationalism (*milliyetçilik*), populism (*halkçılık*), revolutionism (*devrimcilik*) and etatism (*devletçilik*). The basic tenets of Kemalist ideology will be discussed later. At this stage we will look at the institutional framework of the reforms.

Emergence of the Kemalist Group

With the growing Kemalist domination over political life, the Republican People's Party, the state and Kemalism became identical. Any attack on any of them was seen as

¹⁴ Zürcher, *Turkey...*, p. 181.

a betrayal of the country. The state, party and the official press (the only legal press) and the schools started a campaign to make the entire Turkish nation Kemalist. In this campaign, not only Kemalist ideas but also Kemal's heroic image were used. The *Atatürkçüleştirme* (to make the people Kemalist) campaign was even carried out in elementary schools. This campaign was a part of Kemal's new Turkish, Westernist nation building project. As he saw it, he was re-creating his nation, as a religious - free, positivist and nationalist people. Under heavy political propaganda, a new generation was growing, which would be the future elite of the country. Journalist Selahaddin Güngör's memoirs dramatically show how the Kemalist propaganda had affected the Turkish people:

'It was night time, and I was sleeping. I woke up when my older brother started to shake. He was shouting 'Wake up... Hurry. I will take you to Atatürk.' I thought I was in a dream: 'Atatürk? You are kidding me. Can Atatürk be seen by eyes?' I asked my parents, 'Atatürk is God? Does he eat? Does he drink like us?' ...'¹⁵

Thanks to this propaganda Kemal created a Kemalist generation who believed in Kemalist values. This newly emerging group, together with veteran Kemalists composed a new group in Turkish society, namely the Kemalists. For the Kemalists the state was everything. Their attachment was not only on ideological grounds. They were fed by the state funds. Not only was the State the biggest employer, but it provided members of this class with the opportunity for self-enrichment. In a short time, the Republican People Party became the best place to become rich. The state funds were controlled through Party, and poured into the Party members. Apart from these economic gains, the new class also needed the Kemalist state machine to sustain its social position and its way of life as the ruling class.

The ideological and economic differences between the 'lower classes' (villagers, workers, *küçük esnaf* etc.) and the Kemalist elite alienated them from each other. For example, while the Kemalist class saw alcohol drinking, dancing, and dating as symbols of modernity, the conservatives saw all of these as shameful conduct. The Kemalists feared that if they were to lose power they would not be able to enjoy any of these 'modern' things. In time the Kemalist class came to consider itself the guardian of the State, viewing itself, the party and the State as identical. For his part Atatürk saw this class as the core and the guarantor of the reforms while perceiving the other social

¹⁵ Selahaddin Güngör, *Cumhuriyet* (daily, Istanbul), 15 November 1938.

classes as ignorant people who needed to be led for their own good. In one of his speeches he summarised the Kemalist elite's role as follows:

'The duty of these citizens [intellectuals and the Kemalist elite] is to mix the best path to follow in order to ensure their progress and their renaissance. That is how I see our people. The interests of different groups can be reconciled perfectly and there are no means of dividing them into classes. All our citizens enter into the group, which we call the People. Thus the People's Party will be the school of education in citizenship for all our people.'¹⁶

In other words there was only one people, but it was divided into two: those who needed to be educated by the Kemalists Party, and those who were to implement this educational process. This elitist approach¹⁷ left no room for alternative ideas in politics and provided the legitimating base for the monopoly of the Kemalists and the Kemalist ideology over the power.

The Republican People's Party

In this framework, the Republican People's Party (RPP) was the most important organ of state machinery. As stated by Atatürk, it was the school to educate the people.¹⁸ But it was much more than that, it was an intimate part of the administration of the Republic.¹⁹ With Atatürk, the party was one of the producers and practitioners of the State ideology and policies, setting the aims for the Republic in its congress and meetings. An indication of the Party's amalgamation with the State administration can be provided by the fact that the provincial presidents of the party were also governors of their provinces. Above all, the party's president was also the President of the State. In 1937 this practice was written into the constitution as were the party's main principles. In addition to its administrative functions, the party also strengthened the Kemalist class through educational and financial tools. In this task, *Halkevleri* (People's Houses) and schools were very important. Thanks to this Kemalist web, the ideological propaganda was strictly sustained. Although Atatürk saw the Party and the Kemalist elite as tools to westernise the country, this group was loathe to lose its privileges and strove to maintain permanent power over the country. This intention to stay in power was already

¹⁶ Mustafa Kemal quoted in John Parker and Charles Smith, *Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge, 1940), p. 72.

¹⁷ For the Kemalist elitist populism also see **Chapter IV** of this study.

¹⁸ Fahir Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin Mevki*, (*The RPP's Place in Turkish Political Life*), Vol. 1, (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1965), p. 125.

¹⁹ Parker and Smith, *Modern...*, p. 69.

written into the 1935 RPP Programme and implied in the 1927 programme.²⁰ Moreover, party members made efforts to make Kemalism a frozen ideology, which cannot be debated or changed, to protect the party.²¹ Hence, any talk about Kemalism as an ideology does not justly refer to Kemal's ideas but also to the interests of the group Kemal had created because they owed their power and privileges to Kemalism.

In foreign policy, however, the Party's impact was limited: not because of its weakness but due to its lack of interest. The party members mainly concentrated on the domestic politics and notably the economic issues.²² However, the Party's strict monopoly over political life prevented alternative foreign policy courses. Any deviation from the Kemalist perspective was perceived as betrayal and punished by the party and the state machinery. 'As ...his presidency was confirmed for life, Atatürk became increasingly autocratic, treating even minor instances of opposition as rebellion and sending into exile some of his oldest associates, including Rauf Orbay, Halide Edip, and Adnan Adıvar, for criticising some of his policies.'²³ In this environment it could not be expected a pluralism in neither domestic nor foreign policies.

The Presidential Palace (*Çankaya Köşkü*)

According to law, the President of the State was elected by the National Assembly. Yet, despite the written rules, Atatürk, as the party leader had a vital role in election of the parliamentarians and as a result of this there was a hierarchical relationship between Parliament, the Party and the President. As noted earlier, the president of the Party was at the same time the State President; thus Atatürk held the highest position from the foundation of the Republic until his death in 1938. In foreign policy in particular, Atatürk was an autocratic leader and his foreign policy making and implementation can be likened to Abdulhamid II's. Atatürk was aware of the success and effectiveness of the authoritarian Hamidian policies in protecting the empire's unity and stability. As a

²⁰ 'Giriş Kısmı' (introduction section), in **CHP 1935 Programı, (RPP 1935 Programme)**, (Ankara: 1935); **Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi, (The RPP Programme)**, (Ankara: Zelliç Biraderler Matbaası, 1927).

²¹ For these efforts see Şeref Aykut, **Kemalizm: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programının İzahı, (Kemalism: Republican People's Party Programme's Explanation)**, (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitabevi, 1936).

²² Oguz Ünal, **Türkiye'de Demokrasinin Doğuşu, Tek Parti Yönetiminden Çok Partili Rejime Geçiş Süreci, (The Emergence of Democracy in Turkey, The Process of Transformation from a One-Party Regime to a Multi-Party System)**, (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayın AS., 1994), esp. sections 2 and 3.

²³ Shaw and Shaw, **History of...**, p. 395. For the detailed examples see Ünal, **Türkiye'de....**

result he followed a Hamidian-like strategy. In the words of Sugar 'From 1808 until 1938 Turks lived under absolute masters, Abdulhamid and Mustafa Kemal.'²⁴ Despite the similarity, Kemal had more freedom than Abdulhamid. First, he was a national hero and a charismatic leader and therefore did not confront any serious challenge. Second, opposition to Kemal had a cost and almost nobody dared to take this risk. Third, by leaving foreign policy issues to Kemal, the RPP gave him an unbridled freedom on foreign policy issues. Thus he became the final and only decision-maker.²⁵

Civil Bureaucracy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The role of the civil bureaucracy in the policy-making process was determined by the Kemalist dilemma. On the one hand, the Ottoman bureaucracy, was the most Westernised and pro-secular group in the country. In this framework, there was no challenge to Kemal as there had been Jacobean co-operation between the civil-military bureaucracy and the intellectuals since the *Tanzimat*. Moreover, since the bureaucracy owed its existence and privileges to the Kemalist revolution, it had shared aims and ideology with the leadership. Foreign policy bureaucracy was no exception. As noted earlier, the Foreign Office had been the leading institution in the westernisation process since the nineteenth century and this role remained intact in the Republican era despite the radical changes and crises. From İsmet İnönü to Tevfik Rüştü Aras, foreign ministers were changed yet the bureaucrats remained the same.²⁶ As noted by Rustow, 93 % of the Ottoman staff officers and 85 % of the civil servants had remained in their posts after the demise of the Empire,²⁷ giving the Foreign Ministry a much-needed stability. Moreover, Turkish diplomats viewed Atatürk as a hero who had saved and 'civilised' Turkey,²⁸ as a result the Foreign Ministry carried on without questioning his policies.

²⁴ Sugar, cited in Bal, *Preventing...*, p.152.

²⁵ William Hale, 'Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics', in David Shankland (ed.), *The Turkish Republic at Seventy-Five Years, Progress-Development-Change*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1999), p. 92.

²⁶ The foreign ministries were also relatively less frequently changed in this era as seen in the Aras case. Rüştü Aras remained in that position for 13 years (1925-1938).

²⁷ Dankwart A. Rustow, 'The Military', in Robert T. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.) *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 387.

²⁸ Feridun Cemil Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl, Anılar - Yorumlar, 1. Cilt*, (34 Years in Foreign Ministry, *Memories - Comments, Vol. 1*), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1980).

Despite his ideological affinities with the civil bureaucracy, Atatürk's attitude was also shaped by his unhappy personal experience with the civil bureaucracy prior to and during the War of Independence. He viewed bureaucratic inefficiency as one of the main reasons of Ottoman decline. Although most bureaucrats were nationalists and Westernists, they did not lead the nationalist resistance when the country was under occupation and did not use their power to change the political system. Therefore Kemal was suspicious about the civil bureaucracy and thought that he could not trust them in the implementation of his reforms.²⁹ It can be said that he saw the bureaucracy as a body, which had no head and needed to be led. On the other hand he realised the importance of the bureaucracy in the implementation of the reforms, especially in manipulating and educating the masses. But before doing that, they had to be controlled and educated themselves. The Party provided this function by creating a Kemalist bureaucracy; still, Atatürk felt that he had to rely upon his military and administrative representatives and the governors rather than on the bureaucracy as a whole, because of his scepticism regarding the bureaucracy.³⁰

According to the Kemalist perspective, Kemalist bureaucrats' mission was to retain political, economic and social control over society.³¹ The Kemalist bureaucracy's approach to administration was regulative, rather than representational or mobilisational. They were responsible for the good of the whole people because they represented the State, which was the holiest concept in the Kemalist thinking. In the words of Turan, 'the ruled were seen not as citizens but as subjects whose prime duty was obedience to their benevolent rulers.'³² This kind of a bureaucratic machine was a perfect tool to introduce the reforms from above. The alienation of the bureaucrats was high in Ottoman days, yet the cultural gap was not as wide as in the Republican era. As a result the civil bureaucracy did not consider the people's preferences in domestic and foreign policy. There was no competition in the policy-making process yet Mustafa Kemal's suspicious attitude minimised the bureaucracy's role in decision-making. In

²⁹ Metin Heper, 'Ataturk and the Civil Bureaucracy' and İlder Turan, 'Continuity and Change in Turkish Bureaucracy: The Kemalist Period and After', both are in Jacob M. Landau, *Ataturk and Modernization of Turkey*, (Leiden: Westview Press, 1984).

³⁰ Heper, 'Atatürk...', pp. 90-91.

³¹ Turan claims that Ottoman and Turkish bureaucrats constituted an intelligentsia, and a political class whose mission was to retain control over the people: Turan, 'Continuity...', p. 163.

³² Turan, 'Continuity...', p. 103.

those years the power of the Foreign Office declined and became an office that merely implemented the commands from the Presidential Palace.

The Army

Another important foreign policy institution was the army. Like the Foreign Ministry the army was also a radically westernist institution since the nineteenth century, and was the only organised group the Kemalists could rely on.³³ Moreover, Kemal as a former general and war hero was perceived as the natural head of the army.³⁴ Moreover, almost all of the leading Republican statesmen were former army officers like Fevzi Çakmak, İsmet İnönü, Kazım Özalp, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, Kazım Karabekir and Refet Bele. That is to say, in practice the army was in power, hence it did not directly intervene in politics. However, this did not mean that the army had no political ambitions. On the contrary, it saw itself as the guardian of Kemalist, westernist Turkey. Also, the law gave the army unusual powers, unparalleled in any democratic country. As Vaner put it, despite the radical changes in the Ottoman political system, the new Republican army was also the first institution of the nascent Turkish State.³⁵ It was above the Parliament and the Party. As noted by the ruling Republican People Party's 1935 programme:

‘We especially take care that the army of the Republic, which is the unshakable foundation of the high State organisation, and which protects and guards the national ideal, the national existence, and the Revolution, as well as its valuable members, be always honoured and respected....’³⁶

The same programme declared that the army was above all politics: ‘The Turkish army is above all political considerations and influences’.³⁷ This position was confirmed by such legislation as the *1935 Ordu İç Hizmet Kanunu* / 1935 Law of the Army Internal Service and the Constitution. Yet the ideological similarity between the policy-makers and the army made any military intervention unnecessary, and the army's inference happened when the government required that. As noted by Pusat, the most important

³³ Ümit Özdağ, *Ordu-Siyaset İlişkisi, Atatürk ve İnönü Dönemleri*, (*Army-Politics Connection, Atatürk and İnönü Period*), (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1991), p. 43.

³⁴ Although some attempts were made by the other generals, like Kazım Karabekir Paşa, Mustafa Kemal eliminated them by reorganising the army. He accused these generals in his Great Speech: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk (The Speech)* Vol. II, (Istanbul: MEB, 1973).

³⁵ Semih Vaner, ‘The Army’, in Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Tonak (eds.), *Turkey in Transition, New Perspectives*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 237.

³⁶ **The 1935 Program of RPP adopted by the 4th Congress**, (Ankara: CHP), Article 73.

³⁷ **The 1935 Program...**, Article 72.

function of the army during these years was to suppress the opposition.³⁸ In the words of Özdağ, 1923-1938 period was a 'militarist period without military'.³⁹ In brief, the army was at the core of the politics, yet did not need to challenge the civil government because it was the military's government.⁴⁰ There was a very close consultation between the generals and Atatürk, but the ultimate decision-maker was Atatürk himself. In external relations too, the army had privileges. Security issues in particular were its responsibility, and it did not consult or give information to the Foreign Ministry about these issues. While the bureaucracy was also Kemalist, the army officers saw themselves as the only guardian of Kemalism, and did not trust other state bureaucrats. As will be seen in the military coups of 1960, 1971 and 1983, this tradition would continue well after Atatürk.⁴¹

The Parliament and the People

The first Parliament was pluralistic and had real control over the government. It was also sensitive to foreign, security and economy policies because it saw them as the most important components of national independence. However, when Kemal took power, he first changed the structure of the Parliament and blocked opponents. Now Parliament had become Atatürk's parliament. Its members were also Party members and none of them could be elected without Atatürk's support. After the 1935 elections for instance, 386 out of 399 parliamentarians were members of the RPP.⁴² Despite this, Kemal still could not bear any kind of opposition.⁴³ Moreover, because the foreign policy and security issues were 'high politics', they were not debatable in parliament. Therefore, for the policy-makers, parliament was not a place to discuss such an 'important subject'

³⁸ Devrim Pusa, *Militarizmin Tarihsel Sürekliliği, Ordu ve Siyaset*, (*The Historical Continuity of Militarism, Army and Politics*), (İstanbul: Nam Yayıncılık, 1996), pp. 113-133.

³⁹ Özdağ, *Ordu - Siyaset...*, p. 43.

⁴⁰ Cem even argues that the army was governing the country with 'its civil government': İsmail Cem, *Türkiye'de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi*, (*The History of Backwardness in Turkey*), (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1970), p. 297.

⁴¹ See the relevant chapters of this thesis. Also see for the army's perception itself as the only guardian of Kemalism: Mehmet Ali Birand, *Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Army*, (London: 1991); Semih Vaner, 'The Army', in Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (eds.), *Turkey in Transition, New Perspectives*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 236-265; William Hale, *Türkiye'de Ordu ve Siyaset, 1789'dan Günümüze* (*The Army and the Politics in Turkey, From 1789 to Today*), (Trns.: Ahmet Fethi), (İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 1996), pp. 108-134 (the 1960 coup), pp. 160-184 (the 1971 coup) and pp. 209-231 (the 1980 coup); Kili, *Kemalism....*, pp. 110-112; Dankwart Rustow, 'The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic', *World Politics*, Vol. XI, July 1959, pp. 513-552.

⁴² Parker and Smith, *Modern...*, p. 63.

⁴³ Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları, Atatürk'ün Nutuk'u* (*The Official Sources of the Political Culture in Turkey, Atatürk's Speech*), Vol. 1, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), pp. 123-124.

as far as foreign policy is concerned, and instead became an institution, which ratified international agreements signed by the government.

In addition, the authoritarian political environment did not allow any political pressure groups. The only pressure groups were economic groups and almost all of them were formed by the members of the RPP or Atatürk's followers. Since the party governed and controlled the State institutions, foreign and domestic businessmen made efforts to affect party members so as to manipulate the government policies. However even these efforts were limited to economic matters and conditioned on respect for the Kemalist revolutionary principles. Since the political system was not pluralistic and the pressure groups were very limited and weak, the public was very ill-informed. Foreign policy issues were 'high-politics' for the people, even for businessmen, press, and intellectuals. Thus, the effect of the public on foreign policy remained very limited. So, Atatürk and his close circle remained the only decision-makers in foreign policy making.⁴⁴

Conclusion

Atatürk established an autocratic state machine in order to form a secular, Western-style country. This machinery, in a short time, created its own guardians, namely the Kemalist group which was composed of the Republican People's Party, the army, bureaucracy and the Kemalist elite. This newly-emerged group had different values from the ordinary Turk. It was Westernist, secular –even anti-religious- and positivist. The most significant effect of the emergence of the Kemalist group was that not only the Kemalist principles but also the interests of this group became important. As a result, the Kemalists started to use Kemalist principles as a legitimating ideology for their own power and interests against other groups, such as Islamists, Ottomanists, Turkists etc. Atatürk had radical domestic aims, therefore foreign policy was a secondary matter, and Atatürk saw foreign policy as a tool in order to protect Turkey's economic and political independence and to implement its domestic reforms. So, it is hardly possible to say that he made efforts to form a theoretical or ideological foreign policy framework. Furthermore, such an autocratic political system could not produce a

⁴⁴ Hale, 'Foreign Policy...', p. 92.

pluralistic foreign policy; Atatürk naturally was the only decision-maker in foreign policy. As mentioned, he did not even consult the foreign policy bureaucracy.

In conclusion, foreign policy was a secondary matter in Atatürk's reforms and he did not form a completed foreign policy theory. However, his internal aims, personality and style with the state establishment (RPP, the army, bureaucracy etc.) would deeply affect Turkish foreign policy in his era and the following years.

CHAPTER IV

Ideological Background of Kemalist Foreign Policy

‘What particularly interests foreign policy, and upon which it is founded, is the internal organisation of the state. Thus it is essential that the foreign policy agree with the internal organisation.’¹

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

‘You must know the situation you are in. The Padisah (Sultan) is your enemy. The entire Western world is your enemy. Listen, don’t say anybody, but the Turkish nation is also your enemy. They think you are the reason of the war.’²
İsmet İnönü to army officers.

‘In my opinion, this country is Turkish. Non-Turks have only one right in this Turkish home: to be servant, to be slaves.’³

Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), the Minister of Justice, 1930

Having discussed the rise of Kemalism and its institutionalisation, this chapter will analyse the effects of the Kemalist reforms and principles on foreign policy. By way of doing so, it will examine the impact of several ideological principles, like secularism, westernism, republicanism, populism and nationalism, as well as other attitudes rooted in Turkey’s unique experience, like scepticism towards the West and ethnic-political minorities in Turkey. In this framework, the chapter identifies pacifism, isolationism, legalism, non-alignment and neutrality, pragmatism and realism as the main pillars of Kemalist foreign policy.

Ideological - Historical Principles

In the Kemalist era Turkey’s external relations and foreign policy principles were determined by three factors: the Ottoman experience, Turkey’s weaknesses, and the nation-state building ideology. The most important factor was of course the nation-state - building project. Though Kemalism has no book or manifesto, containing all its principles and aims, Kemal declared six arrows (six principles), namely **nationalism, secularism, populism, revolutionism** (or reformism), **republicanism, etatism**, as the main pillars of his doctrine,⁴ which in 1937 became the constitutional principles of the

¹ Atatürk, *Speech....*, p. 378.

² *Ulus* 17 May 1968 and Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası*, (The Turkish Revolution and Its Aftermath), (Ankara: Doğan Yayınevi, 1971), p. 26.

³ Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923-1931*, (*The Establishment of the One Party Administration in the Republic of Turkey*), (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1981), p. 301.

⁴ Six principles were first accepted as the basic principles of the RPP on 10 May 1931 and in the 1935

Republic.⁵ However, the major concepts, like nationalism, secularism, the state etc., have a different meaning in the Kemalist discourse from the Western political literature both Marxist or liberal-democrat understand it. Therefore it is necessary to look at all aspects of the principles and compare actions with words, as well as to examine the impact of the undeclared features of ideology (the scepticism, obsessions and fears) on the Kemalist approach.

Westernism and the Kemalist Civilisation Project

There is little doubt that Kemal's nationalist, positivist, secular, Jacobean, anti-Ottoman and anti-religious ideology was one of the most important factors determining the Republic's policies. The Kemalists were close to the ideological stance of the Young Turks⁶, even it can be argued that the Kemalist secularism, nationalism and westernism rooted in the Young Turk tradition. This was understandable; Most of them were army officers and former CUP members and they were both members of the revolutionary generation of the 1890s who had been trained in the secular schools of the Ottoman Empire. As Zürcher put it

‘Kemal and his circle belonged to the radical wing of the Young Turks who believed implicitly in a popularised version of nineteenth-century European positivism. In their eyes only scientific rationalism could form the basis for the modernisation leap Turkey would have to make, and only a nation-state could give Turkey the coherence needed to complete with the national states of Europe.’⁷

In this ideological framework, although Kemalism emerged as a nationalist movement against Western imperialism its ultimate struggle was against the traditional and religious Ottoman political system. In order to do that they not only accepted some of the Young Turk ideas, but also some of their methods; only the Kemalists were more careful, realistic and pragmatic.⁸

RPP Programme they were slightly modified.

⁵ Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, (*Modernisation, Kemalism and Democracy*), (Istanbul: İletişim, 1993), p. 135.

⁶ ‘He was a representative of Young Turk officer of his generation’: Mango, *Turkey*, p. 40.

⁷ Zürcher, ‘Young...’, p. 175.

⁸ For the connection and differences between Kemalism and the Young Turk ideas see Baskin Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, Resmi İdeoloji Disi Bir İnceleme*, (*Atatürk Nationalism, An Analysis from the Unofficial Ideological Perspective*), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), pp. 41-57; Zürcher, ‘Young...’, pp. 174-176.

Westernism and the Ottomans as the ‘Others’

For the Kemalists the major responsibility for the backwardness and collapse of the Ottoman Empire lay with religion, tradition, and Ottoman institutions.⁹ This created Kemalism's the most important article of faith and the first principle of Kemalist foreign policy: **Westernisation and secularism**. Thus, a great Westernisation campaign was started and Turkey made all possible efforts to forge good relations with the West. Contrary to the *Tanzimat* Westernisation movement, Republican Westernisation demanded acceptance of Western civilisation in full arguing that neither an Islamic nor a Turkish civilisation was capable of dealing with the modern world.¹⁰ For Kemal, Western civilisation was indivisible and had to be adopted as a unit or not at all.¹¹ He claimed that there is only one civilisation in the world, namely the western civilisation, and if a country wanted to be civilised it had to be Europeanised; this was the only way to become modern and advanced.¹² In Arnold Toynbee's words, 'Mustafa Kemal's policy was to aim at nothing short of an out-and-out conversion of Turkey to the Western way of life'.¹³ In a logical extension of this thinking the East was perceived as the source of uncivilised things, poverty and instability. The journalist Abdullah Cevdet, an influential Young Turk, described the essence of this ideology in 1913: 'There is no second civilisation; civilisation means European civilisation, and it must be imported with its roses and its thorns.'¹⁴

Contrary to earlier westernisation attempts, Ottomanism and Islamism, Kemal rejected Turkey's religious and cultural orientations: it was total westernisation which would save Turkey. Ögün argues that Kemal's nationalism did not produce the 'other' in defining itself.¹⁵ It is true that it did not produce an external 'other' but rather an 'internal one': the Ottomans. When it produced the 'Ottomans' as the 'other', Kemalism

⁹ Golam Choudhury, *Islam and the Muslim World*, (London: Scorpion Publishing Ltd., 1993), p.104-105.

¹⁰ Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), p. 296.

¹¹ Quoted in John Redmond, *The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community: Turkey, Cyprus and Malta*, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), p. 21.

¹² Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1918-1937*, Cilt 3, (Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1959), pp.67-68.

¹³ Arnold Toynbee, *The World and the West*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 27.

¹⁴ Quoted in Dankwart A. Rustow, *Turkey, America's Forgotten Ally*, New York, 1987, Council of Foreign Relations, p. 14.

¹⁵ S. Seyfi Ögün, 'Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Hakim Millet Kodunun Dönüşümü' (*The Transformation of the Dominant Nation Code in Turkish Nationalism*), in N. Bilgin, *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik (Republic, Democracy and Identity)* (Istanbul: Baglam Yayinlari, 1997), p. 224.

had to produce an imagined 'us' concept as well, and it was the Western world. In other words, new Turkey looked at its own history through Western eyes. Gökay argues that the Turkish Republic assumed that the Western perceptions of the Ottoman Empire were mostly true and that the main task of the Republic was to transform Turkish society into a Western society.¹⁶ Similarly, the Turkish sociologist Göle claims that Kemalism was a 'civilisation project'. Western customs, books and so on were used to symbolised civilisation while old Turkish customs and language symbolise barbarity.¹⁷ As Göle put it, Kemal thought that the Ottoman culture contradicted civilisation, and he declared that, even if he were to do it on his own, he would struggle against the 'eastern mind'.¹⁸ In the words of Pallis:

'New Turkey nourishes against the old regime. As far as Western civilisation is concerned, the Ghazi has shown himself to be an out-and-out partisan of Western thought, customs, and methods and of their introduction into Turkey in place of the old Islamic life and ideas.'¹⁹

For George Lenczowski, Atatürk's aim was to separate Turkey from its Asiatic roots:

'The major objective of Turkish reform was in general sense, to separate Turkey from the ancient Asiatic-Arabic sphere of culture and tradition and to transform it into a modern, westernised nation.'²⁰

Atatürk, in 1925, claimed that the aim of the reforms was to civilise the Turks, in other words to Westernise them:

'The aim of the revolutionary measures that we have been and are taking is to bring the people of the Turkish Republic into a state of society which is entirely modern and civilised, in every sense and in every way... It is essential that we bring about the utter rout of mentalities incapable of accepting the fact.'²¹

'We must become civilised men from every point of view... Our thinking and our mentality will become civilised from head to foot... The nation should realise clearly that civilisation is a powerful fire which burns and destroys those who disregard it. We shall acquire, keep and finally improve the place we deserve in the civilised family to which we belong. Prosperity, happiness and humanity demand it...'²²

¹⁶ Bülent Gökay, 'From Western Perceptions to Turkish Self-Perception', *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 1995, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 259-269.

¹⁷ Nilüfer Göle, *Modern Mahrem, Medeniyet ve Örtünme*, (*Modern Forbidden, Civilisation and Veiling*), (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1991), pp.48-51.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, p.53.

¹⁹ A. A. Pallis, 'The New Turkey', *The Nineteenth Century*, 1928, Vol. CIV, No. 621, pp. 618-628, p. 620.

²⁰ George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 116.

²¹ Mustafa Kemal, *Atatürk'ün Konuşmaları*, (*Atatürk's Speeches*), (Ankara: 1956), p. 48.

²² Mustafa Kemal in Hekimgil, *Mustafa...*, pp. 18-19

Likewise, in his Great Speech he explained the reason for abolishing the fez:

‘Gentlemen, it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on your heads as a sign of ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred to progress and civilisation, and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary headdress of the whole civilised world, thus showing, among other things, that no difference existed in the manner of thought between the Turkish nation and the whole family of civilised mankind.’²³

That is to say, the Kemal and his friends considered westernisation as synonymous with modernisation and ‘becoming civilised’.²⁴ In brief, if Turkey wants to become a civilised, modern country it had to give up all connections with the Ottoman and Islamic past. From the Kemalist perspective, the main trait of Turkish identity was not religion but nationalism. Thus, ‘the new Turks’ were trying to prove that they were ‘the true Europeans’. Mustafa Kemal, in his interpretation of Turkish history claimed that the Turks were white men like other Europeans and noted that the Turks were the ancestors of the present European races.²⁵ Some Turkish historians and politicians further argued that all civilisations were the creation of the Turks spilling out of the Altay.²⁶ That is to say, for Turkey Europeanisation meant the construction of a new identity, a way of life that legitimated the state and the new regime. According to Kemalist ideology, Europe meant science, technology, rationality, democracy, progress, laicism and welfare, but not Christianity or the old European culture or traditions. For the Kemalist Republic, Europe was a universal concept, not regional, religious or cultural. In the last two centuries Europe had experienced a de-Christianization period, and according to Kemal, there was no room for any religious or metaphysical effect in the ‘European’, ‘Western’ concepts. Europe meant modern civilisation and Kemalism uncompromisingly aimed at reaching the level of a modern civilisation at all costs.

Being a part of European society has been everything for the Turkish governments because it has been almost the only way to guarantee Turkey’s secular, modern, Western-oriented choices. Therefore Turkey has seen Turkish-European and Turkish-Western relations in general as a matter of life and death (Turkey’s European vocation). Obviously, Turkey was making efforts to change its very identity.

²³ Atatürk, *A Speech...*, p. 738.

²⁴ Türkkaya Ataöv, ‘The Principles of Kemalism’, *TYIR*, 1980, Vol. XX, p. 35; Hekimgil, *Mustafa...*, p. 17.

²⁵ Speros Vryonis, Jr., *The Turkish State and History, Clio Meets the Grey Wolf*, Second Edition, (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, Publishers, 1993), p. 62.

²⁶ See A. C. Emre, *Atatürk’ün İnkılab Hedefi ve Tarih Tezi (Atatürk’s Revolutionary Aim and His History Thesis)*, (Istanbul, 1965).

The new Turkish administration saw changing its own civilisational mode as the entry ticket to European society and to becoming a 'normal' European, modern state. This perception would inevitably affect Turkey's foreign policy toward both East and West. Thus Turkish foreign policy during the Kemalist era and after that has consistently been pro-Western.²⁷ Within this framework, Turkey has aimed to be part of all European co-operation and integration movements. As a result the 'new Turks' most of the time felt that they had to support Western policies against others to be a part of the 'Western family'. For example in the Algerian independence war Turkey supported the French side. In most cases Turkey has supported the Western arguments against other countries or alternatively abstained. In its relations with Arab world in particular the impact of the Turkish Western perception has been very effective as has been witnessed in the Fez Affair, in Turkey's indifference attitude towards the Arab world in general.²⁸

The Kemalist Western perception has had such an impact on Turkish foreign policy that Turkey went out of its way to appeal the Europeans. Even the Western attempts to divide Turkey after the First World War could not prevent Turkey from seeking its friendship. Turkish-British relations offer a very good example. It is a well-known fact that Britain had led the anti-Turkish campaign during the First World War and the War of Independence,²⁹ and the British delegate also made an enormous effort to block the Turkish demands in Lausanne. Moreover, as will be seen in detail, when Turkey's capital was moved from Istanbul to Ankara Britain resisted this decision for a long time. Furthermore, the Ankara government suspected of British support for the Seyh Said uprising. Nevertheless, none of these affected Turkey's enthusiasm to establish friendly relations with the British. For instance, in the Lausanne negotiations Turkey made concessions to Britain about the Straits issue just to get British support.³⁰ Even after the Seyh Said uprising Turkey continued to develop its relations with Britain and saw Britain as a partner in Europe and the region. In an interview in *Stamboul* on 5-6 February 1927 Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras made clear how Britain's friendship was important for Turkey:

²⁷ Oğuz Ünal, *Türkiye'de Demokrasinin Doğuşu, Tek Parti Yönetiminden Çok Partili Rejime Geçiş Süreci*, (*The Emergence of Democracy in Turkey, The Transformation Process From One Party to Multi-Party Regime*), (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayın A.Ş., 1994), p. 117.

²⁸ The Turkish western perception's role in Turkey-Middle East relations is discussed in Chapter V of this thesis.

²⁹ Kürkcüoğlu, 'Turco-British...', p. 81.

³⁰ Ateş, 'Cumhuriyet...', p. 72.

‘(Relations with Britain)...have become friendly since the treaty was signed... Turkey sacrificed Musul in the higher interest of peace.’³¹

During the Cold War years some Kemalist academics claimed that Atatürk would have been opposed to the alliance between Turkey and the United States because he was an anti-imperialist. However, Kemal did not miss any opportunity to express his sympathy for the West, including the USA. In a letter to President Roosevelt, Atatürk stated his admiration of American society and his desire for a close relationship with the US: ‘I would like to take this opportunity to express my admiration for the USA. Our two countries have the same ideals for general peace and happiness of humanity.’³²

As will be seen, the other factors would appear like the Russian, Italian, Nazi threats, Cold War etc., that forced Turkey toward a Western orientation, yet the main motive behind Turkish policy-makers was the cultural and civilisational one. Yet while Europe and the West meant everything for Kemalist Turkey, it was aware that the West did not see Turkey as an equal member of the Western state system. Turkish Western perception, as will be discussed, determined its relations not only with the West but also with the East and its own people. On the one hand Turkey was making great efforts to establish close relations with the West and to overcome the problems with these countries, even with Greece³³, on the other hand, as will be seen in the next section, it was very reluctant in relations with the Islamic world.

Secularism

Secularism³⁴ constituted the second most important pillar of Kemalism and the 1927 RPP Programme declared that secularism was one of the priorities of the Republic: ‘It is essential to completely separate faith from earth in state’s and nation’s affairs.’³⁵ Nayir even argued that Kemalism was nothing but secularism.³⁶ In many ways secularism was

³¹ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, ‘Turco - British Relations Since the 1920s’, in Hale and Bağış (eds.), *Four Centuries of Turco - British Relations, Studies in Diplomatic Economic and Cultural Affairs*, (Northgate: The Eothen Press, 1984), p.86.

³² Sadi Borak, *Atatürk’ün Özel Mektupları*, (*Atatürk’s Private Letters*), (İstanbul: 1970), p. 184.

³³ Alexis Alexandris, ‘Turkish Policy Towards Greece During the Second World War and Its Impact on Greek - Turkish Détente’, *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1982, pp. 157-197.

³⁴ For theoretical discussion of secularism see: Mert, *The Early...;* Ayfer Göze, *Türk Kurtulus Savasi ve Devrim Tarihi*, (*The Turkish War of Independence and the History of the Revolution*), (İstanbul: Beta, 1989), pp. 415-499; Timur, *Türk Devrimi...*, pp. 122-131.

³⁵ *CHP 1927 Nizamnamesi*, (*RPP 1927 Programme*), Article 3, Ankara, CHP, 1927.

³⁶ Y. N. Nayir, ‘Ataturkism is Secularism’, in Kemal Karpaz, *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), pp. 322-324. Many present day leftist-

inextricably linked to Westernism, not least since Kemal was an admirer of the French philosophical school of thought which inevitably shaped his secularist approach as well.³⁷ According to the French revolutionary school, religion was an anachronistic institution, which, moreover, posed a challenge to secular power. Hence it was to be placed under the control of the secular power, namely the state so as to protect the political order and the national good. This secularist understanding constitutes the opposite of the Anglo-Saxon (or American) religious and secularist approach. For the latter religious and secular power areas are different, hence neither posed a danger to the other and could co-exist independently from each other.³⁸ As a result, in American historical evolution, both of religion and secularism have maintained their independence, and the state did not need to take religious affairs under its control.

These theoretical differences borrowed from the Christian world proved detrimental to a Muslim country. With the effect of positivism, everything related to Islam was considered as symbol of backwardness. In the words of Lowry, 'Islam in Turkey, like all religious expression in the Soviet Union, was treated as a dangerous current which, although impossible to eradicate, had to be placed firmly under the control of the state.'³⁹ As a result of this secularisation process, the Turkish state came to perceive Islam as both internal and external threat from the universal leader of all-Muslims for centuries. Kemalist secularism inevitably determined not only the state-citizen relations but also Turkish foreign policy. The effects will be discussed in detail in the next section and in the 'implementation' chapter.

Kemalist Eastern Perception

Kemalist civilisation understanding with the effect of 'hard-secularism' determined Turkey's attitude towards the East. 'The more westernising reforms had been materialised the more Turkey turned its face from the East to the West.'⁴⁰ In time Turkey's alienation towards the Muslim and Middle Eastern states became the

Kemalists share Nayır's argument, like Yekta Güngör Özden, former head of the Court of Constitution.

³⁷ For the effects of French tradition on Kemalism: Lewis, 'The Impact...', pp. 105-125; Paul Dumont, 'The Origins of Kemalist Ideology', in Jacob M. Landau (ed.), *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, (Leiden: Westview, 1986), esp. p. 28; Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, *The Modern World, Turkey*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. 129.

³⁸ For a similar comparative analysis of the French revolutionary tradition and English evolutionary approach see Timur, *Türk Devrimi...*, pp. 64-65.

³⁹ Lowry, 'Challenges...', p. 93.

⁴⁰ Çalış, *The Role...*, p. 63.

permanent principle of Kemalist foreign policy. This aspect of Kemalist foreign policy was an offspring of Kemalist Westernism, positivism and secularism. Since the West meant the only civilisation for the new Turkish ruling class and they sought to prove that they were a part of this civilisation, they did so by turning them back on the East. As Bobby Sayyid⁴¹ put it, the Kemalists had to deny and suppress any traces of the Orient because the West was constituted in its opposition to the Orient. Sayyid further argues:

‘To modernize, the Kemalists believed they had to Westernize; but paradoxically, the very nature of Westernization meant Orientalization. For, given that the identity of the West was constituted vis-à-vis the Orient, they had to continue to articulate an identity of the Orient to constitute themselves as Western...’⁴²

Kemalism, by orienting itself toward the West, recreated the ‘East’ concept; and in doing so rejected everything evoking the ‘East’ from the veil to Arabic script and Ottoman customs. Muslim and the Middle Eastern societies were seen as representatives of technological and cultural backwardness. Muslims were still in the ‘dark ages’ and the young Republic had to rid itself of these ‘traitors’ and ideas. ‘The notion of an Islamic state was anathema to Mustafa Kemal and his supporters. They viewed such a state as the way to maintain the *status quo* and perpetuate the backwardness of Turkey’.⁴³ Despite a few instances of co-operation with these countries, Turkey never identified itself as an Eastern country or as part of or a friend of the Eastern world. Any attempt at easternising Turkey had to be destroyed pitilessly, because the East was the source of uncivilised, immature, irrational ideas. Thus many ‘bad’ qualities were equated with Easterners like dirtiness, ugliness, or immaturity.

In addition to the Kemalist Eastern perception, the memories of World War I still rankled in Turkish policy-makers’ minds. For them, the Muslims had not helped the Ottoman war effort, but sold out to the ‘infidels’. This understanding, on one hand, deepened Turkey’s Western orientation; on the other hand it created obsession with the backwardness of the East. Thus, for example, Turkey never considered itself a Middle Eastern country and did not make any effort to foster relations with these countries.⁴⁴ In

⁴¹ Bobby Sayyid, ‘Sign O’ Times: Kaffirs and Infidels Fighting the Ninth Crusade’, in Ernesto Laclau (ed.), *The Making of Political Identities*, (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 264-286, p. 269

⁴² Sayyid, ‘Sign...’, p.270.

⁴³ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 53

⁴⁴ Henri J. Barkey (ed.), *Reluctant Neighbour, Turkey’s Role in the Middle East*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1996); Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, (London: Pinter Publishers,

Barkey's words, 'Turkey's relations with the Middle East has been accidental'.⁴⁵ Even agreements and pacts between Turkey and the regional powers were a result of Turkey's defensive considerations or were imposed by Western countries. For example, the Balkan, Sadabad and Baghdad pacts were mainly against non-regional powers like Italy, Germany or the Soviet Union.⁴⁶ The 1937 Sadabad Pact, for instance, was a good example of how Kemalist foreign policy distanced itself from the Middle East. Although some commentators interpreted Turkey's adherence to this Pact as a return to Pan-Islamism⁴⁷, the pact was of a purely defensive nature, and helped to secure Turkey's eastern frontiers. Kemal's ultimate aim was to cut Turkey off from its oriental and Islamic past, hence several Islamic congresses held in the 1920s and 1930s received no support from Turkey. The Pact's principles were those of non-interference in each other's affairs rather than an example of regional co-operation and collaboration.⁴⁸

When its security was in danger, Turkey proved willing to co-operate with its neighbours, yet this co-operation was *ad hoc*. Turkey's attitude toward these countries would worsen in the future as happened during the Suez crisis (1956) and the Algerian war of independence. With Turkey's increasing pro-Western policies it was perceived as a servant of the West especially by the Arab states.⁴⁹ To sum up, Turkey's Eastern perception and its hostile attitude toward the east and its region were the most important factors in forming its foreign policy toward such vast areas as the African, Asian, Islamic countries, the Arab world, the non-aligned movement, and even the Third World as a whole. As a result, some of Turkey's traditional rivals, notably Greece, managed to outwit it in the Asian, African and Arab arenas.⁵⁰

1991).

⁴⁵ Private notes from the interview with Barkey, in *The New Millennium, Strategic Perspectives in the Middle East* seminar, London, 19-20 October 1998.

⁴⁶ Gönlübol, *Olaylarla...*, p. 103.

⁴⁷ G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1955), 115.

⁴⁸ Bilge Criss and Pinar Bilgin, 'Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East', *Journal* (of MERIA), Issue 1, January 1997, p. 10-11.

⁴⁹ Selim Deringil, 'Turkish Foreign Policy Since Atatürk', in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy, New Prospects*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), p.4.

⁵⁰ Turkey's this policy cannot be explained by using only the Cold War circumstances. For example. Greek and Bulgarian foreign policies, although both are in the different blocks, were more successful than Turkey's foreign policy in using the Asian and African platforms.

The Caliphate Issue

In addition to Turkey's eastern perception, the Caliphate problem left a long-lasting mark on Kemalist and Muslim minds. The abolition of the Caliphate in particular was a turning point, which not only showed the Kemalist attitude towards religion but also underlined its pragmatic nature. As discussed above, the Kemalist regime sought to remove the Islamic character of the state. However Kemal, until he was certain of his victory, never mentioned his secular aims. To the contrary, he gave religious speeches to gain the support of the Muslims in the British Empire. The Caliph was the religious leader of all Muslims and during the Hamidian era his political influence on the Muslims, especially in India, grew. Kemal and the Ankara government used this during the War of Independence War to get diplomatic, moral and financial support, and as discussed in Chapter II of this thesis Kemal's 'Islamic foreign policy' perfectly worked and the Muslim support eased the nationalists' difficulties. This policy even continued in the early years of the republic as Aykan put it: 'during the first years of the republic, religion was used as an instrument of propaganda to secure the material and moral support of Muslims abroad.'⁵¹ However, after the victory this policy was eliminated and Kemal started to implement his real policy toward the Muslim countries. After the abolition of the caliphate, relations were completely changed and the sympathy among the Muslims turned to an antagonism which was to last to the present day. Kemal's logic on abolishing the caliphate was that the caliphate might serve as a focal point for the opponents of the secular Republic⁵² and might invite external interventions. On 3 March 1924 the Parliament voted to depose the Caliph Abdulmejid, to abolish the caliphate and to banish from the country all members of the house of Osman. Then the office of *Şeyhul-ul İslam* was abolished, and the religious schools were closed down. For the Kemalists this was a secular triumph⁵³, but its impact on Turkish foreign policy can not be labelled as victory. Hereafter, Turkey's hostile foreign policy towards the Arabs⁵⁴ nourished the Arabs' misperception. During these years Turkey was very reluctant to improve relations and very strict on the problems between the Turks and Arabs while it was approaching western states with sympathy, or it was even looking

⁵¹ Aykan, *Ideology...*, p. 47.

⁵² Roderic H. Davison, *Turkey, A Short History*, second edition, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1991), 129.

⁵³ Davison, *Turkey...*, p. 129.

⁵⁴ The Kemalist orthodoxy does not accept this term and claims that Kemalist foreign policy was against nobody, but I persistently use 'anti-Arab policy' or 'anti-Eastern civilisation' policy terms, because the mind behind these policies was biased against the Arab and the Eastern culture. Therefore the policies

for friendly relations with its 'arch-enemy' Greece.⁵⁵ For Kemalist foreign policy doctrine, the Arabs evoked Islam for the Turks and Turkey had to rid itself of Islamic and Arab elements from in foreign policy just like it did in domestic politics. Thus, as Vali pointed out, Turkey turned its back on the Middle East and especially on the Arab world in order to eliminate the Islamic and eastern foundations of the Ottoman Empire and 'cut Turkey off from its oriental past'.⁵⁶ Another minor reason was that Vahdettin, the exiled sultan and former caliph, was still active and was looking for a way to regain his position again.⁵⁷

Kemalist Nationalism

Kemal was also from the Turkist school in the Ottoman era, yet his Turkism was completely different from Enver Pasha's adventurist nationalism. His approach was close to Gökalp's and Akçura's Turkism, which advocated Turkification of society in a limited territory. For them the priority was to create a homogeneous society, while Enver aimed at founding a Turkic Empire including Central Asia.⁵⁸ With the dramatic failure of the Young Turks' nationalism, Kemal limited the scope of the *Turkish nation* concept. First of all he needed a homogeneous society that could be united by common values. Ironically the only common value for the majority of Anatolian society was the *sunni* sect of Islam. Even the Turkish language, or the Turkish race could not serve as a handy tool *to create* a Turkish nation. For example the Karaman Turkish Christians, the first Turks to have entered Anatolia, were forced to migrate to Greece in the 1920s, though they were Turkish and spoke only the Turkish language. On the other hand, the Muslim Greeks who lived in the Aegean islands were invited to Turkey, although they were Greek and could not speak the Turkish language.⁵⁹ Similarly, the Gagavuz Turks were 'pure' Turkish, but Christian. Moreover, their language was Turkish. However, when the Gagavuz Turks demanded a mass migration to Turkey, Turkey refused their

produced by this understanding unavoidable would be anti-Arab, anti-Islam or sometimes anti-Eastern.

⁵⁵ Alexandris, 'Turkish...', p. 157.

⁵⁶ Vali, **Bridge**, p. 310; Lewis, **Modern**, p. 133.

⁵⁷ For example he wrote a letter to Seyh of Ezher demanding a place to continue his political activities in 22 March 1926. For full text of the letter see Orhan Koloğlu, 'Vahdettin'in Hilafetle İlgili Son Mektubu', (*Vahdettin's the Latest Letter About Caliphate*), **Tarih ve Toplum**, June 1998, Vol. 29, No. 174, ss.25-26; Orhan Koloğlu, **Türk Çağdaşlaşması 1919 - 1938, İslam'a Etki İslam'dan Tepki**, (*Turkish Modernisation 1919 - 1938, The Effect to Islam and Islam Reaction*), (İstanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 1995).

⁵⁸ Ziya Gökalp, **The Principles of Turkism**, (Leiden: 1968); Ziya Gökalp, **Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization**, (London: 1959); Masami Arai, **Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era**, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992); Uriel Heyd, **Foundations of Turkish Nationalism**, Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press, 1950).

wish. The reason was their religion.⁶⁰ A mass Christian immigration would damage cultural harmony and unity in Turkey. On the other hand, the same state accepted millions of migrants from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece although they were not Turkish and they were not able to speak Turkish. Kemal's aim was clear: to find a common culture and transform it to a Turkish nation. To do so he targeted the Sunni Muslims and accepted them as the core of the newly projected-Turkish nation. That is to say, Kemal's nationalism was based on a common culture, not on a common race. The 1935 RPP Programme defined Kemalist nationalism understanding as 'the nation is the political unit composed of citizens bound together by the bonds of language, culture and ideal.'⁶¹ From this perspective the common religion and language provided a common culture to reach the common ideals, or the Kemalist ideals.

However, despite the unifying character of Islam, there were many minorities inside Anatolia: Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Protestants and other sects of Christianity, Jews, Sunni and Alevi Muslims and other Muslim sects. In addition to the religious diversity Anatolia was home to many races such as Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Georgians, Arabs etc. Therefore the first task was to punish them if they rejected their new national identity. The second phase in creating a nation-state was to re-write Turkish history. Because Atatürk sought to establish a secular Turkish state, he ignored the Islamic past of the Turks and claimed that the Turks had been civilised before converting to Islam. For him, Islam, like an epidemic disease had spoiled Turkish civilisation. Atatürk not only rejected the religion but also the other things, which reminded of the Ottomans, like the Ottoman language. The Arabic script was changed into the Latin one, and many old Ottoman words were replaced by 'pure Turkish words' (*Öz Türkçe*).⁶² All these were parts of the Kemalist Turkification project.

Kemalist nationalism had a key role in shaping the Kemalist foreign policy. First, it was not aggressive and irredentist. Atatürk saw nationalism as a matter for the Anatolian Ottoman subjects, not all Turkic peoples.

⁵⁹ Oran, *Atatürk...*, p. 158.

⁶⁰ Oran, *Atatürk...*, p. 159.

⁶¹ **CHP 1935 Parti Programı** (*RPP 1935 Party Programme*), *Kısım 1* (Part 1), *Madde 2* (Article 2), Ankara: 1935.

⁶² Atatürk even claimed that all languages in the world emerged from Turkish (*dil teorisi*). All these efforts can be considered as a part of the campaign to create a Turkish nation based on secular values. For the language campaign: S. Engin, **Kemalizm Inkilabının Prensipleri**, (The Principles of Kemalism

‘Mustafa Kemal’s strict territorial definition of Turkey on his firm rejection of Pan-Turkism virtually brought to an end all adventures and engagements outside Anatolia. With the establishment of the republic, the focus of the country shifted away from empire to nation-state.’⁶³

Therefore, Kemalist nationalist perspective contributed to the relations with those countries that had Turkish minorities, like Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Greece, China or Iraq as Atatürk distanced Turkey from the Turkish diaspora in the neighbouring countries arguing that Turkey should not meddle in the other countries’ internal problems.⁶⁴ Also Atatürk’s peaceful nationalist language contributed to regional order in the Middle East and the Balkans and made co-operation possible.⁶⁵ On the other hand, the policy of using the external threat to unite different groups increased Turkey’s scepticism towards the West.

Republicanism

Republicanism is one of the officially - declared Kemalist principles, (*altı ok*, six arrows). In domestic politics it shows a radical shift from a monarchic political structure to a Republican system. Republican system does not have to mean a democratic system and for Mustafa Kemal the most important priority was stability and the reforms while some scholars, like Ataöv, claimed that Atatürk’s republic meant a democratic state.⁶⁶ In foreign policy Republicanism means a complete departure from the imperial legacy. According to the imperial mind the main elements of national power were the size of the territory and the population. The Ottoman Turkists, Islamists and Westernists had seen foreign policy through these values. For the republicanist Kemalist approach, the priorities were a homogeneous (Turkified) population, a strong national economy, a secular, Western-styled State based on the nation-state values and a relatively small territory, which can be defended by the Turkish armies. Therefore, as shown earlier

Revolution), Vol. I, (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1939), pp. 146-167.

⁶³ Gökay and Langhorne, *Turkey...*, pp. 4-5.

⁶⁴ Rouleau, ‘Turkey:...', p. 39.

⁶⁵ Certainly, the main reason of friendly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union was real political interests and security concerns. As a relatively small country Turkey had no power to implement a pan-Turkist or any other kind of irrendentist foreign policy. However, the significant contribution of the Kemalist nationalism to the relations cannot be ignored. Atatürk even sometimes avoided from using the ‘Turkist’ term not to provoke the other states and not to cause a misperception: ‘When asked “Are you a Turkist” Atatürk replied “I am Turkish, that’s all.” : Kemal Arıburnu, *Atatürk’ten Anılar (Memoirs from Atatürk)*, (İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi Yayın, 1998), p. 214.

⁶⁶ Türkkaya Ataöv, ‘The Principles of Kemalism’, *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 1980-1981, Vol. XX, p. 29.

while Atatürk saw Lausanne as a victory, Islamists and the Ottomanists claimed that it was a total defeat.

Etatism

Etatism is one of the officially declared Kemalist principles, and shows how Kemalists' stressed the state's role in development.⁶⁷ In foreign policy terms, this meant full independence, and economic independence was viewed as indispensable to such independence.⁶⁸ With the effect of scepticism, etatism determined new Turkey's economic policies. In this context, most foreign companies in Turkey were nationalised and the state tried to replace the minorities and private sector's role in the economy. The main assumptions behind these policies were the regime's mistrust of these factors. For the Kemalists the regime was still fragile hence it had to be protected against foreign elements (protectionism). They also thought that the Turkish private sector was still fledgling and thus it could not be an engine for Kemalist Westernisation. Although etatism was borrowed from the socialists, Kemal was not very rigid on this principle. On the contrary, he only in a later period turned to etatism when realised that relying largely on private sector for industrial development was not enough and refused to make etatism a dogmatic principle but rather saw it as a compulsory tool to develop the country. Boratav claims that one of the important factors caused *etatist* policies was 1929 world economic crisis. He further argues that etatism was a term without any clear content until the second half of 1932 and apart from public investment in railways, and also there was no significant state activity in the productive field, and public intervention in the economy was carefully limited to the area of foreign trade.⁶⁹ However, the Kemalists after Atatürk used etatism against the people and the private sector in order to protect their privileges.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik, (Etatism in Turkey)*, (Istanbul: Gerçek Yayıncılık, 1974); also see Z. Y. Herslag, 'Atatürk's Etatism', in Jacob M. Landau (ed.), *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, (Leiden: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), pp. 171-180; İlhan Tekeli and Selim Ilkin, *Uygulamaya Geçerken Türkiye'de Devletçiliğin Oluşumu, (The Formation of Etatism in Turkey When It was Realising)*, (Ankara: ODTÜ Yayınları, 1982).

⁶⁸ Ince, p. 10; Korkut Boratav, 'Kemalist Economic Policies and Etatism', in Kazancigil and Özbudun, (eds.), *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, (London: Hurst&Company, 1997), pp. 165-190.

⁶⁹ Korkut Boratav, 'Kemalist Economic Policies and Etatism', in Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun (eds.), *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, (London: Leiden: C. Hurst & Co., 1997), p. 172.

⁷⁰ İnönü's *Varlık Vergisi* policy can be considered a good example of exploitation of Kemalist etatism and nationalism. Later the leftist – Kemalists further claimed that Kemal was a good socialist giving etatism as an evidence for his leftism.

Populism⁷¹

Kemalist populism did not mean democracy or the people's self-rule although some Kemalists, like Ataöv claims that Kemalism's ultimate aim was a democracy with a populist dimension: 'He (Kemal) added a populist dimension to the democratic concept of the French Revolution.'⁷² However, despite the rhetoric populism was a reflection of a classless society dream, rather than a democratic concept. As vividly seen in the 1935 RPP Programme, on the one hand populism was described as 'the source of the will and sovereignty is the nation', on the other hand it further continued in a contradictory direction:

'It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of the division of labour for the individual and social life of the Turkish people. The aims of our party (...) are to secure social order and solidarity instead of class conflict, and to establish harmony of interests.'⁷³

To summarise, in the words of Akural 'in dealing with Kemalist ideas on populism, one must distinguish between political rhetoric and political practice... Practical populism was a luxury that the Kemalists could not accord, especially while engaged in the kind of unpopular reforms which Atatürk had in mind.'⁷⁴ The first function of populism was legitimising the regime. The traditional legitimising sources - the Sultan and Islam - were negated by Kemal who declared that 'the voice of the people is the voice of the God'.⁷⁵ By using the nation's power in the name of the people Kemal legitimised his regime although in fact there was no popular support for the Kemalist regime. As such, it was an essentially domestic tool whose impact on Kemalist foreign policy was limited.

⁷¹ For populism see Ismail Arar, *Atatürk'ün Halkçılık Programı ve Halkçılık İlkesinin Tarihçesi*, (*Atatürk's Populism Programme and the History of the Populism Principle*), (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1963); İlhan Tekeli, 'Türkiye'de Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Evrimi', (*The Evolution of the Principle of Populism in Turkey*), *Toplum ve Bilim*, No. 6-7, Summer-Autumn 1978, pp. 65-71; Tanyol, *Atatürk ve Halkçılık (Atatürk and Populism)*, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1984); Zafer Toprak, 'Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Oluşumu', in *Atatürk Döneminin Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarihiyle İlgili Sorunlar Sempozyumu*, 14-16 January 1977, (Istanbul: 1977), pp. 13-31.

⁷² Ataöv, 'The Principles...', p. 30.

⁷³ *RPP 1935 Programme* (with Kili's English, *Kemalism...*, p. 78.

⁷⁴ Sabri M. Akurel, 'Kemalist Views on Social Change', in Jacob M. Landau (ed.), *Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), p. 137-140.

⁷⁵ quoted in Lewis, *The Emergence*, p. 466.

Scepticism

Scepticism of course is not a declared Kemalist principle, and most academics tend to overlook its importance in the Kemalist revolution. However, the first and perhaps the most important characteristic of Kemalism and Kemalist foreign policy was its sense of insecurity in the face of tough opposition.⁷⁶ The Kemalist regime felt insecure about its political ability to maintain power both within Turkey and in the outside world. İsmet (İnönü) Pasha's speech to the army officers in the İnönü Wars clearly shows the fear:

'You must know the situation you are in. The Padisah (Sultan) is your enemy. The entire Western world is your enemy. Listen, don't tell anybody, but the Turkish nation is also your enemy. They think you are the reason of the war.'⁷⁷

Even during the years when Kemal had no real opposition and competition, this insecurity continued and deeply affected foreign policy. George Kennan has argued in case of the Soviet Union that insecurity could well have caused an activist, perhaps an aggressive foreign policy.⁷⁸ In the Turkish case, insecurity evolved into a permanent scepticism towards the West and foreigners in general, the former Ottoman subjects, neighbours, minorities, religious groups, liberals and all opposition groups. More specifically Kemalist Turkish scepticism can be considered the result of three factors: a) the Ottoman experience; b) Turkey's limitations and the Kemalist regime's lack of confidence; and finally c) European biased attitude towards the Turks.

The Ottoman Experience: With the collapse of the Empire many Ottoman foreign policy principles were passed to Kemalist Turkey. These included a) Turkish aloofness; b) Paradoxical Westernism; c) Scepticism towards the West; d) Scepticism towards minorities; d) Russia as primary threat. The collapse of the Empire generated structural and long-lasting fears in Turkey. It was believed that the Turks were alone, and that they had no friend but the Turks. There were no Muslim friends, no Turkish world, and no Western friends at all. From this perspective, Turkey had no real friend in either the East or West. In addition to worries of the West, the new ruling class believed that enemies, hostile countries seeking to destroy it, surrounded Turkey. Not only the

⁷⁶ Kemalist scholars saw scepticism as a virtue and positive element of Kemalism. Kürkçüoğlu names 'scepticism' principle as 'no total confidence on friends and the outer world' and further continues: 'While he (Kemal) never closed all doors to dialogue even with the enemy, Atatürk, never placed too much confidence in friends, or the outer world as a whole, for that matter.' Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, 'An Analysis of Atatürk's Foreign Policy, 1919 – 1938, TYİR, 1980 – 1981, Vol. XX, pp. 135-141.

⁷⁷ Ulus 17 May 1968 and Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası*, (Ankara: Dogan Yayinevi, 1971), p. 26.

British, French and Russians, but also the former Ottoman subjects, such as the Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians, Albanians, Serbs and other neighbours, like Iran, were against Turkey. During the First World War and the War of Independence the Armenians and the Greeks helped the allied forces against Turkey. Even the 'Muslim brothers', the Arabs, were seen as collaborating against the Turks. According to the Turkish nationalists, in First World War the Arabs, with the British, had murdered thousands of Muslim Turks while the Turks were defending the holy sites, like Mecca and Medina; hence they were not brothers or friends but traitors. Even the end of the war could not put an end to Turkey's sense of isolation. The situation in Turkey was alarming during the 1920s and the 1930s. Therefore even after Lausanne, security remained at the top of the agenda. Almost all-great European powers were neighbours of Turkey⁷⁹ at a time when tensions in Europe were increasing. Nazi Germany's and Italy's aggressive policies raised the spectre of a possible war in Europe. On top of it Turkey confronted a direct great menace: the Soviet Union. The military gap between these two neighbours was unbridgeable. Despite good relations during the 1920s Turkey perceived the Soviet Union as a primary threat to its territorial integrity and independence. In brief, Turkey was alone, and had to overcome from its security, political and economic problems.

Turkey's and the Regime's Limitations: The second and third reasons of Kemalist insecurity and scepticism were Turkey's economic, military and political limitations, and the regime's weaknesses. After a string of continuing catastrophic wars, the already fragile Turkish economy had been further weakened. Turkey was still an agricultural country and economically dependent on the European powers. Only 155 industrial establishments employed more than 100 workers by the tally of the 1927 census.⁸⁰ Even agriculture was largely undeveloped and based on primitive methods. Worst of all the 1929 economic crisis badly hit the growing Turkish economy. Exports plummeted and Turkey confronted dire financial difficulties. At the political level, Turkey was vulnerable to international crises due to its geographical position, and felt obliged to devote a large part of its budget to defence expenditure. Apart from these, the inherently fragile political system and lack of external and internal political support worsened the situation for the regime and made it more radical and autocratic. In this framework,

⁷⁸ George F. Kennan (X), 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', *Foreign Affairs*, 25, July 1947, pp. 566-582,

⁷⁹ The Soviet Union in East, Britain in Iraq and Cyprus, France in Syria, Italy in some of the Aegean Islands (Oniki Islands and Meis Island).

⁸⁰ Davison, *Turkey*, p. 140.

Kemal thought that Turkey had to be more careful than any other country to protect its integrity and independence, and should be aware of an irredentist, aggressive foreign policy. Therefore Kemal's first priority was to strengthen the regime and the Turkish economy and military. Thus it can be said that the ultimate aims of Kemal's foreign policy were dictated by the internal reforms and the need to protect the country's integrity and political independence. That is to say, Turkey directed all its energies to domestic political and economic reconstruction, while foreign policy was perceived as a supportive element of this reconstruction. As a result Turkey's insecurity determined a sceptical, pacifist, survival policy.

The European Biased Attitude: As seen in the Independence War, the European attitude towards the Turks was far from friendly. Old habits die hard. Despite the sustained secularisation of Turkish political life, Europeans continued to view the Turks through the old religious prejudices.⁸¹ For them, the Turks remained the 'terrible Turks' and there was no place for them in Europe. Most of the Europeans apparently agreed with Captain John Still: '...morally speaking, where the Turks rules there is Asia.'⁸² Naturally, Europe's unfriendly approach towards the Turks created its counterpart in Turkey, where not only the regime, but also all the people became sceptical about the West.⁸³

Kemalist Western Scepticism

The first effect of Kemalist scepticism was on Turkish-Western relations. Despite its enthusiasm for being European, Kemalist scepticism vis-à-vis the West was a significant factor in shaping Turkey's relations with the West. The ultimate aim of the Kemalist governments had been to be an equal part of the Western world, yet they were aware that the West did not consider Turkey an equal member of the 'family'. The Ottoman experience had proved that the Turks could not trust the Europeans. Not only Russia but almost all the great European powers had undermined the Empire by using

⁸¹ Inalcik and Söylemez argue that the West has always tended to see Turks as foreigners while Turks have identified themselves as Western: Halil Inalcik, 'The Turkish Impact on the Development of Modern Europe', in Kemal Karpat (ed.), *The Ottoman State and Its Place in the World*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), p. 54; Yuksel Soylemez, 'The Turks in Europe: A Historic, Cultural and Diplomatic Perspective', in Erol Manisali (ed.), *Turkey's Place in Europe*, (İstanbul: Logos, 1988).

⁸² John Still, *A Prisoner in Turkey* (London: 1920), cited in James Pettifer, *The Turkish Labyrinth, Atatürk and the New Islam*, (London: Viking, 1997), p. 51.

⁸³ For the role of European attitude see: Sedat Laçiner, 'Türkiye Avrupa İlişkilerinde Kültür ve Medeniyet: Tarihsel ve İdeolojik Kökenler' (*Culture and Civilisation in Turkey-Europe Relations:*

economic pressure, minorities or military pressures. Western policies toward Turkey during the First World War alleviated the mistrust between the two sides. Henceforth, the Turkish people and state were obsessed with the idea that the European powers wished to remove them from Europe and eventually from history altogether. They, therefore, regarded all European actions with reserve and suspicion. Kemal when explained the reasons of the failure in the First World War he accused the West: our nation's fault is to have manifested over-confidence in the honesty of Europe.⁸⁴

Similarly, many years later, in 1937, Kemal expressed his scepticism related to Britain and the West in general to visiting Metaxas, Prime Minister of Greece:

'...You and we, are both friends of the English... You say that England will not let others touch us (Turkey). All right. But (England) may think of taking up a convenient attitude towards those who would touch us... (England) may show such tolerance for the purpose of winning time and more freedom in its operations by engaging us with a large enemy force. In other words, it may tolerate an enemy landing in our shores. Didn't it act like that towards Ethiopia?... We took into consideration even such a probability. We have taken measures in this direction. That was the essence of our recent manoeuvres in the Aegean...'⁸⁵

That is to say Turkey's westernisation was in spite of the West as its republicanism was in spite of its own people.

Internal Threats and Foreign Policy-Domestic Politics Relations

As discussed above, the Turkish Republic inherited the fears and obsessions of the Ottoman Empire. The external threats were the West, Turkey's neighbours and the Soviet Union. Yet, from the regime's standpoint there were internal menaces as well, like minorities, liberals and radical Muslims. As it saw it, the external forces were using these groups to undermine Turkey from the inside, therefore the Republic had to be aware of these groups. In Kemalist ideology, the minority groups and democratisation were the most effective tools of the Western countries against Turkey, since these constituted the weakest side of the Turkish state. Thus, homogenisation of the country, with its attendant secularisation, became the most important priority of the Kemalist governments.

Historical and Ideological Roots), **Liberal Düşünce**, Vol. 4, No. 13, Winter 1999, pp. 39-57.

⁸⁴ Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk (Speech)*, Vol. III (Documents), (Istanbul: Turk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, *n.d.*), p. 1185.

⁸⁵ Bilal N. Şimsir, 'Atatürk'ün Yabancı Develer Adamlarıyla Görüşmeleri, Yedi Belge (1930-1937)', (*Atatürk's Meetings with the Foreign Statesmen, Seven Documents*), *Belleten*, Vol. XLV/1, No. 177,

The Sevres Syndrome and the Role of the ‘Minorities’⁸⁶

Since a new Sevres-type arrangement was the worst thing the new Republic could face, the status of the minorities remained one of the most important issues on the Turkish foreign policy agenda. Like the CUP, Kemal considered the minorities one of the most dangerous threats for the unity and independence of the state. As he saw it, the Empire’s substantial Christian populations, formerly an economic and financial asset, had become a potential weapon in the hands of foreign powers.⁸⁷ He also viewed the various minorities - the Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Macedonians and Arabs – as acting in a disloyal, even traitorous way towards the Ottoman Empire. As he put it:

We are a nation which was late and negligent in applying the idea of nationality...our nation has suffered because our nationality was ignored. Various nationalities within the Ottoman Empire saved themselves by embracing the nationalist faith and by the force of their nationalist ideal. We understood what we were, that we were a nation that was different and foreign to them after we forced from among them. They insulted and humiliated us when our power declined. We understood that our fault was to have forgotten what we are. If we want the world show us respect, first let us show respect towards our own character and nationality... let us be aware that a nation which has not found its national identity is a prey to other nations.⁸⁸

According to this approach, non-Turkish subjects in Turkey were potential ‘traitors’. Yet the foremost problem was that nobody knew what the term ‘Turk’ meant. Mustafa Kemal knew that he had to create a ‘non-existent’ Turkish nation. After severing the connection with Islam and the Ottoman past, this was a daunting task, because Turks had identified themselves with religion and Ottoman culture. Moreover, even the new Turkish state contained numerous ethnic groups with different languages, religious, and historical backgrounds and the exchange population with Greece meant a growing dominance of Muslims in Turkey, the diversity remained still huge.⁸⁹ İnönü, Atatürk’s successor, summarised the official position in 1925:

‘We are frankly nationalists...and nationalism is our only factor of cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. We must turkify the

January 1981, pp. 191-192. (with Kürkcüoğlu’s English: ‘An Analysis of ...), p. 137.

⁸⁶ According to the founding agreements, like Lausanne, there is no legal minority in Turkey, except the Greek Turkish people. Also the minority groups strictly refuse to being recognised as minority, even Kurdish, Jewish, Christian peoples. When we say minority we do not mean legal minorities, but people who are not majority in population and in policy-making process.

⁸⁷ F.A.K. Yasamee, *Ottoman Diplomacy, Abdulhamid II and the Great Powers, 1878-1888*, (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1996), p.2.

⁸⁸ Mustafa Kemal’s Speech to the Youth of Konya quoted in Kili, *Kemalism*, p. 82.

⁸⁹ Ingvar Svanberg, *Kazak Refugees in Turkey, A Study of Cultural Persistence and Social Change*, (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1989), pp. 55-57.

inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or 'le turquisme'.⁹⁰

From this perspective there was only one nation – Turkish - even though there were many ethnic groups. In the 1924 constitution, for example, the term 'citizenship' had been equated with Turkishness.⁹¹ In 1930 Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), the Minister of Justice, declared that non-Turks had no rights in Turkey:

'In my opinion, this country is Turkish. Non-Turks have only one right in this Turkish homeland: to be servant, to be a slave.'⁹²

All people within Turkey's borders were Turkish from the time of their birth, and their problem could not be the business of any other nation. From this perspective no country could interfere in the affairs of Turkey's ethnic or religious groups in Turkey. According to Kemalist understanding, if any country tried to muddle in this issue, that country would become an open enemy of Turkey's unity and stability. Hence Turkish governments perceived the Western protestations about human rights and minority issues as another attempt to divide and destroy Turkey. Thus, as will be seen in the post-Cold War era, the Kurdish issue and human right issues became the most important factors in Turkey's relations with both the Western countries and Turkey's neighbours, and this also determined many issues in Turkey's foreign policy leaving no room for any change or manoeuvre.

Liberals and the Radical Muslims

In addition to the minority issue and external threats, for the Kemalist regime, there was another threat: the lack of sufficient support. As noted by Eisenstadt, the revolution was undertaken by army officials with strong and ideological tendencies which were against the political ideas of the low and the middle classes, who moreover were not allowed autonomous access to the new political centre.⁹³ On top of this, the mistrust, if not antagonism towards some ethnic and political groups, such as the liberals, Kurds and radical Islamic groups which it perceived as internal enemies. Kemal, though aiming at

⁹⁰ Bilal Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye'de 'Kürt Sorunu', 1924-1938*, (*The Kurdish Problem' in the British Documents*) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi / Turkish History House Publication, 1991), p. 58.

⁹¹ Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, (Lanham: Carnegie Corporation, 1998), p. 10.

⁹² Tunçay, *Türkiye...*, p. 301.

⁹³ S. N. Eisenstadt, 'The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective', in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (eds.), *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, (London: Hurst&Company, 1997), p. 138.

a Western - style democratic capitalist state, viewed liberal democracy as constraining his ambitious reforms, at least for a while.⁹⁴ Beside, for the Jacobean westernists, liberal westernists were unrealistic, even gullible and naïve who could easily fall for the machinations of the revolution's enemies: foreign powers, minorities and radical Muslims. Similarly, from the Kemalist perspective, radical Muslims were 'sick people' who sought to take Turkey into the dark ages and who could not differentiate between right and wrong. They had therefore to be manipulated, directed and, if necessary, destroyed. For instance, in his speech, Kemal labelled the only opposition party the Republican Progressive Party covering the religious, Kurdish and the liberal opposition as traitor:

'...Facts and events have proved that the programme of the republican Progressive Party has been the work emanating from the brain of traitors. The Party became the refuge and the point of support for reactionary and rebellious elements. They worked in order to facilitate in our country the application of plans which had been hatched by our enemies for the annihilation of the new Turkish State, the young Turkish Republic.'⁹⁵

Given its initial limited appeal, Kemalism had to adopt an autocratic approach in order to survive. Moreover, for the Kemalists, democracy and liberal values had been used as a 'Trojan horse' to weaken Ottoman power and could be used again against the Turkish Republic. Democracy could also help the radical Muslims who still hoped to re-establish an Islamic state like the Ottoman Empire and who were seen as the deadliest threat to Kemalist Turkey and Turkey's unity. Islam was thus treated as a dangerous current which, though impossible to eradicate, had to be placed firmly under state control.⁹⁶ The Kemalist prescription for this issue was similar to the one for the Kurdish issue: to create 'a state-Islam' and eventually demolish religious influence in society. The Seyh Said's revolt of 1925 directed against both secularism and the authority of the central government turned these fears to an 'Islam-phobia'.⁹⁷ According to the government, the Kurdish Islamists were used to block Turkey's interests in Northern Iraq by the British. As a result, the Kemalist state used secularism and unity of the

⁹⁴ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 56.

⁹⁵ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*, (Ankara: Basbakanlık Basimevi, 1981), p. 735.

⁹⁶ Heath Lowry, 'Challenges to Turkish Democracy in the Decade of the Nineties', *Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. V, Fall 1996, pp. 89-11, p. 93.

⁹⁷ Ward, *Turkey*, p. 15. For Seyh Said revolt see also: Uğur Mumcu, *Kürt - İslam Ayaklanması 1919-1925*, (*Kurdish - Islamic Revolt*), (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1992); K. Öke, *Musul ve Kürdistan Sorunu 1918-1926*, (*Musul and Kurdistan Issue*), (Ankara: Türk Kültürü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1992) and Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar, 1924-1938*, (*The Revolts in the Turkish Republic*), (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basimevi - Turkish Headquarter of the General Staff, 1972)

country to suppress the democratic and cultural demands of different political and ethnic groups. These two terms were useful for the ruling class, especially the army, to prevent public participation in the policy-making process.

Methodological Principles and Attitudes of Kemalist Foreign Policy

Kemalist foreign policy's ideological background inevitably determined its other characteristics and methodology. Thus, owing to Kemal's authoritarianism he readily imposed his pacifist, isolationist, legalist, pragmatic, and 'realist' foreign policy.⁹⁸

Pacifism & Isolationism

The First World War and the War of Independence left Turkey a weak and poor country. The economy had collapsed, the treasury was empty, and the army and the people were tired of fighting. Under these circumstances the last thing Kemal needed was a war which could abort his reforms. That is to say, Kemalist foreign policy was largely an offspring of the internal aims and it did not have irredentist, aggressive and imperialist aims. Thus, its most important priority was the preservation of the *status quo* and peace,⁹⁹ 'The most important watchwords of Kemalist foreign policy were "peace at home and peace abroad (*Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh*)"'¹⁰⁰ and this principle has constituted the keystone of Turkish foreign policy.¹⁰¹ This did not mean an intention to defend peace in the region and in the world. Such objectives were well beyond Turkey's reach; and beside Turkey was not interested in making the world a safer or more peaceful place as were universal ideologies like socialism.¹⁰² 'Peace at home, peace abroad' symbolised the hope for a peaceful international environment so as to gain an

⁹⁸ Different scholars add more Kemalist principles and 'basic elements'. For K rk u  lu for instance main elements of Atat rk's foreign policy are a. Artful use of Tactics, b. the usefulness of personal contacts, c. Dialogue even with the enemy, d. No total confidence on friends and the outer world, e. Discreteness, f. Honour and dignity, g. Difference between personal and government affairs (continuity of foreign policy – No dependence upon passing individuals: K rk u  lu, 'An Analysis...', pp. 135-141. Berke Dilan adds more principles like anti-imperialism, rationalism: Hasan Berke Dilan, *Atat rk D nemi T rkiye'nin Dis Politikasi, 1923-1939*, (*Turkey's Foreign Policy in Atat rk Period*), (Istanbul: Alfa, 1998, pp. 6-7.

⁹⁹ Abd lahat Ak in, *Atat rk' n D   Politika İlkelere ve Diplomasisi, İkinci Kısım*, (*Atat rk's Foreign Policy Principles and Diplomacy, the Second Part*), (Istanbul: Inkılap ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1966), p. 1.

¹⁰⁰ Kili, *Kemalism*, p. 113.

¹⁰¹ Metin Tamko , *The Warrior Diplomats, Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press 1976), p. 299  Roderic H. Davison, 'Peaceful Foreign Relations: An Achievement of Atat rk', *A SBF Dergisi*, Nos. 1-4, January-December 1981, Vol. XXXVI, p. 167.

¹⁰² Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic, A Case Study in National Development*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 163.

important respite to implement the reforms. In short, the first feature of Kemalist foreign policy was its pacifism,¹⁰³ and as will be seen in the next chapter, Turkey always sought to solve its disputes with the other states through pacific means.¹⁰⁴

For Mustafa Kemal Turkey was a weak country that should avoid a pan-Turkist, pan-Islamist, Ottomanist or even internationalist-activist foreign policy. He qualified these approaches as ‘illusions which are a long way from any practical value’ and which ‘aroused fear and anxiety in the rest of the world’.¹⁰⁵ In his *Great Speech* Kemal criticised these approaches:

‘To unite different nations under one common name, to give these different elements equal rights, subject them to the same conditions and thus found a mighty state is a brilliant and attractive ideal; but it is a misleading one. It is an unrealisable aim... There is nothing in history to show how the policy of Pan-Islamism could have succeeded or how it could have found a basis for its realisation on this earth.’¹⁰⁶

As early as 1921 Kemal argued that ‘let us recognise our own limits’.¹⁰⁷ For him, Ottomanism, pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism were adventurist foreign policy courses which had undermined Turkey’s security by rising fears about Turkey’s foreign policy aims. Kemal underlined the importance of security in foreign policy making: ‘In formulation of our foreign policy we pay particular attention to safety and security of our country and to our capacity to protect our rights against any aggression.’¹⁰⁸

From this perspective, Turkey was not able to pursue any aggressive or irredentist foreign policy, nor could it even entertain such ideas, which were bound to raise fears and doubts about its intentions. Turkey was surrounded by former Ottoman provinces or historical enemies of the Ottoman Empire, and this kind of aims might provoke these countries and might risk Turkey’s sovereignty and unity. Hence, Turkey had to be kept small and should convince other countries of its goodwill - the only means to maintain its independence. Henceforth Turkey had two foreign policy aims: territorial integrity

¹⁰³ Kili, *Kemalism*, p. 113.

¹⁰⁴ Metin Tamkoç, ‘Turkey’s Quest for Security Through Defensive Alliances’, *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 1961, p. 10.

¹⁰⁵ Vladimir I. Danilov, ‘Kemalism and World Peace’, in Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun (eds.), *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), p. 110.

¹⁰⁶ Atatürk, *Speech...*, p. 379.

¹⁰⁷ Kinross, *Ataturk...*, p. 458.

¹⁰⁸ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, (*Atatürk’s Speeches and Statements*), Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1961), p. 356.

and peace to complete the reforms.¹⁰⁹

Legalist Foreign Policy

The second characteristic of Kemalist foreign policy was its legalism. Kemalist Turkey chose a legalistic approach to diplomatic disputes since 1923 for two main reasons. Domestically, the Kemalist ruling-elite had no public support for their secularist, nationalist policies. They were mainly civil and military bureaucrats, who were opposed by people, religious leaders, royal family and even external powers. Under these circumstances the only thing they could rely on was the law. They had to be legalist to protect themselves. Thus, since the days of the CUP, a hidden coalition emerged between the Westernists, namely civil bureaucrats, intellectuals and military officers. Similarly, they believed that Turkey's foreign policy had to be legalist. Also, it was widely believed that weaker states were the main beneficiaries from international law and Turkey was a relatively weak and small state compared with the Soviet Union, the British Empire and other imperial powers surrounding it. Thus Turkey refrained from using military force to solve external problems, even border issues. For example in Hatay and the straits problems Turkey always looked for a legal solution, although the international environment was very suitable for a unilateral resolution of the problems. For the policy-makers Turkey was part of the civilised world and this meant written agreements. As they saw it, one of the main reasons for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was its 'aggressive' foreign policy. Also, Turkey's legalist foreign policy was a natural extension of its pacifist orientation, as it was hoped that Turkey could guarantee its territorial integrity and independence by achieving an equal membership in the European state-system and getting support of international law. Thus, in terms of the settlement of disputes with foreign powers, Turkish diplomacy was marked by great reliance upon political and legal procedures of pacific settlement.¹¹⁰

Another practical reason for this policy was that Turkey wanted solutions to be long lasting. Thus Turkey became the first state to use legal methods for the revision of post-

¹⁰⁹ This Kemalist approach brought concessions and wanes in the foreign policy aims, yet for Fukuyama, Atatürk's foreign policy understanding is a good example for a 'power maximising foreign policy'. He argued that Kemal by growing smaller guaranteed Turkey's power in the long run: Francis Fukuyama, **The End of History and the Last Man**, (London: Penguin Books, 1992), pp. 256-257.

¹¹⁰ Metin Tamkoç, **The Warrior...**, p. 303.

war agreements¹¹¹ though other defeated states, like Germany, chose an aggressive revisionist foreign policy. This policy continued during the 1920s and the 1930s and it succeeded in changing some parts of the Lausanne Treaty. The legalist foreign policy mainly used bilateral and multilateral diplomatic negotiations, international agreements, international organisations and bodies, conciliation etc. Even after the Atatürk era, legalism, together with pacifism, remained an unalterable feature.

Non-Alignment Policy and Desire for Neutrality

Despite its pacifism and legalism, the third feature of Kemalist foreign policy was its obsession with internal and external sovereignty. As a result of the Ottoman experience, equality with the European powers and sovereignty was put at the top of the priority list. Thus, Turkey avoided agreements or co-operation with any country, which would lead to a pact or bloc. As noted earlier, during the First World War the Ottoman Empire had aligned itself with Germany and this resulted in its own destruction. Earlier the Ottoman Empire had lost Cyprus as a result of British-Ottoman military co-operation against Russia. Kemal feared that Turkey had no power to manipulate international politics while it was exposed to their vicissitudes. Hence a pact or military-political grouping might cause a war or crisis Turkey could not control. After the First World War the defeated nations became revisionist and aimed to change the balance of power, while the winners sought to protect the *status quo*. Turkey was obviously a loser yet it strictly avoided this polarisation,¹¹² refraining even from any political or military co-operation which could provoke any third party, like Italy or the Soviet Union. The only exceptions are the Balkan and Saadabat pacts which were not directed against any country but were defensive alliances. Atatürk was very reluctant to enter into international commitments, including participation in the League of Nations.¹¹³ Thus, Turkey assiduously guarded its non-aligned status during the Atatürk era, adhering to a policy of non-involvement outside and concentration on national development at home.¹¹⁴ Even after Kemal this

¹¹¹ Türkkaya Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1965), pp. 5-7.

¹¹² Mehmet Gök, 'Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Dış Politikasının İç ve Dış Kaynakları', (*The Internal and External Sources of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Republican Era*), in *Atatürk Türkiye'sinde, 1923-1983, Dış Politika Sempozyumu* (*The Symposium on Foreign Policy in Atatürk's Turkey*), (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1984), p.54.

¹¹³ Akşin, *Atatürk'ün...*, p. 4.

¹¹⁴ Akgönenç, *A Study...*, p. 40.

policy continued and Turkey managed to remain outside the Second World War though it admitted the need for 'powerful friends'.¹¹⁵

Pragmatism and Realism

Although Kemalism was a revolutionary movement with certain unchangeable principles, ironically, pragmatism was one of them, especially in foreign relations. This can be considered a continuity of Ottoman foreign policy. The Ottoman Empire had been preserved by exploiting the rivalry among the European powers¹¹⁶ to protect its territorial unity. Kemal, as a former Ottoman officer, also used the same method. He and his successors played off one power against the other to protect Turkey's interests. As a result Turkey, though not a communist country, benefited from Soviet military and financial aid against the West during the Independence War. At the same time, Kemal tried to establish good relations with the French, Italian and British to balance Russian power in the region. Moreover, despite his ultra-secular ideas, Kemal sought to get the support of the Muslims. For example, in his first speech to the newly gathered parliament in April 1920, he argued that the parliament was not composed of the representative of Turks, Kurds, Circassians and the Lazs, but rather of the representatives of a strongly unified Islamic Community.¹¹⁷ He even promised the Muslims of the British Empire that he would restore the Caliphate. Islamic solidarity was one of the significant factors, which helped the Turkish nationalist movement's foreign policy.¹¹⁸ Thus even Islam was used to create a secular nation-state. However, after the attainment of independence, Kemal's 'Islamist' policy changed completely and the Constitutional Commission of the Second Parliament declared that there was only a Turkish nation in the Turkish territories and no more nations.¹¹⁹

In addition to the Ottoman heritage, pragmatism was also necessitated by Turkey and the Kemalist regime's economic, political and military weaknesses. The regime and the country's weaknesses were very important, because Kemalism did not have universal

¹¹⁵ Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, p.6; Deringil, *Turkish....*, p. 71.

¹¹⁶ Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey, A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923*, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), p.19

¹¹⁷ *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, Vol. 1, (Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1961), pp. 73-74.

¹¹⁸ Mim Kemal Öke, *Güney Asya Müslümanları'nın İstiklal Davası ve Türk Milli Mücadelesi Hilafet Hareketi, 1919-1924*, (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988), p. 55.

¹¹⁹ Şeref Gözübüyük and Zekai Sezgin, *1924 Anayasası Hakkındaki Meclis Görüşmeleri*, (*The Parliament Meetings on 1924 Constitution*), (Ankara: SBFY, 1957), p. 7.

aims, but it was solely concerned with the Turkish experience. Kemalism was a 'homeland ideology'¹²⁰, and the circumstances in Turkey inevitably formed and changed Kemalist ideology. Apart from these factors, this pragmatism was a direct result of Kemal's personality. Kemal was not a rigid ideology-minded person but rather a pragmatic and realist leader. In his speech to the army generals he expressed flexibility of his ideology:

'My general, this party has no doctrine... Of course it does not; if we had a doctrine, we could freeze the movement.'¹²¹

In the words of Harris '... he was a pragmatist and an experimenter; he did not seek to bind Turkey to an ideology or to set foreign policy in a rigid mold.'¹²²

Kemal's pragmatism and realism ultimately determined his foreign policy orientation. After the war Turkey continued to use competition among the western powers to achieve its national interests, as evidenced by the Hatay problem, which was solved when France was in trouble in Europe. Even during the Hitler and Mussolini eras, Turkey sought to maintain relations both with Germany and Italy and with their enemies like Britain, the United States and France.

¹²⁰ Karal, 'The Principles...', p. 23.

¹²¹ Aydemir, *Tek...*, p. 502.

¹²² Harris, *Turkey...*, p. 180.

CHAPTER V

Foreign Policy as Atatürk Implemented

‘Musul is very valuable for us. First, there are round it oil wells which constitute an unlimited source of wealth. Secondly, there is the equally important question of Kurdishness. The British want to set up a Kurdish government there. If they do so, this idea will spread to the Kurds inside our borders. To prevent this, the border must be drawn further south.’¹

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk President

‘Turkey sacrificed Musul in the higher interest of peace.’²

Tevfik Rüşü Aras, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Having examined the evolution of the main ideological and methodological principles of the Kemalist approach, this study will now discuss the implementation of these principles in the foreign policy sphere by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Certainly a detailed exploration of the events in these decades falls out of the scope, aims and limitations of this study. Rather it has three aims. to identify Kemalist attitudes in the implementation of foreign policy; to test how Mustafa Kemal’s Kemalism was Kemalism; and to find the determining factors in Turkish foreign policy, which emerged in the Kemalist era and continued for several decades.

The 1920s: Diplomatic Restoration

Although Turkey gained its independence after a bitter war (The War of Independence) with the European powers, the Kemalist ideology was not anti-Western. On the contrary, as noted earlier, it was pro-Western and Kemal’s ultimate aim was to win the friendship of the West, notably Great Britain as the most influential power in Europe and Turkey’s region. Moreover, with its weak economy and army, Turkey could not protect its independence and integrity without Western support. Therefore, from the Kemalist perspective, the West constituted not only the economic and political model for the Republican regime but also a security tool against an attack from the Soviet Union or any revisionist state, like Italy. However, even after Lausanne, relations with the European powers were still problematic. These powers were not aware of Kemal’s

¹ Atatürk, quoted in Andrew Mango, ‘Reflections on the Atatürkist Origins of Turkish Foreign Policy and Domestic Linkages’, in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds.), **Turkey’s New World, Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy**, (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 2000), p. 12.

² Kürkcüoğlu, ‘Turco-British...’, p. 86.

desire for friendly relations, perceiving Turkey as a new version of the Ottoman Empire. These (mis) perceptions were further aggravated by unresolved issues left over from the Lausanne conference, such as the Musul problem.

When Turkey transferred its capital from Istanbul to Ankara, Britain, France and Italy tried to prevent this move. This was an old tendency left from the Ottoman years: In the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, the great European powers had a control over the government and the sultan could not simply ignore France, Britain or Germany's ideas on the internal problems. France, for instance, opposed the new regulations in the Turkish educational system regarding the status of French schools in Turkey, while Italy viewed Turkey as falling within its sphere of influence. In addition to the capital issue, the Turkish Straits and Musul were at the top of the agenda with the British. Turkey was not happy with the order established by Lausanne in the Straits because their demilitarisation infringed on Turkey's sovereignty. For its part Britain was also unhappy with the situation because it wanted an international commission that would control the Straits with an independent flag. As will be seen shortly, Turkey managed to resolve the problem in line with its preferences, in an international conference, by exploiting an international crisis.

A no less thorny issue in Anglo - Turkish relations was the Musul dispute. This oil rich area was vital for the security of the British Empire in Asia. The British had occupied Musul, whose population was composed mainly by Turkish, Kurdish and Arab people, on 15 November 1918.³ When the Mudros Armistice was signed, the British were 30 km away from Musul.⁴ In other words, the occupation was not based on any agreement. Even the Sevres treaty did not assign the region to Britain but to an envisaged Kurdish state where the region would be a part of Kurdistan.⁵ However, the Ottomans and the Nationalist movement never accepted these intentions, and the National Pact declared

³ Turkey had confidence on that the local people preferred Turkey. Therefore Turkey continuously insisted on a plebiscite in the region: Hasan Berke Dilan, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası, 1923-1939*, (*Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1923-1939*), (Istanbul: Alfa Yayın, 1998), p. 31.

⁴ Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti* (*The State of Turkey's Foreign Policy*), (Istanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1942), pp. 162-163 and Busch, *Mudros to Lausanne, Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1925*, (New York: New York State University, 1976), pp. 10-11.

⁵ The Kurdish region, which was on the way of the British Indian colony, had always been important for the British Empire because of the geo-political considerations. The British tried to increase their influence in the region since the 19th century. For the examples: İstanbul Ottoman Archives of Prime Ministry, No. 8042/B1257/Hüküm; No: 768/11/41/1298/ 7.7.7/8. (The British activities in the Kurdish regions).

Musul Ottoman territory.⁶ Though Kemalist Turkey reconciled itself to the loss of the Arabian portion of the former Ottoman Empire, it refused to accept the loss of northern Iraq,⁷ which it viewed as Turkish territory. Atatürk declared Musul's importance as vital for Turkish development:

'Musul is very valuable for us. First, there are round it oil wells which constitute an unlimited source of wealth. Secondly, there is the equally important question of Kurdishness. The British want to set up a Kurdish government there. If they do so, this idea will spread to the Kurds inside our borders. To prevent this, the border must be drawn further south.'⁸

For the Turks, there were 263,000 Kurds and 146,000 Turks in the region⁹ and they preferred Turkey to Iraq.¹⁰ During Lausanne the area was still under British occupation, but failure to reach a decision and the need for an early conclusion to the conference necessitated the issues' deferment to the post-Lausanne era. When the Istanbul conference failed on 5 June 1924, the negotiations continued in the League of Nations. At the time Britain was the dominant power in the League while Turkey was not even a member. During the negotiations some clashes between British and Turkish soldiers ensued and Britain threatened Turkey with possible war. Turkey believed that Britain would go to war over the Musul dispute or could use the Kurdish, Islamist or economic cards to intervene in Turkey's internal affairs in order to get Musul. There was a serious Islamist-Kurdish revolt near the border and Turkey believed that Britain provoked and helped the rebels. Since Turkey could not accept such risks it gave in, and the Agreement on Borders and Good Neighbourliness was signed in Ankara on 5 June 1926, and accepted the League of Nation's decision on Musul, recognising the Turkish-Iraq border and received £500,000 in return for its 10 per cent share in the oil company.¹¹ Lord Kinross argued that the surrender of Musul to Iraq was 'Atatürk's sole

⁶ The British did not recognise the National Pact: A. Toynbee, *Survey*, Vol. 1, 1925, p. 482.

⁷ K. Krüger, *Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East*, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932), p.175.

⁸ Atatürk, quoted in Andrew Mango, 'Reflections on the Atatürkist Origins of Turkish Foreign Policy and Domestic Linkages', in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds.), *Turkey's New World, Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 2000), p. 12.

⁹ Seha L. Meray, *Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar ve Belgeler (The Lausanne Peace Conference, Documents)*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Ankara: SBF Yayınları, 291), p. 343.

¹⁰ Kemal Melek, 'Türk İngiliz İlişkileri (1890-1926) ve Musul Petrolleri' (*The Musul Oil in Turkish-British Relations, 1890-1926*), in Toktamis Ates and others, *Türk Dış Politikasında Sorunlar, (The Problems in Turkish Foreign Policy)*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1989), pp. 38-39.

¹¹ Stephen F. Evans, *The Slow Rapprochement, Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Atatürk, 1919-1938*, (University of Hull, 1982), p. 96.

mistake in foreign policy'.¹² However, the Musul dispute was not an exception in Kemalist foreign policy, but rather an excellent example of its typically over-cautious reaction to risky situations. According to Tefik Rüşti Aras, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'Turkey sacrificed Musul in the higher interest of peace.'¹³ Of course Musul was an important territory in terms of the Turkish economy. However, for Kemal, maintaining this area would risk Turkey's independence and most importantly the success of his radical reforms. Even the British could not understand the Kemalist mind in this crisis. For Kemal neither the territory nor the oil were the priority, but rather a homogeneous population and a strong nation-state. But not all-Turkish political groups thought the same way. Non-Kemalist groups were to raise issue on numerous future occasions.¹⁴ Islamists, Ottomanists and Turkist groups were to claim that Northern Iraq was a natural part of Turkey, hence it should be annexed to the Republic. Certainly such claims echo remaining imperial notions in the Republican era.

The resolution of the Musul problem enabled Anglo-Turkish relations to improve, albeit at a slow pace. This was due to Britain's scepticism about Turkey. Although Atatürk sought Britain's long-lasting friendship and support, the British politicians underestimated his reforms.¹⁵ Sir Clerk, the British ambassador to Turkey, frequently assured London of Turkey's desire for closer relations with Britain having been impressed by Kemal's warm references to Britain.¹⁶ But his messages fell on deaf ears as the British government failed to grasp the Kemalist worldview.¹⁷ As a result relations remained friendly but on a low level until the British realised Turkey's importance in south-eastern Europe against the revisionist powers.¹⁸

¹² Kürkçüoğlu, 'Turco - British...', p. 98.

¹³ Kürkçüoğlu, 'Turco - British...', p. 86. Mustafa Kemal's Musul policy is seen as a traitorous to the National Pact, particularly by the Islamist scholars. For different approach: Kadir Mısırlıoğlu, **Musul Meselesi ve Irak Türkleri**, (*The Musul Dispute and the Iraqi Turks*) (İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1976); Ziya Arif Sirel, *İngilizler Musul'u Nasıl Aldılar*, (*How the English got Musul?*), **Yakın Tarihimiz** (*Our Current History*), Vol. 1, No. 9, (İstanbul), 1962.

¹⁴ Particularly ultra-Turkist group did not give up the idea of that Musul is a Turkish town. Even some Kemalists sounded similar claims. Once Tefik Rüşti Aras, Turkish Foreign Minister at that time, said: Turkey gave Musul to Britain but this was not only to satisfy Britain but also to satisfy the Iraqis. By doing this we aimed to gain their heart for a possible confederation between Turkey and Iraq.' Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, **Türk - İngiliz İlişkileri, 1919-1926**, (*Turkish - British Relations, 1919-1926*) (Ankara: Ankara University SBF, 1978), p. 321.

¹⁵ Türkkaya Ataöv, **Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945**, (Ankara: 1965), pp. 2-3.

¹⁶ Stephen F. Evans, **The Slow Rapprochement, Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Atatürk, 1919-1938**, (University of Hull, 1982), p. 97.

¹⁷ Evans, **The Slow...**, p. 97.

Diplomatic Isolation from the West and Involuntary Friendship with the Soviet Union

These British attitudes help explain why, despite Atatürk's pro-Western orientation and Westernist, secularist aims, Turkey was not comfortable with the European powers during 1920s. Worst still, all the major European powers were now Turkey's neighbours: Syria was under French rule, Iraq was a British mandate, Cyprus had been annexed to Britain, Meis island and the Twelve Islands in the Aegean Sea were under Italian occupation. Thus, Turkey was pushed into the directions of the Soviet Union by Western, notably British policies.¹⁹

For its part, the Soviet Union felt besieged by the West. Like Turkey, it was not a member of the League of Nations (LN), which was perceived as a Western tool to undermine Soviet security. As a politically and economically isolated country, the Soviet Union's strategy was based on two main columns: to improve its relations with Germany and its neighbours including Turkey.²⁰ Turkey, in particular, was an important country for Soviet security, as vividly underscored by the Dardanelles campaign during the First World War and the Soviet Union was keen to improve relations with Turkey and to keep Turkey outside the LN and the 'anti-Soviet bloc'. The LN's 'impartial' decision on the Musul dispute created an excellent opportunity for these countries and on 17 December 1925 the day following the decision of the League of Nations to award Musul to Iraq (Britain), the Turco-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression was signed by Chicherin and Tevfik Rüştü Aras in Paris. As Melek put it, this agreement was very much a protest against Britain and the LN.²¹ Chicherin blamed the LN for its Musul decision stating:

'If Britain doesn't be more conciliatory, its attitude would may cause inevitable results. Musul is very important for Turkey and despite Turkey's peaceful desires, Turkey's border cannot be drawn further north.'²²

The efforts for co-operation gave its fruits in a short time and two years later, the trade volume between Turkey and the Soviet Union was doubled as a result of a commercial

¹⁸ Evans, *Slow...*, p. 97.

¹⁹ Dilan, *Türkiye'nin...*, p. 56.

²⁰ Dilan, *Türkiye'nin...*, p. 56.

²¹ Kemal Melek, 'Türk - İngiliz İlişkileri (1890-1926) ve Musul Petrolleri', in Toktamış Ateş and others, *Türk Dış Politikasında Sorunlar*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1989), p. 73. With these treaty both promised not to attack each other and not to enter any alliance against each other (Article 2). Also according to the treaty in any possible conflict they had to be neutral toward each other (Article 1). The unofficial aim of this treaty was to give a free hand to Turkey and the Soviet Union against the West.

treaty.²³ Furthermore, in 1928 the Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov proposed Turkey's participation in the Preparatory Disarmament Talks - Republican Turkey's first appearance in an international gathering.²⁴ In this meeting Turkey supported the Soviet argument by proposing a total disarmament. The political co-operation continued and Turkey was the first country to sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact prohibiting war. In Karakhan's Ankara visit, the Non-Aggression Treaty was reaffirmed. Notwithstanding some problems Turkey greatly benefited from the co-operation with the Soviet Union: it guaranteed its north-eastern borders, found a new economic market and source of financial support and counterbalanced the West strategically. However, Kemal never lost sight of the Soviet lethal threat to Turkish security. As he saw it, the Soviet Union would not be Turkey's friend forever.²⁵ Ankara also feared of potential Soviet attempts to import its ideology to other countries, including Turkey and Iran.²⁶ As a result, even at a moment of diplomatic isolation from the rest of the world, the Turco-Russian Treaty of Neutrality reaffirmed the Turks' fears of the Russians. Consequently Turkey continued to work on improving its relations with the Western powers, signing a treaty with France on 30 May 1926, and a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Italy on 30 May 1938. These agreements further underscored Turkey's non-aggressive policy and its determination to keep itself free from any entanglements in the conflicts of the European powers.

Turkish - Greek Reconciliation

In addition to the great powers, Turkey consolidated relations with its immediate neighbours and smaller states in the region. It signed friendship and neutrality agreements with Yugoslavia in 1925, with Persia (Iran) in 1926, with Hungary in 1927, with Afghanistan in 1928 and with Bulgaria in 1929. In doing so, Turkey sought to

²² Bilge, *Güç...*, p. 99.

²³ For the official text of the agreement see: Dilan, *Türkiye'nin...*, pp. 59-60.

²⁴ Dilan, *Türkiye'nin...*, p. 61.

²⁵ Atatürk saw the Soviet Union as a source of instability and threat not only for Turkey, but also for both Europe and Asia: The beneficiary of a war in Europe will be neither Britain, France nor Germany but Bolshevism. As a neighbour and such a nation who had conflicted with this country (Russia), we carefully watch the developments in Russia and we can easily realise the danger. The Bolsheviks, who exploit the Eastern nations, are not only threatening the European states but also the Asia countries: Atatürk's conversation with MacArthur in Kemal Arıburnu, *Atatürk'ten Anılar*, (*Memoirs from Atatürk*), (İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi Yayın, 1998), pp. 336-338; *Cumhuriyet* (İstanbul, daily), 8 November 1951; George S. Harris, *Turkey, Coping with Crisis*, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 178.

²⁶ As will be seen below Stalin's intention was understood as early as in 1935 when he declared Turkey, Iran and all Near East as the 'Russian region': Herbert Melzig's memoirs in Arıburnu, *Atatürk'ten...*, p. 203-205.

prove its peaceful intentions, and no where was this as important as its relations with Greece. Atatürk was keen to put an end to the century-old feud between the two nations. He believed that as neighbours, the two countries could not secure their stability without peace. He, therefore, expressed his readiness to end the hostility between Turkey and Greece:

‘I could never myself keep on hating a nation for the mistakes of its Government... And towards the Greeks I feel the same. I am confident that we shall soon be great friends, friends as we were before the Powers intervened.’²⁷

The first problem between Greece and Turkey in the Lausanne negotiations was the exchange of minorities. Despite the migration wave caused by the war, there was still a Greek minority mainly in Istanbul, and a Turkish minority in Western Thrace. Both countries had sought to keep some minorities in each other’s territory to protect their property, and possibly to use them as a fifth column. Moreover, the mass migration from Turkey frightened the Greeks.²⁸ To eliminate this source of friction, a treaty was signed on 30 January 1923 and an exchange commission was set up.²⁹ According to the treaty (Article 1) the Istanbul Greeks and Turks living in Western Thrace were to be exchanged. However, Greeks settled in Turkey before 30 October 1918 and Turks settled east of the borders drawn by the Bucharest agreement were excluded from the exchange (Article 2).³⁰ The Commission worked smoothly till mid-1924 and the exchange of some population had been realised, before a crisis erupted over Article 2. For the Greeks and the Turks the term ‘settled’ meant different things: Turkey interpreted settled Greeks as those who lived in the Istanbul municipality, while Greece understood it as those who lived in the greater Istanbul province. The negotiations continued until the 1930s, and increased Greek fears of a possible Turkish attack.³¹ But these fears were not necessary, as Kemal viewed Greece as both an important

²⁷ Mustafa Kemal cited in Alexis Alexandris, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Greece During the Second World War and Its Impact on Greek-Turkish Détente’, *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1982, p.157. For the details of the statement see also Grace Ellison, *An Englishman in Angora*, (London: 1923).

²⁸ Georges Castellan, *Balkanların Tarihi*, (*History of the Balkans*), (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1995), p. 440.

²⁹ Soysal, *Türkiye’nin...*, pp. 177-184.

³⁰ League of Nations, Category VII, 1924, *Assembly Council Circular Letters*, 10/34, 4 9.1924.

³¹ Greece also tried to get British and the LN’s support against the Turkish, and both Britain and the LN gave clear political support to the Greek thesis. Even the General Secretary of the LN, Drummond, gave the organisation’s guarantee to protect Greece’s borders against Turkish attacks. Drummond even advised Venizelos to strengthen the Greek air force to stop a possible Turkish attack in the Aegean Sea: Özden Zeynep Alantar, ‘Türk Dış Politikasında Milletler Cemiyeti Dönemi’ (*The League of Nations Period in Turkish Foreign Policy*), in Faruk Sönmezoğlu (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (*The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy*), (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994), p. 55. As will be shown later, the West’s these

cornerstone in Turkish security against Russia and Italy and a springboard to improve relations with the West. Despite this, as a result of Greek policy, relations were frozen in 1929.³² But not for long. The disagreement worked against Greek interests; while the number of Turks in Greece was merely 60,000, there were 200,000 Greeks in Turkey. Therefore, an exchange agreement was signed in 1930 which solved the problem mainly in favour of the Turkish argument.³³ The problem was now over, but Turkey learnt from this crisis that it could not rely on the West and international organisations against Greece because the latter had more friends than Turkey. On the other hand, the solution of the exchange problem, and with the Greco - Turkish Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration of 30 October 1930, made a close Turkish-Greek co-operation in the Balkans possible. Another factor was the situation the Greeks in; Greece was in a political turmoil and an economic depression in the 1920s and the Italian threat to Greece was increasing. Under these circumstances Greece turned its face to Turkey and sought good relations with the Turks.³⁴ Thanks to these agreements,³⁵ as Kemal planned, Turkey and Greece played a leading role in the establishment of the Balkan Pact in 1934. Also the Greek-Turkish co-operation helped to make British foreign policy more favourable to Turkish security strategy. The more Italy increased pressure on the Balkans, the better relations between Turkey, Greece and Britain became more clear.³⁶

Relations with the Muslim World and the Caliphate Issue: Escape from Its Own Civilisation?

Similar to relations with the West, Kemalist foreign policy had an emotional dimension in its policy toward the Eastern world. As noted in the previous chapter, Turkey's relations with the East were determined by Kemalist ideological perceptions. These viewed the East and Islam as a source of backwardness and led to a reluctance to improve relations with the Muslim and Eastern countries.³⁷ Apart from this ideological

'partial' attitudes strengthened the mistrust between the Turks and the West.

³² Alantar, 'Türk...', pp. 54-55.

³³ Baskın Oran, *Türk - Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu*, (*The Western Thrace Problem in Turkish - Greek Relations*), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991), p. 81; Also see S. Akgün, 'Turkish - Greek Population Exchange', *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, Vol. 1, 1993. For the text see, İsmail Soysal, *Tarihçeleri ve Açıklamaları İle Birlikte Türkiye'nin Andlaşmaları*, (*Turkey's Agreements with Their History and Explanations*), Vol. I, (1920-1945), (Ankara: TTK, 1989), pp. 353-396.

³⁴ Gürel, *Tarihsel...*, p. 40.

³⁵ Soysal, *Tarihçeleri...*, pp. 353-396.

³⁶ Gürel, *Tarihsel...*, p. 42.

³⁷ Because the effects of ideology on Turkey-Eastern countries relations are detailed in 'the Kemalist

perception, the Caliphate issue and Turkey's unwillingness to challenge European interests in the Eastern countries worsened the relations. As a result, Turkey declined to join the Cairo Conference of the Muslim organisations and countries (May 1926),³⁸ being opposed to any external and internal policy that involved Islam.

The 'Fez Affair' offers a vivid illustration of Turkey's Eastern perception and approach towards the Arab world. As discussed in Chapter IV, Atatürk had banned the fez in Turkey on 25 November 1925, accusing this hat of symbolising the Eastern-Islamic civilisation. For the Kemalist regime, removing the fez from Turkish heads was a part of the Turkish revolution.³⁹ Some opponents of the removal law were even sentenced to death and hanged by the regime.⁴⁰ It was so important, yet the Turkish government naturally had no power to interfere in the Arab world. In one of the official receptions in Ankara Hamza Bey, the Egyptian Ambassador wore the fez, considered a proper ceremonial dress for the Egyptians. When Kemal saw the ambassador, he asked him to remove his headgear⁴¹ even implying that he did not like the Egyptian uniform:

'At a reception in Ankara one evening Atatürk's eye lighted on with a salver for the fez, remarking 'Tell your King I don't like his uniform.' When the news of the episode reached Cairo... a break in relations with Turkey was only avoided by tactful diplomacy on both sides.'⁴²

Inevitably Turkey's attitude toward Egypt made a close relationship impossible. After the fez scandal Egypt demanded an apology and Turkey refused. Anti - Egyptian and anti-Turkish campaigns were started in both countries' press and misunderstanding was deepened.⁴³

Foreign Policy's Main Principles and Actors' chapter, it is assumed not necessary to repeat Turkey's eastern perception here.

³⁸ Toynbee, *Survey...*, 1925, Vol. 1, pp. 80-90, see also Çalış, *The Role...*, p. 70.

³⁹ Atatürk, *Speech...*, p. 738.

⁴⁰ For the details see Chapter IV of this thesis.

⁴¹ 'Diplomatic Storm a Fez May Cause', *Daily Herald*, London, 11 November 1932; 'Fuss Over a Fez', *Evening Standard*, daily, London, 11 November 1932; 'Two Nations Quarrel Over a Hat', *The Daily Express*, London, 8 December 1932.

⁴² Kinross, *Atatürk...*, p. 462.

⁴³ 'Hüsniyetimize Rağmen' (*Despite Our Goodwill*), *Cumhuriyet*, (İstanbul daily), 12 December 1932; 'Neşriyatımız Mısır'da Tahrif Ediliyor' (*Our Words are being Changed in Egypt*), *Milliyet*, Istanbul daily, 12 December 1932; 'Mısır Politikacıları Tahrif, Tezvir ve Entrika Yolunu Tuttular' (*The Egyptian Politicians Chose*), *Milliyet*, İstanbul daily, 12 December 1932.

Similarly, Turkey did not allow Muslim pilgrims to wear the traditional turbans while visiting Turkey. This increased tension between Turkey and Saudi Arabia.⁴⁴ Obviously, for Turkey the Arab world was not very important, but rather a place Turkey had to get away from. The roots of this policy touched the very identity of the new regime. Between 1923-1938, Turkey's lukewarm attitude to the Islamic states did not damage relations so much because most of them were under European rule⁴⁵ and had no power over external relations.⁴⁶ However, this attitude would determine Turkey's relations in more volatile times. For example, as will be discussed in the next chapter, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognise Israel in 1949; for Altemur Kılıç, assistant to the Turkish Ambassador to the UN at that time, the decision was taken to emphasise Turkey's Western identity.⁴⁷ In the light of all these evidences it can be argued that ideology was one of the most important determinant in early Republican foreign policy vis-à-vis Islamic states, preventing Turkey from establishing closer relations with these countries.

Turkey's Unwillingness to Challenge European Interests in the Region

The third factor which shaped Turkey's relations with the Middle East, and the Islamic world was its reluctance to challenge the European powers. Turkey, during these years, always supported the strong party but not necessarily the morally-right one. Its approach to the 1924-25 upheavals in Morocco is a good example. At first, the Turkish press took interest in the Rif rebellion and drew parallels with Turkey's own War of Independence; however, from 1925 onward, the government, its press and the elite began to voice concern that it might hurt Turkey's interests to draw the wrath of the French and the Spanish at a time when their support was needed at the League of Nations over the Mosul dispute.⁴⁸ Though Turkey had gained its independence as a result of an anti-imperialist war, 'Atatürk was not willing to contribute actively to the Arab struggle for

⁴⁴ Mahmut B. Aykan, *Turkey's Role in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 1960-1992, The Nature of Deviation from the Kemalist Heritage*, (New York: Vantage Press, 1994), p. 23.

⁴⁵ Andrew Mango, 'Turkish Policy in the Middle East, Turning Danger to Profit', in Dodd (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy, New Prospects*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), p.59.

⁴⁶ Also see for Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East: Türel Yılmaz, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya İlişkin Dış Politikasının Genel Bir Değerlendirmesi*, (*A General Outlook to Turkey's Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East in the Republican Era*), *Türkiye Günlüğü*, No. 52, September-October 1998, pp. 43-51.

⁴⁷ Altemur Kılıç, *Turkey and the World*, (Washington: 1959, p. 189; Andrew Mango, 'Turkish', p. 59.

⁴⁸ Bilge Criss and Pınar Bilgin, 'Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East', *Journal (of MERIA)*, 1, January 1997, p. 3.

independence from the Western powers'.⁴⁹ The reason for that, as mentioned was not only Turkey's weakness, but also Turkey's ideological orientation, namely Kemalist pragmatism and secularism.⁵⁰

The 1930's: Active Neutrality

The 1930s were crisis years. Europe was divided into revisionist and anti-revisionist states. Turkey's dilemma was that it sought to defend the *status quo* but at the same time needed to maintain good relations with the revisionist powers. As will be shown later, Germany was Turkey's biggest trade partner; the Soviet Union was on the one hand a formidable threat, on the other hand it was a source of credit and political and diplomatic support; Italy was dangerously close to Turkish territories, while France and Britain, the old enemies of the War of Independence, were the only countries that could counter balance the revisionists and the Soviet Union. In the 1930s, this dilemma together with Atatürk's desire for a very close relationship with Britain and fear of the Soviet Union determined Turkey's relations with the European powers. The international developments and the Soviet Union's attitude⁵¹ would not be conducive to Turkish-Soviet relations, and the relations worsened gradually towards the end of the 1930s.⁵² Also the changes in Italian and German politics affected Turkish foreign policy. The rise of Mussolini and Hitler alarmed Turkish officials who became increasingly anxious about the revisionist states. According to Kemal a new world war was coming and Turkey had to do its best to avoid being drawn into such a conflict. In 1936 he predicted that: 'There are black clouds over the European sky. For me, in four or five years period, Italy and Germany will unite and will cause a second world war catastrophe.'⁵³

By way of bracing for these uncertainties Turkey as mentioned sought partnership with the *status quo* powers, and tried to resolve the problems left over from Lausanne, and

⁴⁹ Aykan, *Turkey's Role...*, p. 23.

⁵⁰ Aykan, *Turkey's Role...*, p. 22-24.

⁵¹ As discussed, Stalin had implied that Turkey with Iran was in 'the Soviet Zone' and this kind of statements rose historical Turkish fears about the Russian intentions. For Atatürk's reaction to Stalin's plans regarding Turkey's region see Ariburnu, *Atatürk'ten...*, pp. 203-205 (for Atatürk's reaction to Stalin's speech in 1935) and pp. 208-210 (For Atatürk's reaction in the Soviet Embassy in Ankara in 1937). In the words of Gönlübol, 'The Turks may have suspected long-term Russian designs to reach the warm waters of the Mediterranean.: Gönlübol, 'A Short...', p. 3.

⁵² Gönlübol, 'A Short...', p. 3.

strengthen Turkey's military power. In this framework, stability in the Balkans and the Middle East, full Turkish sovereignty over the Straits, militarisation of the Straits Zone, securing the borders and participating in the decision-making processes of international organisations were the Turkish priorities. At the same time, Turkey tried to take all necessary measures, like international agreements, to protect itself from possible Italian aggression, and aimed at keeping the Soviets friendly, or at least neutral by making agreements and not to provoke the Russians. All this while continuing the internal reforms. The next part will discuss the relations and measures taken by Turkey for stability in its external relations.

Turkey and the League of Nations

As demonstrated by the Musul and *Etabli* disputes, the League of Nations was not a favourable platform for Turkey. However, Kemalist foreign policy was Westernist in its orientation and saw Turkey's security as lying with the West. Turkey was also defending the *status quo* in the region like the League. Thus, as another measure against the looming international crisis,⁵⁴ Turkey made great efforts to join the League. Mustafa Kemal clearly declared Turkey's expectations from the LN:

'(...) one of our primary desires is to see the League of Nations to be able to strengthen international security, to remedy the remnants of the old wounds and to achieve humanitarian results.'⁵⁵

However the first attempts failed due to Soviet hostility to the organisation and its subsequent attempts to keep Turkey out. First, Soviet officials warned Turkey not to join. In 1931 Litvinoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, visited Ankara and said that the friendship with Turkey was the corner stone of Soviet foreign policy.⁵⁶ Then the Soviet Union increased its economic support to Turkey, and both agreed on an eight-million-dollar fresh credit to Turkey.⁵⁷ Also the Soviets supported the Turkish line over the Straits, fearing that if the Straits were captured by a major power, like Britain, this would pose a deadly threat to the Soviet Union. In brief, the Soviet Union was the largest country, supporting Turkey economically, diplomatically and politically and its

⁵³ Erkin, *Dışişlerinde...*, p. 83.

⁵⁴ Tamkoç, 'Turkey's Quest for Security Through Defensive Alliances', *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 1961, p. 9.

⁵⁵ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, (*Atatürk's Speeches and Interviews*), Volume 1, (Ankara: Türk Inkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1961), pp. 367-368.

⁵⁶ Bilge, *Güç...*, p. 106-107.

⁵⁷ Bilge, *Güç...*, p. 107.

will was considered vital in Ankara though the Soviet Union was still perceived as a potential enemy. Moreover, according to the 1925 agreement Turkey could not enter such an organisation against Soviet will (article 1), and the latter's approval was conditioned on Turkey's being a permanent member of the League of Nations Council; for otherwise it would have no control over its decision-making process.⁵⁸ Turkey insisted on that, but it was obvious that the dominant members of the League would oppose this request and until 1932 Turkey could not risk the friendship of the Russians. However, by 1932, the threat to Europe had grown and Turkey saw itself alone and isolated and the LN would be a way to protect the *status quo* against the revisionist countries. This time even the USSR seemed convinced about the visibility of Turkey's participation in the LN, and this year Turkey was accepted as a full member of the League. Although the LN membership proved ineffective, it confirmed Turkey's intentions. Henceforth, being an equal member of European-Western institutions, like LN and NATO would become the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy.

The Italian Threat, the Balkan Union and the Sadabad Pact: Departing from the Neutral Stand?

Italian pressure was growing over the Balkan states during these years.⁵⁹ Italy's fortifications on the islands of Leros, Rhodes and the Dodecanese -all situated very close to the Turkish Aegean coasts- posed a direct threat to Turkish security. Italy also harboured ambitions in Africa and Asia including Turkish territories.⁶⁰ Although a Treaty of Mutual Friendship and Non-Aggression had been signed on 30 May 1928 between Turkey and Italy, Turkey was alarmed by the Italian demands and plans on Turkey. In the words of İsmet İnönü, Turkish Prime Minister, the main characteristic of Italy Turkey relations in the 1930s was 'the problem of security.'⁶¹ In search for security, Kemal sought good-neighbour relations with the Balkan, Black Sea and the Eastern neighbouring states, and tried to normalise relations with the great European powers, notably Britain and France. The membership to the LN was a part of this strategy. As has been seen Turkey had ensured a friendly relation with the Soviet Union and had solved its problems with Greece. Under the Kemal's strategy, Turkey would

⁵⁸ Gönübol, *Olaylarla...*, pp. 77-78.

⁵⁹ For the developments in the Balkans in the inter-war period see Sina Akşin and Melek Fırat, *İki Savaş Arası Dönemde Balkanlar*, (*The Balkans in the Inter-war Period*), (Istanbul: 1993).

⁶⁰ Dilan, *Türkiye'nin...*, p. 87.

⁶¹ İsmet İnönü, *İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, (*İnönü's Speeches and Interviews*), (Istanbul: Milli

involve almost all peaceful international arrangements in its region from the Sadaabat Pact to the Balkan pact, trying not to provoke Italy or any other great power. In these years 'Turkey also always sought to settle its disputes with the other powers through pacific means.'⁶² The Balkan Pact one of the most important columns of this strategy:

Neither Turkey nor the other Balkan countries could defend themselves against an Italian attack and any support from the European powers seemed unlikely.⁶³ Moreover, the Balkan states were saddled with serious domestic problems, such as differences between Serbs and Croats over the future of the Yugoslav Federation.⁶⁴ Under these circumstances a joint Balkan defence alliance was viewed as a matter of urgent necessity by Turkey. Initiated by Turkey and Greece⁶⁵, the First Balkan Conference met in 1930. In the following three years Turkey exerted great diplomatic efforts to transform the relationship into a binding, political agreement; and its negotiations with regional states, like Greece and Romania, over a series of friendship and non - aggression treaties formed the core of the Balkan Pact of 1934.⁶⁶ To Turkey's disappointment, Bulgaria and Albania did not join the Pact: the former had territorial designs on Greece and Romania, and 'its desire to secure a revision of the terms of the peace treaties was stronger than its desire to establish friendly relations with its neighbours'⁶⁷ while the latter was under Italian pressure not to join.

The Pact was an important step in Turkish foreign policy orientation. As Eren⁶⁸ pointed out, it can be considered a departure from Turkey's neutral stance to a multilateral defence system. However, the Pact's ultimate aim was to protect the *status quo*, and Turkey could not do that on its own. Turkey sought to eliminate the differences between the small Balkan states and to fortify Turkish defence of Turkey and the Balkans against a possible Italian attack. Also, as will be seen, Turkey would never act aggressively or

Eğitim Basımevi, 1946), pp. 287-288.

⁶² Tamkoç, 'Turkey's...', p. 10.

⁶³ Robert J. Kerner and Harry N. Howard, *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente: 1930-1935*, (California: California University Press, 1936), pp. 35-41.

⁶⁴ For Turkey's policy toward this issue: *Cumhuriyet'in İlk On Yili ve Balkan Pakti*, (*The Republic's First Ten Years and the Balkan Pact*), (Ankara: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971); Erkin, *Dışişlerinde...*, Vol. 1, pp.123-125.

⁶⁵ The Greek efforts for a Balkan Pact was significant. The Greeks had even advocated a Balkan Union: Kerner and Howard, *The Balkan...*, pp. 25-27.

⁶⁶ Dilan, *Türkiye'nin...*, p. 92.

⁶⁷ Türkkaya Ataöv, 'Turkish Foreign Policy: 1923-1938', *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 1961, p. 125; also see Dilan, *Türkiye'nin...*, p. 147.

even think of getting involved in Balkan conflicts in the following years despite its commitment to the defence of the joint frontiers of the member states. So, despite the appearance, to the contrary, in the Balkan Pact, as has been seen, Turkey did not break with Kemalist tradition, but its membership of the Pact confirmed Kemalism's principles of pragmatism, desire to protect the *status quo*, and realism. Atatürk clearly stated in his speech on 1 November 1934 in the parliament that the Pact was established to preserve the *status quo*:

'Balkan agreement is a document which considers the special respect among the Balkan states. It is very important in protecting the existing borders.'⁶⁹

The Pact made its last meeting in 1940 and then it was *de facto* dissolved, but Turkey had largely benefited from its existence. First, the members of the Pact supported the Turkish position over the Straits dispute. Second they joined the LN economic measures against Italy together with Turkey. Third, the joint action of these countries strengthened the defence of the Balkans and Turkey's diplomatic and political position. Finally, the Pact eliminated the danger of aggression from Bulgaria.

Similar to the Balkan Pact, another measure against a possible great war was the Sadabad Pact of Non Aggression (July 1937) between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. The signatories undertook to consult each other in all matters of common interest, and to commit no aggression against one another's territory.⁷⁰ Unlike the Balkan Pact, Turkey in particular shunned a mutual guarantee of Pact members' joint frontiers, not least since Iran and Afghanistan bordered on the Soviet Union and such a commitment could implicate Turkey in a conflict with the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union occupied Iran the Pact would collapse.

⁶⁸ Eren, *Turkey...*, p. 295.

⁶⁹ Atatürk's speech in *Atatürk'ün Milli Dis Politikası, Cumhuriyet Dönemine Ait 100 Belge, 1923-1938*, (*Atatürk's Foreign Policy, The 100 Documents of the Republican Period, 1923-1938*), (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981), pp. 59-60. For more details for Turkey's pacifist, legalist and pragmatist foreign policy attitude regarding the Balkan Pact and the Pact's defensive features see: Mustafa Yilmaz and others, *Atatürk and Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, (*Atatürk and the History of the Republic of Turkey*), (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1998), p. 168; Tamkoç, 'Turkey's...', p. 9-10; Dilan, *Türkiye'nin...*, p. 145; Gönübol and others, *Olaylarla...*, pp. 99-101; Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 114.

The Straits Issue and the Montreux Convention as an Example of a Legalist Foreign Policy⁷¹

It will be recalled that Turkey was not satisfied with the Lausanne stipulations about the Turkish Straits,⁷² having made great compromises on the issue in order to save the conference and gain British support. It did not formally raise the question in the international arena, but made frequent soundings on the matter until 1934. After this date, alarmed by the Italian aggression in Ethiopia, German revisionism and the re-armament trend in Europe, Turkey viewed the question of the Straits as a matter of urgent necessity, and made official efforts to solve it by assenting full Turkish sovereignty over the Straits.⁷³ According to the Mudros, Sevres and Lausanne agreements, warships could freely pass through the Straits⁷⁴, but Turkey wanted some restrictions on war ships as war was close. Also, the straits zone had been demilitarised by the Lausanne Convention (Article 18), and Turkey could not defend it against a possible attack. Hence, the Straits Convention had to be revised before a possible war. Turkey's argument was legally based on *rebus sic stantibus* (change in circumstances) principle. On 17 April 1935 Turkey brought the matter before the Council of the LN, with the Soviet Union's support. Were these seaways to pass to an anti-Soviet state Soviet security would be in great danger. On the other hand, Turkey was seen as a country that could be controlled on this matter. Italy openly opposed Turkey, and Britain and France gave indefinite replies. Likewise, in the Balkan Entente, held on 10-13 May 1935, Turkey won Greek, Yugoslav and Romanian support for its position. On 11 April 1936 Turkey warned all signatories to the Convention about the urgent need for revision of the Convention. Then, Numan Menemencioğlu, the General Secretary of

⁷⁰ Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 115. For the text of the treaty see Dilan, *Türkiye'nin...*, pp. 211-215.

⁷¹ For Turkey's official position on the Straits question see *Montreux ve Savas Öncesi Yillari, 1935-1939*, (*Montreux and the Pre-war Years, 1935-1939*), (Ankara: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973). For the Straits issue in general in these years see also: Mahmut N. Laçin, *The Importance of the Straits in the Foreign Relations of Turkish Republic*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Southern California, 1948; İsmail Soysal (ed.), *Turkish Straits, New Problems and New Solutions*, (Istanbul: Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies, 1995); James T. Shotwell and Francis Peak, *Turkey at the Straits*, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1940). For the details of the conference and the text see Seha Meray and Osman Olcay, *Montreux Bogazlar Konferansi, Tutanaklar - Belgeler*, (*Montreux Straits Conference, Documents*) (Ankara: 1976); Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, 'The Straits Convention of Montreux, 1936', *British Yearbook of International Law*, Vol. 18, 1937, pp. 186-191; Cemil Bilsel, *Türk Boğazları*, (*The Turkish Straits*), (İstanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1948).

⁷² Ataöv, 'Turkish...', p. 109; Dilan, *Türkiye'nin...*, pp. 123-125.

⁷³ Gönlübol and others, *Olaylarla...*, p. 121.

⁷⁴ *Montreux ve...*, p. 3 and p. 24; Mensur Akgün, 'Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Jeopolitik Etken Olarak Boğazlar' (*The Straits in Turkish Foreign Policy as a Geopolitical Factor*), in Faruk Sönmezoglu (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (*The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy*), (Istanbul: Der Yayinlari, 1994), p. 215.

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a part of a diplomatic campaign, visited many capitals, except Rome and Tokyo, to get international support for the Turkish thesis. By April 1936, all the signatories except Italy declared their intention to participate in the Montreux Conference to revise the Convention. Even Britain, which was against any revision clearly supported the Turkish position.⁷⁵ Actually, as argued by many scholars,⁷⁶ Turkey was able to confront the international community with a *fait accompli* on the issue. The Soviet Union and Britain would have probably not opposed such a change and the other countries did not have the power to prevent Turkey from doing so because they were enough with revisionist policies in the European politics. Sir Percy Loraine had warned the British that Turkey was capable of re-militarising the Straits Zone without the permission of the Lausanne signatories and had advised his government to respond favourably to the Turkish request.⁷⁷ Kemal was also aware of this situation. Once he had said: 'In my opinion the situation in Europe is quite suitable to revise the Convention... I am sure we can succeed to do this.'⁷⁸ Similarly, Tevfik Rüştü Aras stated that: 'Turkey will not hesitate to take the necessary steps to ensure the security of the Straits in unforeseen circumstances.'⁷⁹

Nevertheless, Turkey made great efforts to persuade other countries. This policy can be given as another example of Kemalism's legalist foreign principle. As a result, all the Lausanne signatories, except Italy, which boycotted the negotiations,⁸⁰ met in Montreux, Switzerland, and with the Montreux Accord of the Straits signed on 22 June 1936⁸¹ Turkish sovereignty over the Straits was re-established and Turkey gained the right to militarise the zone. The international Straits commission was abolished, and naval vessels in the Black Sea were to be limited to specific quotas and were not permitted to remain there more than 21 days. Thus, the access of non-Black Sea powers

⁷⁵ According to a report of the British Head of the General Staff Turkey's friendship was priority in the Mediterranean region. The report also underlined the importance of security of the Straits. These factors shifted British position in the issue. For the report see: Ludmila Zhivkova, *Anglo - Turkish Relations, 1933-1939*, (London: 1976), p. 31.

⁷⁶ Like Evans in his *The Slow...*, p. 100.

⁷⁷ Evans, *The Slow...*, p. 100.

⁷⁸ Gönlübol, *Olaylarla...*, p. 121.

⁷⁹ Evans, *The Slow...*, p. 100.

⁸⁰ Mehmet Gönlübol, 'A Short Appraisal of the Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic, 1923-1973', *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 1974, Vol. XIV, p. 4.

⁸¹ For the full text of the Accord in Turkish: *Resmi Gazete*, (*Turkish Official Gazette*), 5 August 1936; Reha Parla (ed.), *Belgelerle Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Uluslararası Temelleri*, (*The International Foundations of the Republic of Turkey with the Documents*), (Lefkose, TRNC: 1985), pp. 119-135.

was limited.⁸² On the other hand, merchant shipping was given complete freedom of passage. Under any war all crossing had to be during daytime. All warships were to inform the Turkish authorities 8-15 days prior to passing in both wartime and peacetime (Article 13). There were no restrictions on Turkish vessels and warships.⁸³ The Accord enhanced Turkey's strategic importance as crossing through the Straits without Turkey's permission became almost impossible. This, in turn, helped to alter Britain's attitude toward Turkey.

The Hatay (Sancak) Issue and Kemalism's Legalism⁸⁴

Another example of Turkey's legalist foreign policy understanding was the Hatay (Sancak) issue⁸⁵ and Turkey's attitude to this problem affords a vivid illustration of Atatürk's step-by-step problem-solving approach. For instance, Abdurrahman Melek claimed that for Atatürk, settlement of the Hatay problem was impossible before a solution in the Straits question, therefore he had planned these two problems step-by-step.⁸⁶ Though Turkey's claim to the Hatay province was solidly grounded in international law, Kemal did not press this claim at once. Before starting a diplomatic campaign for Hatay, Kemal ensured the British and Russian support for the Turkish arguments.⁸⁷ Turkey sought not only the great powers' support, but also the small and regional states' diplomatic support. For instance the Balkan conference declared its support for Turkey in the Straits question on 4 May 1936.⁸⁸ It was only after the Montreux Agreement had been signed that he voiced the Turkish claim to the province⁸⁹ declaring hereafter the main focus of the Turkish-French relations would be the Hatay

⁸² The Soviet Union wanted to close the seaway to the non-Black Sea powers.

⁸³ The Convention in İsmail Soysal (ed.), *Turkish Straits, New Problems and New Solutions*, (Istanbul: Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies, 1995).

⁸⁴ For Hatay issue and its importance in Kemalist foreign policy see Abdurrahman Melek, *Hatay Nasıl Kurtuldu? (How was Hatay Saved?)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991); Arnold Toynbee, 'The Franco-Turkish Dispute over the Sanjak of Alexandretta', *Survey of International Affairs*, Vol. 14, 1936; İsmail Soysal, 'Hatay Sorunu ve Türk - Fransız İlişkileri, 1936-1939', (*The Hatay Dispute and Turkish - French Relations*), *Türk Tarih Kurumu Belleten* (Ankara), Vol. XLIX, No. 193, 1985; Gönlübol, *Olaylarla...*, pp. 126-133.

⁸⁵ Mehmet Gönlübol, 'Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası: Amaçlar ve İlkeler' (*Atatürk's Foreign Policy: Aims and Principles*), in *Tarihi Gelişmeler İçinde Türkiye'nin Sorunları Sempozyumu (The Symposium of Turkey's Problems in Their Historical Developments)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992), p. 49.

⁸⁶ Melek, *Hatay...*, p. 26.

⁸⁷ Gönlübol, 'Atatürk'ün...', p. 50.

⁸⁸ Gönlübol, 'Atatürk'ün...', p. 50.

⁸⁹ Soysal, 'Hatay...', p. 83. For more details see the memoirs of the first President of the Hatay State: Tayfur Sökmen, *Hatay'ın Kurtuluşu İçin Harcanan Çabalar (The Efforts to Free Hatay)*, (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Yayınları, 1999).

problem.⁹⁰ Thereafter Kemal used both the Turkish press⁹¹, and the French press to warn the French government. When he thought that the French public was ready and the French government was weak enough he involved the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the issue and launched diplomatic initiatives in Paris and the League of Nations. Turkey, in this framework, was not using purely nationalist arguments, but based its claim on international law. In a decade when nations took their rights by force of arms, Kemal's methods were quite different. It can be argued that the Kemalist strategy was based on that if Turkey gained its rights by using force or without securing great-power endorsements it would easily lose them. That is why Turkey attached great importance to France's approval, although the latter was in no position to undertake any military operation in the region. By 1936 Turkey had solved most of the problems with France according to international law, but Hatay, whose majority population was Turkish⁹², was still under French rule. When France transferred all its sovereignty rights on the province to newly independent Syria on 9 September 1936, Turkey publicly opposed this. Moreover in the province there was a strong Turkish opposition to Arab nationalism.⁹³

The international political situation was also favourable to Turkey: It enjoyed British and Soviet support and was an active LN member. Turkey could take military action but, similar to the Straits dispute, it aimed at a long-lasting solution through a legalist approach. Thus, Turkey gave an official note to France on 9 October 1936 and asked France to give the same status (independence) as it had given to Syria and Lebanon.⁹⁴ At first the French stance was negative, but when Turkey implied the possibility of military operation. Atatürk told the French Ambassador:

'Such issue cannot cause a military clash between Turkey and France under the extraordinary circumstances the world faced today. But I considered that and decided. If there is any possibility for a clash. Having resigned from my posts I will personally enter Hatay with a few voluntary friends.'⁹⁵

⁹⁰ Atatürk's speech on 1 November 1937 in the Turkish Parliament in *Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası, Cumhuriyet Dönemine Ait 100 Belge, 1923-1938 (Atatürk's National Foreign Policy, 100 Documents of the Republican Period)*, Volume II, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981), p. 65.

⁹¹ The campaign was mainly led by *Tan* and *Cumhuriyet* daily papers. For example: A. Emin Yalman, 'Karanlığı Aydınlatmak Lazımdır' (*The Darkness must be Enlightened*), *Tan* (daily, İstanbul), 17 September 1936 and Yunus Nadi, 'Davamızda Revizyon Yoktur' (*There is no Revision in Our Struggle*), *Cumhuriyet* (daily, İstanbul), 19 September 1936.

⁹² Nurettin Ardic, *Antakya - İskenderun Etrafında, (Around Hatay and Iskenderun)*, (İstanbul: A Halit Kitabevi, 1937; Sökmen, *Hatay'ın...*, p. 37.

⁹³ Sökmen, *Hatay'ın...*, p. 35.

⁹⁴ Sökmen, *Hatay'ın...*, p. 17; Ataöv, 'Turkish...', p. 114; Dilan, *Türkiye'nin...*, p. 139.

⁹⁵ H. R. Soyak, *Atatürk'ten Hatıralar, (The Memoirs from Atatürk)* volume two, (İstanbul: n.d.), p. 607.

France changed its position and the official negotiations were started in December 1936.⁹⁶ The negotiations were held in the LN and Turkey and France accepted the Sandler Report on 26 January 1937. The final regulations between the sides, the Report, the Statue and the Constitution recognised the separate political identity of Hatay province from Syria.⁹⁷ This was a diplomatic success for Turkey, which preserved its good relations with France while at the same time giving Hatay the right to determine its own fate; indeed, two years later, in 1939 Hatay declared its independence and France accepted the situation with a written agreement with Turkey on 23 June 1939.⁹⁸ Turkey in this issue never even considered Syria. Even when the Syrian Parliament protested over the detachment of the province, Turkey and France ignored it altogether,⁹⁹ and the Hatay issue would remain a sore point in Turkish-Syrian relations to this very day.

Conclusion

In conclusion, on the one hand, the regime's sense of insecurity became the pillar of its policies. On the other hand, Kemalism's ultimate aim was to be an equal member of Western civilisation by rejecting the Eastern cultural links. Thus two main attribution appeared: **scepticism** and **Westernism**. The dilemma was clear. Neither the Turkish people, nor the West supported this Westernisation and this impasse was reflected in external issues. As a poor and weak country Turkey wanted to enter European civilisation, which clearly rejected the Turks. Thanks to the authoritarian regime, the intense contradictions proved manageable as all opposition was suppressed. However, in foreign affairs the situation was different. No country can shape the international arena. As a result Kemal used a pacifist, isolationist, legalist, neutral foreign policy orientation in order to gain time for his internal reforms and to protect Turkey's economic and political independence.

'I think Atatürk's these words were a bluff, yet it worked and after a couple of days Léon Blum, the French Prime Minister, in his letter to the Turkish Ambassador on 18 January 1937 expressed his support for diplomatic efforts and soften the French attitude in the issue.' Sökmen, *Hatay'ın...*, p. 21.

⁹⁶ Sökmen, *Hatay'ın...*, p. 17.

⁹⁷ Soysal, 'Hatay...', p. 85.

⁹⁸ For the full official text of the Turkish-French Agreement see Parla (ed.), *Belgelerle...*, pp. 147-154.

⁹⁹ *İkdam Gazetesi* (daily, İstanbul), 3 December 1939.

Fortunately for Kemal, the international crises of the 1920s and the 1930s helped to reduce the contradictions in Turkish foreign policy. The competition between the West and the Soviet Union and the latter's economic difficulties saved Turkey from the Communist threat. Similarly the problems in Europe helped Turkey resolved many problems without any clash, like the Straits issue and the Hatay issue. Moreover, Turkey's civilisation understanding did not harm Turkey's foreign policy because the Muslim nations were still under European colonial rule and failed to notice the ideological changes in Turkey. Thus, Kemalist contradictions were frozen for a while, and Turkey gained vital time for internal reforms.

Although the Kemalists after Kemal argued that Mustafa Kemal had set up all the necessary foreign policy principles for Turkey's external relations, in the light of this information, whether Atatürk's foreign policy was solely an ideological foreign policy understanding is still a debatable question. It is true Kemal's domestic aims, his personal ideas and his personality deeply affected Turkish foreign policy, and the era between 1918 and 1938 can be called as a Kemalist foreign policy. However, apart from Kemal and his ideas, many other factors also affected Turkish foreign policy in these years, such as the international crises, the problems inherited from the Ottoman Empire, Turkey's weaknesses etc., and these factors sometimes forced Kemal for a certain policies, like a pacific and pragmatic foreign policy.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ İsmet Giritli, 'Kemalist Ideology and Its Characteristics', in **Papers and Discussions, Türkiye İş Bankası International Symposium on Atatürk**, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Cultural Publications, 1984), p. 314.

CHAPTER VI

İnönist Kemalism: Deviation or Transformation?

‘Stalin succeeded in frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans.’¹

Khrushchev, the Soviet leader

‘We must Turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or ‘le turquisme.’

İsmet İnönü, Turkish President

Turkish foreign policy between 1918-1939 was a policy of survival. Two basic foreign policy goals reigned supreme throughout this period: The creation of a strong, modern state which could defend its political independence and territorial integrity, without foreign assistance, against external and internal aggression; and to make Turkey a full, equal member of the European community of nations by disengaging Turkey from its Islamic and Eastern legacy. Turkey continued these policies after Atatürk because the security problem was still at the top of the agenda, and the new regime needed a respite both domestically and internationally. All the fears and problems which had created the Kemalist principles were still there. Even, when he lay on his deathbed in 1938, Kemal was advising his followers that

‘A world war is near. In the course of this war the international equilibrium will be destroyed. If during this period we act unwisely and make the smallest mistake, we will face with an even graver disaster than in the Armistice years (1918 Mudros Armistice).’²

As Atatürk had predicted, the Second World War erupted, leaving an enormous mark on Turkish foreign policy. The Kemalist foreign policy school evolved dramatically in this era due to the international crises. Yet, while identifying themselves as Kemalists in the İnönü era a new version of Kemalism appeared with a slightly different ideological approach. Another significant development of the İnönü era was Turkey’s departure from neutrality towards pro-Western activism.

¹ Quoted in Strobe Talbott (ed.), **Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament**, (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), pp. 295-296.

² Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, **İkinci Adam** (*The Second Man*), Vol. 2, (Istanbul: Remzi, 1976), p. 87.

The Determinants of İnönü Policy

Four main factors formed Turkey's internal and foreign policy³ in the İnönü era were: a) Turkey's structural, economic and political limits; b) the regime's weaknesses; c) İnönü's personality; d) the international situation.

Turkey's Structural, Economic and Political Limits

The first factor affecting Turkey's foreign policy was its economic limits. So much so that at times, Turkey's relations with the outside world ran parallel to the course of its economic and financial relations. As Deringil put it, economics was not exactly the forte of the Turkish leaders, who came from a predominantly military background.⁴ For example at Lausanne, İnönü's ignorance of finance and economics handicapped him tremendously.⁵ The priority of the governments was the state and independence of the country, hence a huge portion of the budget went to military sphere. Furthermore, the Turkish leaders sought, first of all, to make Turkey self sufficient in foodstuffs and some industrial products, like guns. As a result of this, with the lack of technical and administrative manpower, the damage caused by continuous wars could not be repaired, and the per capita income was just a little higher in 1945 than it had been in 1929.⁶ The budget deficit in 1939/1940 was 125.3%, which was the highest since 1930.⁷ In other words Turkey was still an economically weak country. Furthermore, Turkey was a relatively low populated country with 17, 820,950 (1940), of whom 13,475,000 lived in rural areas. A weak economy and manpower problem not only undermined the regime but also limited Turkey's security and foreign policies and increased dependence on other powers. Despite their obsession with 'economic self-sufficiency and

³ For analysis of Turkish foreign policy in İnönü years see: Türkkaya Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945*, (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1965; Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Edward Weisband, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda İnönü'nün Dış Politikası, (İnönü's Foreign Policy in the Second World War)*, (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1974); O. Faruk Logoglu, *İsmet İnönü and the Making of Modern Turkey*, (Istanbul: İnönü Vakfı, 1997), pp. 61-90 ('The Diplomat'); Erkin, *Dışişlerinde...*; Gönübol and others, *Olaylarla...*; Fahir Armaoğlu, 'İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye', *AÜSBF Dergisi*, Vol. XIII, June 1958, pp. 139-179; Yusuf Sarıay, *Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakına Yönelişi ve NATO'ya Girişi, (Turkey's Move Towards the Western Alignment and Its Accession to the NATO)*, (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988); *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl, İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları, 1919-1946, (The 50 Years in Turkish Foreign Policy, The Second World War Years)*, (Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1973);

⁴ Deringil, *Turkish...*, p. 12.

⁵ Sonyel, *Turkish...*, p. 200.

⁶ Sefik Bilkur, *National Income of Turkey*, (Ankara: National Statistics Office), 1949.

⁷ *İstatistik Yıllığı, 1942-1945 (The Statistical Yearbook of the General Directorate of Statistics)*, Vol. 15. (Ankara: T. C. Başbakanlık, İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü), p. 393.

independence' the Turkish leaders realised that foreign aid was unavoidable. Turkey's need for aid facilitated German economic and financial domination of the Turkish economy⁸ with its attendant political influence. For example between 1933 and 1937 Germany's share in Turkey's total foreign trade increased over 50%.⁹ Germany's aim was to integrate the Turkish economy into the German economy as it did in many Balkan countries. As a matter of fact that the German plans to dominate Turkish economy had started in the early years of the 1930s. Thanks to the first five year plan of the Nazis, Germany got an opportunity to infiltrate into Turkish economy, and the trade between Germany and Turkey dramatically increased during the 1930s.¹⁰ However as Kruger pointed out the Turks perceive no political aspiration behind this trend during these years,¹¹ yet the picture changed with the Second World War and the German intention was not lost on the Turkish government.¹² Thus, for instance, Hamdi Arpag, the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin, suggested to increase the portion of soybean in Turkish agricultural export, the government viewed the suggestion as a part of a German attempt to colonise the Turkish agriculture and discharged the ambassador.¹³ Germany was even buying some of the Turkish products, which it did not need, sometimes at prices above the normal level to re-sold them to the other countries. The aim was simply to maintain the German dominance in the Turkish economy.¹⁴ To counterbalance German influence, Turkey turned to Britain and France, - to little avail.¹⁵ Britain and France were mainly importing from their own colonies, thus forcing Turkey to lean even more heavily on the German economy.

The Regime's Weaknesses and Legitimacy Problem

Apart from the economic difficulties, the new regime was still saddled with domestic problems. In the 1930s, the RPP (The Republican People's Party) was the ruling and the only legal party in Turkey. Yet it failed to make inroads into the hearts of the Turkish people. So long as Atatürk was alive his personal prestige compensated for this failure,

⁸ 70% of Turkish cotton and chrome went to Germany. By 1937 Germany had supplied 69.7% of its iron and steel, 78% of Turkish wool yarns and tissues, 61% of its machinery and 55% its chemicals.

⁹ *İstatistik...*, pp.394-396.

¹⁰ Ataöv, 'Turkish...', p. 129.

¹¹ Karl Kruger, *Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932), p. 112.

¹² Ahmet İzzet Feridun, 'Ankara Thwarts Hitler's Economic Invasion', *Free Europe*, 8 May 1942, p. 154.

¹³ Senior diplomat Feridun Cemal Erkin states that the government was aware of the German plans and was trying to defuse them. Erkin, *Dışişlerinde...*, p. 121.

¹⁴ Ataöv, 'Turkish...', p. 130.

¹⁵ Ward, *Turkey*, pp. 92-93.

though not fully.¹⁶ For example, seven years after the declaration of the Republic, Atatürk had to be protected from the people by the military.¹⁷ This lack of popular support for the regime increased after the death of Atatürk, driving the regime towards greater authoritarianism and making it ever more wary of the internal minorities (Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Kurds etc.) and the foreign powers (Soviet Union, Italy etc.).

İnönü's Personality

A critical role in shaping Turkey's policy was, naturally played by President İsmet İnönü. In the words of Akgönenç, 'the successor of Atatürk was not a man of revolution and change but rather *status quo*.'¹⁸ He was a more sceptical and extremely prudent person. During the Atatürk era he was described as the strict side of Kemalism. When Atatürk needed a Prime Minister, to forcefully suppress the opposition he always used İnönü, as had been seen in the Seyh Sait Revolt. İnönü was radically secular, modernist, Turkist and authoritarian, at times more radical on Kemalist principles than Atatürk himself. There is no doubt that İnönü was an important figure, yet he lacked Kemal's charisma, hence he had to use force or rules in a strict way to carry out his radical policies and to make the people obey. To underscore this, he made himself life-time chairman of the ruling party (*Milli Şef*) and fully controlled the instruments of government. Moreover he personally maintained tight control over the press and other forms of the mass media.¹⁹ Thus, İnönü's ideology and practice increased domestic tension, made the party more authoritarian. As an extremely suspicious person, İnönü perceived the opposition and the minority groups as a threat to his power. He also knew that he could not rely on the West for Turkey's unity. Alongside a highly authoritarian domestic policy he followed an isolationist foreign policy, which was over-cautious and over-sceptical about the world. For İnönü, Turkey had no friend, but itself: the West

¹⁶ As noted by Aydemir 'The RPP could not become a people's party. During the 1930's the RPP was very far from the people. In addition to a coalition between the few bureaucrats the few people in the small towns formed the RPP, that's all. The members of the party was just for their own interests but not the Republican ideas.' Aydemir, *Tek...*, pp. 402-403.

¹⁷ Oğuz Ünal, *Türkiye'de Demokrasinin Doğuşu, Tek Parti Yönetiminden Çok Partili Rejime Geçiş Süreci*, (*The Emergence of Democracy in Turkey, The Transformation Process From One Party to Multi-Party Regime*), (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1994), p.42.

¹⁸ Oya Akgönenç, *A Study of Political Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy with Particular Reference to New Trends in Turco-Arab Relations, 1960-1975*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The American University, 1975, p.35. For a different view see Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları, 1944-1973* (*The İsmet Pasha Years of Our Democracy*), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990) and Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü, The Making of a Turkish Statesman*, (Leiden: Brill, 1998), and Lagoglu, *İsmet...*

¹⁹ Weisband, *Turkish...*, p. 34-35.

would sacrifice Turkey any time, and Russia was poised to occupy Turkish territories; Germany and Italy were also not very friendly; and Turkey was not ready for a possible war. In this environment, İnönü was extremely worry of making any mistake in foreign policy. In his own words: 'The one cardinal principle in setting foreign policy which I followed throughout the war was that an early mistake is hard to make up'²⁰

The International Environment and the Second World War

There is no doubt that the most important development during the İnönü years was the Second World War.²¹ The War and the post-war events left a remarkable mark on Turkish foreign and internal policies. İnönü took office on the eve of the Second World War and was immediately confronted with a dangerous international situation. On the one hand, having stabilised his personal rule, Stalin now focused on expanding Soviet power and influence, and Turkey, as a traditional enemy, was high on the list. Not only was Turkey an obstacle to Soviet expansion to the Mediterranean and the Middle East regions, but the Soviets viewed parts of Turkey as historically belonging to them. Even during the 1930s, which can be considered the 'good-relations years', Stalin had implied that the Soviet Union could possibly occupy some Eastern provinces of Turkey.²² Consequently, with the rising tension in Europe the Soviet Union was seen as a primary threat to Turkey's security. So were revisionist Germany and Italy which threatened stability in Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Mussolini's aggressiveness in the Mediterranean became a real menace after the seizure of Albania. According to the fascist outlook, the Mediterranean Sea was an Italian lake and Italy was a new Roman Empire. Obviously there was an immediate concern for Turkey's security because Turkey was not powerful enough to resist these aims. Under these circumstances Turkey had no alternative but to seek a closer relationship and co-operation with the Western democracies in defence of the *status quo*. However, France and Britain had no power to counterbalance the revisionists, and the United States had no interest in European political 'games'. That is to say, after more than a decade, Turkey's security problem was still there, and Turkey's foreign policy, even after Atatürk, was still a survival policy. Thus the main principles of Kemal's era remained

²⁰ İnönü, cited in Weisband, *Turkish...*, p. 36.

²¹ Aydın, 'Determinants of...', p. 105.

²² Sarıca, *Atatürk'ten Hatıralar*, (İstanbul: İnkilap ve Aka, 1998).

intact, or even deepened. The only advantage of the situation was that the West also needed Turkey for its own defensive system against Germany, Italy and the communists. As seen in the Hatay issue, for example, France altered its policy toward Turkey and it sought a closer relationship.²³ Thus, Turkey found some opportunities to solve the remaining problems from Lausanne. However, when the Soviet Union made a pact with the Nazis on 23 August 1939 and these countries started to divide Eastern Europe, Turkey was caught between two stools.²⁴ On the one hand, it needed the West for its security. On the other, the last thing Turkey wanted was a conflict with the Soviet Union and Germany. Hence it sought a treaty with all the opposing sides. When all attempts for an agreement with the Soviet Union failed, Turkey made every possible effort to protect its neutrality and not to provoke the Soviet Union. However, Soviet intentions were similar to those of tsarist Russia's. As the price of its co-operation, in negotiations with the Axis powers, the Soviet Union demanded the establishment of a base for land and naval forces within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and recognition of its expansionist policy in the Caucasus.²⁵ Further, Germany and Italy were enemies of Turkey, and it could not easily challenge and any treaty with Britain or France would to provoke these countries. On the other hand, Turkey could not protect its territorial integrity and independence without the Western alliance's support because it did not have resources to fight a war. Yet the Western powers precisely expected a Turkey which fully participated the war. When Turkey understood that the Soviet intention was to prevent a possible Turkish alignment with the West, but not an agreement with Turkey, it signed a mutual defensive alliance treaty with the Western powers, namely Britain and France, on 19 October 1939 (Mutual Assistance Pact of 1939).²⁶ Under this agreement Turkey would provide aid if war came to the Mediterranean region, but according to the special provision it would not be obligated to fight against the Soviet Union²⁷ and if a European nation attacked Turkey, Britain

²³ For the details of France's Hatay policy see Erkin's (diplomat in Hatay in that date) memories: *Dışişlerinde...*, pp. 104-105.

²⁴ Faruk Sönmezoglu, 'II. Dünya Savaşı Döneminde Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası: Tarafsızlıktan NATO'ya', (*Turkish Foreign Policy in the Second World War: From Neutrality to the NATO*), in Faruk Sönmezoglu (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (*The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy*), (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994), p. 79; Barbara Ward, *Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 104;; Yulug Tekin Kurat, 'Elli Yıllık Cumhuriyetin Dış Politikası, 1923-1973', (*Foreign Policy of the 50-Years Republic*), *Belleten*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 154, April 1975, p. 270; Sarıay, *Türkiye'nin...*, p. 15

²⁵ Gönlübol and others, *Olaylarla...*; Eren, 'Foreign...', p. 300

²⁶ Sarıay, *Türkiye'nin...*, pp. 13-14; İsmail Soysal, '1939 Türk – İngiliz - Fransız İttifakı', (*The 1939 Turkish – British - French Ally*), *Belleten*, Vol. XLVI, Nos. 181-184, January 1982, p. 370.

²⁷ Article 1, Article 2 and Protocol II appended to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1939.

and France would come to its aid. Despite Turkey's efforts not to provoke the Soviet Union, the Mutual Assistance Pact marked the turning point in Turkish-Soviet relations since the Soviets perceived the pact as a part of an anti-Soviet strategy.²⁸ This alliance may seem contradictory to Kemal's non-alignment policy because Atatürk's one of the primary concerns was to keep Turkey out of great power games. But Turkey had no choice and considered the alliance with the West as the least of all evils which gave Turkey a measure of security without joining the war.²⁹ However İnönü was severely criticised for the Mutual Assistance Pact particularly in the 1970s by the leftist-Kemalist groups. For instance, Avcioglu accused İnönü for 'his departure from the Kemalist non-involvement principle'. Avcioglu further claimed that İnönü with a 'useless' agreement damaged the 'traditional Turkish-Soviet friendship'.³⁰

In 1941 the Nazi armies poured into Greece. All the Balkans and some parts of the northern Black Sea were now under the German occupation. Syria was under the control of Vichy France, Iran had been invaded by the Soviets and the British, and the Germans were very active in Iraq. Turkey was thus surrounded by the Nazis and the communists. It had signed a tripartite treaty with France and Britain and tried to forge its economic and political ties with these countries but this did not mean that it felt itself as a true partner of the West. Britain and its allies were not reliable in Turkey's eyes.³¹ As mentioned above, the treaty would be operative in the course of conflict. However, though Italy declared war on the Allies, Turkey retained its neutrality. This abstention, in the latter years of the war, became a major axis of Turkey's relations with the Allies. The main reasons for Turkey's neutral position were its mistrust of the Allies and its own weaknesses. However, the Allies could not appreciate the circumstances and applied pressure on Turkey to join the war. So did Germany. In July 1941, for instance, it pressed for free passage of its troops from the Balkans to Syria and Iraq and offered

²⁸ Jacob C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957), Vol. III, pp. 226-228; Altemur Kılıç, *Turkey and the World*, (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 76-80.

²⁹ İnönü knew from his personal experiences in the First World War that Turkey could not rely on Western countries' words for Turkey's security. For him, the West could easily sacrifice Turkey to Germany, Soviets or Italy (Bilge, *Güç...*, p. 233), as they handed Czechoslovakia over to Hitler. The Axis victories also increased Turkey's scepticism about the strength of the alliance. The fall of France in particular showed how the German army was strong and Britain was powerless in protecting its allies. Moreover İnönü was aware of that Turkey was unprepared (Necmettin Sadak, 'Turkey Faces the Soviets', *Foreign Affairs*, April 1949, pp. 449-461).

³⁰ Dogan Avcioglu, 'İki İnönü', *Cumhuriyet*, 8-9 January 1974.

³¹ Aydın, 'Determinants of...', p. 105.

Western Thrace and some of the Greek islands in return. As expected, the Turkish refusal was a direct result of its legalist, sceptic, pacific foreign policy principle. When the carrot policy did not work Germany tried the stick. Yet Turkey stood its ground and maintained its neutrality. Von Papen, the German Ambassador to Ankara reported Turkey's position to his government:

'Turkey reiterates and repeats her unchanged desire to keep out of hostilities and to refuse to let herself be drawn into the struggle for any interests which do not directly concern her... any attempt to force the Turks to pronounce themselves definitely would cause Turkey to adhere to the enemy.'³²

After some Allied victories, in the spring of 1943, the British Prime Minister Churchill decided that it was time for Turkey to join the war. Also the Soviet Union had changed sides by joining the Allies and wanted to weaken the German armies with a Turkish front in south. The Soviet determination to push Turkey from neutrality to war became evident,³³ and it pressed for an Anglo-American commitment to force Turkey into the war. The United States was reluctant to give such a commitment but in time it also demanded Turkish support for a final strike. Thus, the Allies replaced Germany in pressuring Turkey to join the conflict. Paradoxically enough, though realising that an Allied victory was close, the Turkish leaders became more reluctant to enter the war. Apart from a possible German attack, they feared that a Russian invasion was bound to occur, as indeed would happen in many Eastern and Central European countries, with neither Britain nor the United States being able to curtail the Russian appetite for Turkish territories. If Turkey entered the war its territorial integrity and political independence must be guaranteed, or otherwise, as Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen stated, Turkey would be in a position of risking its whole existence by coming in.³⁴ İnönü was convinced that if Turkey entered the war without enough legal and military guarantees, 'the Soviets would occupy Turkey either as a member of the Axis or as a liberator.'³⁵ These fears were confirmed when the Soviets argued that 'The arms England was sending to Turkey were not going to be used against Germany, but rather were to be used to reinforce Turkey against Russia after the war.'³⁶

³² Von Papen, cited in Eren, 'The Foreign', p. 301.

³³ Weisband, *Turkish...*, p. 167.

³⁴ Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in War and Peace, Diplomats in Peace and War*, (London: John Murray, 1947), p. 203.

³⁵ Aydın, 'Determinants of...', p. 105.

³⁶ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, and others, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası: 1919-1965*, (Ankara: Dışişleri

Apparently the Soviet Union mistrusted the West and considered Turkey weapon to be used by the West. At the Moscow Conference, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, proposed that the three great powers coerce Turkey immediately into the war.³⁷ The pressure increased even further at the Cairo conference where the Allies implied that Turkey would not be able to assume a respected position in the post-war world without contributing to common effort.³⁸ Unable to resist the Russian and British pressure, Turkey agreed in principle to join the war.³⁹ Yet this was merely a tactical move designed to keep Turkey out of the conflict. Turkey now understood that it could not convince the United States and Britain about a possible Russian attack, hence used a military pretext to resist the Allied demands. The Turkish conditions for entering the war were the freeing of the Aegean islands from the Germans by the British, and increasing the heavy arms and plane deliveries to Turkey because the Turkish army lacked modern equipment and Axis planes were within easy striking range of Turkish cities.⁴⁰ Turkey demanded 500 tanks, 7,000 trucks, 2,000 tractors, 2,000 artillery and aircraft pieces, and 300 planes by the end of 1943⁴¹ -which it believed that the Allies could hardly deliver. This delaying tactic was understandable: for Turkey, the primary threat was Russia, not Germany, and Turkey's participation would strengthen the Soviets against Turkey. Moreover, the Soviet post-war designs on Eastern Europe were apparent to Turkey at a time when the US and the UK still ignored them. Furthermore, the Turks felt that the great powers were forcing it into the war in disregard of the costs to Turkey. In the words of Weisband, 'Turkish policy-makers soon gathered the impression that the British and Russians wished to force their country into the war, whether or not Turkish cities could be adequately protected, whether or not Turkish troops could be properly supplied and reinforced.'⁴²

Bakanlığı Matbaası, 1968), p. 158.

³⁷ Robin Denniston, *Churchill'in Gizli Savaşı, Diplomatik Yazışmalar, İngiliz Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve Türkiye, 1942-1944*, (İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1998), p. 178; Bilge, *Güç...*, p. 188; Sönmezoğlu, 'II. Dünya...', p. 81.

³⁸ Yusuf Tekin Kurat, 'Kahire Konferansı Tutanakları, (4-7 Aralık 1943) ve Türkiye'yi Savaşa Sokma Girişimleri', (*The Minutes of the Cairo Conference, 4-7 December 1943, and the Efforts for Turkey's Entrance to the War*), *Belleten*, Vol. XLVII, No. 185, January 1983, p. 296; Bilge, *Güç...*, pp. 192-219.

³⁹ Sönmezoğlu, 'II. Dünya...', p. 82.

⁴⁰ David, J. Alvarez, *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy, The United States and Turkey, 1943-1946*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1980), p. 26; Kamuran Gürün, 'Türkiye'yi II. Dünya Savaşı'na Sokma Çabaları' (*The Efforts for Turkey's Entrance to the War*), *Belleten* (Ankara), 1988.

⁴¹ Alvarez, *Bureaucracy...*, p. 27.

⁴² Weisband, *Turkish...*, p. 173.

Most importantly, the Turkish government felt that the inherent trend of the international political equilibrium in the post-war era would lead the British and the US to negotiate with the Soviet Union about their sphere of influence.⁴³ This consideration proves that Kemalist Western scepticism and mistrust was still etched on the minds of Turkish decision-makers. The mistrust of the West was at such a level that Turkish diplomats even avoided written communications about the Soviets with the British and the Americans in case the documents would be leaked to the Soviet Union which in turn, would use them after the war.⁴⁴ Hence while the Allies insisted on Turkish participation, the Turks continued to demand extensive military assistance before action. In fact, the Allied promises to equip the Turks never fulfilled though they continued to press Turkey for joining the war. After the failure of the Big Three Conference in Tehran, Stalin told Britain that Turkey would never enter the war and that the war would last longer because of this. For his part, Churchill used Turkey's fear about the Soviet Union again and again. After the 1943 Cairo meeting, for example, he implied that Britain would support the Soviet demands in the Dardanelles if Turkey did not submit to Allied desires.⁴⁵ Subsequently Britain accused Turkey of bad faith and recalled its military mission from Turkey without notice. It limited diplomatic relations and suspended those military deliveries planned. The US followed it.⁴⁶ Thus Turkey lost military aid, close diplomatic relations and traditional British political support against the Soviet Union.

Throughout 1944, although it limited its economic relations with the Axis and some diplomatic relations with Germany in August, Turkey kept stalling and did not declare war until the Allies victory was very close. However, it remained greatly alarmed by the Soviet advance in Eastern Europe. On 5 September 1944 the Soviet army started to occupy Bulgaria, near the Turkish borders. At the same time, Stalin was pressing the British and the Americans over Soviet post-war demands over Turkey. In January 1945, Churchill and Eden implied that they accepted Stalin's demands on the Turkish Straits⁴⁷ by not commenting on these demands to maintain the Soviet support in other fronts, like

⁴³ Akgönenç, *A Study...*, p. 49.

⁴⁴ Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, The Straits and U.S. Policy*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 201-209.

⁴⁵ Gönlübol, *Olaylarla...*, p. 183.

⁴⁶ Weisband, pp. 273-283; Sönmezoglu, 'II. Dünya...', p. 82.

⁴⁷ Nuri Eren, *Turkey, Today and Tomorrow, An Experiment in Westernization*, (London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1963), p. 235.

the Pacific. The next month, at the Yalta Conference, Stalin once more sounded the issue but did not specify his demands. Thus, at the Yalta, the revision of the Montreux Convention was discussed by the Soviet, British and the American leaders, but they could not reach any decision. However even discussion of a possible revision alarmed the Turks.⁴⁸

In February 1945, when Turkey understood that its neutral policy would isolate it from the West, it declared war on Germany. Yet this was too little too late. Victory was very close, and the post-war order would be established in full partnership with the Soviet Union and, as will be seen later, the Soviet designs on Turkey were anything but friendly. Still as a fruit of the declaration of war, Turkey was a founding member in the San Francisco conference and signed the United Nations (UN) Charter. Henceforth three trends determined Turkey's internal and external policies: a) The Soviet pressure; b) Turkey's approaching to the West, and as a result of this c) democratisation of the Turkish political system.

The Impact of the War and the Domestic Dimension of Turkish Foreign Policy

Deepened Fears and Scepticism

Turkey's success in avoiding the war was due to İnönü's personality, the country's limitations, the regime's weaknesses and Atatürk's ideological heritage. Kemalism provided both the determination to remain impervious to any temptation beyond Turkey's borders and the confidence to accept sacrifice for self-defence.⁴⁹

Turkey did not enter the war, but preparations for war cost millions and weakened the economy. These difficulties were further exacerbated by world-wide rise in prices and the mobilisation of almost a million men. The nation was on constant alert. No one knew what to expect from day to day. After the occupation of Greece, the Germans could cross to Istanbul and Çanakkale (Gallipoli) overnight. The entire industrial establishment Turkey was able to develop in thirty years could be destroyed. The metropolitan areas of Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, the heart and spirit of the new regime, could similarly be destroyed. In addition to fears of a possible German invasion or a

⁴⁸ Tamkoç, 'Turkey's Quest...', p. 15.

⁴⁹ Eren, Turkey..., p. 303.

Soviet attack, the pressures from the Allies to enter the war and the economic difficulties deepened Turkey's historical fears for its independence and integrity, inherited from Atatürk and the Ottoman eras. In other words, the 'Sevres-phobia' of the 1920s reappeared. From the Turkish perspective, the British and the Americans were ready to sacrifice the country to the Russians, Germans or Italy; foreigners were conspiring yet again to partition Turkey and finally share it between them.

Postdam gave Turkey its worst nightmare. The West and the Soviets joined against the Turks. At the Postdam, Stalin demanded military bases on the Straits with a joint control and the Kars and Ardahan provinces of Turkey back to the Soviet Union.⁵⁰ Worst of all, the Conference agreed on that the Montreal Convention should be revised.⁵¹ The Second World War underlined Turkey's aloneness in the world once more. This constantly preoccupied Turkish decision-makers in the following years to become one of the most important principles of Kemalist foreign policy. That is to say, fear became a permanent part of the ideology as Turkey's fears about its independence and territorial integrity and **scepticism of the West evolved into paranoia**. Ironically, despite its Western scepticism Turkey understood that it could not protect itself against the Soviet Union without Western support, and as will be discussed, this in turn made it a prisoner of the Western bloc.

The minorities were among the first victim of the regime's siege mentality. They had been viewed as *Trojan Horse* of the foreign powers in Turkey. The Nazi influence and the pressure created by the War aroused these fears again. *Varlık Vergisi*⁵², the Property Tax, is an excellent example of this. The National Assembly on 11 November 1942, ordained a capital levy on all property-owners, big farmers and businessmen, including 'those who, while not being merchants, commission-agents, brokers or middlemen by profession, have at any time since 1939, be it only on one occasion, received money or payment in kind as brokerage or commission, under any name whatsoever, through engaging in commercial transactions.'⁵³ The amounts to be paid were fixed by

⁵⁰ Bilge, *Güç...*, p. 280; Sarıay, *Türkiye'nin...*, p. 50; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, I, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958), pp. 413-416. For 'Turkey' in Truman's *Memoirs* also see pp. 424-426 and 451.

⁵¹ Tamkoç, 'Turkey's Quest...', pp. 15-16.

⁵² For *Varlık Vergisi* see Faik Ökte, *Varlık Faciası (The Varlık Disaster)*, (Istanbul: Nebioğlu Yayınları, 1951). For a more recent study Rıdvan Akar, *Varlık Vergisi (Property Tax)*, (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1992).

⁵³ Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 117-121.

government local officials and there was no appeal against their assessment. If someone could not pay the tax, his / her property would be sold at public auction and if the price obtained was insufficient they were sent away to do forced labour.⁵⁴ People liable to pay were classified under three categories: M, G and D. 'M' for *Müslümanlar* (Muslims), 'G' for *gayrimüslümler* (non-Muslims) and 'D' for *dönmeler* (converted Jewish Muslims who maintained their identity as a different religious sect). Geoffrey Lewis claimed that the non-Muslims paid up to ten times the amount levied on a Muslim of the same estimated wealth, and *dönmes* paid about twice as much.⁵⁵ Although this policy was ended on 15 March 1944, by that date it had worked as the main tool of Turkification of the Turkish economy because many factories and businesses were sold off to ethnically Turkish people. Moreover, its impact continued after the war though Turkish governments became more sensitive to ethnic and religious minorities and tried to reduce the inequalities among the country's various groups. Indeed, religious and ethnic issues have remained one of the taboos in Turkish foreign policy and any external attempts to intervene in these issues have been conceived as another plan to divide Turkey. As a result, İnönü's minority policy left a permanent mark on Turkish foreign policy, making the Kemalists more suspicious of democratisation and human rights issues.

Authoritarianism and Resurgence of the Pan-Turkist School of Thought

The war years deepened the regime's scepticism about the people in general.⁵⁶ As a natural result of its ideology the government saw the people as a tool for its ultimate aims. Especially foreign relations were perceived as too sophisticated issue for ordinary citizens. Throughout these years both domestic politics and the press were kept under tight control. Even the semi-official daily papers were closed down on numerous occasions.⁵⁷ The press and politics were also manipulated in Turkey's effort to stay out of the conflict. Under these circumstances liberalism and Islamism, two leading opposition groups, were kept under tight control. Some mosques were even closed down, and many people were accused of reading religious books, including the Qu'ran.

⁵⁴ Ökte, *Varlık...*, p. 57 and 237.

⁵⁵ Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 119.

⁵⁶ Haluk Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Polisiği*, (*The Political Economy of Turkish Foreign Policy*), (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1998), p. 53.

⁵⁷ *Cumhuriyet* five, *Tan* seven, *Vatan* nine, *Tasvir-i Efkar* eight, *Vakit* two times. For details of the situation of the Turkish press in the war years see: Cemil Koçak, 'İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türk Basını' (*The Turkish Press and the Second World War*), *Tarih ve Toplum*, No. 25, November 1986, pp. 29-33.

As a result, in addition to Kemalism, the only ideology allowed by the state was pan-Turkism. One of the reasons of this was the German propaganda activities. The Germans attempted to control some of the Turkist groups by offering certain Soviet territories (some part of Central Asia and the Caucasasia). The Turkish government on the other hand could not destroy them with a fear of provoking the Nazis.⁵⁸ Therefore, it can be argued that one of the direct effects of the war was the resurgence of the pan-Turkist school in Turkish politics. As noted earlier, Atatürk had focused on the reconstruction of Anatolia and the creation of a more homogeneous nation-state rather than a Turkist or pan-Turkist empire. However in the 1930s he did not prevent pan-Turkist activities since he saw them both as a tool in underscoring the greatness legacy of the Turkish race and as a potential political benefit in the future. However during the Second World War years, with the effect and support of Nazi Germany Turkists became more active and aggressive. When Germany seemed to be on the verge of defeating the Soviets, there was a resurgence of Pan-Turkist propaganda, encouraged by the officials.⁵⁹ Some high ranking officials even gave public support for pan-Turanist groups; like General Ali Fuad Erdem; Nuri Pasha, brother of Enver Pasha, a romantic figure for Pan-Turkists; General H. E. Erkilet who frequently contributed to Pan-Turkist journals such as *Çınaraltı*.⁶⁰ Even *Cumhuriyet*, the semi-official paper of the government during the 1930s, called several times on Turkey to join Germany in the war against the Soviet Union. For pan-Turkists a possible German victory over the Soviet Union would give an excellent opportunity to rescue the Turks who were still ‘slaves under the Russian yoke’. The Pan-Turanist movement won many converts among university students and the elite.⁶¹ However its effect on foreign policy was very limited. Their fanatic and aggressive attitude had never been accepted by the İnönü government, which used them for internal and external balancing act. For example, the pro-Turkist Alparslan Türkeş, who headed the ultra-nationalist Turkish Party for three decades, sent a letter including suggestions on foreign policy to İnönü in 1939, advising the government to occupy the entire Balkans:

‘.. As long as Bulgaria exists we cannot establish long-lasting co-operation with Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece.... We have to capture the territories where a million Turks live and we have to erase the nation, which strongly desires the Turkish country.

⁵⁸ Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 117.

⁵⁹ Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism, From Irredentism to Cooperation*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), p. 113.

⁶⁰ Landau, *Pan-Turkism...*, p. 113.

⁶¹ Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 120.

If we do so our influence would increase on the Balkan states. Thus we can set a Balkan bloc. Thanks to this bloc we can stop the Italians and we can redirect the Germans to Russia. After that, if Italy attacks Anatolia we would attack the Italian peninsula through Yugoslavia.... In a possible Russian-German clash we can capture the Caucasus. Then we will attack the Germans with the British and the French because the Germans would be too tired to defend themselves....⁶²

This ultra-nationalist and imperial foreign policy and defence understanding differed from İnönü's Kemalist foreign policy. Nor were Türkeş's means more amenable to the regime:

'To destroy Bulgaria: We must organise some military actions and justify military mobilisation.... We must annex Hatay to Turkey to surprise the totalitarian states. First we must paint 15-20 of our air planes with the Bulgarian army colours and...thus the world will support us and blame the Bulgarians for the war.'⁶³

In short, despite the resurgence of Pan-Turkism in domestic politics, İnönü did not consider this ideology a viable foreign policy alternative. Once the German defeat had become clear, pan-Turkist organisations and propaganda were suppressed.⁶⁴ Henceforth pan-Turkist movements would be perceived as a threat by the regime and their activities would be restricted or banned. However, İnönü's policies left two long-lasting effects on Turkish politics. First, the pan-Turkists were to maintain their ground for a possible hatching in future years, as seen in the 1970s. Second, İnönü's harsh policies against the Turkists in the last years of the war set Kemalist Turkism apart from the Pan-Turkist current, as the İnönü-type Turkism rejected right-wing Turkism by approaching the Turkish left.

From Neutrality to Pro-Western Activism

Turkey's wartime policy was a survival policy and its only aim was the preservation of Turkey as a sovereign independent state. These years clearly underlined the differences between the Ottoman adventurist approach and the Republican sceptic and prudent foreign policy. Contrary to *İttihat Terakki*'s alliance with Germany to regain lost territories before the First World War, the alliance with the West was entirely a

⁶² Lieutenant Alparslan Türkeş's Letter to the President İsmet İnönü, 18.4.1939. (Letter No. 3-6547, The Prime Ministry Archives, Ankara).

⁶³ This part of the letter cannot be read in the original copy, but it can be guessed that Türkeş suggest to bomb some Turkish small towns by using these Turkish air planes and then to accuse the Bulgarians.

⁶⁴ Zürcher, *Turkey...*, p. 214. Many pan-Turkists were prosecuted and the leading figures were put in prison: Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism, from Irredentism to Co-operation*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), pp. 113-116.

defensive measure and Turkey was a reluctant partner in this. However, Turkey's war time policies led to its isolation after the war. Turkey was accused of having behaved selfishly in sparing itself at a time when other countries suffered greatly. The apparent contradiction between the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation with Britain and France (1939) and the Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact signed with Germany in 1941 was seen by the West as a sign of Turkey's unreliability.⁶⁵ Also after the disappearance of the German threat, Turkey was no longer worthy of great-power attention and became peripheral. Turkey felt itself in greater isolation than at any time since 1923.⁶⁶ The Soviet claims and threats came in these circumstances. The war had ended, but not for Turkey. It was still under a great danger and had no friends, either the West, or the Russians. Furthermore, not only the external pressures but also the internal problems threatened the Kemalist regime. The economic difficulties of the War and the regime's strict policies had played a crucial part in the emergence of opposition against the government and this pushed the government to follow a different strategy in foreign relations. As a result, the Turkish government began a democratisation and economic liberalisation campaign to attract the West's economic, political and military support.

External Threats: The Soviet Pressure

As the World War progressed the importance of the Soviet Union for the Allied war effort grew steadily. This led the British and Americans to lend a more sympathetic ear to the Soviet demands, and Turkey's extremely cautious policy did not help change their attitude. Traditionally, Turkey helped Britain check Russian ambitions in the region, or had looked for a partner to counterbalance Russia, but the circumstances had changed. The Soviet Union was now the dominant power not only in the region but also in Europe, while Britain accepted a division of influence in the region. The Allied states had even agreed on possible future changes of the 1936 Montreux convention regulating the Turkish Straits and hinted that they would not react to a greater Soviet influence on Turkey.⁶⁷ The Soviet Union lost no time in using this window of opportunity. The Soviet Union's demands focused on the Straits⁶⁸ and the Turkey's north-eastern

⁶⁵ Deringil, 'Turkish...', p. 2.

⁶⁶ Eren, *Turkey...*, p. 303.

⁶⁷ Gürsel, *Tarih...*, pp. 232-237; Bilge, *Güç...*, pp. 280-292.

⁶⁸ For the role of the Straits issue in the Second World War and aftermath see: Harry N. Howard, *Turkey on the Straits and the US Policy*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974); Harry N. Howard, 'The United States and Turkey: American policy in the Straits Question, 1914-1963', *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1963, pp. 225-250; Fletcher Standefer Crowe, *The Soviet Union and the Turkish Straits*,

provinces,⁶⁹ but from the Turkish perspective the real Soviet intention was to make Turkey a satellite state in a communist bloc.⁷⁰ However, the US and the UK were reluctant to give support to Turkey against the Soviet Union.⁷¹

In March 1945 the Soviet Union gave Turkey notice that it would not renew their bilateral treaty in the following autumn, when it was due to expire. A couple of months later the Soviet intention transpired when it declared that it would negotiate a new Treaty of Friendship with Turkey if the latter agreed to hand back Kars and Ardahan, Turkey's two easternmost provinces, to the Soviet Republic of Georgia, and to accept Soviet participation in defence of the Turkish Straits. Moreover, the Soviet advance in the Balkans aroused fears in Turkey. The Red Army was in Bulgaria and the communist guerrillas seemed poised to take over Greece. In the east, the Russian troops were invading Iran. On the northern front, the Soviet navy in the Black Sea posed serious threat to Turkey's control of the Straits.⁷² Since it could not resist the Soviet Union on its own, Turkey desperately searched for Western help.⁷³ In another word, Turkey was

1933-1945, unpublished PhD thesis, The Florida State University, 1973; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, 'The Straits: Crux of the World Politics', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXV, April 1949, pp. 183-201.

⁶⁹ Bilsel, *Türk...*, pp. 65-86; Yusuf Sarıınay, *Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakına Yönelişi ve NATO'ya Girişi*, (*Turkey's Move Towards the Western Ally and Its Accession to the NATO*), (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988), pp. 43-45.

⁷⁰ Hurewitz claims that the historical Russian strategy to reach the warm seas (*i.e.* the Mediterranean) was unchanged: J. C. Hurewitz, 'Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origins of the Problem', *World Politics*, Vol. XIV, October 1961-July 1962, pp. 605-632.

⁷¹ For the American Foreign Secretary Grew the relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey was 'friendly' and there was no necessity to intervene their relations: Mehmet Gönlübol and Haluk Ülman, 'İkinci Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk Dış Politikasında Genel Durum', (*The General Outlook of Turkish Foreign Policy after the Second World War*), in Gönlübol and others, *Olaylarla...*, p. 194.

⁷² Despite the official Soviet demands, the Turkish leftists, like Oran, Ataöv and Gerger, argue that the Soviets were not genuinely interested in any territorial gains from Turkey. Of course it was not easy to express pro-Soviet ideas during that time, but in the period of 1960-80s the leftist academics criticised the Turkish policy-makers and advocated that Turkey and United States provoked the Soviets in the post-war era. For example, the leftist academic Baskın Oran claims that the Soviet Union's attitude towards Turkey was defensive not offensive and the Soviet's ultimate aim was friendly relations with Turkey. For Oran, Turkey had to clarify its peaceful intention towards the Soviet Union in order to get Soviet friendship, not join an alignment with the anti-Soviet states: Personal interview with Baskın Oran, 15 December 1997, Ankara, Turkey; also see Baskın Oran, *Türkiye'nin Kuzeydeki Komşu Sorunu Nedir? Türk - Sovyet İlişkileri, 1939-1970*, (*What is the Problem of Turkey's Northern Neighbour? Turkish-Soviet Relations, 1939-1970*), (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970, pp. 55-57; personal notes from his *Türk Dış Politikası* (*Turkish Foreign Policy*) course in Ankara University, The Faculty of Political Science 1993-1994 terms. Similarly Prof. Türkkaya Ataöv, from the same school, blamed Turkey of being a part of the imperialist expansion of the West against the Soviet Union: Türkkaya Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye* (*US, NATO and Turkey*), (Ankara: Aydınlık Yayınevi, 1969), pp. vi-viii; personal notes from his *Orta Doğu* (*The Middle East*) course in Ankara University, The Faculty of Political Science 1993-1994 terms. These examples clearly show the impact of ideology on Turkish foreign policy approaches. Also see Gerger, *Türk...*, p. 49.

⁷³ Gürsel, *Tarih...*, p. 237.

forced to abandon its pre-war neutrality by the Soviet Union.⁷⁴ The year 1945 was perfect timing for the Soviet designs, because the Western powers were busy re-establishing the post war international order and needed Soviet support. In the words of Eren, 'under the leadership of the United States, the democracies were engulfed in comatose co-operation with Soviet Union'.⁷⁵ In these circumstances Turkey's territorial integrity could be sacrificed to maintain peace.

The Turkish efforts to win Western support in the face of adversity did not fail to leave an impact on the domestic scene. Foremost among these was the democratisation of the Turkish political system. As noted in the next section, there were also internal reasons for this development, but the main factor was external. Severe criticism was made by the United States Congress of the İnönü regime and some Western countries advised Turkey to democratise its political system if it wanted to join the Western bloc.⁷⁶ Turkey was in such a desperate position that it would even change its political system to get American assistance against Soviet aggressiveness. Feridun Cemal Erkin, who represented Turkey in the San Francisco conference, wrote in his memoirs that before they departed to the United States President İnönü told them that

'The Americans may ask you when we are going to establish a multi-party regime. If they do, tell them that Atatürk's dream was to set up a full democracy, but the wars did not allow this. Now that the war is over İnönü's task and desire, as the president of Turkey, is to realise this dream.'⁷⁷

Similarly, Nihat Erim, another delegate, confirmed Erkin's recollection in his memoirs, saying that İnönü gave them full authority to declare that Turkey would shortly become a multi-party regime.⁷⁸ As a result, ironically the Americans learned of the Turkish government's plans to change the essence of the regime before the Turkish people. The democratisation policy helped but it was not enough to get American support. As will be seen, the trigger of a shift in the American policy came from the Russians. For example, in the Postdam conference (17 July-2 August 1945) American President

⁷⁴ Hale, 'Foreign Policy...', p. 92.

⁷⁵ Eren, *Turkey...*, p. 303.

⁷⁶ Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 188-192; İltis Turan, *Cumhuriyet Tarihimiz (The History of Our Republic)*, (Istanbul: Çağlayan Yayınları, 1969), p. 106.

⁷⁷ Feridun Cemal Erkin, 'İnönü, Demokrasi ve Dış İlişkiler' (*Inönü, Democracy and External Relations*), *Milliyet*, daily, 14 January 1974.

⁷⁸ Nihat Erim, 'Şekil ve Mahiyet Olarak Cumhuriyetimiz' (*Our Republic as Appearance and Essence*), *Ulus*, daily, 20 October 1950.

Truman said that the Soviet Union's territorial demands from Turkey was a bilateral subject between the Russians and the Turks, and should be solved by the two sides.⁷⁹ On the other hand Truman and Churchill claimed that the Straits issue could not be only a Soviet - Turkish problem, but international because the United States, the United Kingdom and the other countries also had an interest in that.⁸⁰ Stalin insisted on the Soviet demands and the problem remained unsettled in this conference.

From Neutrality to Alignment with the West

In mid-1945, developments in the international balance of power were in Turkey's favour. The collapse of Germany created a vacuum in central and eastern Europe which was being filled by the Soviet Union. It penetrated deep into the Balkans, and the Red Army advanced right to the heart of the European continent - Berlin. Consequently, sympathetic or 'satellite' regimes were established under Soviet control or influence, from Yugoslavia, to Albania, to Bulgaria to Romania. In other countries, like Hungary or Poland communists were on the rise. This in turn shattered the American high hopes for the post-war order and drove the United States to consider the Soviet-American co-operation of the war years. In his memoirs, Truman explained the radical shift in American foreign policy:

'(...) without American participation there was no power capable of meeting Russia as an equal (...) 'Fortress America' notions could only result in handing to the Russians vast areas of the globe (...) this was the to align the USA clearly on the side, on the head, of the free world.'⁸¹

Thus the United States left its isolationist approach and pacifist attitude towards the Soviet Union involving the European security. This development apparently generated a positive shift in the American and British policy towards Turkey.⁸² Thus Stalin's plans were reversed. In Khrushchev's words, 'Stalin succeeded in frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans.'⁸³

⁷⁹ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, II, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958), p. 96.

⁸⁰ Gönlübol and Ülman, pp. 195-196.

⁸¹ Truman, *Memoirs* II..., p. 102.

⁸² Sarinay, *Türkiye'nin...*, pp. 59-61.

⁸³ Strobe Talbott (ed.), *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), pp. 295-296.

As the United States became deeply involved in the defence of Western Europe, Greece and Turkey became ever more crucial in blocking the Soviet threat.⁸⁴ This cultivated in the Truman doctrine of March 1947 which viewed these two countries as the corner stone of US containment policy,⁸⁵ and accepted a firm Turkish line vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. When, in 8 August 1946, a formal Soviet note declared the inadequacy of the Montreux Convention for the security of the Black Sea and proposed a new regime for the Straits,⁸⁶ and Turkey, thanks to the American encouragement, was able to reject these demands and did it.⁸⁷

The Truman doctrine was not confined to the political area. It also included a \$ 400 million aid package to Turkey and Greece, the largest American bilateral government aid programme in peacetime. Moreover, the Truman Doctrine was the start of the American commitment to those states threatened by communism wherever they were. In this framework, by 1962, Turkey was to receive economic and military aid from the US worth of \$ 3,7 billion, \$ 2,1 billion of which for military purpose.⁸⁸ Turkey was also admitted into the 1948 Marshall Aid Programme. As a result, Turkey's dependency to the West peaked.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Bruce R. Kuniholm, 'Turkey and the West since World War II', in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (ed.), **Turkey between East and West, New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power**, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 46; Tamkoç, 'Turkey's Quest...', p. 18.

⁸⁵ President Truman declared that 'It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjection by armed minorities or outside pressures. (...) Greece's neighbour, Turkey, also deserves our attention... Turkey now needs our support. Since the war Turkey had sought additional finance assistance from Great Britain and the United States for purpose of effecting that modernisation necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East': 'Message of the President to the Congress before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947', **Bulletin of the Public Affairs Information Service** (New York: 1947) and Graham Evans and Jeffry Newnham, **Dictionary of International Relations**, (London: Penguin Books, 1998), p. 545.

⁸⁶ For the first Soviet note see Bilsel, *Türk...*, pp. 62-65.

⁸⁷ A. Haluk Ülman, **İkinci Cihan Savaşı'nın Başından Truman Doktrinine Kadar Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri, 1939-1947**, (*Turkish-American Diplomatic Relations from the Second World War to the Truman Doctrine*), (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1961), pp. 55-57; Feridun Cemal Erkin, **Türk - Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi**, (*Turkish-Soviet Relations and the Straits Question*), (Ankara: 1968), pp. 414-440; Tamkoç, 'Turkey's Quest...', p. 17.

⁸⁸ Mango, *Turkey*, p. 74. Military assistance during the Eisenhower administration averaged approximately \$ 200 million a year: Bruce R. Kuniholm, 'Turkey and the West since World War II', in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), **Turkey Between East and West**, (Oxford: Westview Press, Inc., 1996), p. 51.

⁸⁹ Mango, *Turkey...*, p. 74.

Efforts to Enter the Western Block

Having obtained US support Turkey sought to strengthen its relations with the West through written agreements aimed at long-lasting association. It can be argued that to achieve this, the Turkish government was ready to do almost anything. Thus Turkey's foreign policy was fully geared for incorporation into the Western world. For example, though a Muslim country, Turkey supported Israel against the Arabs: 'By voting in favour of the establishment of the Palestine Conciliation Commission in December 1948 despite negative Arab votes, Turkey for the first time acted with the West on a matter of great concern to the Muslim world.'⁹⁰ Moreover, Turkey became the first Muslim state to recognise Israel on 28 March 1949. The intention was to get the sympathy of the perceived influential Jewish community so as to secure US aid. Yet in following this course of action, İnönü's foreign policy once more underlined the Kemalist outlook of the Middle East and the Muslim world. For Turkey the Middle East was not its own region but somewhere in the world. Nor was there any room for religious considerations in Turkish foreign policy. From the Kemalist point of view, Turkey had to be in the Western bloc. İnönü's policy continued another component of the Kemalist pragmatic approach: alignment with the powerful side. It also demonstrated Turkey's dependence on external developments, as Turkey's attitude was also a result of the necessity for American aid.⁹¹ This attitude helped Turkey's relations with the West, yet as will be seen in the Baghdad Pact and the Cyprus issue led to alienation from the Arab world and left a lasting scar in Turkish - Arab relations.⁹²

Turkey's eagerness to join the Western bloc made it the most ardent proponent of European political integration. But as Eren put it, in almost every instance, Turks had to fight there way in.⁹³ Thus Turkey was left out of the European Council at the beginning, and a similar case pertained to its entrance into NATO. The problem was that, although the US saw Turkey's role in the European defence, European prejudice about 'the terrible Turks' was still in Europeans' sub-consciousness, and it was difficult for them

⁹⁰ Mahmut B. Aykan, *Turkey's Role in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference: 1960-1992, The Nature of Deviation from the Kemalist Heritage*, (New York: Vantage Press, 1994), p. 35.

⁹¹ For example, Turkey-Arab relations expert Aykan claims that İnönü lost his freedom of action in foreign policy in the face of the Soviet threat and the ideological polarisation of the world. Aykan, *Turkey's Role*, p. 51.

⁹² Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 142-143. Also for Turkey's Western alignments' impact on Turkish-Arab relations see Aykan, *Turkey's Role...*

⁹³ Eren, *Turkey...*, p. 305.

to accept the Turks as equal members of the European-family.⁹⁴ Hence, even the clear American stance and aid could not completely restore Turkey's sense of security. The Iranian example and the experience of many Eastern European countries after the war reaffirmed Turkey's conviction to be at the core of the Western political and military system, lest it be sacrificed on the altar of the Cold War. Moreover, the idea of economic aid detached from political considerations was dangerous for Turkish security. Turkey had no word in the decision-making process though this was closely related to its national interests. Turkish Foreign Minister, Necmettin Sadak, expressed Turkey's worries in 1948: 'Turkey, already more than an ally of the United States, is looking forward to crystallisation of this relationship in an Alliance.' From the Turkish perspective, only full political, military and economic integration with the West could guarantee Turkey's security and independence.⁹⁵ Furthermore, as noted earlier, Turkey had ideologically seen its Europeanisation / Westernisation as a matter of life and death and the catastrophic effects of the Second World War and the Soviet pressures on Turkey made the regime more desperate for being politically, economically, militarily and even culturally part of the Western world. The Western support for Turkey was now not only the source of military or financial aid but also the legitimising factor for the Kemalist establishment inside. However, even though the West needed Turkey as a bastion against the Soviet Union, as will be discussed below, its main role in Western eyes was in the Middle East. In 1949 NATO was established. The next year, on 1 August 1950, Turkey, claiming that it had been the first to stand up to Soviet aggression formally applied for membership.⁹⁶ But the Turkish application met with opposition from every quarter (Britain, Belgium, France etc.), the only supportive country being Italy. Britain and France proposed a separate Middle Eastern Alliance with a link to NATO because they did not want to guarantee a country so much on the Soviet Union's doorstep. They even promised financial and military aid to keep Turkey outside.⁹⁷ When Turkey was rejected, the İnönü government proposed a bilateral alliance to the United States in the same year, but this was also refused.⁹⁸ During this time the Soviet Union was attempting to separate Turkey from the Western bloc, including through the

⁹⁴ For the role of the European biases in the relations see Chapter VII of this study.

⁹⁵ Eren, *Turkey...*, p. 305; E. Athanassopoulou, 'Western Defence Developments and Turkey's Search for Security in 1948', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2, April 1996, p. 82.

⁹⁶ Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 141.

⁹⁷ Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 140.

⁹⁸ Oral Sander, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri, 1947-1964*, (*Turkish-American Relations, 1947-1964*), (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1979), pp. 69-70.

use of inducements. However, by now the Turks had come to view the Soviets as historical enemies considering a permanent Turkish-Russian friendship impossible due to the historical Soviet demands over Turkey. Besides thanks to the Korean War, on 15 May 1951, Turkey would be invited by the United States to join NATO.⁹⁹ The orientation of Turkish foreign policy would be thus firmly set with the West.

Deviation from Kemalism?

In the İnönü era three significant developments occurred. First, İnönü gave his own interpretation to Kemalist ideology. Second, changes in the international balance of power forced Turkey from neutrality to a Western stance. Third, Turkey's security dilemma in the post-war years underscored its dependence on the international balance of power.

İnönü - Type Kemalism: İnönism

Under İnönü, Kemalism as an ideology was dramatically changed, as İnönü's interpretation dominated the Kemalist ideology. As noted earlier, Atatürk had avoided drawing strict, unchangeable ideological rules. It is true that the Kemalist regime was authoritarian, and that Kemalist values determined the Republic's policies. However, there was no universal ideology, rather such aims as economic development, secularisation of the political life, maintaining Turkish independence etc.

In the İnönü era, even this set of aims was frozen as the regime became increasingly authoritarian and detached from the masses. Whether this new course can be named as Kemalism is debatable as it was different from that of Kemal. As has been noted, the main reasons for this radical transformation were İnönü's over-cautious personality; international developments, particularly the unreliable attitudes of the Western allies; economic problems; the resurgence of the traditional Russian threat and bureaucratic corruption. As a result, obsessions soon became paranoia and the regime saw enemies inside and outside. Atatürk's scepticism of minorities and the West turned into paranoia under İnönü. The political opposition groups, like Islamists and liberals and the ethnic-religious minority groups (Jewish, Christians etc.), took the brunt of this paranoia.¹⁰⁰ As

⁹⁹ See the next chapter.

¹⁰⁰ For a vivid example of İnönist interpretation of Kemalism see: **Atatürk Kimdir? Kemalizm Nedir?**

will be seen, despite Turkey's close relations with the West in the 1950s and the 60s, under the impact of the İnönü years, Turkish policy-makers would continue to see these groups as a threat to unity and stability.

This situation inevitably reflected on foreign policy. As in the Atatürk era, the president exercised supreme power over foreign policy issues, and Parliament's power was limited.¹⁰¹ Moreover, İnönü tightened his control of the state agencies, press and the people. As mentioned earlier, even the press was under serious pressure and the government closed down many newspapers.¹⁰² Foreign policy problems were very sensitive issues and no one had the right to voice ideas unless allowed by the government.

The most lasting effect of the İnönü era was the transformation of the civil service and other Kemalist elites into a significant political force with a clear group-consciousness. The war and the attendant need to maintain tight control greatly increased the number of civil servants. Also their responsibilities and power were widened during these years. The party, RPP, was the home of all Kemalists, evolving from a political party to a state-party in the 1930s and 1940s, providing provincial governors. Opposition to the Party was considered an act of national treachery. In the words of Shaw and Shaw: 'The RPP was more than just a political organisation; for many its members, it was a religion. It was their lives, it was the nation...'¹⁰³

İnönists claimed that they were Kemalists, and that the state belonged to the Kemalists. They used the state power to become the most powerful political group and holding the political and military posts. Unfortunately they lacked Atatürk's pragmatism. This spelled future trouble by putting this elite in a collision course with the political and economic groups such as liberals, Marxists, Islamists, nationalists, villagers and businessmen who desired a more liberal political and economic system. As will be seen, the 1960 military coup would prove how serious this conflict was.

Atatürk'ün Hayatı, Kemalizm'in Esasları, (*Who is Atatürk? What is Kemalism? Atatürk's Life, The Foundations of Kemalism*), (Tasvir Neşriyat, 1944).

¹⁰¹ Aydın, 'Determinants...', p. 117.

¹⁰² Koçak, 'İkinci Dünya...', pp. 29-33.

¹⁰³ Shaw and Shaw, **History of...**, p.403.

From Scepticism to Paranoia

As noted earlier, the Ottoman experience and the War of Independence had caused a 'Sevres-phobia', namely obsessive fears that the external world was conspiring to partition Turkey and share it. Ironically, this suspicion towards the world, the West in particular, as has been discussed, had become one of the characteristics of Kemalist foreign policy. However, Atatürk's pragmatism and realism had balanced his scepticism. Yet the Second World War with the Soviet demands on some Turkish territories and the Turkish straits in the post-Second World War as discussed revived the Sevres-phobia turning it during the İnönü era into a paranoia. Even in the post War years, despite Turkey's participation in the Western security system this paranoia would continue to determine Turkish foreign policy.

The second development in the İnönü era was Turkey's shift from neutrality towards a pro-Western position. It can be said that, this did not fit with Kemalist neutrality. So it can be claimed that İnönü's foreign policy implementation deviated from Kemalist foreign policy understanding. As narrated in the previous Chapter Atatürk had always aimed at the preservation of Turkey's neutrality. He had also sought a good relationship with the West. During his period, the problems left over from Lausanne, the international crisis and the West's attitude had prevented this. Under these circumstance Kemal had no alternative but neutrality between Russia, Germany, and Britain. Turkey also used small organisations, like the Balkan Pact, to build a security belt albeit an ineffective one. This policy continued in the İnönü era. But after the war it was almost impossible to preserve Turkey's neutrality. The end of the Second World War increased Turkey's isolation from the West. The Soviets had publicly threatened Turkey, and there was no power to counterbalance this but the West. In addition, internal economic and political problems partly caused by the Second World War forced the Turkish elite to find a new way. For instance Turkey's GDP decreased 25 % in these years.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, Turkey's own resources were too limited to overcome the post-war economic

¹⁰⁴ Stefanos Yerasimos, *Az gelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye: Dünya Savaşı'ndan 1971'e*, (*Turkey in the Process of Underdevelopment: From the World War to 1971*), 3. Book, (Trs.: Babür Kuzucu), (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1989), p. 165. For the other economic problems see also Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali*, (*The Logic of Revolution and The Revolution of 27 May*), (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1973), p. 141.

problems. Almost all political groups agreed that Turkey needed foreign economic aid in post-war era.¹⁰⁵

Under these circumstances, it can be said that the West was not a choice for Turkey but rather a necessity, aimed at preserving its integrity and security. Because Turkey could not meet the Soviet threat with its own resources, it chose to enter the West.¹⁰⁶ Hence, Turkey's entrance to NATO did not fit with neutrality but it was not a contradiction of Kemalist foreign policy understanding, on the contrary, if Mustafa Kemal had found the opportunity he would have done the same thing. In this framework, İnönü's foreign policy can be considered a **restoration of Kemalist foreign policy**, not a real deviation from it, because in Kemalist ideology pragmatism was more important than isolationism. In another words, Turkey's alignment with the West was a deviation from isolationism, not from Kemalism. The ideological impasse and the international circumstances imposed this course of action on Turkey.¹⁰⁷

The İnönü era also showed that Turkey, though a small-state, confronted the same problems the Ottoman Empire had faced. Turkey did not have the power to shape international relations even for preserving its own independence and regime. As seen above, the regime was in a legitimacy crisis after the War. The economy had collapsed and Stalin demanded some Turkish territories. İnönü had no tool for all these threats, but the international balance of power and saw to join the West and adopt Western economic and political models in domestic politics as the only solution.¹⁰⁸ As a result, the autocratic İnönü government realised a radical shift in the economic and political systems, and efforts were started to liberalise the Turkish economy and democratise the political system. Thus, similar to the last years of the Ottoman Empire, integration with the West became the most important factor in democratisation and improvement of human rights conditions in Turkey. The West's push for democratisation would increase Kemalist scepticism, yet they had no alternative but the West.

¹⁰⁵ Haluk Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Polisiği, Soğuk Savaş'tan Yeni Dünya Düzenine*, (*The Political Economy of Turkish Foreign Policy*), (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1998).

¹⁰⁶ Gönlübol, 'A Short...', p. 17.

¹⁰⁷ The Turkish scholar Cem Erogul claims that the 1947 Turkish-American agreement was a deviation from Kemalism and Turkey's Western alignment was simply against the Kemalist foreign policy understanding: Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti, Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, (*The Democrat Party, Its History and Ideology*), (Ankara: İmge: Kitabevi, 1990), p. 178.

¹⁰⁸ Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, pp. 37-39.

Finally, the end of the İnönü era marked the end of the setting of Kemalist foreign policy ideology and the one-approach years. Contrary to the Ottoman period,¹⁰⁹ in the Atatürk and İnönü eras the State did not allow any alternative understanding and suppressed them by law or by force. Ironically, hereafter Turkish political life became the story of the conflict between the Kemalist forces and the other alternative schools, such as conservatives, Islamists, pro-nationalists, Marxists etc.. The struggle between them would naturally reflect on foreign policy issues as well. Turkey in these years under the war circumstances became more autocratic, yet security needs forced the İnönü regime to a multi-party system inside Turkey and a pro-Western stance in the world. As will be seen in the next chapter, these two currents, namely democratisation and Cold War politics determined Turkey's domestic and foreign policy in the following years.

¹⁰⁹ As discussed in Chapter I, there has been a relatively pluralistic political environment in the Ottoman years compared with the one-party regime. Islamists, Turkists, Socialists, Ottomanists and the other political groups were able to defend their ideas, in particular after the II. Mesrutiyet, while as has been seen in Chapter III the Republican Turkey allowed only the secular Westernist Kemalists to form political party and surpassed all the other oppositions.

CHAPTER VII

Democratic Approach vs. Kemalism

The post-war era saw a pro-Western policy in Turkey. As Turkey moved away from neutrality in foreign policy and continued a democratisation process aimed at achieving American support and regime legitimacy. These two trends – westernisation of foreign policy and democratisation – determined Turkish political life in the post-war decades and began with Democrat Adnan Menderes. The Democrat approach in domestic and foreign policy under Menders was the first serious challenge to Kemalism and first serious deviation from the Kemalist foreign policy tradition.¹

Internal Changes: Liberalisation in Politics and Economy

Until the 1950s the experiments with political democracy conducted in Turkey had been imposed from the above, starting with the Union and Progress experiment of 1908 and continued with Atatürk's establishment of the Republic in the 1920's. These experiments were limited in duration and were replaced inevitably with authoritarian regimes.² The war and the *etatist* policy of the İnönü government increased the economic problems and dissatisfaction among the middle class and the villagers. Combined with the need for US economic and political support, and with increasing pressures from domestically and externally, President İsmet İnönü reintroduced a multi-party system after the Second World War. Despite İnönü's decision, the local party and state authorities and the other authoritarian forces resisted democratisation, and the elections of July 1946 highlighted the RPP's obstinacy. The official elite had, for more than twenty years, been enforcing the dictates of the Government, and as pointed out in the previous chapter, they had developed group-consciousness during the İnönü years. They believed that a multi-party regime was unnecessary and even a betrayal of Kemalism, at least for a while. As the owner of the state they perceived power as not

¹ As argued in the previous chapter, İnönü period also saw slight deviations from Kemalism yet the change was limited. Moreover the change in the İnönü period was a transformation of Kemalism more than a deviation into a new understanding. Hence it can be argued that the Menderes era is the first serious challenge to Kemalist orientation.

² Osman Okyar, 'Stepping Stones to Europe, A Historical Perspective', in **Turkey and Europe in a Cultural Context**, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1998), pp. 9-16, p.15.

only a right, but also as a responsibility, as a task.³ However the multi-party system provided alternatives for internal and foreign politics.

Despite the resistance from his party,⁴ İsmet İnönü, addressing the parliament on 1 November 1945, declared himself in favour of having an opposition party and argued that as the war was over there was more room for democracy. This speech encouraged some prominent members of the RPP to establish an opposition party and resulted in the resignation of four of them - Adnan Menderes, Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, Refik Koraltan and Celal Bayar- to found the *Demokrat Parti*, DP (Democratic Party) on 7 January 1946. Although the first 'democratic' elections of July 1946 were not fully democratic under a tensioned atmosphere and repression in many provinces,⁵ the DP gained a significant number of the seats, 62 of the 465.⁶ Following the elections the widespread support for the DP and its political and economic liberalism, which used the basic Kemalist tenets of nationalism and secularism, led alarmed the RPP, but it was too late. The Democrats claimed that it was the only political group, which would finish what Mustafa Kemal had begun and Bayar had made an agreement with İnönü that the DP would respect the Atatürk principles.⁷ Moreover the DP identified itself as anti-communist⁸ and accused the government of being soft on communism, thus justifying its existence in Turkish political life and gaining American support. In the years 1945 to 1946, fifteen new parties were founded. However, thanks to its good relations with the regime and other power sources, the DP emerged as the major opposition party while some parties like *Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi* (Turkish Socialist Workers and Peasants Party) founded in 1946 by Şefik Hüsnü Degmer, were closed down. The DP opposition forced the RPP to allow religious education in the schools and to reform the Village Institutes known as 'atheist schools' by the conservatives.

Furthermore the RPP had no choice but to move even closer to the DP programme on many issues, such as the economy. For instance, Turkey in 1950 applied for

³ Frank Tachau, 'The Republican People's Party, 1945-1980', in Metin Heper and Jacob M. L Landau (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1991), p. 102.

⁴ Tachau, 'The Republican...', p. 101.

⁵ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 107.

⁶ Celal Bayar stated that according to an enquiry of the DP the real number of seats won by the party was 279! Zürcher, *Turkey...*, p. 222.

⁷ Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti, Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, (*The Democrat Party History and Ideology*). (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi SBF, 1970), p. 12.

⁸ Robinson, *The First...*, p. 175.

membership of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and devalued the Turkish lira by 120 per cent. With additional liberalising measures Turkey was slowly integrating into the US led-world economy. However RPP's hard-liner members were resisting the change⁹ arguing that etatism was the best way for Turkish development. Therefore, for certain RPP members economic liberalism meant losing power. The elections of 14 May 1950 put an end to the one-party regime and only four years after its establishment the DP received 408 seats (53.4 per cent of the vote) in parliament while the RPP got 69 seats (39.8 per cent of the vote).¹⁰ Moreover, all the provinces where the RPP won were to the east of Ankara, the less developed region of Turkey. In other words, most of the RPP support came from the areas controlled by the tribal chiefs of the Eastern Turkey, while the relatively rich provinces supported the DP.

The new DP government was very different from those of the Kemalist era. Although the central leadership came out of the RPP, most of its members were young and from the rural areas. The DP had very close links with the people but had not much representation in the bureaucracy or military. Indeed much of what the DP promised went against the interest of officers such as strengthening local government against the governors and the bureaucracy; greater religious freedom; support for the private sector instead of state enterprise; liberalisation in politics; devoting a significant percentage of the budget to the villages and agriculture; easier farm credit; protection from excesses committed in the villages by the gendarmes. In short, the DP promised to protect the people from the state by 'exploiting the hostility of the people towards their government'¹¹ and this made a clash between the party and the bureaucracy inevitable.

Ideological Sources and the Main Determinants of the Democrat Foreign Policy¹²

There was no essential difference between DP and RPP foreign policies before the 1950 elections. Both of them based their foreign policy on friendship with the US and the

⁹ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 105.

¹⁰ After the election the people organised meetings to celebrate the DP's victory. The celebrations were protest-like and showed the people's dissatisfaction with the one party-years: *Cumhuriyet*, 15 May 1950.

¹¹ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 105.

¹² For general discussion of DP's foreign policy see: Hüseyin Bağcı, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politikası*, (*Foreign Policy of the DP Period*), (Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 1990); Mahmut Dikerdem, *Ortadoğu'da Devrim Yılları, Bir Büyükelçinin Anıları*, (*The Revolution Years in the Middle East, Memoirs of an Ambassador*), (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1990); Gönlübol and others, *Olaylarla...*, pp. 137-334; Eroğul, *Demokrat...*, pp. 61, 68-74, 82, 99-101.

Western bloc and believed that communism was the greatest menace that Turkey faced. Both also had a Kemalist foreign policy heritage, and the DP Programme hardly differed from that of the RPP. However, Kemalism was not the only ideological source of the DP's foreign policy, and this created an altered foreign policy from that of the RPP. The Democrats were fed by three different ideological sources: Kemalism, liberalism (in economic issues) and conservatism (more tolerant to the religious matters).

Kemalism and DP Foreign Policy

Despite their rivalry with the RPP, the DP founders were fervent supporter of Atatürk. Celal Bayar declared in his memoirs that he was fanatic of Kemalism.¹³ As former RPP members, they were Republican and loyal to the Kemalist values, particularly secularism, nationalism, Westernism and republicanism. The DP founders did not claim a new ideology, but differed in the application of ideas. Therefore it can be said that the DP made efforts to carry out some Kemalist foreign policy aims, such as partnership with the West, and defending *status quo* in the region etc. However a different methodology, external factors and the structural economic and political changes shifted the DP's political ground away from Kemalism. Hence, the Kemalist effect on the Democrat foreign policy was limited. The DP's policies were not against the Kemalist tenets in essence, but a mixture of Kemalism and other considerations. Moreover, the developments in this period forced them to find a new way. The core-Democrats were not anti-Kemalist,¹⁴ however the Democrat Party in a short time became the focal point of anti-Kemalist groups. Remembering how Kemalists had suppressed the opposition in the 1920s-30s, anti-Kemalists claimed they were Kemalists claiming Kemalism needed a new interpretation. Thus a new tradition emerged in Turkish politics: *takiyye* (pretence) policy. Especially the marginal groups had to hide their real aims to save themselves.

Americanism and Westernism

The second pillar of the Democrat approach, perhaps the most important, was its American style Westernism. Unlike the RPP's radical Republican Westernism based on the revolutionary French experiences, Democrat Westernism was based on the British-

¹³ Celal Bayar, **Ben de Yazdım**, (*I Wrote too*), (Istanbul: 1968), p. 145.

¹⁴ Eroğul, **Demokrat...**, p. 12; Bayar, **Ben de...**

American model. It was evolutionary not revolutionary and was a resurgence of the Americanist school of the 1920s and 1930s. The Democrats sincerely believed in an American political, economic model and dreamed to transform Turkey into a 'little United States'.¹⁵ It is true that, after the Second World War, the İnönü government had also looked for American friendship and even implied some structural changes in Turkish political life towards the American style, and the transformation to the multi-party regime was one of the direct results of this. However, the shift in the RPP's policies was tactical; while İnönü believed in the need for American support, the DP's ideology was based on Western liberal democratic philosophy.¹⁶ Kemalists attacked the DP's Americanism claiming its aim was not Westernisation of Turkey but making Turkey a bastion of the West.¹⁷ The DP saw itself as the representative of the people with the mission to transform the country to a modern, liberal, democratic Western country. Indeed, most RPP members were openly against American values, the DP saw American civilisation as the ultimate aspiration for Turkey. In this context, the Democrats, for a first time in Turkish history, adopted a systematic American political approach and became the pioneers of the Americanist political school in Turkey.¹⁸

The impact of this ideological orientation was significant: First, the Americanist Democrats encountered antagonism from RPP members particularly those with leftist leanings who identified with the Soviet Union. Not only the radicals in the RPP but the party itself was still sceptical about the West and blamed the West for exploiting and colonising the third world. Secondly, thanks to the Democrat's American civilisation project, Turkey's post-war foreign policy under the Democrats was perceived as a crucial element in the Democrat vision to transform Turkey.¹⁹ Third, the Democrat Americanism or British Westernism not only determined Democrat foreign policy, but also affected all aspects of the political and social life in Turkey, and was perceived as a serious challenge by the Kemalists which culminated in a military coup in 1960.

¹⁵ Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, p. 65.

¹⁶ Shaw and Shaw have a different argument: '...one of the brightest aspect of the new Turkey has been the general agreement of all the major parties on the basic lines of foreign policy.' Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 429.

¹⁷ Niyazi Berkes, 'Satılık Memleket' (*A Homecountry to Sale*), *Yön*, No. 98, 12 February 1965, p. 8.

¹⁸ In fact there were some Americanists in the Independence War, like Halide Edip Adıvar and then Ahmet Emin Yalman, who advocated American mandate, annexation or close relations with the US to save the country from the Europeans, but these attempts were mainly personal and not influential. Also most of them were not aware of the American political / economic system but aimed the US military support for Turkey.

¹⁹ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 118.

Besides the ideological orientation, another factor that demolished Turkish scepticism of the West was the Soviet and communist threat. Thus, despite Turkey's tradition of diplomatic bargaining, the rise of a hostile Soviet power forced the Democrats into a firm commitment to the Western allies.²⁰ Hence, DP foreign policy, contrary to the Kemalist understanding, lacked Western scepticism; for the DP Turkey was not alone, there were common threats to the democrat world, not only to Turkey. According to this understanding, international solidarity could save Turkish interests as well. As a result, Turkey under DP rule championed international co-operation and organisations against the communist attacks. DP's anti-communism not only ensured Western support in the international arena, but also legitimated its scepticism-free Westernism and gave it a free hand in domestic politics.

Capitalism and the Need for Foreign Aid

The DP's economic policies, like its political policies, were also based on liberalism. Contrary to the etatist RPP, the DP advocated a state-free economy similar to the United States economic model. As a result, despite its good relations with the State, one of the leading groups in the DP were members from private business class, especially *esnafs* (small tradesmen). This group was against the etatist RPP policies, and demanded a more liberal economy. The DP soon became the spokesman for private enterprise and individual initiative.²¹ Not only businessmen, but also villagers, workers and the liberals fed up with the etatist policies. Poverty and lack of basic services such as education and health, had worsened during the war years and after, particularly in the villages and the poor districts of the cities, but they were neglected by the RPP. The DP's liberal promises led ordinary 'little man' to believe that 'by helping the Democrats come to power not only would he liberate himself from an oppressive state but the DP would also improve his material lot.'²² The DP aware that the most important factor in its power was the people's support, had promised a relaxation of government controls, more opportunity for private initiative, increased public services and greater concentration on agricultural development and modernisation. Indeed one of the slogans of the DP in the elections was '*Her mahalleye bir milyoner*' (a millionaire for every

²⁰ Robinson, *The First...*, p. 175.

²¹ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 105.

²² Robinson, *The First...*, p. 106.

district). After the election, Turkey's economy grew rapidly for five years.²³ The transport, telecommunication and energy systems were developed. The road network rose from about 10,000 km in 1950 to about 24,000 km in 1960. The number of private cars climbed from 8,000 to 45,800.²⁴ Electric power increased four times in ten years while agriculture was being modernised, land under cultivation rose to 23.264 billion hectares from 14.5 billion hectares. The number of tractors increased about three times from 1,756 to 43,436 by 1960.²⁵ Total agricultural output was doubled, and industrial production rose from an index of 100 in 1948 to 256 in 1960.²⁶ Turkey thanks to the improvements in the agricultural sectors became one of the world's major wheat-exporting countries with its production of cereals in 1953 totalled over 14 million metric tons, which was just 8 million in 1950.²⁷ Especially the early 1950s were the golden years of the DP era. Between 1950-1953 in particular Turkey experienced a miracle-like 13 percent a year increase in its GDP.²⁸ With this economic development literacy increased, the health system was reformed and many new goods that Turks had never seen became available.

The problem was that, in reality the role of the DP's liberalising policies in bringing economic success was limited, and the main reasons for the rapid growth between 1950-1955 were the good weather, the bumper grain crop and foreign aid.²⁹ The economy began to show signs of stagnation with a radical drop in the growth rate by 1954.³⁰ However the government was unaware or underestimated these factors as it maximised popular support. But economic development creating more pressure on the suffering budget brought its own problems, such as price inflation and a trade gap. The budget fell into chronic debt (to almost 20 per cent of average revenues).³¹ The new desire for consumer goods awakened among the social groups supporting the DP government, yet the government had no fresh source to continue development. Thus the government

²³ For the economic development in the DP period see: William Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*, (New York: 1981); Morris Singer, *The Economic Advance of Turkey, 1938-1960*, (Ankara: 1977); Osman Okyar, 'Development Background of the Turkish Economy, 1923-1973', *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest*, Winter 1993, pp. 20-21.

²⁴ Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, pp. 408-409.

²⁵ Hale, *The Political...*, pp. 87-113.

²⁶ Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, 409.

²⁷ Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 131.

²⁸ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 116.

²⁹ Davison, *Turkey*, p. 152; Türkkaya Ataöv, 'The 27th of May Revolution and Its Aftermath', *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 1960-1961, p. 15.

³⁰ Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, p. 75; Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 116.

expenditure upon industrial and agricultural areas was increased. As a result, Turkey's foreign debt reached to 12 billion US American dollars at the end of the DP period.³² In addition to the trade gap, chronic debt and inflation, economic problems also created social and political problems in the last years of the 1950s. The civil and military officers, who had the real power in a fledgling democracy, were suffering economically because inflation had decreased the real value of their salaries. They believed that the government was supporting other social groups, namely businessmen, tradesmen, villagers, workers, religious people etc., at the expense of revolutionary groups, officers and the Kemalist elite.³³ Apart from the army officers, the DP's economic and political policies caused a social tension. High inflation was in particular was the main responsible for instability. The unrest among the university intellectuals, writers and the youth was significant. The student riots for instance increased the tension in the 1960s.³⁴ Under these circumstances, not only the government but also the regime was in danger in the late 1950s. Therefore the DP was desperate to find fresh foreign loans. Thus foreign aid became an important factor in Turkish foreign policy. In these circumstances the DP declared that its principle mission was the introduction of foreign capital into Turkey.³⁵ In this context, the need for foreign loans would play a crucial role in making the DP's pro-Western Middle East and Balkan policies and increase Turkish economic dependence on USA.

Besides the domestic needs, the second cause for foreign aid was external. Menderes always emphasised that Turkey was the bulwark of defence of the region, however its power was limited to play such a role, and it was necessary to increase its economic strength with the American help.³⁶ Hence, Turkey's military expenditures increased to match US's design for the region.

Conservatism and Islam in DP Foreign Policy

³¹ Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, p. 74.

³² Eroğul, *Demokrat...*, p. 180.

³³ Aydemir, *İhtilalin...*, pp. 264-270; Ahmad, *The Making...*, pp. 121-122.

³⁴ Aydemir, *İhtilalin...*, pp. 221-286.

³⁵ Cem Eroğul, 'The Establishment of Multiparty Rule: 1945-71', in Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (eds.), *Turkey in Transition, New Perspectives*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 101-141, p. 110.

³⁶ Ara Sanjian, 'The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact', *The Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 226-266, p. 228.

In the area of religion, DP's policies were similar to its economic policies: It was not against Kemalism's secularism and 'DP did not exploit religion for its own gain'³⁷ but it opposed applying the secular principles in an İnönist way. The RPP, believing religion was a most dangerous area, argued that it could not be left to the people's initiative. The İnönü era, for instance, was the most difficult years for Islamic practitioners. Islamists claim that many Muslims had to hide thousands of Qu'ran, the holy book, and other religious materials under the soil. Also many more, accused of reading the religious books or practising Islamic worships,³⁸ were arrested by the gendarme. The Democrats were also mainly secular, but since public support and foreign support were the main legitimising force for power, they were more moderate. Thus, the first cracks in Turkey's religious taboo appeared in these years, when politicians began to realize that proper playing of the religious card was an effective way of garnering votes.³⁹ For the DP, religion was one of the inseparable elements of the Turkish nation and the Turkish history. They argued that demolishing the religious values would undermine the unity of the Turkish nation and as a result would damage social harmony. Moreover, for the DP's understanding people's demands were essential and more important than the state's official principles. Menderes, for example, told parliamentarians: 'if you want you can bring *seriat* (Islamic law) to Turkey'.⁴⁰ In this framework, in the election campaign the Democrats promised greater religious tolerance. Thus the Turkish people's yearning for more religious freedom at last found an outlet with Turkey's transition to multi-party democracy with the DP.⁴¹

The second factor for the resurgence of Islam was due to the DP's economy policies. The majority of Turks benefited from rapid economic development in the 1950s, particularly the businesses sector and people in the rural areas. The fledgling Turkish bourgeois gained self-confidence; the working class started to gain a class-

³⁷ Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy (1950-1975)*, (London: C. Hurst, 1977), p. 19; Richard Tapper, 'Introduction', in Richard Tapper (ed.), *Islam in Modern Turkey*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), p. 9. For a different view see Ataöv, '27th of May...', pp. 16-17 and Eroğul, *Demokrat...*, pp. 80-81.

³⁸ For the details of the claims see Islamist author-journalist Abdurrahman Dilipak's studies esp.: *Bir Başka Açıdan İnönü (İnönü from a Different Perspective)*, (Istanbul: Beyan, 1990).

³⁹ Heath Lowry, 'Challenges to Turkish Democracy in the Decades of the Nineties', *Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. V, Fall 1996, pp. 89-111, p. 94.

⁴⁰ Ömer Dedeoğlu, *Bir Milletvekilinin Günlüğünden, Anılar (From a Parliamentarian's Memoir)*, (Ankara: 1999), p. 45.

⁴¹ Abdullah al-Ahsan, *Ummah or Nation, Identity Crisis in Contemporary Muslim Society*, (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1992), pp. 78-80.

consciousness and contrary to the RPP era, there were now many economic classes and power centres in the country.⁴² The population was growing very quickly and the many villagers were pouring into the towns and the cities and bringing their traditions and values.⁴³ All this demolished the Kemalist monopoly in political life. Particularly the lower-classes, the new workers who had come from the rural areas found an opportunity to show their cultural and traditional values and demanded policies that accorded with their values. As mentioned, the DP was a populist party and as such gave more importance to popular cultural and religious demands than the RPP did. Also, as seen, at this time people were relatively powerful and had financial and political power to nourish the Islamic movement. Actually, the ordinary Turkish citizen demanded more freedom in the religious matters, but not an Islamic state and 'it was not the religious basis of the DP's political ideology, but its tolerant attitude towards religion, which made the Democrat Party popular among the voters.'⁴⁴ They were identifying themselves as Muslim Turkish people, not only Turkish, or Muslim. In other words, they demanded peace with religion and tradition. The poor popular support for the Millet Partisi underscored this reality. The *Millet Partisi* (the Nation Party), which represented the more religious wing of the opposition to the RPP, got a poor vote in the 1950s elections.⁴⁵ The Nation Party (NP) had used more religious slogans in the elections yet the obvious choice of the Muslim Turk was the moderate DP. The DP saw these demands and tried to make peace among the state and the people to reconcile the nationalist ideas with religious values. Unlike the RPP the DP formed its policies according to people's preferences. This new understanding resurrected the liberal Ottomanist school of thought in a different form. Their slogan highlighted the difference between the DP and the RPP: 'Enough is Enough! It's the people's turn to speak'. As will be seen, this school of thought would continue under the AP, ANAP and DYP in future years, under the name of *Türk-Islam Sentezi* (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis).

As a result of the DP's religious tolerance policy, the traditional Arabic call (*ezan*) to prayer from the minarets was restored with its Turkish equivalent. The State radio stations began to broadcast Arabic Quran verses. New mosques were built both

⁴² Erogul, *Demokrat...* and Gerger, *Türk...*, pp. 64-97.

⁴³ Ilter Turan, 'Religion and Political Culture in Turkey', Richard Tapper (ed.), *Islam in Modern Turkey*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), p. 45.

⁴⁴ Turan, 'Religion and...', p. 45.

⁴⁵ Turan, 'Religion and...', pp. 78-79; Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 16.

privately and by the state. The *türbes* (religious mausoleums) were officially opened. The role of the Islamic groups in politics and society also increased.⁴⁶ The people's warm welcome to the DP's policies alarmed the Kemalists and the RPP, and the Kemalist bureaucracy and the Kemalist elite perceived these developments as a betrayal of Kemalism, and blamed the DP for undermining the secular Kemalist revolution. Indeed when a campaign opposed to the statues and the portraits of Atatürk began, the DP realised that it had started a process which it could not control. Thus, the Democrats slowed down the Islamists, and cracked down on extreme religious organisations while the NP (Nation Party) known as a religious party was dissolved.⁴⁷ Despite these measures the DP continued its tolerant religious policy and religious Turks mainly supported the DP and its successors.

The differences between the DP and the RPP naturally influenced their foreign policy attitudes. The DP's conservatism brought about a new line in Turkish foreign policy, but this had little impact on Turkey-Muslim world relations as the Menderes governments determined their policies according from a Western perspective.

The first effect of the DP's position was on its anti-communist attitude. DP supporters were mainly religious -at least traditional- and from the middle classes. Therefore there was an ideological barrier to co-operation with the communist Soviet block. On the other hand, as the member of a party which carried out the radical anti-religious reforms, most the RPP members, like the communists, were against the religious tolerance of the DP and many declared that they were atheists. This ideological similarity with the communists increased the Kemalist Western scepticism in the RPP and widened the gap between the RPP and the DP on foreign policy issues.

The third reason for the Islamic resurgence was the US's containment policy. As the Americans saw Islam as a bulwark against Marxism, particularly in the Middle East, they supported the Islamic movements in the region and in Turkey. Moreover, the West demanded from Turkey a more active role in the Middle East. According to this plan, Turkey would be at the heart of an anti-Soviet security organisation in the region. Since

⁴⁶ Al-Ahsan, *Ummah...*, pp. 78-79; Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 16.

⁴⁷ Howard A. Reed, 'Secularism and Islam in Turkish Politics', *Current History*, 32, June 1957, pp. 337-338.

Turkey was perceived as an atheist regime by the Arabs, it had to increasingly Islamise its policies. Thus, with American encouragement and the people's warm welcome the DP opened doors for a more Islamised Turkey.

While its economic and foreign policies helped the Islamic resurgence, Democrat conservatism also helped to push the Turkish people towards pro-Western policies. Despite Kemalist perceptions (or obsessions), the Democrats played the most active role in the Islamic world since the end of the Ottoman Empire. In some degree, the Democrats' conservatism made possible such a policy. Thanks to the DP's new Islamic understanding, Menderes sought co-operation with Egypt, Iraq and Jordan and even seriously planned to occupy some countries like Iraq when the Westernist regimes were in danger.⁴⁸

Cold War Ideology and Turkish Foreign Policy

The differences between the DP and RPP inevitably reflected on the DP's foreign policy, and created an emotional dimension in its policies in favour of the West, notably the US.⁴⁹ As an elected government the DP accepted the American political and economic system as the best model for Turkey. In addition to the DP's ideological preferences, Democrat foreign policy was not free from the lessons of historical experience and the fears: The DP perceived the Russian communists as the most dangerous threat to Turkish independence and remembered the military weaknesses of the Turkish Army during the Second World War. Moreover, economically Turkey needed Western credit and aid for its economic development. As a result Turkey became the champion of the Cold War and amended its foreign policy considerations according to Cold War circumstances.⁵⁰ The Cold War tension dramatically increased in the DP years and NATO and the West's rigid responses to the Eastern Block widened the gap between the two sides. Turkey, due to its strategic location between the East and West benefited greatly from the Cold War. The 'terrible Turks' of the past, thanks to the Cold War, became full member of the main Western political and military systems:

⁴⁸ Of course the main motive behind the Democrat Middle East policy was Turkey's pro-Westernism and anti-Communism. However the similar factors were there in the RPP period and the İnönü governments did not show any interest to be part of the region.

⁴⁹ Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, pp. 64-65.

⁵⁰ Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, pp. 83-91; Ahmad, *The Making...*, pp. 118-119.

OECD (1948), the Council of Europe (1949) and the NATO (1952). Moreover, the US gave open political, military and economic support against the Soviet Union and for Turkey's modernisation-democratisation process. Thus Turkey became a member of the Cold War lobby and provoked radical attitudes as the Cold War and American support became a central column of Turkish foreign policy with Kemalism.⁵¹

With the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was based on an assumption that Turkish national interests were identical with Western interests. In other words, the Turkish leaders assumed what was good for the West was good for Turkey⁵² although Turkey's national interests many times contrasted with Western interests. However as will be seen Turkey sacrificed its interests in the Middle East, the Third World and the Muslim World in order to maintain this Western support.⁵³ In the Middle East, for example, Turkey, as US advised it, condemned the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956, and supported both the American intervention in Lebanon and the British military intervention in Jordan in 1958,⁵⁴ while during the Algerian Independence War, Turkey supported the French side.⁵⁵ Moreover, during these years the foreign policy bureaucracy particularly identified itself with the NATO.⁵⁶ This undoubtedly damaged Turkey's relations with the non-Western world. Indeed this was understandable because the Turkish foreign policy machinery was still slow to grasp the radical change in the world political order. Turkey had missed the rise of the Third World for example. Also under the Kemalist ideological assumption Turkish foreign policy had assumed that the Western world was a religious and cultural bias free society and could easily accept Turkey as an equal partner.

European Turkish Biases as a Determinant in Turkish Foreign Policy

Despite American support, secularisation in Turkey, the Second World War and other international events European Turkish biases over Turkey remained and, similar to the Ottoman experiences, the European attitude towards the Turks, as will be discussed, deeply affected Turkish foreign policy in the DP era and the future. Although its effects

⁵¹ Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, p. 65.

⁵² *Cumhuriyet*, 25 December 1955; Also see Çalis, *The Role...*

⁵³ See the next chapter, esp. the Cyprus Issue section.

⁵⁴ Gönübol, *Olaylarla...*, pp. 303-305.

⁵⁵ Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, p. 77.

were limited in the DP era because of the reasons will be discussed below, the European resistance to the Turks was vital in understanding the motives behind Turkish policy makers' mind. Also the European attitudes, by nourishing the Turkish Western scepticism shaped the Turkish Westernist and the Islamist schools in different ways. Therefore, before moving the implementation of the Democrat policy and testing ideologies' role in DP foreign policy we will discuss the European reluctance towards the Turks and its impact on Turkish foreign policy.

NATO Membership and European Resistance to the Turks

It can be said that, during the first years of the DP period, the Kemalist scepticism about the West was not influential in Turkish foreign policy, and the American policies were never questioned. The DP was ready to do anything to enter the Western bloc and these efforts resulted in NATO membership, yet the first experiences were a disappointment for the Turkish Westernist school, particularly for the Democrats. As have been seen Turkey immediately applied for NATO membership after the founding of the organisation in the İnönü era, but was rejected.⁵⁷ For the West Turkey's role was in the Middle East. Also, for many Europeans, the Turks were not European and had no place in Europe. Even some of the European politicians argued that there was no difference between the Turks and the Russians in hostility against Europe.⁵⁸ A British diplomat in 1950 for example declared that Turkey could not enter the NATO because it was a Muslim country,⁵⁹ while Hamilton Armstrong, a British observer, claimed that Turkey's membership would weaken 'the ideal of a Christian, democratic community of free states.'⁶⁰ This European approach confirmed the failure of the Westernists in Turkey, and disappointed both the Democrats and the Republicans who as positivist and secular Kemalists believed in science and technology and argued that there was no place for religion in the modern world, yet now they, after 28 years of the revolution, confronted the religious biases at the heart of the civilisation. As will be seen, the Western

⁵⁶ Interview with İlber Ortaylı.

⁵⁷ For Turkey's efforts to enter the NATO see, Oral Sander, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri, 1947-1964*, (*Turkish American Relations, 1947-1964*), (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1979), pp. 67-80; Sarıncay, *Türkiye'nin...*, pp. 70-104; Selahattin Deniz, *Dünya Siyasetinde Türkiye'nin Yeri ve NATO*, (*The Place of Turkey in the World Politics and the NATO*), (Ankara: n.d.).

⁵⁸ Sedat Laçiner, *The Cultural and Civilisational Dimensions in Turkey-Europe Relations* (London: IAA, 1999).

⁵⁹ İsmail Berduk Olgaçay, *Tasmalı Çekirge (Collared Grasshopper, The Memoirs of Ambassador Olgaçay)*, (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1990), p. 311.

⁶⁰ Hamilton Armstrong, 'Eisenhower's Right Flank', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 29, July 1951, p. 661.

politicians would not abstain from expressing their anti-Turkish feelings in future, but Turkey pretended not to see them. In this framework, especially the Europeans, namely Britain and France, made enormous efforts to keep Turkey out of the core of the West by promising financial and military aid. The Turkish application for NATO membership failed meeting opposition from every quarter. Moreover, when Turkey offered to contribute to the UN forces in the Korean War, it gained a great deal of credit among the NATO governments.⁶¹ The Korean venture was a clear demonstration of Turkey's potential contribution to NATO. Also the Korean War underlined Turkey's importance in containing the Soviet Union. However, this was not enough for NATO entry and when on 15 May 1951, Turkey and Greece were invited to NATO by the United States, the UK, Denmark, Belgium and Norway made efforts to block Turkish entry.⁶² For Britain, Turkey was a Middle Eastern country and the West should not risk its security for the Turks. The British argued that Turkey should be directed to the East despite its enthusiasm to be a European power⁶³ and that Turkey should join a regional pact or joint command in the Middle East, rather than take part in the European defence system.⁶⁴ As a result the third attempt also failed, and with the American support, Turkey accepted the British request to co-sponsor a proposal for the establishment of an anti-Soviet organisation in the Middle East⁶⁵ and as a result of this, Britain withdrew its objection.⁶⁶ Thus, Turkey proved that it was ready to do anything to win the confidence of the Western bloc. Turkey's insistence on its entry to the core of the West as the reward for its full support for the West against the Soviet Union worked and on 18 February 1952 Turkey became the only Muslim member of NATO and the only member, which shared a border with the Soviet Union.⁶⁷ For the Turkish Westernists

⁶¹ Hüseyin Bağcı, 'Türkiye'nin NATO Üyeliğini Hızlandıran İki Önemli Faktör: Kore Savaşı ve ABD Büyükelçisi George McGhee', (*Two Important Factors That Speed Up Turkey's NATO Membership: The Korean War and the US's Ambassador George McGhee*), *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi / METU Development Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1-2, 1991, pp. 1-35; Olgaçay, *Tasmalı...*, pp. 306-307; Tamkoç, 'Turkey's Quest...', p. 24; Mango, *Turkey*, pp. 74-75; Sarıay, *Türkiye'nin...*, pp. 88-89.

⁶² Edip Çelik, *100 Soruda Türk Dış Politika Tarihi (The History of Turkish Foreign Policy in 100 Questions)*, İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1969), p. 157; Yulug Tekin Kurat, 'Turkey's Entry to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization', *Foreign Policy* (Ankara), Vol. 10, Nos. 3-4, 1983; Mehmet Gönlübol and Haluk Ülman, 'Türk Dış Politikasının Yirmi Yılı, 1945-1965', (*Turkish Foreign Policy's 20 Years, 1945-1965*), *AÜSBF Dergisi*, Vol. 21, No. 21, March 1966, pp. 147-148; Vali, *Bridge...*, pp. 116-117.

⁶³ Ercüment Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika, (Our Leaders and Foreign Policy, a Diplomat's Memoirs)*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), p. 78; Kürkçüoğlu, 'Turco - British...', p. 95.

⁶⁴ Kürkçüoğlu, 'Turco - British...', p. 95.

⁶⁵ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Arap Orta Doğusu'na Karşı Politikası, 1945-1970 (Turkey's Foreign Policy on the Arab World, 1945-1970)*, (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1972), p. 45.

⁶⁶ Gönlübol, 'A Short...', p. 7.

⁶⁷ It is certain that one of the most important factors helped Turkey's inclusion to the NATO was the American support and George McGhee's, the American ambassador to Ankara, personal efforts. For

Turkey was now a full member of the Western family. In the words of Altemur Kiliç; ‘the NATO alliance filled Turkish hearts with pride and exaltation. They were no longer “outsiders”. They were at last part of the West.’⁶⁸

Apart from the debates mentioned above, Turkish researcher Baskin Oran’s approach must also be noted: One of the main reasons for Turkey’s NATO application naturally was the Soviet threat, Oran however argues that it was not the case because Turkey did not consider the Soviet Union as a threat when it applied for NATO. According to him, the main reason was Turkey’s vocation to be part of the capitalist western world and need for fresh credit. Oran further argues that the DP saw the NATO membership as the guarantee for the future of the Turkish multi-party regime.⁶⁹ This thesis does not share Oran’s idea of that the Soviet Union was not a threat for Turkish security, yet as discussed above the other part of his argument confirm the findings of this study.

Clash of the Civilisations and Turkey’s EEC Application

Turkey’s NATO membership highlight the strength of Kemalist ideology in Turkish foreign policy, because the only cause for Turkey’s efforts to enter the Western block was not the Soviet threat, rather ideological considerations played crucial role in Turkish application. It was an extension of the Kemalist civilisation perception. Yet, Turkey’s membership also underlined the European unwillingness to accept the Turks, and proved how Kemalism failed to anticipate the role of religious and the cultural values in international relations. However, like the previous RPP governments, the DP perceived the European civilisation as a religion-free civilisation, based on the scientific, positivist values. Thus, the DP government did not lose any opportunity to make its Europeanness confirmed. When the EEC was established in 1957 the Turks saw this economic organisation as another opportunity to bind Turkey to the European security and political system and help the ailing Turkish economy. When the DP government applied for membership only two years after the Rome Treaty was signed, it perceived no historical and cultural biases from its European counterparts. In spite of

McGhee’s role in this process see Bağcı, ‘Türkiye’nin...’, pp. 1-35; George C. McGhee, ‘Turkey Joins the West’, *World Affairs*, July 1954, pp. 617-630. Turkish diplomat Olgaçay says the multi-party regime and the 1950 elections in Turkey changed the feelings of the Americans about the Turks in favour of Turkey. For the details Olgaçay, *Tasmalı...*, pp. 304-305. For the official text of Turkey’s accession to the NATO see *Düstur*, III. Tertip, Vol. 33, p. 314 and *Resmi Gazete (The Official Gazette)*, 19 February 1952), No. 8038, pp. 232-233.

⁶⁸ Kiliç, *Turkey...*, p. 159.

the naïve Turkish European perception, even in the Cold War, Europe was not ready for Turkey. Indeed as Rene Albert-Carrie noted in 1965: 'one of the major components of the idea and the culture that are Europe is undoubtedly the Christian and the territorial domain of Europe may roughly be equated with what that of Christendom.'⁷⁰ Similarly, for the historian Braudel, Western Christianity is the main constituent in European thought: 'a European, even if he is an atheist, is deeply rooted in the Christian tradition.'⁷¹ Obviously there was no room for Turks in these western definitions yet the Turks, thanks to the 'ideology's blindness effect', could not see this cultural block to Turkish entry. In this context, for the European countries, Turkey's NATO membership never meant a full acceptance of Turkey as a European country by the West. However for the Turks 'it was taken as a sign that Turkey had been fully accepted by the Western nations on equal terms'.⁷² Rose argues that the only reason for Turkey's acceptance into NATO was its strategic borders with the Soviet Union.⁷³ Even under the Cold War circumstances Turkey's cultural Europeanness problem was seen as a far-fetched reality to the Europeans. For example, to historian Lichtheim, Turkey's place was the Middle East, not Europe: 'if cultural criteria are applied, Turkey forms part of the Middle East, whereas East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia unquestionably belong to Europe.'⁷⁴ Geography said 'NO' (the vast bulk of the country and its population were in Asia), religion said 'NO' (Turkey was secular, but the Turks were Muslims)⁷⁵. In addition to the problem of European identity, the Turkish economy was a typical Mediterranean agricultural economy with more than 75 per cent of the labour force in agriculture and four-fifths of total exports agricultural products.⁷⁶ The private sector was protected by high-tariff barriers and unofficial state aid. In spite of the high economic growth rate (five per cent) and the relatively strong democratisation movement, Turkey was a typical agricultural society. In other words, Turkey was not ready for an economic organisation, the European Community (EC).⁷⁷

⁶⁹ Oran, 'Türkiye'nin...', p. 73.

⁷⁰ Rene Albert-Carrie, *The Unity of Europe: An Historical Survey*, (London: Secker&Warburg, 1965), p. 334.

⁷¹ F. Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, (London: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 333-334.

⁷² Zürcher, *Turkey...*, p. 246.

⁷³ Richard Rose, *What is Europe*, (New York: HarperCollins, 1996, p.42.

⁷⁴ George Lichtheim, *Europe in the Twentieth Century*, (London: Weidenfeld&Nicolson Ltd., 1972), p.381.

⁷⁵ Quoted in Birol Ali Yeşilada, 'Prospectus for Turkey's Membership in the European Union', *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 1992-1993, Vol. 6, Nos.: 1&2, Winter, p. 42.

⁷⁶ Yeşilada, 'Prospectus...', p. 42.

⁷⁷ Yeşilada, 'Prospectus...', pp. 42-44.

Nevertheless, Turkey immediately applied for EC membership on 31 July 1959. Similar to the NATO case, the Russian threat once again helped Turkey's position in Europe, as the Western European countries needed Turkey's support against the Soviet threat because of its vital geo-strategic position between the two blocs. Also 'the new European ideology' allowed the entrance of Turkey to the European society. Turkey was a country that would contribute directly and substantially to the defence of the West, and notably the EC countries.⁷⁸ As a result, it can be said that, similar to the NATO application, the EC accepted Turkey's application for association agreement because of security and political considerations, not economic or cultural. The second reason for the EC's 'enthusiastic' response to the Greek and Turkish applications was competition between the UK and the EC. The UK had chosen to remain outside the EC and insisted on looser and wider free trade as an alternative to the EC. Therefore, an application from any European country was important to the EC as a welcome token of international recognition.⁷⁹ To conclude, Turkey's application was welcomed by the EC, yet the EC's attitude towards Turkey's application was motivated by problems of politics and security. Thus, the problems rooted in history were in fact ignored for a while. While Europe saw the Turks as 'foreigners' in the continent, for the Turks NATO, the EEC and other agreements and memberships in the European political system were more than an organisation and agreements: As will be seen in the European Community (then the European Union) case Turkey has always shown a tendency to perceive any agreement or membership in a Western block as a sign of its European identity. The gap between Turkish and Western perceptions caused misunderstandings and increased the role of identity in Turkish foreign policy. In the mind of the Turkish decision-makers Turkey had no alternative to the West. Turkey had to be a Western, European country. Economically, politically and culturally, this could be costly, but, for them, the other alternatives were even more costly. Yavuz argues that the Kemalist elite saw the Soviet Union's aggressiveness as an opportunity to strengthen Turkey's secular, European character.⁸⁰ Likewise, Leffer claims that the Turkish elite exaggerated the

⁷⁸ Yeşilada, 'Prospectus...', p. 44.

⁷⁹ Meltem Müftüler-Bac, 'Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 29. Also see Mehmet Ali Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası: 1959-1985*, (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1985); Meltem Müftüler-Bac, *(Turkey's EC Adventure: 1959-1985)*, (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1985); Meltem Müftüler-Bac, 'Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 29.

⁸⁰ M. Hakan Yavuz, 'İkicilik (Duality): Türk-Arap İlişkileri ve Filistin Sorunu (1947-1994)' (*Duality: Turkish - Arab Relations and the Palestine Issue*), in Faruk Sönmezoğlu (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasının*

Russian danger to become a part of European political system.⁸¹ At this point, we see the apparent influence of the ideology, that is the impact of Kemalism and Westernism in general on foreign policy, which gave no manoeuvre area for Turkey, and almost fixed Turkish foreign policy in many areas for the Cold War years.

In brief, although the West showed its reluctance over Turkish membership of the Western club, Turkey ignored this negative attitude. The main reasons for Turkey's attitude were: a) ideology. Both the RPP and the Democrats were from the same school of thought and their ultimate aim was a Western Turkey. The RPP, in particular, rejected Turkey's Islamic, Ottoman and Eastern heritage. They saw the West as an end-mark for Turkey's Eastern adventure, hence they pretended not to see the European resistance to their efforts, b) a weak economy. The need for Western economic support for the undeveloped Turkish economy, c) The Soviet threat, which frightened the Turks into the Western orbit, d) a weak army, which did not have power to defend the country and needed the Western defence system against the Soviet threat, e) The Greek factor. In the first years of the Republic, Turkey did not give enough importance to Greece as an enemy because there were relatively greater dangers. But in the DP era the Cyprus and minorities problems worsened relations. Since Greece had grown four times in size with Western military and political support by taking over the Turkish territory, the Greek application was seen as potential disaster, by the DP government. Thus Turkey thought that it had to be represented on each platform where the Greeks stood. Indeed, Greece had not applied, Turkey would have taken much longer to decide what kind of relations it wanted with the Community.⁸² Turkey's application to the EEC was a response to the Greek initiative in 1959 and aimed to neutralise the Greek attempts in Europe against Turkey. As a result, Turkey officially applied to the EEC sixteen days after the formal Greek application.⁸³

Analizi, (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994), p. 244.

⁸¹ Melvyn Leffer, 'Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952', *Journal of American History*, Vol. 71, No. 4, March 1985, pp. 807-825.

⁸² Mehmet Ali Birand, 'Turkey and the European Community', *The World Today*, February 1978, pp. 52-61.

⁸³ Birand, *Türkiye'nin*; Meltem Müftüler, 'Turkey and the European Community: An Uneasy Relationship', *Turkish Review*, Autumn, 1993, pp. 31-41, p. 32.

Implementation

Relations with the US and NATO⁸⁴

Despite resistance from European members, Turkey continued its pro-Western policies and after 1952 in particular 'Turkish foreign policy loyally followed the Western line.'⁸⁵ Actually the Democrats relied on the Americans and were happy with the America's pro-Turkey policies. Indeed, almost all moderate schools of thought, including the DP and RPP, regarded Turkey's NATO membership as the main pillar of Republican foreign policy.⁸⁶ Hereafter Turkish foreign policy was based on the assumption that there was no difference between Western interests and Turkish national interests. The NATO alliance took precedence in all considerations of foreign policy.⁸⁷ Izmir became the headquarters of NATO's South-East Europe command. Thus, Turkey, under the DP government, indeed developed its closest association with the West in history and frequently announced that it was loyal to the Western camp and 'championed the Cold War'.⁸⁸ As Fuat Köprülü, Turkish Foreign Minister, declared, the DP considered the NATO agreement as a national policy. Köprülü said that there was no difference between the main principles of Turkish foreign policy and those of NATO.⁸⁹ With the economic, military and political mutual engagements Turkey re-organised its position in politics and certainly left its neutral position. Turkey, after joining NATO signed other security arrangements like the Balkan Pact with Greece and Yugoslavia (1953) and the Baghdad Pact (1954) which were the results of open US encouragement and part of an anti-Soviet strategy. That is to say even the regional security arrangements were designed according to Turkey's position in the Western block.

⁸⁴ For Turkish - American relations see Nasuh Uslu, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri*, (*Turkish-American Relations*), (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000), pp. 98-129; Sander, *Türk...*; Harris George S., *Troubled Alliance: Turkish American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, (Washington, D.C. and Stanford, Calif.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972); Melevyn Leffer, 'Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952', *Journal of American History*, Vol. 71, No. 4, March 1985, pp. 807-825; McGhee, *ABD...*; Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası, 1964-1980*, (*The US' Turkey Policy, 1964-1980*), (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1995); Eren, *Turkey...*

⁸⁵ Gönlübol, 'A Short...', p. 7.

⁸⁶ Gönlübol and others, *Olaylarla...*, p. 311.

⁸⁷ Eren, *Turkey...*, p. 236.

⁸⁸ Kurat, 'Turkey's', p. 23; Nurhan İnce, *Problems and Politics in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1960-1966, With Emphasis on Turkish-United States Relations, The Cyprus Question, and the Leftist Movement*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Kentucky, 1974, pp. 29-30.

⁸⁹ Köprülü's budget speech in the Parliament in 1955. *Cumhuriyet*, 25 December 1955. For NATO-DP relations see also: Metin Toker, *DP'nin Altın Yılları, 1950-1954*, (*The DP's Golden Years, 1950-1954*),

Ironically, during these years, as Turkey anchored itself to the West, the Soviet Union, after Stalin died, was moving to a more co-operative position. But Turkey had serious doubts to soften its relations with the Soviet Union. At Stalin's funeral Molotov, for example, told the Turkish Ambassador that the Soviet Union denounced Stalin's aggressive policies and wanted friendly relations with Turkey.⁹⁰ Moreover, the Soviet Union's 'friendly' declarations could not persuade the Turkish side and both President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes, expressed their mistrust of Soviet leaders.⁹¹ Similarly, the Deputy Prime Minister Fatin Rüştü said that he could not see any improvement in the Soviet policies towards Turkey.⁹² The Soviets hoped for relationship as realised in the 1920s, but now Turkey was a NATO member and committed to the West. In turn, Khrushchev denounced the Menderes government for its position:

‘Our relation with Turkey was very good during the Mustafa Kemal and the İnönü years; but then it was shadowed. We know it was not only Turkey's false, we also gave some speeches and declarations (*Stalin's demands for some Turkish territories and the Straits, s.l.*) which shadowed the relations. But we then made efforts to rectify our mistakes and made great efforts to establish good friendly relations. Unfortunately, the Turkish statesmen do not respond our call as we did.’⁹³

Khrushchev was right to think that the Turks were reluctant friends, but it is not fair to say that the DP's Soviet policy was so different to that of Mustafa Kemal and İnönü's policies as Khrushchev claimed. The main direction of Turkish Soviet policy remained unchanged since the 1920s. Turkey co-operated when possible, but nobody could expect co-operation with a country that had territorial aspirations in Turkey.

During the 1950s relations with the US reached their high point as Turkey identified its interests with American ones.⁹⁴ In 1959 the DP government signed a bilateral pact with the US that enabled the US to intervene in Turkey's internal affairs on behalf of the regime.⁹⁵ In foreign policy, co-operation was even closer. As Mahmut Dikerdem, the Turkish Ambassador, recalls the Menderes government ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to vote in the United Nations as the US voted. Dikerdem further says that

(Ankara: Bilge, 1990), pp. 160-175.

⁹⁰ Bilge, *Güç...*, pp. 337-338.

⁹¹ Bilge, *Güç...*, p. 339.

⁹² Gönlübol et. al. (eds.), *Olaylarla...*, p. 312.

⁹³ Khrushchev's Speech, cited in Gönlübol et. al. (eds.), *Olaylarla...*, p. 270.

⁹⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 25 December 1955.

⁹⁵ Haluk Ülman and Mehmet Gönlübol, 'Savaş Dünyasında Türkiye'nin Durumu' (*Turkey's Position in the State of War*), in Gönlübol, *Olaylarla...*, pp. 272-273.

according to the government's orders, the Ministry had to support the British, French and Americans against the national liberation and independence movements.⁹⁶ As a result, Turkey gave open support to the American policies in any part of the world, from Lebanon⁹⁷ to South Korea. Likewise, the DP government supported the French attitude in North Africa and the British for their Egypt policy.⁹⁸

Relations with the East

The RPP had very much ignored the eastern world though there was very suitable and profitable circumstances for Turkey in the Middle East and in the Eastern world in general. By the 1950s the eastern nations saw a number of independence struggles against the imperialist states and identified with Turkey as a country that defended its independence against European powers. From Iran to Africa, to Bangladesh nationalists praised Turkey and its independence struggle. Even Atatürk's indifferent policies could not change their feelings about the Turkish revolution. The situation was even more favourable in the Middle East. For example, in Egypt the *blue bloods* (aristocrats) were Turkish, Egyptian King Fuad and his son King Faruk were half-Turkish. In the Fuad era Turkish was the Palace language. Though Faruk had banned the use of Turkish in the Palace Turkish blood was the primary indication of noble birth in Egypt and a pre-condition of entry to the distinguished Mohammed Ali Club in Cairo was Turkish origin.⁹⁹ Not only the Egyptians but also many other Middle Eastern statesmen spoke fluent Turkish, and many more perceived Turkey as a natural ally, notably Ibrahim Haşim Pasha, the Jordanian Prime Minister, and Samir Rifai Pasha, the Jordanian Minister for Foreign Affairs.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, the Turks had governed Algeria for centuries, and despite this, many Algerians saw the Turks as their ancestors and there were many Turkish districts in the country. Moreover the ordinary Algerian perceived the Turks as mediator between Algeria and the West. Furthermore, the Middle Eastern countries had gained their independence and they lacked experience in the international arena. They needed Turkey's support, as Turkey was the only Muslim NATO member and the

⁹⁶ Dikerdem, *Ortadoğu'da...*, p. 66.

⁹⁷ In the 1958 Lebanon Crisis Turkey clearly supported the US and the Turkish air bases were open to the American usage: George Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), p. 67.

⁹⁸ Bölükbaşı, *Türkiye ve...*, pp. 4-5; Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 119.

⁹⁹ For the Egyptian' feelings about the Turks see the memoirs of Mahmut Dikerdem, the Chief of the Turkish Mission in Cairo for three years: Dikerdem, *Ortadoğu'da...*, pp. 27-28.

¹⁰⁰ Mahmut Dikerdem, Turkey's Ambassador to Amman, says that Samir Rifai Pasha was one of the few genius friends of Turkey in his *Ortadoğu'da Devrim Yılları* book p. 169.

successor to their former ruler, the Ottoman Empire. Turkey had the opportunity to be an excellent mediator between these states and the colonialist countries. With the DP government Turkey also found an excellent ideological ground to improve its relations with these countries.

Despite such suitable circumstances in the region Turkey designed its Middle East policy according to its relations with the Western block. As a direct result of the identification of the Turkish and Western interests in the Turkish decision-makers mind, Turkey carried out the US policies in the region and Menderes deserted Atatürk's and İnönü's pacific, non-alignment policies in the Middle East, claiming that İnönü had neglected the Middle East despite Turkey's location. Menderes defended an active Eastern policy as an integrated part of an active Western policy. For Menderes and Köprülü, Turkey could play a 'big brother' role in the Middle East because it was the strongest country in the region in terms of the military and economic power, and would unite the Arab states against the communist block. In return the US would provide military, political and economic aid to these countries notably to Turkey.¹⁰¹

Similar to the Turkish assessments, the US saw Turkey as a cornerstone of its Middle Eastern security operations. After withdrawal of the British from the region, the US needed an 'assistant state' to carry out anti-communist policies in the region.¹⁰² The intense dislike of the colonial powers had prevented the British to establish an organisation in the region. Also, the US needed partners in the region, as it had no close relations with the regional countries in terms of culture, history and politics. Moreover, the Americans did not want to incense the Soviet Union in the region. For the US, Turkey, as a Muslim, Middle Eastern state, was a perfect state to organise a defence system against the Soviets. However, Turkey did not consider itself as a Muslim, Eastern state, and the Middle East did not accept Turkey as a regional, Muslim country. Moreover, there was a misperception about the threat between the Arabs, Turks and Americans. From the American perspective the threat to the region was communism.

¹⁰¹ Hüseyin Bağcı names Menderes' eastern policy as 'locomotive foreign policy'. However, as Menderes followed the American instructions in the Middle East, this name is arguable. Hüseyin Bağcı, 'Demokrat Parti'nin Ortadoğu Politikası' (*The DP's Middle Eastern Policy*), in Sönmezoğlu (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, pp. 89-120, p. 93; Bağcı, *Demokrat...*

¹⁰² Sander argues that not only the Soviet threat but also security of Israel shaped US' Middle East and Turkey policy, and one of the aims of Baghdad Pact was to protect the young Israeli state: Sander, *Türk...*, pp. 125-126.

The western prescription was containment of communism by using any tool including religion. As an Eastern country Turkey might play a crucial role in these Western plans. For Turkey, however, the menace came from the north. Turkey also perceived Islamisation and Easternisation as threats as dangerous as the Soviet Union. The Turkish solution was the integration of Turkey with West. However on the other hand, for the Arabs, who had never seen any Soviet occupation, the threat was not the Soviet Union but Western imperialism. Therefore the Turks', the Arabs' and the West's expectations from the region were completely different.

Thus, Turkey's Middle East policy, similar to the Kemalist approach, was an inseparable part of its Western policy. The Kemalist Middle Eastern policy was defensive arrangement and an extension of relations with the West. However, now the West's condition was an active Turkey in the Middle East. Turkey, according to the British and the American strategies, had to organise a Middle Eastern block against the Soviet Union. Moreover, the DP's other difference from Kemalist Middle Eastern policy was its readiness for such an active policy. Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü stated his unhappiness with Atatürk and İnönü's policy towards Arab states promising to restore relations.¹⁰³

Thus Turkey became the voice of NATO in the region and did not act without asking the Americans and the British. This made many Middle Eastern states hostile to Turkey, like Nasser's Egypt.

The second factor that worsened Turkey's relations within the region was the Menderes government's inexperience in foreign policy, as the *Tugay Affair* shows. Turkish diplomat Hulusi Fuat Tugay, whose wife was one of the closest relatives of the Egyptian King, had been sent to Cairo as the ambassador of Turkey in the period of King Faruk. It was considered a good idea to improve the relations by the Menderes government. When the regime changed and Nasser took power it caused a disaster in relations as Turkey did not recall its ambassador. Even as Nasser implied that Turkish ambassador would be declared *persona non grata* Turkey did not change its position

¹⁰³ Dikerdem, Ortadoğu'da..., pp. 14-15.

and the affair climaxed with Tugay insulting Nasser¹⁰⁴ and Egypt removed the ambassador's diplomatic privileges and forced him to desert the country.

Apart from Turkey's pro-Westernism and the DP's inexperience Menderes' personality badly affected Turkey's Middle Eastern policies. Menderes always wanted to complete the plans at once, but, as a well-known fact, foreign policy needs patient and time. Therefore, the Jordanian and Iraqi Prime Minister's were always complaining about Menderes' impatience.

The Baghdad Pact

The Baghdad Pact¹⁰⁵ is an excellent opportunity to analyse the Menderes government's Middle Eastern policy and to examine deviation from Kemalist foreign policy towards an active and internationalist approach. However, for Kürkçüoğlu, the Baghdad Pact cannot be considered as a deviation from Kemalism. He argues, like the Balkan Pact (1954), the Baghdad Pact was a direct result of the Kemalist approach, although it failed because of the certain circumstances in the Middle East and because of that Menderes and his friends were not of Atatürk's calibre: '...Turkey believed that it was acting in compliance with Atatürk's foreign policy of maintaining peace in the Balkans and in the Middle East. However, especially since the roots for bi-polarity did not exist in the Middle East... the Baghdat Pact in particular... did not work out well.'¹⁰⁶ However as will be examined Menderes' enthusiasm to lead the region in the name of the West and, as will be seen in the Syrian and Iraq crises, his militarist activism regarding to Iraq and Syria prove that the Menderes' Baghdad Pact and Middle Eastern policies in general can be taken as an example in order to test the deviation from the Kemalist approach.

For Turkey, the pact was defensive, as it feared the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly involved in the Middle East, and this obviously threatened Turkey's security. Therefore Turkey saw collaboration with the Muslim states useful for Turkey's

¹⁰⁴ When the Egyptian press severely attacked to Tugay, Turkish Ambassador, and his wife Tugay blamed Nasser and told him '*You didn't behave like a gentleman with your press attacks*'. Dikerdem. *Ortadoğu'da...*, p. 77-78.

¹⁰⁵ Treaty of Mutual Co-operation. For Turkish text, see *Düstur* III, Vol. 36, p. 422. For the Baghdad Pact see Robert Devereux, 'Turkey and the Baghdad Pact', *SAIS Review*, Vol. 3, Autumn 1958; Ismail Soysal, 'The 1955 Baghdad Pact', in *Studies on Turkish Arab Relations Annual*, (Istanbul: Foundation for Studies on Turkish Arab relations, 1990); Ayşegül Sever, 'The Compliant Ally? Turkey and the West in the Middle East, 1954-58', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 1998, pp. 73-90.

¹⁰⁶ Kürkçüoğlu, 'An Analysis...', p. 180.

security against the Soviets. But Turkey viewed this co-operation as an extension of political realities rather than of religious affinities. That is to say there was no change in Turkey's secular policy understanding of its relations with the Muslim states. That is why Turkey hesitated to sign the Treaty of Friendly Co-operation with Pakistan in 1954, which would be the first step of the Baghdad Pact, at this time the Pakistanis were still dreaming of a greater Islamic block, and the Arabs were aiming to unite all Muslims against Israel.

Moreover, unlike the Turkish, the Arabs did not see communism as a great threat.¹⁰⁷ For them the biggest problem was Israel and western imperialism.¹⁰⁸ Under these circumstances Turkey's reluctance can be understood. However, with American and British encouragement or enforcement Turkey was persuaded to construct the Baghdad Pact with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Great Britain, but Turkey was still suspicious for the success of the pact, and was cautious not to be drawn into the Arab-Israel conflict. When Turkey and Iraq signed an agreement on 24 February 1955 the Pact became operational and Britain on 5 April, Pakistan on 23 September and finally Iran on 3 November 1955 joined the Baghdad Pact.¹⁰⁹ The US desisted from full membership¹¹⁰, but all knew that the US was the hidden member of the Pact. The aim was to unite the Muslim states against the Soviet Union by using the Turks. Menderes' government was aware of that fact and for the Kemalists even he encouraged the US policy-makers for such a pact to lure American aid despite the suspicious Kemalist bureaucracy.¹¹¹ In other words, in addition to the defensive character of the pact, Turkey for the first time in Republican history, joined in a pact for other than defensive aims. As noted, with the pact, it was hoped that Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt would enter the pact. Egypt accused it of being a device of Western imperialism for dividing the Arabs. Egypt led Lebanon and Jordan by insisting that the Arab League should defend the Middle East not a West-

¹⁰⁷ Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz....*, pp. 78-79.

¹⁰⁸ George McGhee, *ABD-Türkiye-NATO-Ortadoğu*, (*USA-Turkey-NATO-Middle East*), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1992), pp. 185-204.

¹⁰⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 26 February 1955; S. M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 170.

¹¹⁰ Robinson claims that the Truman administration did not want to annoy the Israelis with the membership by aiding the Arabs against Israel. (Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic, A Case in National Development*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 184). Also Waldemar Gallman, the American observer in the Baghdad Pact Council Meeting of November 1955, argued that American membership to the Pact would further estrange Egypt. Cited in Burke, *Pakistan's...*, p. 171.

¹¹¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 20 April 1958.

led organisation. In Lebanon pro-pact leader Camille Chamoun lost power as a result of a pro-Nasser coup by General Shahap and under the shadow of these developments Jordan avoided from joining the pact.¹¹²

Nasser's anti-Western policies welcomed the Soviet entrance into the Middle East, and this alarmed the Turks. The Russians were now in south of Turkey. Under these circumstances, Turkey did not try to understand Nasser or other national anti-Western movements but looked at the problem through Cold War considerations. Hence, with the outbreak of the 1956 Suez Crisis the Menderes government faced a formidable dilemma. It was obvious that the British, French and Israeli joint action against Egypt did not have international support and the operation infringed on international law. Turkey, as a member of the Baghdad Pact, accused Israel of being the greatest threat to the Middle East peace, and withdrew its representative from Israel on 26 November 1956. In spite of this official attitude, Turkey was trying to assure the Israelis that Turkey and the Baghdad Pact was not against Israel, and that Turkey had no alternative but to denounce Israel. Turkey's policy failed in a short time, and Turkey damaged its relations with both Israel and the Arabs as neither believed in Turkey's sincerity. Even some Arab leaders accused Turkey of helping the colonialist foreigners in the region as Anwar Sadat stated over Suez that Turkey encouraged the British to attack Egypt in 1956 in *El Cumhuriye*, a Cairo daily: 'As a matter of fact, Turkey is the country which through the Baghdad Pact encouraged the British to attack Egypt in the first place.'¹¹³

In addition, the Soviet Union was also not happy with Turkey's role in the Pact. That is to say the Pact was a complete failure for Turkey. Thus the Pact, which aimed to unite the Middle Eastern states against the Soviet Union, became a divisive organisation and contributed to the 1958 revolution in Iraq¹¹⁴ and finally it was foundered in 1958. After the military coup in Iraq, the new Iraqi government boycotted the meetings and finally Iraq withdrew from the pact. When Iraq left, the other members change the pact's name as Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), and its headquarter was moved to Ankara from Baghdad.¹¹⁵ The Baghdad Pact, later CENTO, experience showed that not only

¹¹² Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz....*, pp. 78-81.

¹¹³ Cited in Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Arap Orta Doğusuna Karşı Politikası: 1945-1970* (*Turkey's Foreign Policy toward the Arab Middle East*), (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972), p. 100.

¹¹⁴ Robinson, *The First*, p. 185.

¹¹⁵ Burke, *Pakistan's...*, p. 170.

Turkey but also the Middle Eastern states saw Turkey as a non-regional country. Moreover, most of the regional states perceived Turkey with Israel as the West's outpost or 'Trojan Horse' in the region. It was ironic to be seen as a non-regional power for the Turks, who were the leaders of the Muslims and the governors of the region for centuries.

The Syrian Crisis also confirmed Menderes' foreign policy perspective. The increasing Soviet influence in Syria frightened Turkey, and the DP government considered this as part of a Soviet policy to surround Turkey from the south. In the 1956 crisis Syria had supported Nasser. When the Syrian officers harmed the oil pipelines in Syria Western states were alarmed. By 1957 Nasserist officers increased their power and when General Afif al-Bizri, a suspected communist officer, replaced a moderate Syrian chief of staff, Turkey's fears about Syria were confirmed. Turkey viewed that Syria was becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union.¹¹⁶ Also Turkey had concern over the Syrian intentions regarding Hatay. As a result Turkey moved its troops to the Syria-Turkey borders with close US support.¹¹⁷ In September Soviet Premier Nikolay Bulganin officially warned Turkey not to intervene in Syrian internal affairs and not to attack Syria.¹¹⁸ The message was clear: The Syrians are not alone. Later that month a Soviet fleet visited the Syrian seaport of Lazkiye. With Turkey's efforts, the crises became a global crisis, and the US and the USSR appeared as its major actors. Menderes argued that 'The crisis is not between Turkey and Syria but between the two blocks.'¹¹⁹ This attitude proves the Democrat tendency to see the regional problems through the Cold War ideology.

Apart from the Syrian Crisis, Menderes repeated his Cold War-obsessed regional policy in the Iraq Crisis. In July 1958 Menderes decided on military intervention when the pro-Western Iraqi government was overthrown on 14 July 1958.¹²⁰ The US dissuaded Menderes from military intervention by recognising the new Iraqi regime and Turkey followed the Americans.¹²¹ In a short time, Camille Chamoun, Prime Minister of Lebanon, who was frightened by the events in Iraq, officially invited the Americans to

¹¹⁶ Uslu, *Türk...*, p. 126.

¹¹⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 20 September 1957.

¹¹⁸ Uslu, *Türk...*, p. 126.

¹¹⁹ Kazım Öztürk, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri ve Programları*, (*Turkish Republic Governments and Their Programmes*), (Istanbul: Ak Yayınları, 1968), pp. 456-457.

¹²⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, 29 July 1958; Aydemir, *İhtilalin...*, pp. 270-276; Kürkcüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğusuna Karşı Politikası, 1945-1970*, (*Turkey's Policy on the Arab Middle East*), pp. 131-132.

intervene the Lebanese politics while the Jordanian King Hussein called the British to restore the order in Jordan.¹²² As a result of these invitations the US troops landed in Lebanon and the British in Jordan in the summer of 1958. In these crisis Turkey fully supported the Americans and the British.¹²³ It allowed about five thousand American troops to use NATO Adana base (Incirlik) in case of emergency. All these were seen as the return of the Western imperialism to the Middle East by the Arab nationalists and marked the end of the Baghdad Pact.¹²⁴ The Soviet propaganda also provoked the Arabs that the Turks were coming to dominate the Arabs. İnönü, RPP's leader, strongly opposed the US airlifting in Incirlik air base for the Lebanon problem. For İnönü, Menderes' Middle East policy was obviously a deviation from the Kemalist understanding because it was aggressive and adventuristic.¹²⁵ İnönü called Menderes' Iraq and Lebanon policies as 'illegal and adventurous' which risked Turkey's security.¹²⁶

As will be seen below, the overall Turkish policy shifted in the late 1950s. The growing internal opposition to the DP policies included opposition to DP's active, Westernist policy in the Middle East and demanded a policy of strict non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries, particularly of Iraq. In addition, Menderes realised that his Middle East policies were fruitless and the politics in the Arab world had different dimensions than the global Cold War. Thus Turkey recognised the revolutionary Iraqi regime in July 1959 and a year later a Turkish delegation went to the anniversary celebrations of the revolution.

Before moving to the summary of the DP policies the last thing to be mentioned is Turkey-Israel relations in this period since relations between these two countries are a perfect example of ideology's role in Turkish foreign policy. Although its people were Muslim, Turkish foreign policy always implied a hidden support for Israel, Turkey saw Israel as a way to gain sympathy in the West.¹²⁷ For example, Foreign Secretary Sadak, in an interview in the *New York Times* on 7 February 1948, argued that Israel had

¹²¹ Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin...*, pp. 133-134.

¹²² Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin...*, pp. 133-134.

¹²³ Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin...*, pp. 134-135.

¹²⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 6 February 1960.

¹²⁵ İsmet İnönü, *TBMM Meclis Zabıt Ceridesi*, 1958, pp. 844-845; *Cumhuriyet*, 6 February 1960.

¹²⁶ Loğoğlu, *İsmet...*, p. 61.

¹²⁷ Amikam Nachmani, *Israel, Turkey and Greece*, (London: Frank Cass, 1987), p. 51.

become a reality and the world recognised it, underlining that the Turkish had never prevented migration of the Israelis to Palestine in history.¹²⁸ Turkey recognised Israel officially on 21 March 1949, and made efforts to develop its relations despite Arab protests. Turkey, from time to time, seemed anti-Israel, but these policies did not always showed 'real' Turkish Israeli policy. As noted many Turkish diplomats declared that these policies were tactical not to provoke the other countries, namely the Arabs and the Soviet Union. For example Turkey's policy after the Suez Crisis toward Israel did not reflect its policy. The Suez War obliged pro-Western-Turkey to recall its Ambassador from Tel Aviv. However, Turkish ambassador İstinyeli informed the Israeli Foreign Ministry that Turkey's policy was not against Israel but a tactical policy to calm tension down.¹²⁹ Turkish-Israeli relations proved the undeniable roles of Kemalist pragmatism and Westernism in foreign policy. It also showed that Turkey determined its Middle Eastern policy according to the Cold War and the West's global interests.

Given this, it is no surprise that, Menderes' Middle Eastern policy is the most important example of the DP departure from the Kemalist tradition in foreign policy.

Relations with the Third World

One of the victims of Turkey's assumption-based foreign policy, which suggested that what is good for the West is good for Turkey, was Turkey's relations with the Third World. Turkey's dependence on NATO and the inflexible Cold War stance not only over shadowed its relations with the Middle Eastern states but also prevented establishment of healthy relations with the Third World.¹³⁰ After the Second World War many Western colonies gained their independence. They neither supported the Soviet Union nor the US led West. Their aim was to form a new pact to unite developing countries like Egypt, Yugoslavia, Algeria and Indonesia and sought a strategy maximising their own gains while minimising their costs.¹³¹ Turkey, as a developing country was expected to support supported them, however, with the effect of its ideological orientation Turkey missed the rise of the Third World and saw the developments from the American perspective. When Third World countries held a

¹²⁸ Also see İsmail Soysal, *Soğuk Savaş Dönemi ve Türkiye (The Cold War Period and Turkey)*, (Istanbul: ISIS, 1997), p. 53.

¹²⁹ Yavuz, 'İkicilik...', p. 247.

¹³⁰ Eroğul, *Demokrat...*, pp. 70-71.

¹³¹ Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy, Pattern and Process*, fourth

meeting to decide on their strategy in Bandung in 1955 Turkey perceived the movement as a part of the communist conspiracy when the US suggested Turkey join the conference,¹³² Turkey it changed its policy and joined. At the conference Zorlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, spoke as if he was a Western spokesman by rejecting neutralism in world politics. Turkey advocated that neutralism would help the advance of communism in the world. As Gönlübol pointed out, Turkey, though itself underdeveloped, acted as spokesman for the developed Western nations.¹³³ Naturally, Turkey's pro-Western attitude worsened its relations with many countries in the Third World. This was so at the United Nations where Turkey would lose many votes over national cases such as the Cyprus problem. Furthermore Turkey continued to support the Western countries in other cases. For example, Turkey supported the French in the Algerian Independence War at the cost of losing Turkish prestige and influence in the Middle East and Algeria.¹³⁴ Although many Western states supported the Algerians Turkey saw the matter as a part of NATO solidarity and voted in the UN against Algeria.¹³⁵ In other words, with the impact of ideology, namely the Cold War, DP's Americanism, Kemalist realism and pragmatism, Turkey sacrificed its national interests in the East to maintain good relations with the West.¹³⁶

A Test of the Ideology: The Cyprus Problem:

Although the Menderes government did not attach much importance to the problem of Cyprus, observers agree that the eruption of the Cyprus conflict constitutes the most important development during this period. The Cyprus problem, in fact, could have been a perfect motive for the DP to change its pro-American foreign policy since the West did not give political support to the Turkish side and the Western response to the Cyprus issue implied a resurgence of the traditional anti-Turkish feelings in Western minds. However, the DP's pro-American position prevented any change in its policies.

edition, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 164.

¹³² Sander, *Türk – Amerikan...*, p. 123.

¹³³ Gönlübol, 'A Short...', p. 7.

¹³⁴ Ambassador Faik Melek claims that the Menderes government had secretly sent military aid to the Algerian forces by airplanes. However Turkey never officially gave support to the Algerians: Faik Melek, *Hepsi Geldi Geçti, Dışişlerinde 43 Yıl, (All Passed, 43 Years in Foreign Ministry)*, (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1994), pp. 115-139.

¹³⁵ Gönlübol, 'A Short...', p. 7; Eroğul, *Demokrat...*, p. 71.

¹³⁶ Eroğul argues that Turkey's support to the Western powers vis-à-vis 'imperialists and the Third World countries was an obvious deviation from Kemalism because, according to him, Mustafa Kemal was an anti-imperialist: Eroğul, *Demokrat...*, p. 95.

Cyprus before independence was a British colony with a Greek (80 percent) and Turkish (20 percent) population. The Greek Cypriot aim was Enosis (annexation of Cyprus to mainland Greece). However, Turkey could not see the Greek intention because the Turkish statesmen focused on the Soviet threat and relations with the West. For Şükrü Sina Gürel, Turkish State Minister, Menderes governments' West-East-obsessed foreign policy encouraged the Greeks to annex the island to Greece.¹³⁷ Gürel claims that DP's naïve Westernist ideology was the main cause for the crisis.¹³⁸ In 1951, Menderes had implied the problem could be solved in a peaceful way and had given a clear message to Greece that the Cyprus problem was not so crucial for Turkey.¹³⁹ Also the US promised to support the Greek argument in the United Nations in 1954.

Turkey similar to the early policies, did not resist the Greek efforts. In these years the United Kingdom, not Turkey, defended Turkish rights in the island as the British saw the Turkish Cypriots as a tool to prevent the partition of the island.¹⁴⁰ The Turkish government realised the importance of the problem with British encouragement and the people's enforcement. The developments in the period of 1959-1960 resulted in an independent Cyprus.

The importance of the island for Turkish security was not debatable even in the 1950s, however the DP's ideological orientation (scepticism-free Westernism) prevented it from seeing its importance. As a result, Menderes governments' attitude to the Cyprus problem can be considered a perfect example of ideology's blinding effect. Nevertheless, the agreements signed by Menderes set the ground for Turkey on this issue of Cyprus problem.

Since Menderes' government did not attach great importance to Cyprus, the study does not detail the Cyprus problem of the 1950s, but noted the cause of this policy. However, as will be shown, the Cyprus problem would become the most important subject for

¹³⁷ Şükrü S. Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri, 1821-1993*, (*Turkish-Greek Relations in Historical Dimension, 1821-1993*), (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık), p. 55.

¹³⁸ Personal interview with Şükrü Sina Gürel, 15 December 1998, Ankara.

¹³⁹ Şükrü S. Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi, 1878-1960, Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika*, (*History of Cyprus, 1878-1960, Colonialism, Nationalism and International Politics*), vol. II, (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1984), p. 77.

¹⁴⁰ Eroğul, *Demokrat...*, p. 109.

Turkish foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s, creating a formidable challenge for both Kemalist and Democrat ideologies.

The Clash of Ideas and Kemalist Resistance

As seen above, the Democrats imitated the Republicans in political life and this nourished authoritarianism. But it was the multi-party era, and the Democrat years differed from the early years of the Republic. The Republican leaders, Atatürk and İnönü had almost unbridled freedom in all matters, internal or external. However in the DP years, the ideologies competing with Kemalism were actively rivalling one another, and the bans could not stop any of them. Indeed, the official prohibitions were strengthening them, as experienced in the ultra-nationalism and Islamism. As a result the Democrat era was pluralistic and colourful when compared with the previous eras. The new schools of thought emerged, like Marxist-Kemalism and leftism, and the old banned schools of thought in foreign policy became active, like Ottomanism and Islamism. Naturally the pluralist environment caused more discussion and foreign and government policies were frequently questioned.

The second characteristic of the DP term was that the DP had the support of the masses. Thanks to the liberalisation of the economy and politics, more religious freedom, the effects of the rapid economic development, the DP government gained the hearts of the businessmen, tradesmen, small businesses, conservatives, Islamists, religious people, villagers and liberals. This support balanced the opposition, and gave the DP public support in foreign policy problems.

As has been seen many aspects of the DP policies implied a clear deviation from the Kemalist tradition. The Democrats saw what the Kemalists perceived dangerous as a co-operation opportunity, like religion. Actually the Democrats never declared that they were against Kemalism. Indeed, they declared themselves as the 'best Kemalists' and claimed that the RPP misunderstood Kemalism, and used Kemalism to mask its interests. Whether the Democrats were right or wrong, Kemalist supporters, most notably the RPP and the civil and military bureaucracy, perceived the DP as a direct threat to themselves and the Kemalist revolution. Ironically, the Marxists also joined the anti-DP bloc accusing Democrats of being undemocratic and argued that Turkey had

been more democratic under Atatürk's one-party regime than during the DP period.¹⁴¹ Thus a hidden opposition was born. The government belonged to the elected DP, but the bureaucracy was under the control of the Kemalist bureaucracy. Under these circumstances an ideological, even physical clash was inevitable and the Kemalist resistance came from four different places: the army, bureaucracy, parliament and the press.

Bureaucracy

As noted in the İnönü period the bureaucracy with other Kemalist groups had gained a group-consciousness. They became guardians of the Kemalist ideology and regime, and thanks to the İnönü governments, they were well equipped against a popular or elected-government control. In addition to the Constitution and the law, there was very strong co-operation between the military and civil bureaucracy as both considered themselves as leaders of the state and regime. When a party different from the RPP gained power with a different ideology and aims, the army and the civil bureaucracy perceived that as a counter-revolution against Kemalism and their privileged position. The Democrat reforms, as mentioned, were not actually against Kemalism or Kemalists but the one-party regime and privileged posts. The DP reforms were against the İnönü - type interpretation of Kemalism and the Democrat political and religious policies offered a different alternative to the bureaucrats and Army's autocratic interpretation of Kemalism as well as its economic policies undermined the bureaucrats' positions in the society. Now the Kemalists were not the only power-centre, but one of them. The rising business class and fledgling working class were claiming their rights from the bureaucrats. Apart from the economic changes, the economic policies increased internal migration and the social structure of the society was greatly changed. Villagers settled down around big cities, and even this migration was perceived as a threat by the bureaucrats, to the regime. For the bureaucrats the new comers invaded the cities, which had been the bastion of Kemalism. In their part, now relatively richer villagers and businessmen were replacing the posts of the bureaucrats as the most respected members of the society.¹⁴² With economic development and democratisation two things became the symbol of power: money and votes. The bureaucrats now had neither financial

¹⁴¹ Mihri Belli, *Milli Demokratik Devrim*, (*National Democratic Revolution*), (Ankara: Aydınlık Yayınevi, 1970).

¹⁴² Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Military and Politics in Turkey: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution',

power nor votes. The main cause of the unrest among the civil and military bureaucrats, which resulted in a military coup in 1960, was the decline in their power.

The situation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was no exception. As one of the leading Kemalist institutions there was unrest among the diplomats and the other foreign ministry officers over changes in the structure of society. For example, Ambassador Mahmut Dikerdem blamed Köprülü, the first Democrat Minister of Foreign Affairs, of being *köylü* (villager).¹⁴³ Also most of the bureaucrats were against the Democrat's over-active Americanism. The Ministry had been the leader of Westernism in Turkey, yet they were publicly against activist interventionism. The Turkish diplomats memoirs prove that the Ministry was particularly against the Democrat's Middle Eastern policy as it was viewed as a clear deviation from Kemalist foreign policy.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, for the Kemalist bureaucracy the DP did not take the Kemalist foreign policy principles into consideration when it was forming Turkey's external relations. For them, the Democrats neglected secularism, pacifism, realism, legalism and the non-alignment principles of Kemalism.

However, despite their unhappiness they did not resist the Democrat policies. One of the reasons for this was the bureaucracy's contentment with Turkey's integration into the West. Unlike the army, the Foreign Ministry had very close relations with the West, and accepted NATO membership as an inseparable part of Turkish foreign policy. Hereafter, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs championed NATO and the Western block in Turkey and similar to the DP leaders, they identified Turkey's interests with Western policies. Ortaylı, for example, claimed the Turkish Foreign Ministry's Westernism was naïve, and criticised Turkish diplomats of being idealist-Westernist.¹⁴⁵ It can be argued that this idealism prevented a possible clash between the government and the bureaucrats.

The Democrat governments for their part did not like the foreign policy bureaucracy, viewing it as timid. Moreover, their understanding and methodologies were completely different in many issues. Yet, it was very difficult to sack any officer due to the law.

American Historical Review, Vol. 75, 1970.

¹⁴³ Dikerdem, Ortadogu'da...

¹⁴⁴ Dikerdem, Ortadogu'da...

Therefore, the DP appointed its best men to key positions. For example, the Democrat Foreign Minister's brother was appointed as ambassador to Cairo. The second measure the Democrats took was to weaken the bureaucracy by dividing its responsibilities between other government departments, such as Foreign Ministry, Financial Affairs Ministry etc.

In conclusion, similar to Atatürk's scepticism, but for different reasons, the Democrats did not trust the Foreign Affairs Ministry bureaucracy and did not share its power with it. The bureaucracy remained an institution, which just carried out routine jobs (protocol, translation, reporting the events in the world and consulate jobs). Apart from these, in decision-making the Ministry's role was limited. Even the Ministers did not solely rely on the Ministry bureaucracy.

Parliament

In Parliament, the Menderes government had a measure of freedom as the opposition had no real power to control the government because of the DP's overwhelming majority and internal parliamentary rules. The government rarely had to answer serious charges in parliament and 'certainly nothing comparable to Great Debate or Agonising Reappraisal of the type to which the US Congress periodically submits the American leadership.'¹⁴⁶ For example, many secret agreements between Turkey and the United States were not ratified by parliament.¹⁴⁷ In addition to the lack of a control-mechanism in parliament the consensus on the main pillar of foreign policy, namely Westernism, helped the DP.

Conclusion: Challenge and Deviation

Having discussed the ideological background, implementation and the reactions to the Democrat foreign policy we can draw the main features of the DP period. First of all, as happened in the Ottoman, Mustafa Kemal and İnönü eras, external factor remained the most important determinant in Turkish foreign policy. Despite the crucial changes in the

¹⁴⁵ Interview with İlber Ortaylı, 14 December 1997, Ankara.

¹⁴⁶ Robinson, *The First*, p. 163.

¹⁴⁷ Haydar Tuçkanat, *İkili Anlaşmaların İç Yüzü (The Inside Story of the Bileteral Aggrements)*. (Ankara: Ekim Yayınları, 1970), p. 252; Sander, *Türk-Amerikan...*, p. 109; George Harries, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, (Washington D.C.:

aims, ideologies and the methods, the impact of these changes remained limited. The traditional Russian / communist threat, need for the external financial and military aid remained at the top of the agenda. Thanks to its geographic location and political position between the blocks Turkey was exposed to the Cold War may be more than the other countries. Thus, most of time the success of Turkish foreign policy remained dependent on international circumstances.

Second, the close connection between the domestic and foreign policies continued in the DP era. The Menderes governments did not separate them and saw these two as inseparable. Therefore apart from the international circumstances Democrat foreign policy was deeply dependent on domestic policies.¹⁴⁸ This increased the importance of ideology in foreign policy.

Third, as a result of the first two factors, in the Democrat years two more factors shaped Turkish foreign policy **westernisation** (under the Cold War circumstances) and **democratisation**. There was a close relationship between these two factors. The main force behind Turkish democratisation process was external factors. The more Turkey needed the West, the more it democratised. Democratisation provided alternatives to the Kemalist model and made the system more pluralistic. On the other hand, Westernisation had two contrary effects; it imposed on Turkey a capitalist Western economic model, thus, undermining the Kemalist elite and state structure by increasing the power of the bourgeois, villagers, religious-traditional groups and other periphery forces. At the same time the Kemalists legitimated their ideology by using the success of the Western block. From their perspective Turkey had to be an equal member of the West and the only way to do so was through Kemalism.

Similar to its impact on the Kemalists, democratisation and the Cold War affected the Democrats in two different ways. On the one hand, they provided a legitimating ideological ground for alternatives to Kemalism. Democratisation granted power to the Democrats. The rise of the US as the leader of the Western block provided foreign support for DP power. On the other hand, the fledgling Turkish democracy denuded

American Enterprise Institute, 1972), p. 55.

¹⁴⁸ For a similar argument see Yavuzalp, former diplomat in Menderes era: Ercüment Yavuzalp, **Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika**, (*Our Leaders and Foreign Policy*), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), p. 75.

Turkish foreign policy from its balanced, realist cautious character. Under the populist understanding Turkey dramatically changed its foreign policy tracks without analysing the situation enough. Likewise together with the Democrat's economic and cultural orientations, the Soviet threat and close relations with the West left Turkey without protection and Turkey was exposed to the bad effects of the Cold War. The Cold War ideology created its own organisations and connections and a Cold War lobby emerged in Turkey with the DP power. This lobby threatened all Turkish people with the Soviet, communist menaces. It is true sometimes even the Turkish governments used the Cold War to justify their position in the West, yet most of the time Cold War considerations buried other considerations under the communist-capitalist competition, including the Kemalist and the Democrat ones. As a result Turkey heavily involved the Cold War competition in the name of the other countries.

Fourth, thanks to the Cold War's impact, Turkish foreign policy was based on an assumption. For that assumption Turkish national interests and the Western interests were identical. However the Western countries did not share Turkey's exaggerated understanding of this. As a result Turkey sacrificed or risked its national interests to maintain Western support. As a part of that policy Turkey supported the Western states in any part of the world and almost on any subject at the cost of losing its good relations with these states.

Fifth, the DP foreign policy can be considered a failure. The DP sought an alternative to the Kemalist approach because Kemalism could not provide a sufficient framework for foreign policy. Ironically the Democrats also suffered from lack of a sufficient ideology in foreign policy. In other words, they had an ideology or a bulk of the ideologies, but none of these were for foreign policy. The DP's inexperience and thirst for success made it impatient in foreign policy and deprived it of ability to carry out a consistent foreign policy. Particularly in the Middle East and the Third World the DP's contradictory policies damaged Turkish foreign policy's reliability and predictability. Also its alliance with the West was based on naïve assumptions.

Having drawn the general features of the DP era, it can be said that the sixth feature of the DP era was that the Democrats could be considered as the first organised and successful challenge to the Kemalist ideology. The Democrats changed the essence and

methods of Kemalist foreign policy. In some degree they were forced by the international developments to do so, yet most of time they knew what they did. It is true, the Cold War and the economic, military weaknesses decreased the effect of the ideological changes, but their different ideological orientation distinguished from their foreign policy from the Kemalist one. They mainly failed in foreign policy implementation in some degree, but this failure cannot be taken as proof of the success of the Kemalist approach. It can be said that the Democrat's success was to shake the Kemalist monopoly. The Democrat power sowed the seeds of opposition and pluralism over Turkish political life. The coming political groups would take the Democrat example to oppose the Kemalist revolutionary approach. Particularly the centre-right political parties would see themselves as the extension of the Democrat political school.

In foreign policy, despite its challenge to Kemalism, the DP was inevitably under the effect of the Kemalist legacy as well. The impact of Kemalism's secularism, pragmatism, realism, Eastern perception and the Western obsession could be seen in the Democrat foreign policy. However, the DP left the Kemalist understanding in many foreign policy issues. The Democrats heavily criticised the Kemalist non-alignment, pacifism principles and the Kemalist Middle Eastern policies. For example, the DP's Middle East policy represented a departure from traditional Turkish policy of not committing itself irrevocably to any particular position in the Middle East.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, since the Ottoman-German ally, Turkey for the first time identified its national interest with a foreign power's interests. As witnessed in the Iraq and Syrian affairs Turkey was almost militarily involving itself in the other countries' internal affairs. In other words Turkey risked its own national security for a foreign country, namely the US. Obviously, all of these imply a clear deviation from the Kemalist foreign policy understanding and a challenge to the Kemalist foreign policy bureaucracy.

Finally, thanks to the relatively pluralistic environment, the traditional foreign policy school of thoughts re-emerged (like Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism) and the new schools appeared or the marginal currents strengthened their influence (like Americanism and communism). The difference between these schools was somewhat large. The communists defended closer relations with the Soviets while the Democrats

¹⁴⁹ Robinson, *The First...*, p. 186.

perceived the communists as if not the biggest the only threat to Turkey. The Islamists saw the common religious values as the only co-operation consideration in the international arena, while the Kemalist Republicans argued religions are the main reason for backwardness and poverty. Ultra-Turkists aimed for a greater Turkish state. In other words, now there were many alternatives in addition to Kemalism. The Kemalists were still the strongest group yet they were now under heavy criticism from the other schools. Pluralism not only demolished the Kemalist monopoly but also damaged governmental freedom on foreign policy issues. Parallel to the increase of the people's effect on the political system, the governmental monopoly on foreign policy issues was demolished. Hereafter the governments had to consider the people as an actor in foreign relations, and they at least made efforts to manipulate them as seen in the Cyprus crisis. Thus populist policies appeared in the Turkish foreign policy making process as well. When populism re-appeared, as will be seen in the next chapter, the ethnic groups' influence was increased, because Turkey was an immigrant's country. Since then the Azerbaijani, Western Thrace Turkish, Georgians, the Chechen, Abkhaz, Kurdish, Bulgarian Turkish, Iraqi immigrants, the Cypriots and others became an important factor that no government could ignore in foreign policy.

Contrary to the existing literature,¹⁵⁰ as discussed in this chapter, it can be said that the deviation from Kemalist foreign policy understanding in the DP era is certain. The change was dramatic. The Democrat counter-attack was met by the Kemalists in 27 May military Coup and the Kemalists would make effort to turn back the country to the early Republican years. But now the challenge was greater than the Democrat challenge, namely international developments. The next chapter will explore the efforts to re-set Kemalism and its policies against the challenge of the international realities.

¹⁵⁰ For example Hale argues that, despite the drastic domestic changes, there was no change in foreign policy in İnönü and Menderes eras: Hale, 'Foreign...', p. 94.

CHAPTER VIII

Neo-Kemalism vs. Neo-Democrats

(1960-1971)

‘I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.’¹

Lyndon B. Johnson, US President, 1964

‘Atatürk taught us realism and rationalism. He was not an ideologue.’²

Süleyman Demirel, Turkish Prime Minister

The Democrats, as the first organised and successful challengers to Kemalism, undermined Kemalist policies. Turkish foreign, economic and domestic policies were re-shaped by the DP. However, the DP not only challenged Kemalism but also the privileged Kemalist class, namely the bureaucracy, the army and the Kemalist elite. When they lost their economic and political privileges, the military made a coup to stop the Democrat reforms. Hence, the 27 May Coup can be viewed as a revenge of Kemalists. After the coup, the military and military-supported governments tried to change the DP policies and return to the early Republican foreign and domestic policies. As has been seen, the domestic and foreign policies were not clearly distinguished and as a result of this, Turkish foreign policy was as one of the branches of Turkish domestic politics. In the post-coup era, however, almost all-political groups focused on foreign policy issues and made an effort to set up an ideological foreign policy framework. These efforts and international developments caused a great change in Turkish foreign policy. This chapter will therefore explore the causes of this transformation. Moreover, in this period Turkey saw the rise of a neo-Kemalist foreign policy approach, in other words the Kemalist left. Although they used ‘Kemalism’ as a name, as will be seen, their foreign policy understanding was very different from Atatürk’s foreign policy understanding. In this framework, the chapter also examines the roots of this school, and aims to explain the ideological ground of leftist-Kemalist foreign policy approach. Furthermore, there is no doubt that one of the most important events, which left traumatic marks on Turkish policy makers, is the Cyprus Crisis. The

¹ *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer 1966, p. 387.

² İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, *Anılarım*, (*My Memoirs*), (İstanbul: Güneş, 1990), p. 125.

Cyprus Crisis changed almost everything in Turkish foreign policy. The Western attitude in the Crisis can be considered as the greatest challenge to the Kemalist and liberal-conservative Westernism in Turkey. Turkey's aloneness in front of the crisis created a great shock and caused a radical shift in Kemalist and conservative-liberal foreign policy understanding. Also, the Cyprus Crisis provided a good example to test the success of ideology in Turkish foreign policy. Finally, we will focus on Demirel's Justice Party's foreign policy understanding and its implementation. In a period, in which resurgence of Kemalism was witnessed, neo-Democrat Justice Party tried to establish a more balanced foreign policy and made efforts not to make same mistakes of the DP.

The Army: Kemalist Revenge

Democrats vs. the Army

The Army, which was the most respected institution in Turkey, saw itself as the guardian of Kemalism and the state.³ In this context, the Democrats, aware of the importance of the army in Turkish politics, gave a priority to the military needs at the cost of economic development.⁴ However, with the establishment of multiparty rule, the army inevitably lost its privileged position, hence it found itself in an identity crisis. Moreover, the Democrat anti-etatist policies diminished the financial power of the military compared with the business and agricultural classes. In particular the high inflation undermined the economic power of military officers. Also, they no longer enjoyed their previous level of direct representation in political power, as the percentage of deputies of military origin fell sharply after the 1950 elections and the same was true for the executive body where five of the six ministers of National Defence during the Menderes period were civilians, although eleven of the predecessors of the İnönü period had a military background. As a result, as Vaner put it, 'the change in ruling elites, which derived from important social transformations and reflected a shift in political structures, was perceived by the army as the degradation of its own institutional prestige

³ Robinson, *The First...*, p. 88; Also see Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, 'Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force', *World Politics*, October 1960, pp. 19-44.

⁴ William Hale (Trn. Ahmet Fethi), *Türkiye'de Ordu ve Siyaset, 1789'dan Günümüze*, (*The Army and the Politics in Turkey, Since 1789*), (İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 1996), p. 94 and Morris Singer, *The Economic Advance of Turkey, 1838-1960*, (Ankara: Turkish Economic Society, 1977), p. 415.

and a challenge to its image within society.’⁵ After the 1954 elections the relations between the civilians and the army worsened as for the first time in centuries, the army was now under civilian authority.

Under these circumstances the army declared that they were Kemalist soldiers and the DP policies had damaged Kemalism, saw no alternative but a military coup – called ‘revolution’ by the Kemalist elite. The first report of the Constitution Commission established by the coupe for instance stated that the Menderes government was ‘antagonistic to the army, courts, university and Atatürk’s reforms.’⁶ For the army the revolution marked the beginning of the process of its affirmation in the political arena⁷ in order to protect Kemalism.⁸ Under the coup administration, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Foreign Minister, and Hasan Polatkan, the Finance Minister, were executed by a military court on 16-17 September 1961 and 12 more politicians were also sentenced to death. The party was closed down, and two hundred people, including many deputies, were given prison sentences. After the coup, the military officers set up the *Ulusal Birlik Komitesi* (National Unity Committee, hereafter NUC). The NUC remained in power for more than a year to carry out the revolution’s reforms: banks were closed, the personal accounts of leading politicians and businessmen were frozen, and loans were suspended. Also all inflationary policies were cancelled, like large construction projects. The purchase of government bonds was made compulsory for wage earners. Price controls were introduced. Land taxes were increased. On the other hand the salaries of army officers were greatly increased and special army stores were opened.⁹ The Army Mutual Assistance Association (OYAK) was established and the army collecting capital from its officers started to run business like a civilian corporation. OYAK also set up army bazaars to support the officers.¹⁰ Moreover the Democrat Party supporters or sympathisers were purged from the army and the bureaucracy and 147 academicians were dismissed.¹¹

⁵ Semih Vaner, ‘The Army’, in Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (eds.), *Turkey in Transition, New Perspectives*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 236-265, p. 237-238.

⁶ Ataöv, ‘The 27th of May...’, p. 20.

⁷ Vaner, ‘The Army...’, p. 328.

⁸ Andrew Mango, *Turkey*, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968), p. 89.

⁹ Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, pp. 414-415.

¹⁰ Ahmad, *The Making...*, pp. 130-131

¹¹ W. F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961, Aspects of Military Politics*, (Washington D.C.: 1963), p.p. 54-55; Saw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 415.

The Coup's Ideology: Leftist and Kemalist

The coup leaders were anti-Democrat and opposed all DP reforms. They named their policies Kemalist,¹² however, their Kemalism was less pragmatic than that of Atatürk. They were idealist and aimed to transform the country without any compromise. Surprisingly, as will be seen, they were idealistic on foreign policy matters as well. Thirdly, unlike with Atatürk's Kemalism, the importance of the socialist ideas on their Kemalism was obvious. Social justice, equality, independence, anti-imperialism were the main pillars of the 'revolution-like-coup' and this leftist attitude also reflected on their foreign policy approach.

Kemalist Measures and the Re-structuring of Foreign Policy Machinery

After the coup, the army declared that they would not give up the democratic multi-party political system, however, they attempted to maintain their Kemalist hegemony within a multi-party system. As such, they set a political structure around a politically strong army. The system was fully-democratic in appearance and the 1961 Constitution made by the soldiers was considered as the most democratic Turkish constitution. Yet army control over the political life was obvious.

In foreign policy, the 1961 Constitution aimed to restore Kemalist principles. As Server Tanilli put it, the Constitution accepted 'independence' and 'peace' as the two main pillars of Turkish foreign policy.¹³ The Introductory section underlined Kemal's 'peace at home, peace in the world' principle.¹⁴ Thus the Kemalist pacifist principle was constitutionalised by the coup. Likewise in that section and in article V, 77 and 96 the independence principles were underlined.¹⁵ Apart from the independence and pacific principles, other Kemalist principles, namely secularism, Kemalist nationalism, republicanism, *etatism* and populism were maintained. In particular, secularism continued to determine Turkey's relations with the Muslim countries. Thus, the coup aimed to secure Kemalism in foreign policy with constitutional obligations. Moreover, the 1961 Constitution drew a pluralistic legal framework in domestic matters in order to divide and balance the civilian power. As will be seen this pluralism caused resurgence

¹² Aydemir, *İhtilalin...*, pp. 5-12.

¹³ Server Tanilli, *Devlet ve Demokrasi (State and Democracy)*, 6th edition, (Istanbul: Say Yayınları, 1990), pp. 593-595.

¹⁴ *Constitution of the Turkish Republic*, (Trs.: S. Balkan, A. Uysal and K. Karpat), (Ankara: 1961), Intr. Section.

of left and right ideologies, particularly the rise of Marxism. Thus, the constitutional changes indirectly helped to create more alternatives in foreign policy creating a pluralistic foreign policy in future.

Second, the state machinery was re-structured. The National Security Council (NSC, *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*) was also created. The members of the Council were the President, Head of the General Staff, four other generals (from Air, Naval, Ground and Gendarme forces), Prime Minister, Minister for Defence Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The body's main task was to maintain Kemalism in state and society and to control politicians and bureaucrats. According to the 1961 Constitution, the NSC was more powerful than the Prime Minister, President, Cabinet and on some occasions even Turkish Parliament. For example, the Constitution stated that the Cabinet had to consider decisions taken by the NSC,¹⁶ and in practice the Cabinet had to carry out NSC decisions without debate.¹⁷ The NSC had great power also in foreign policy decision making and as an extension of the revolutionary ideology, the NSC's priority in external relations was national security. Therefore the NSC looked at the foreign policy issue through the national security prism. The problem was that there was no clear definition for national security or as Orhan Erkanlı, Coup leader, stated national security covered all political issue: 'From the price of rice to roads and touristic sites, there is not a single problem in this country which is not related to national security. If you happen to be very deep thinker, that too is a matter of national security.'¹⁸

As a result, the NSC had incredible freedom in deciding domestic and foreign policies and in reality the Cabinet and foreign policy bureaucracy were only assistants to the NSC in implementing the policies. In addition to the NSC's approach to foreign policy, the army also saw the national security issues as its constitutional task. Therefore, neither the NSC nor the army consulted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Cabinet in many foreign policy issues.

¹⁵ Constitution...

¹⁶ The 1961 Constitution, Article 118/3.

¹⁷ Bülent Tanör, 'Türkiye'de Dış İlişkilerin İç Hukuk Rejimi' (*The Legal Regime of Turkey's External Relations in Domestic Framework*), in Faruk Sönmezoğlu (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy)*, p. 324.

¹⁸ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 130.

Another institutional change introduced was the creation of the Supreme Court (*Anayasa Mahkemesi*). In democratic systems Supreme Courts are established to protect the people and minorities against the state's unjust policies. However, in Turkey the priority was protecting the state from the people and the Constitutional Court was set to protect the Kemalist state from the people, parliament and 'unreliable politicians'. Also the High Court of Justice was reorganised to try accused members of the DP¹⁹ and 592 leading members were brought to trial at Yassıada. Furthermore, other laws and institutions were introduced by NUC, like the State Planning Organisation (SPO) formed to plan and control the official expenditures aimed at completely changing the Democrat economic structure because for the Kemalist elite the Democrat's liberal market economy was decaying the social structure of Kemalist ideology.

Contrary to the Democrat market economy model, the NUC promoted a planned economy with an import substitution strategy. Moreover, the 1961 Constitution set a bicameral parliament and cut parliament's duties of legislation, ratification of the treaties and the authorisation of the use of armed force (Articles 63, 64, 65 and 66). The lower house with 450 deputies was to be elected for four years by a direct general election. The upper house, the Senate of the Republic (*Cumhuriyet Senatosu*) was to be composed of 150 members elected for a six-year term. Also according to the constitution, 15 additional members were to be appointed by the President from individuals distinguished for their services in various fields, at least ten of whom were to be independent of political parties (Articles 70 and 72). Furthermore the chairman and all of the members of the NUC were automatically appointed members of the Senate. With these amendments, the NUC aimed at a balanced political system to prevent civilian 'autocracy' over the elite and aimed to guarantee the military, bureaucrats and the Kemalist elite's privileged position in society. Also the NUC aimed to maintain the Kemalist values in the state system with the Constitution law and the institutions. With these reforms, the challenge to Kemalism was ended and the generals and the bureaucrats once more became the privileged most respected group in society and as will be seen they were dedicated to the preservation of the status quo.

¹⁹ *Düster, Dördüncü Tertib*, two vols. (Ankara: 1961).

Post-Revolution: The Need for a Transformation in Foreign Policy

The 1960 Revolution alarmed the United States and the world,²⁰ as it became difficult to predict political developments in Turkey. Aware that they needed international support, notably that of NATO, the coup leaders moved quickly to dispel anxiety about Turkey's international position, and pointed out that the reason for the coup was domestic not external.²¹ In his first speech on national radio, Alparslan Türkeş, the coup's spokesman, declared Turkey's position after the coup:

'(...) We are addressing ourselves to our allies, friends, neighbours, and the entire world. Our aim is to remain completely loyal to the United Nations Charter and to the principles of human rights; the principle of peace at home and in the world set by the great Atatürk is our flag. We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), and we are faithful to them. We repeat our ideal is peace at home, peace in the world.'²²

Not only the army, but also the İnönü JP governments had reaffirmed Turkish commitments to the West and the world.²³ In the early 1960s in particular Turkey did not change its foreign policy,²⁴ however in the later years Turkish foreign policy underwent remarkable changes. It can be argued that there were six main reasons for these changes: The failure of the DP policies; the army's scepticism over the Democrat Americanism; the resurgence of opposition in foreign policy matters; the rise of the anti-Western Marxist school; the marriage between Kemalism and the left; and finally the Cyprus Crisis. We, now, discuss the first two of them, and then we will focus on the other issues in the following sections.

Failure of the DP's Foreign Policy: The failure of the DP in foreign policy was obvious. In the Middle East the Baghdad Pact had resulted in a disaster for Turkey while thanks to Menderes' policies over Iraq, Syria and Turkey's support for the former colonialist powers, anti-Turkish feelings had dramatically increased in the Arab world. Turkey's pro-Western policy did not even make Israel happy. In the West though Menderes had sacrificed Turkish interests in the East to maintain Western support, the Western

²⁰ *New York Times*, 28 May 1960, *The Times* 29 May 1960.

²¹ *Milliyet*, 27 May 1960.

²² Deniz Atiye Erden, *Turkish Foreign Policy Through the United Nations, 1960-1970*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts, 1974, 46-47.

²³ İsmail Arar, *Hükümet Programları, 1920-1965 (The Government Programs, 1920-1965)*, (Istanbul: Burcak Yayınevi), pp. 312-350.

²⁴ Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, pp. 94-99.

attitude especially over Cyprus proved that the West would not support the Turks. As a result, in spite of its domestic success DP foreign policy was considered a failure and this failure forced the policy makers to look for a new way, and encouraged the opposition to challenge the existing policies.

Army Unhappiness with DP-Type Americanism: The May 1960 coup had been triggered by the deteriorating domestic political and economic situation in Turkey yet, the execution of the Minister for Foreign Affairs is significant, and shows the extent of Army's unrest over the Democrats foreign policy. Under the heavy influence of the left-wing groups, the army perceived the Democrat foreign policies as a deviation from the Kemalist path and the Democrats policy in the Middle East especially dissatisfied Army officers. For example, General Esengil argued that the Turkish army lost prestige and control over Turkey's security while NUC member Karan claimed that Turkey had become a sacrificeable country for the American interests.²⁵ For the army, Menderes' foreign policy was a deviation further from Kemalist secularism, Westernism and realism.²⁶ The Army was not happy with Democrat foreign policy, and planned a radical change in foreign policy. Despite their words, the army was more sceptical about relations with the West. In addition, the revolution's leaders were under the influence of left-wing groups and the army, thus attached greater importance to the concept of equality and national independence within bilateral relationships than the DP regime had. For the revolutionary leaders particularly, secret agreements with the United States were against Kemalist realism and independence principles as the DP had placed total trust in United States, even Turkish customs did not control the American goods sent to Turkey.²⁷ However the United States let Turkey down in foreign policy, as seen in the Lebanon and Cyprus affairs. As one American Ambassador to Ankara accepted in his memoirs, the United States did not even ask Turkey when it used its bases in Turkey.²⁸ As a result, the Coup leaders made an effort to change secret agreements and the direction of Turkish-American relations and to do so they even encouraged public debates on that matter. In particular the army requested to increase Turkey's power to

²⁵ Kenan Esengil, *27 Mayıs ve Ordudaki Kısımlar (27 May and the Sacrifices in the Army)*, (Istanbul: 1978), pp. 10-11; Orhan Erkanli, 'Dış Yardımlar ve Dış Tesirler' (Foreign Aid and Foreign Effect), *Gerçek Fikir Ajansı Bülteni*, No. 3, January 1966.

²⁶ George Lenczowski, *Soviet Advances in the Middle East*, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 1972), p. 49.

²⁷ *Cumhuriyet* (daily, Istanbul), 2 July 1961.

²⁸ George McGhee, *ABD-Türkiye-NATO-Ortadoğu (USA-Turkey-NATO-Middle East)*, (Ankara: Bilgi

decide the status of American soldiers and officers in Turkey. According to the 1954 Agreement with the United States, an American soldier was not under Turkish jurisdiction if he was on duty and the army considered these privileges an extension of capitulations in the Ottoman Empire. More generally, the army was against the DP's Americanism and wanted more balanced relations with the world on the basis of the principles of equality and independence.

Rise of Neo-Kemalism (Leftist Kemalism) in Foreign Policy

Until the 1960 coup the difference between foreign and domestic policies was not clear for Turkish political groups. For Atatürk, foreign policy was an extension of domestic goals and he saw foreign policy as a tool to maintain his reforms. İnönü followed Atatürk's way and did not promote a distinct foreign policy theory. In the Menderes period, foreign policy matters increased importance, but foreign policy was still a 'high politics' issue even for the parliamentarians. However, after the coup, with the effect of political polarisation, the gap between the political groups on foreign policy matters widened and also the coup leaders, contrary to the previous Turkish leaders, encouraged public debates on foreign policy.²⁹ These debates deepened the differences. The first response came from the Kemalist leftists who shared the ideology of the military coup. Particularly the *Yön* circle made efforts to set a different foreign policy ideology based on leftism and Kemalism.

Marriage of Kemalism and Leftism: *Yön* Movement

As has been seen, Atatürk had severely suppressed the Marxist movement in Turkey. However, in the liberal atmosphere of the constitution of 1961, works of many leading socialist writers and leaders were freely translated and circulated in Turkey. Socialist ideas were rising among the people and the intellectuals in the 1960s.³⁰ The 1960 Coup's leftist ideas became more influential in certain sections of the Kemalist elite and bureaucracy and their influence over the educated elite was remarkable. In particular RPP members during the İnönü era were exposed to the communist ideology and it can

Yayınevi, 1992), p. 275.

²⁹ Changes in international relations also provided a suitable environment for such debates: Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, 'Dış Politika Nedir? Türkiye'deki Dünü ve Bugünü', (*What is Foreign Policy? It's Past and Today in Turkey*), AÜ SBF Dergisi / Ankara University SBF Journal, Vol. 35, Nos.: 1-4, January-December, 1980, p. 235.

be said that the İnönist interpretation of Kemalism provided a suitable ground for Marxists in the state machinery. In the DP period, similar policies of the RPP and of the Marxists, like etatism, anti-religious and anti-liberal economic policies connected these two political groups and increased the Marxist influence over the bureaucracy, the army and the RPP. This culminated in the 1960s when similarities between the leftist groups and the RPP increased and the leftist Kemalists became the strongest group among the Kemalist elite.

The marriage of Kemalist Western scepticism with leftist anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism resulted in reinterpretation of the goals of Turkish foreign policy and opened an era of criticism over Turkey's Western orientation.³¹ Until that time the Islamists had protested over Turkey's commitments to the West, but they were weak, and had no influence over the state. On 20 December 1961 the leftist Kemalists established their influential journal, *Yön* (Direction). This journal provided the first serious and organised criticism of Turkish foreign policy. *Yön* advocated new security strategies for Turkey outside of NATO and propagated rapprochement with the Soviet Union.³² In doing so, for the first time in Republican history Turkey's Western connections were severely criticised.³³

While the need for change was real and there was serious concern over the Turkish-Western alliance among the academics, the army and politicians, nobody knew any alternative to the West. For example when the *Forum* journal began a serious debate on Turkish foreign policy, academics claimed that any change from the traditional foreign policy was impossible although the need for such change was essential.³⁴ The neo-Kemalist response came from Haluk Ülman whose article can be considered as the first serious Kemalist critique of Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy. In his article, Ülman claimed that the international system was changing and the Soviet Union was no longer such a threat. Ülman further claimed that NATO could not guarantee Turkey's security, but might increase Turkey's defence expenditure, and risk Turkish security by

³⁰ Gönlübol, 'A Short...', p. 8.

³¹ Gönlübol, 'A Short...', p. 8.

³² Mümtaz Soysal, 'Yalnızlık' (*Aloneness*), *Yön*, No. 143; Haluk Ülman, 'Dış Politikamızın Değişkenleri II', *Yön*, No. 27, 20 June 1962, p. 16.

³³ Ergun Aydınoglu, *Eleştirel Bir Tarih Denemesi, 1960-1971, Türk Solu (A Critical History Essay, 1960-1971, Turkish Left)*, (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1992), pp. 38-42.

³⁴ 'Dış Politikamız Üzerine' (*On Our Foreign Policy*), *Forum*, 15 December 1960 and *Forum*, 15

provoking other nations. Therefore, Turkey had to end all NATO commitments and he suggested that Turkey improve its relations with the communist block and the Third World.³⁵ Ülman's argument encouraged others and literally opened an era of criticism. Leftist Türkkaya Ataöv, Doğan Avcıoğlu and Mümtaz Soysal, all are lecturers in Ankara University, followed Ülman and claimed that Turkey's pro-Western policies harmed Turkish interests.³⁶ They also tried to reconcile Kemalism and leftist ideas with the aim of formulating a Kemalist-leftist doctrine arguing that the Kemalist reforms were socialist. Yön authors named Kemalism 'national socialism'.³⁷ For neo-Kemalists Atatürk was the greatest leftist in Turkish history and the War of Independence and the Kemalist reforms were the greatest anti-imperialist, leftist achievements of the Turks.³⁸ For example Ataöv criticised Turkey's policy towards the Algerian Independence War as 'Turkey lost its credits, which it had gained with the War of Independence. The only way to get them back and to be a leader for the developing states was Kemalist Socialism.'³⁹ Similarly Avcıoğlu saw Turkey's place among the Third World states.⁴⁰

In fact, the contradiction was obvious: As has been seen Atatürk's aim was never to be the leader of any group of nations. His first and only priority was Turkey, not the developing countries. Despite such obvious differences the new leftists continued to use the Kemalist name. Avcıoğlu, the leading columnist and publisher of *Yön*, suggested a revolutionary take-over by the Kemalist-leftist army officers in order to realise all these objectives because for him, there were 'native collaborators of imperialism' in Turkey.⁴¹ These collaborators were the Turkish bourgeoisie and its representatives, namely JP and

February 1962; Aydınoglu, *Elestirel...*, p. 55.

³⁵ Haluk Ülman, 'Dış Politikamızın Değişkenleri I', (*Changeable Factors of Our Foreign Policy I*), *Yön*, No. 26, 1962, pp. 14-15.

³⁶ Yön authors claimed that Atatürk aimed at Westernism but he was against the West: Niyazi Berkes, 'Gericilik ve Batının Zararlı Tesirleri' (*Reactionary Movements and the Bad Effects of the West*), *Yön*, No. 58, 23 January 1963, p. 8.

³⁷ Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, 'Atatürk'ün Özlediği Türkiye', *Yön*, No. 47, 7 November 1962, p. 12; Sadun Aren, the leading socialist-Kemalist also argued that Kemal's populism and etatism principles in particular showed his socialist dream for Turkey: Sadun Aren, 'Atatürk'ün Özlediği Türkiye'yi Kurabildik mi?', *Yön*, No. 47, 7 November 1962, p. 14.

³⁸ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, 'Türk Sosyalizminin İlkeleri' (*The Principles of Turkish Socialism*), *Yön*, No. 56, 9 January 1963, p. 8; Cahit Tanyol, 'Açık Oturum Konuşması' (*The Open Negotiations Speech*), *Yön*, No. 75, 23 May 1963, p. 11; Sadun Aren, 'SBF'de Atatürk' (*Atatürk in SBF*), *Yön*, No. 49, 21 November 1962, p. 5.

³⁹ Türkkaya Ataöv, 'Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası' (*Atatürk's Foreign Policy*), *Yön*, Turkish journal, No. 47, 1962, p. 18.

⁴⁰ Doğan Avcıoğlu, 'Emperyalizmin Çırpınışları' (*Imperialism's Last Struggles to Live*), *Yön*, No. 98, 12 February 1965, p. 3.

⁴¹ Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Devrim Üzerine (On the Revolution)*, (Ankara: Bilgi, 1971); *Türkiye'nin Düzeni (Turkey's Order)*, (Ankara: Bilgi, 1970).

other right-wing parties.⁴² Similarly almost all leftist-Kemalists, like Çetin Altan,⁴³ Türkkaya Ataöv,⁴⁴ Mehmet Ali Aybar⁴⁵ claimed that Western imperialism was responsible for Turkish backwardness. For example Ataöv argued that NATO and the United States brought nothing but infringement, instability and backwardness to Turkish society and risked Turkish security by provoking the Soviet Union.⁴⁶

Another platform for the leftist-Kemalists was the *Aydınlık* journal. In fact, it was a Marxist-Leninist periodical in essence and shared very little with Kemalism, however some of its members claimed that Mustafa Kemal was a good socialist and anti-imperialist. Belli, for example, argued that the Kemalist reforms prepared a suitable ground for a socialist revolution accusing the Democrats of being a bastion of ‘Western imperialism’ in the Middle East.⁴⁷ Behice Boran also stressed socialism as an alternative for Turkey’s foreign affairs arguing that the alliance with NATO hindered Turkey’s economic progress and risked its security.⁴⁸

The leftist-Kemalist foreign policy framework was based on three main assumptions: a) the West was imperialist and wanted to colonise Turkey and other Third World countries. Therefore, Turkey’s efforts for integration into the West did not help Turkey’s development and security, b) The Turkish Right and business class were collaborators with Western imperialism, and enemies of Kemalism. In order to implement an independent, Kemalist and anti-imperial foreign policy a revolution led by the army and other ‘progressive’ forces was compulsory, c) Turkey’s foreign policy must be independent, socialist and Third Worldist and friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the Third World were essential.

⁴² *Cumhuriyet* (daily, Istanbul), 15 November 1962.

⁴³ Çetin Altan, *Onlar Uyanırken: Türk Sosyalistlerinin El Kitabı* (*When They are Awakening: Guide Book for Turkish Socialists*), (Istanbul: Dönem, 1967).

⁴⁴ Türkkaya Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye* (*America, NATO and Turkey*), (Ankara: Aydınlık, 1969).

⁴⁵ Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm* (*Independence, Democracy, Socialism*), (Istanbul: Gerçek, 1968).

⁴⁶ Ataöv, *Amerika*.

⁴⁷ Mihri Belli, ‘Ulusal Demokratik Devrim’ (*National Democratic Revolution*), *Aydınlık*, 27 May 1966; Mihri Belli, *Yazılar, 1965-1970* (*Collected Essays*), Ankara: Sol Yayınları, 1970), pp. 12-24.

⁴⁸ Behice Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları*, (*Turkey and the Problems of Socialism*), (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1970), pp. 46-52.

The creation of a Marxist Turkish Workers Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TIP*) increased criticism of traditional Turkish foreign policy.⁴⁹ The Marxists and other leftist groups, however, not only influenced and pressured government agencies but also organised street demonstrations and attacks against American interests in Turkey.⁵⁰ Foreign policy was crucial to the Marxists programme and unlike the JP, RPP or other parties, TIP focused on foreign policy.⁵¹ TIP publicly criticised Turkey's alliance with the United States, and accused the West of occupying Turkey economically and politically.⁵² TIP also accused Turkish foreign policy makers of this and attempted to prove that Mustafa Kemal was the greatest leftist in Turkish history by arguing that the RPP and the DP governments deviated from Kemalist policies. For TIP the real Kemalist foreign policy had to be based on independence and the struggle against the imperialist West⁵³ as the TIP declared its foreign policy objectives were: 'to protect the national independence, Republic, territorial integrity, equality in foreign policy...to struggle against imperialism and support the independence movements in the Third world and colonies.'⁵⁴

As will be seen in the next chapter *Yön* and the success of the TIP caused an ideological shift within them as the RPP became the home of leftist-Kemalism. In the 1960s Ecevit created a new ideology for the RPP, *Ortanın Solu* (Left of Centre).⁵⁵ Ecevit argued that the RPP had to change its 'non-Kemalist' policies because as the greatest anti-imperialist Atatürk's policies were good examples of leftist policies. Ecevit, in reaction to the elitist approach of the single-party system of the 1930s-40s, argued that elitism had alienated people from the party and caused repeated election defeats in the multi-party period. New understanding had to be on people and class-policies.⁵⁶ Ecevit further claimed that like Atatürk the RPP had to follow a foreign policy based on more independence and good relations with the anti-imperialist states, namely the Third

⁴⁹ Mahmut B. Aykan, *Turkey's Role in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 1960-1992, The Nature of Deviation from the Kemalist Heritage*, (New York: Vantage Press, 1994), p. 55.

⁵⁰ Aydınoğlu, *Eleştirel...*, pp. 46-49.

⁵¹ *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Programı*, (*Turkish Workers Party Programme*), (Ankara, TIP, n.d.).

⁵² *Cumhuriyet* (daily, Istanbul), 25 March 1965, *Milliyet* (daily, Istanbul), 27 May 1967.

⁵³ Erkin Topkaya, *Anayasa, Siyasi Partiler Kanunu, Program ve Tüzükleriyle Türkiye'de Başlıca Siyasi Partiler*, (*Constitution, the Law of Political Parties and the Main Political Parties with Their Programmes*), (Ankara: Ulusal, 1969), p. 442.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 443-444.

⁵⁵ For Ecevit's new leftist ideology see: Bülent Ecevit, *Ortanın Solu* (Left of Centre), (Istanbul: Tekin, 1968).

⁵⁶ Güneş - Ayata, pp. 161-162.

World and Soviet Union. One of the most significant features of the Ecevit's foreign policy understanding was its American scepticism. Ecevit publicly accused the Americans of destabilising the other countries in his 1966 party speech:

'In America it has been disclosed with what "dirty game" the CIA is involved affecting domestic politics in friendly and allied countries. It pours money into elections in order to bring those who it wants into power and unseat those it does not want; in some countries it even stuffs polling boxes with false ballots. In order to prepare a pretext for smashing legal and domestic opposition, it has claimed that there was a great communist danger.'⁵⁷

Though Ecevit could not find opportunity to implement his ideology at this stage, in the 1970s he marginalised İnönü and his ideology from the party and leftist-Kemalism became the ideology behind Turkish foreign policy in the 1970s.

Despite Marxist and Kemalist-leftist propaganda and the real need for change, Turkey needed time for such a great shift in foreign policy because the coup leaders and then İnönü needed fresh financial credits. Moreover, the Soviet Union was still a great menace, and Turkey saw no alternative to alliance with the West. As a result, NATO and the alliance with the West were generally considered taboo issues in Turkey. For example, Kemalist-socialist Sadun Aren notes that the TIP party could not start a 'NO to NATO' campaign for fear that their party would be closed down by the courts.⁵⁸ Only the Jupiter Missiles Affair and the Cyprus crisis demolished this taboo and allowed the neo-Kemalists to openly attack existing Turkish foreign policy.

Apart from the leftists, even the traditionalist foreign policy experts started to criticise Turkey's pro-Western policy and its neglect of the Third World. For example Fahir Armaoğlu, a traditionalist Kemalist academic, argued that Turkey could manage to improve its relations with the developing countries with NATO membership.⁵⁹

The İnönü Government and the First Shock (1961-1963)

Having strengthened its position and ensured the future of its reforms the military decided to transfer power to elected civilians. Perhaps, they would not have done that if the economy had gone well, but in the face of radical measures the economy almost

⁵⁷ Quoted in Harris, *Troubled Alliance...*, p. 136.

⁵⁸ Sadun Aren, *TIP Olayı 1961-1971, (TIP Affair, 1961-1971)*, Istanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1993), p. 67.

came to a halt and as Shaw and Shaw have argued not only businessmen but also workers and peasants began to show increasing unrest and a desire for the restoration of a civilian regime.⁶⁰

After the coup, the RPP had emerged as the most important political party. However, the people associated the RPP with the coup and the RPP's programme was more liberal than ever, in particular the newly emerging mercantile class and the peasants feared that a possible RPP return to power would restore etatism and other early Republican autocratic policies. In the elections of 15 October 1961 the RPP received only 36.7 percent of the vote and the JP 34.8 percent. The NTP gained 13 percent and the Republican Peasants Party (RPP) gained 14 percent of the vote. In the Senate the JP gained 47 percent of the seats and the RPP just received 24 percent.⁶¹ The result was a great disappointment for the NUC, and the Council even thought of invalidating the results but the agreement between the RPP and the JP prevented that and the NUC agreed to retire from the scene and allow a coalition government to form under İnönü's leadership.

First, as a reaction to the DP's activist Middle Eastern policy, İnönü made great efforts to keep Turkey out of the Middle East in the first years of the 1960s.⁶² In other words, İnönü tried to restore Kemal's non-involvement policy in the region, however as will be seen the international developments would force Turkey for a more active Middle Eastern policy. Another foreign policy development of the second İnönü period was the Soviet attempt to improve relations with Turkey. The Soviet Union offered \$ 500 million to İnönü on 1 January 1962,⁶³ and a \$ 25 million trade agreement was signed. However İnönü could not dare to institute a complete change in Turkey's Soviet policy and declared that Turkey belonged to a different political system and could not change its foreign policy. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's moderate Turkish policy influenced the Turkish elite and nourished the neo-Kemalist approach. The neo-Kemalists claimed that Turkey should not lose the opportunity to improve relations with the Soviet Union in order to balance its foreign policy. Mehmet Gönlübol, a traditional

⁵⁹ Fahir Armaoğlu, 'Türkiye ve NATO', (*Turkey and NATO*), *Forum*, No. 193, 1962, p. 18.

⁶⁰ Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, pp. 415-416.

⁶¹ Dodd, *The Crisis...*, p. 223.

⁶² Süha Bölükbaşı, *Türkiye ve Yakınındaki Orta Doğu*, (*Turkey and Its Near Middle East*), (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1992), p. 5.

Westernist, accused the neo-Kemalists of being ideological: 'It is early to understand the real Soviet intentions. We cannot refuse the West at once just for a couple words of Khrushchev.'⁶⁴ When Soviet credit failed to restore the Turkish economy, İnönü turned again towards the United States and demanded more economic aid. The United States agreed to increase aid, and as Sander put it, Turkey supported United States and the 'colonialist states' against the developing countries or colonies in order to show its gratitude to NATO.⁶⁵

The third significant development was the Jupiter Missile Crises. Since Turkey focused on economic aid it made maximum effort not to annoy the NATO members. However during the Cuban Missiles Crisis the Turkish people and the state perceived the Jupiter Missiles as symbols of the NATO guarantee against a possible Russian attack.⁶⁶ However, the United States decided to remove these missiles from Turkey as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis the Soviet Union following the Cuban Missiles Crisis without consulting or informing Turkey.⁶⁷ This decision shocked all in Turkey and increased doubts in the minds of Turkish statesmen about the credibility of the Turkish-American alliance. Turkey had to accept the decision but debates in parliament showed that even the pro-Western political parties had doubts about the reliability of the United States against communism, including the Justice Party.⁶⁸ Only the neo-Kemalists were happy. For them, Turkey had at last realised that the United States could not secure Turkey's independence. Doğan Avcıoğlu declared the Cuban Crisis as a start of a new dawn in Turkish foreign policy⁶⁹ and almost all political groups questioned the essence of the alliance with United States, which was considered a taboo in Turkish foreign policy. Leftist-Kemalist Abdi İpekçi for example claimed that the alliance with the United States and the American bases in Turkey had risked Turkey's security.⁷⁰

⁶³ *Cumhuriyet*, 2-3 January 1962; Bilge, *Güç...*, p. 346.

⁶⁴ Mehmet Gönübol, 'Kıssadan Hisse', (*Moral of the Story*), *Forum*, No. 205, 1962, p. 9.

⁶⁵ Sander, *Türk...*, p. 207.

⁶⁶ Turan Yavuz, *Satılık Müttefik, Gizli Belgeler Işığında 1962 Küba Füze Krizi ve Türkiye*, (*The Ally for Sale, The Cuban Missile Crisis and Turkey in the Light of the Secret Documents*), (Istanbul: Dogan Kitapçılık AS., 1999), p. 19.

⁶⁷ Yavuz, *Satılık Müttefik...*, p. 19; Harris, *Troubled...*, pp. 91-94.

⁶⁸ Erkin, Turkish Foreign Minister, argued in the debates in the parliament, that Turkish security was not in danger after the removal of the Jupiter missiles because Turkey would be protected by the traditional missile systems: *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Vol. 11, 1963, 30. Session, 1. Otr., pp. 104-105; *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Vol. 11, 52. Session, 4. Otr., pp. 221-225.

⁶⁹ Doğan Avcıoğlu, 'Füzeler Kalkarken' (*When the Missiles are Rising*), *Yön*, No. 59, 1963, p. 3 and *Yön*, No. 46, 1962, p. 3.

⁷⁰ İpekçi further claimed that the alliance with the West damaged Turkish economy: Abdi İpekçi,

The Cyprus Crisis and the Johnson's Letter: the Realities' Challenge to Westernism

There is no doubt that the most important reason for the transformation in Turkish foreign policy during these years was the Cyprus Crisis and the Western attitude toward Turkey on this issue. The armed clashes of 1963 between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in particular stimulated the interest of the general public and many different political groups in foreign policy matters.⁷¹

According to the founding Zurich agreements between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, these three states undertook to guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, security and constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus. Also, the Cyprus Constitution set out that all governmental agencies and cabinet positions were to be shared between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in a 70:30 ratio. The ratio in the armed forces was to be 60:40.⁷² Despite both the written agreements and the constitution, inter-communal fighting broke out between the two groups. In Turkish eyes, the Turkish Cypriots were persecuted by paramilitary Greek groups, who pursued *Enosis*, union with Greece. In time, thousands of Greek volunteers came to the island. For Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots *Enosis* was against both international and Cypriot national law, and unacceptable to them. Turkey preferred to settle the question within NATO, or by direct negotiation with Greece. However, neither Greece, the UK, the USA, nor international organisations, such as NATO and United Nations (UN) could stop the clashes. Turkey accused Greece of encouraging the struggles to annex the island to Greece⁷³ and when the problem could not be solved by international society, Turkey advocated the partitioning of the island or a federation of the two parts.⁷⁴ However the Greek Cypriots thought that they were near to victory as the Turks living

Milliyet, 23 April 1962.

⁷¹ Gönlübol, 'A Short...', p. 8.

⁷² Farid Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, (London: Hurst&Company, 1998), pp. 12-41; Zaim M. Necatigil, *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law*, (Oxford: Oxford University, 1989).

⁷³ T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Turkish Views on the Question of Cyprus*, (Ankara: Turkish Foreign Ministry Report, 1964); Tözün Bahçeli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1990).

⁷⁴ T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Turkish View on Cyprus*, (Ankara: Turkish Foreign Ministry Report, 1965), pp. 20-22.

in the enclaves were relatively weak economically and militarily. Therefore they refused the partition option. When UN peace keeping efforts failed, Turkey periodically reaffirmed its right to intervene in the clashes in Cyprus. Finally İnönü implied that Turkey would use all the rights, which the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959 and 1960 gave Turkey, to stop the 'genocide' on the island.⁷⁵ This meant a military occupation, and Greece replied that a Turkish invasion would result in Greece defending Cyprus. The American reaction to the Turkish warning was both severe and surprising. Turkish statesmen believed Turkey was one of the loyalest allies of the United States and that it had sacrificed some of its national interests for NATO.⁷⁶ In this context, the Johnson letter⁷⁷ was a big disappointment for the Turks, as Gürel states 'the style used in the letter was not so polite. However its context was more upsetting than its style.'⁷⁸ In his letter President Johnson warned Turkey not to use the American military aid in Cyprus:

'I must tell you in all candor that the United States could not agree of any United States supplied equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.'⁷⁹

Moreover Johnson threatened Turkey by saying that if Turkey intervened in the Cyprus crisis and if as a result of that action the Soviet Union attacked Turkey neither NATO nor the United States would support or defend Turkey:

'(...) Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey would lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.'⁸⁰

In other words, NATO and the United States were threatening to abandon Turkey if the Soviet Union invaded. The Johnson letter represented a complete failure in Turkish foreign policy and the anti-Turkish Western attitude was clear proof of the failure of the Turkish Westernist school in general. As Sahin pointed out, until the letter, Turkey was

⁷⁵ Clement Dodd, 'Turkey and Cyprus', in David Shankland (ed.), *The Turkish Republic at Seventy-Five Years*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1999), p. 74.

⁷⁶ Yavuz, *Satılık Müttefik...*, pp. 18-19.

⁷⁷ For the full text see *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer 1966, p. 387; *Hürriyet*, 13 January 1966; *Cumhuriyet*, 15 January 1966; Haluk Şahin, *Gece Gelen Mektup: Türk - Amerikan İlişkilerinde Dönüm Noktası*, (*The Letter That Came at Night: The Turning Point in Turkish - American Relations*), (Istanbul: Cep, 1987).

⁷⁸ Gürel, *Tarihsel...*, p. 58.

⁷⁹ *The Middle...*, pp. 386-393.

⁸⁰ *The Middle...*, p. 387.

one of the rare countries, where ‘no one said go home to the Americans.’⁸¹ The letter aroused indignation in the Turkish press; For example, the daily *Cumhuriyet* implied that the United States might stop Turkey by using military force claiming that after the Greek fleet United States Sixth Fleet had sailed off towards Cyprus.⁸² Turkish public during this crisis perceived the American intervention as a clear sign of political support for Greece.⁸³ As noted by Halil ‘the letter created the most ominous crisis Ankara had to face since the War of Independence⁸⁴ and the letter was to shake the Turkish faith⁸⁵ and with the Johnson letter, Turkish expectations of the American government proved fallacious.⁸⁶ In the words of Robinson, even the Americanist Turks were ‘*saddened and puzzled*’.⁸⁷ Moreover, the letter caused a resurgence of Kemalist Western scepticism. Now the Turkish policy makers were aware how they were wrong when they set a foreign policy based just on alliance with the West and ignoring the East and the Third World. Thus, the letter bitterly harmed the Turkish-American relations up to the present day. In the following years the Cyprus problem shadowed the relations and the Turkish policy makers always remembered the American attitude. Moreover, the problem triggered anti-American street demonstrations and a harsh press campaign led by the Turkish left (including the Kemalist left) championed anti-Americanism in these campaigns.⁸⁸ Thanks to the campaigns, the left increased its influence over the foreign policy matters.

As a result, Turkey could not intervene in the clashes in Cyprus⁸⁹ and the public and the press forced İnönü for a sharp response. İnönü in response stated

⁸¹ Şahin, Gece..., p. 10.

⁸² ‘Amerika’nın Altıncı Filosuna Mensup Altı Savaş Gemisi Kıbrıs Açıklarında’, *Cumhuriyet* (daily, İstanbul), 12 June 1964.

⁸³ *Milliyet* (daily, İstanbul), 6, 9, 13 June 1964; *Cumhuriyet* (daily İstanbul), 9-10 June 1964. It is also claimed that one of the factors had affected Johnson for his ‘pro-Greek’ letter to İnönü was the Greek lobbying at the White House: ‘Johnson’s 1964 Letter to İnönü and the Greek Lobbying at the White House’, *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, XVI, 1974, pp. 45-58.

⁸⁴ Ali Halil, *Atatürkçü Dış Politika ve NATO ve Türkiye (Kemalist Foreign Policy and NATO and Turkey)*, (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1968), pp. 172-173.

⁸⁵ Şahin, Gece..., pp. 21-26.

⁸⁶ Mehmet Gönlübol, ‘NATO and Turkey’, in *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 1971, p. 5.

⁸⁷ Davison, *Turkey...*, p. 161.

⁸⁸ Şahin, Gece..., p. 25; Mango, *Turkey*, p. 94; Yılmaz Çetiner, ‘Turkey Turns Anti-American’, *Atlas*, August 1965, pp. 107-108; Gönlübol, ‘A Short...’, p. 9.

⁸⁹ As a matter of fact that the American reaction was not the only reason for Turkey’s decision not to intervene Cyprus. Turkey in these years suffered from shortage of landing craft and other necessary equipment for a military operation on the island: Dodd, ‘Turkey and Cyprus’, p. 74.

'There are between us a wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles of the NATO... If NATO's structure is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor's allegations, then it means this defect in NATO needs to be remedied.'⁹⁰

Thus, Turkey for first time since the War of Independence, felt itself alone and in need of new friends and support. Metin Toker, İnönü's son-in-law, expressed need for new friends: 'it is natural for Turkey to search for strong friendships in the Third World.'⁹¹ Now, the desire for change was clear among the Kemalists, neo-Kemalists and leftists. The conservatives and Islamists now also favoured an immediate change. Thus the Johnson letter raised anti-Americanism and increased the importance of the neo-Kemalist group on foreign policy. Moreover, the third effect of the letter was search for new friends in the international arena. Finally, the fourth result was that the foreign policy matters became at the centre of parliamentary debates. Now the governments were not free, as they had been.

The Search for New Friends and the Response of the Non-aligned States

With the failure of the NATO sponsored negotiations between the Greeks and Turks, Turkey decided that the United States and Europe were pro-Greek in the Cyprus matter realising that the anti-Turkish biases were still in the minds of the Europeans and the Americans. Thus Turkey turned towards the non-aligned countries for political support over the Cyprus problem as the Cyprus issue was now a topic at the UN General Assembly and the non-aligned states were in majority. Therefore Turkey needed to persuade these countries to win UN support for its case.⁹² However, when the UN General Assembly adopted a series of resolutions detrimental to Turkish interest in March-December 1964, which limited Turkish rights in Cyprus, Turkey realised the position it was in. The number of the supporters for the Turkish side in the UN was just six, and four of them were CENTO members.⁹³

As discussed, both the Atatürk and İnönü governments had focused on relations with the West and did not attached importance to the Muslim world or developing nations in Asia and Africa nor were the Turks very interested in its Middle Eastern neighbours and

⁹⁰ *The Middle East Journal*, Summer 1966, pp. 386-393.

⁹¹ Metin Toker, 'Bir Seyahatin Bilançosu' (*Balance of a Trip*), *Akis* (weekly, Turkish), 3 July 1964, p. 7.

⁹² Leftist-Kemalists in particular argued Turkey needed Third World in solution of the Cyprus problem: Ibrahim Camli, 'Kıbrıs Meselesinin Çözümü Üçüncü Dünyanın İçindedir' (*The Solution for Cyprus Issue is in the Third World*), *Yön*, No. 108, 23 April 1965, p. 7.

the Third World. Lack of experience in the region and Kemalist foreign policy's avoidance of regional affairs enabled successive Turkish governments not only to pursue but to justify this course.⁹⁴ Further, Turkey had declared that it was against the non-alignment movement at Bandung and had supported Israel against the Arabs during the İnönü period. However, Greece had better relations with these countries. While Turkey acted as the representative of the capitalist-West, the Greeks had given full support for the non-aligned states in Bandung. Likewise, Makarios, the Greek Cypriot President of Cyprus, was one of the most active leaders among the non-aligned countries. Therefore, Turkey's attempts to persuade the non-aligned states failed and for example, the Cairo Conference (1964) decided against Turkey and in favour of the Greeks, with Egypt's Nasser leading opposition against Turkey and the Arab and Afro-Asia group followed him.⁹⁵ Indeed, Turkish Ambassador Semih Günver, in his memoirs, stresses that the non-aligned states did not consider Turkey as a member of their world⁹⁶ and the only Arab-Muslim country that gave support to Turkey was Algeria although Turkey had supported the French against the Algerians in the UN in 1950s. Thus, Turkey bitterly realised its isolated position because of its alliance with the West. It is true, Turkey had carried out an isolation policy in the Atatürk and İnönü periods, yet in those years Turkey had chosen isolation and neutrality, now the world did not want Turkey. The Cairo Conference brought home the fact that Turkey had no time to lose in gaining hearts of the Muslim, African and Asian states. For the neo-Kemalists Turkey had to make efforts to gain the support of the socialist states as well. Ironically the neo-Kemalists had attacked the DP governments for departing from a Kemalist national pact course, which caused the Cyprus Crisis to take such an unfavourable path.⁹⁷ In reality, it was Kemalist ideology that was responsible for the isolation as the reactions of the non-aligned states was the declaration of the failure of ideological foreign policy considerations. This contradiction undermined the neo-Kemalist ideological framework in future years as well. Following the Turkish disappointment in Cairo the Soviet Union renewed its offers to improve relations. Now Turkey was ready for such an improvement and succeeded to change the Soviet position

⁹³ Gönlübol, 'A Short...', p. 11.

⁹⁴ Bilge Criss and Pinar Bilgin, 'Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East', *Journal*, No. 1, January 1997, p. 5.

⁹⁵ *Milliyet* (daily, Istanbul), 12-13 October 1964, *Cumhuriyet* (daily, Istanbul), 12 October 1964.

⁹⁶ Semih Günver, *Tanınmayan Meslek: Anılar ve Portreler*, (*Unknown Occupation: Memoirs*), (Ankara: A.Ü. SBF., 1982), pp. 156-159.

⁹⁷ 'TIP Dış Politikayı Bildiriyle Eleştirdi' (*TIP Criticised Foreign Policy with a Declaration*), *Milliyet*.

over the Cyprus issue. After his Moscow visit, Erkin, Turkish Foreign Minister, declared that there was a similarity and mutual understanding between Turkey and the Soviet Union on the Cyprus problem.⁹⁸ A cultural agreement was also signed and both countries declared that they would respect each other's territorial integrity. All these developments met with general approval in the Turkish press⁹⁹ that saw Turkey gaining new friends in addition to the West. Erkin accepted the radical shift in Turkish foreign policy and argued that it was a direct and natural result of the change in international politics and based on the Kemalist principles.¹⁰⁰

Turkey also focused on the Muslim world starting a diplomatic campaign in the World Islamic Conference and received clear support on the Cyprus issue. These victories were followed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic (UAR) increasing their diplomatic representation in Turkey to the ambassadorial level.¹⁰¹

İnönü's Cyprus and 'pacific' NATO policies were severely criticised not only by the leftist groups, but also the conservative JP, which was viewed as a neo-Democrat party. Despite the İnönü government's rigid position over the Cyprus crisis, the JP accused the government of being timid on this issue. Nevertheless, the JP gave support to the government at international platforms viewing the problem as a 'national issue'.¹⁰² The Islamist Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*) on the other hand, severely criticised both the RPP and moderate neo-Democrats over the Cyprus crisis accusing them of making co-operation with the 'imperialist' West.¹⁰³ The criticism forced the İnönü government to resign. It was replaced by the Suat Hayri Ürgüplü government on 21 February 1965, which lasted until 22 October 1965. The Programme of the Ürgüplü government of 26 February 1965 implied that Turkey had alternatives to NATO:

'Our NATO membership and loyalty to the common security system never means we have to support a group (*zümre*) in foreign policy (...) We sincerely want to improve

14 October 1964.

⁹⁸ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Vol. 33, 1964, 12th session, 1, p. 533.

⁹⁹ Metin Toker, 'Moskova Ziyareti'nin Anlamı', (*The Meaning of the Moscow Visit*), *Akis*, 30 October 1964, p. 7, *Cumhuriyet*, 26 October 1964; *Milliyet*, 30 October 1964.

¹⁰⁰ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Vol. 33, 1964, 12th session, 1, p. 533.

¹⁰¹ Aykan, *Turkey's*, p. 57.

¹⁰² *Hükümet Buhranı, Hükümet Teşkili ve Kıbrıs Olayları Karşısında AP*, (*JP Before the Government Crisis, Government Formation and the Cyprus Events*), The JP Executive Committee Report, AP Genel Merkezi Neşriyatı, No. 4, Ankara, 1964, pp. 25-52.

¹⁰³ MP 1965 Seçim Beyannamesi (The NP Election Declaration), MP Head Quarter, Ankara, 1965.

our relations with the Soviet Union. Good relations with the Soviet Union is a subject that we attach great importance.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, Hasan Isik, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister, visited Moscow and Peking to underline the policy change in Turkish foreign policy¹⁰⁵ Also Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, Turkish Prime Minister, visited Moscow in 1955, and the Soviet Foreign Minister paid a visit to Ankara in the same year. Furthermore, Turkey refused to join the Multilateral Force within the NATO proposed by the US.¹⁰⁶ Another foreign policy initiative of the Ürgüplü government which showed the shift in foreign policy understanding was 'seven goodwill delegations' affair. Turkey not only made efforts to persuade the Soviet Union and China to get diplomatic support for Cyprus, but also sent seven 'goodwill delegations' to the Asian, African and Latin American countries to explain Turkey's position in the Cyprus problem. Isik, in his speech in the parliament, declared that the main aim of these delegations were not limited to the Cyprus issue, but the delegations would search 'opportunities to establish a long-lasting co-operation' with these countries.¹⁰⁷

The Marxist propaganda's impact was clear, yet the radical differences in the programme can not be explained in only ideological terms. It was obvious that the main factor was Western attitudes towards Turkey on the Cyprus issue and Turkey's isolated position in the world. Indeed, when Resolution 2077 was adopted at the UN on 18 December 1965, Turkey once more realised its isolation: Forty-seven African states, almost all Arab states (except Lebanon, Syria and UAR out of fifteen) voted against the Turkish argument.¹⁰⁸ After the shocking decision, the Turkish press and many parliamentarians had argued a structural change in foreign policy.¹⁰⁹ As mentioned the reason for the shift was not solely ideological, and the real needs forced Turkey for a different foreign policy, yet the radical left benefited most from these developments and tried to manipulate Turkish foreign policy towards the Third World and the socialist

¹⁰⁴ Kazım Öztürk, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri ve Programları*, (*The Governments of Turkish Republic and Their Programmes*), (Istanbul: Ak Yayınları, 1968), p. 601-602

¹⁰⁵ Frank Tachau, 'Turkish Foreign Policy: Between east and West', *Middle East Review*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1985, p. 25.

¹⁰⁶ Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, pp. 94-99.

¹⁰⁷ *The Bulletin of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, No. 5, 1965, p. 637.

¹⁰⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 18 September 1965.

¹⁰⁹ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Vol. 2, 28th session, 27 November 1965, pp. 16-82; *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Vol. 40, 1965, 115th session, 1, p. 545; *Cumhuriyet*, 19-20 September 1965

The 1965 Elections and New Turkish Foreign Policy: Neo-Democrats vs. Neo-Kemalists

After the 1965 vote of the General Assembly over the Cyprus Crisis Turkey understood that its previous attitudes towards the Third World states had systematically alienated it from this influential group at the UN.¹¹¹ As a result almost all ideological groups focused on a new foreign policy framework and even İnönü promised a more diverse foreign policy.¹¹² In addition to the leftist-Kemalism, neo-Democrats, Islamists and the ultra-Turkists made efforts to form their own foreign policy ideological framework. In this environment, the 1965 elections put an end to the military-supported governments as the Justice Party came to power with 52.87 percent of the votes. RPP could only get 28.75 percent of the votes.¹¹³ For the Kemalists the JP's election victory meant the return of the DP: 'The DP's legacy continues. 27 May Revolution attempted to demolish it, yet it is now understood that we returned all the way back.'¹¹⁴ Leading leftist-Kemalist Avcioglu viewed the election results as a counter-revolution against Kemalism.¹¹⁵ The second effect of the elections was the confirmation of leftist-Kemalism's victory over Kemalist Orthodoxy. It can be said that the 1965 election crystallised the differences between the political groups.

Leftist-Kemalism's Victory over the Traditional Kemalism

The JP were not the only victors in the 1965 elections. The TIP, the main representative of the Kemalist-left, also succeeded in entering the Parliament receiving 15 seats. The left's success and the neo-Kemalists opposition to İnönü-type Kemalism caused change in the RPP as well. The Bülent Ecevit-led group rebelled against the İnönü administration by claiming that the RPP's ideology must be a democratic leftist Kemalism and İnönü recognised the leftist character of the party. The deviation from

¹¹⁰ Gönlübol, 'A Short...', p. 12.

¹¹¹ Deniz Atiye Erden, *Turkish Foreign Policy Through the UN*, 1974, p. 143.

¹¹² **CHP Söz Veriyor**, **CHP 1965 Genel Seçimleri Bildirisi**, (RPP Promises, RPP 1965 General Elections Declaration), (Ankara: CHP, 1965).

¹¹³ Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945-1971*, (*The Explained Chronology of the Multi-Party Era in Turkey, 1945-1971*), (Ankara: Bilgi, 1976), p. 299.

¹¹⁴ Fethi Naci, 'Seçimlerden Sonra' (*After the Elections*), *Yön*, No. 133, 15 October 1965, p. 6.

¹¹⁵ Dogan Avcioglu, 'Yeni Dönem' (*New Era*), *Yön*, No. 134, 22 October 1965, p. 3.

Kemalist Orthodoxy, however, resulted in a split in the party and 48 RPP Parliamentarians and Senators accused the RPP of being socialist instead of being Kemalist resigned in order to establish the Republican Thrust Party (RTP, *Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi*) under the leadership of Turhan Feyzioğlu. The foundation of the RTP underscored the leftist character of the Republican People's Party.

Moreover, in this period, the political parties mushroomed and the differences between the ideological groups became clearly distinguished. The resurgence of the Islamists, Turkists, ultra-Turkists, Leftists, Marxists, Kemalists-leftists (RPP, TIP), Kemalist-traditionalists (RTP), Democrats¹¹⁶ (DP) and neo-Democrats (JP) increased political polarisation in Turkey. Unlike the previous periods all these groups focused on foreign policy matters and saw these problems as the main pillars of their ideology. The real struggle was between the neo-Kemalists and the neo-Democrats, however the tension caused by the political polarisation limited the governments in foreign policy implementation and would create a terror environment in the 1970s Turkey. The TIP's victory and the swing to the left process in the regime's party, RPP, increased ideological polarisation.

The Return of the Neo-Democrats: JP's Multi-Dimensional Foreign Policy¹¹⁷

In the wake of the coup, several parties, like the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, JP) and the New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*, NTP) were formed to secure the DP legacy, and the moderate conservative JP captured most of the DP votes. Although the JP could not declare that it was the successor of the DP because of the NUC, it advocated policies similar to those of the DP: economic liberalism, conservatism in politics, close co-operation with the United States against communism in foreign policy and more freedom in religious matters. During the first years (1961-1964) the RPP's etatism and the JP's liberalism were conflicting. The JP benefited from the failures of the weak İnönü coalition governments, and under Süleyman Demirel's leadership the JP gained a victory in October 1965 elections. The JP received 52.87 percent of the votes,

¹¹⁶ 26 former Democrat parliamentarians established a new party called as Democrat Party.

¹¹⁷ For Demirel's own ideas on his foreign policy see Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor 5: Demirel Dönemi, 12 Mart Darbesi, 1965-1971*, (*Cüneyt Arcayürek Explains 5: The Demirel Period, 12 March Coup, 1965-1971*), (Ankara: Bilgi, 1993), p. 125. For a comprehensive study on the Justice Party see Levi Avner, *The Justice Party of Turkey, 1961-1977*, PhD thesis, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1983.

while the RPP gained only 28.75 percent of the votes.¹¹⁸ The people's reaction to the military coup and the RPP policies were clear. However the JP did not perceive the election victory as revenge against the Kemalist elite. As neo-Democrats they knew the power of the army and the bureaucracy and they were cautious not to provoke the military or the Kemalist elite, even they claimed that they were the only true Kemalists who can implement Kemalist policies.¹¹⁹ For them their priorities were the restoration of the liberal economy and political structure during these years which were considered as the first stage to full civilian government. Between 1965 to 1970 the JP tried to implement its liberal economic and political program. Since the 1960 Coup, first time a single party had majority in parliament, however, the Kemalist elite, bureaucracy and the rising leftist opposition did not allow the full implementation of JP policies as the 1961 Constitution weakened governmental powers vis-à-vis the public and opposition. The Kemalist-left in particular enjoyed this.

The Ideological Framework of the Justice Party's Foreign Policy

Similar to the DP, the JP's foreign policy orientation was based on Cold War assumptions, nationalism, political conservatism, economic liberalism and pro-Westernism. Also, like the DP, the Justice Party was the follower of the Ottomanist school in foreign policy. It aimed for good relations with the Middle East and West, and was against isolationism. As an extension of the Ottomanist Turkish-Islam Synthesis idea, it pursued good relations with the Muslim and the Turkish world as well. The JP tried to apply this ideological orientation into Turkish foreign policy as long as the army allowed.

Another feature of the JP's foreign policy understanding was that economy was as important as security. As mentioned in the JP programme, for Demirel foreign policy should support the economic development programmes of Turkey.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ For the details of the figures and the elections see: Shaw and Shaw, *History*, pp. 425-426; Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 138-139; Ahmad and Ahmad, *Türkiye'de...*, p. 299; J. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, (Leiden: 1974), pp. 247-264.

¹¹⁹ Süleyman Demirel's Speech, 'Adalet Partisi'nin Kuruluşunun 5. Yılına Girerken', (*When the JP is 5 Years-Old*), *Zafer* (daily), 11 February 1965. The Times argued Demirel had to persuade the army to continue: cited in *Zafer* (daily), 16 February 1965.

¹²⁰ Kazım Öztürk, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri ve Programları*, (*The Governments of the Turkish Republic and Their Programmes*), (Istanbul: Ak, 1968), p. 665.

Despite similarities with the DP, neo-Democrats did not believe they could rely on only the United States, therefore, unlike the DP, the JP did not defend an absolute pro-American stance while it was still Americanist and advocated closer relations with United States.¹²¹ In the words of Mango, despite the ideological similarities between the DP and the JP, 'the JP government did not prevent the emergence of a new look in Turkish foreign policy.'¹²² Second, unlike the neo-Kemalists it continued to perceive communism as the greatest threat to Turkish society and security.¹²³ As has been seen, İnönü and Ürgüplü governments had used the Soviet factor to counter-balance 'the pro-Greek' American attitude in the Cyprus issue. However the JP programme declared a new card: The Muslim world. The programme also aimed to improve relations with the UN and the Third World countries.¹²⁴ This foreign policy principle was a natural extension of the JP's neo-Democrat ideology. As a conservative, religious and capitalist party the JP's anti-Soviet attitude was understandable. Nevertheless, the fact was that the United States had let Turkey down and to balance United States the JP government looked to Europe. The EC was seen as the new source of political and financial support. As a result the JP championed Turkey's integration with Western Europe. As Tevetoğlu, a leading JP member, stated, for the JP integration in Europe was the only solution to security and development problems of Turkey in a Cold War environment.¹²⁵ The JP, unlike the leftist-Kemalists could not give up Westernism, because the West, for the JP, was not only a foreign policy choice but a guaranty of its existence inside. For them, integration with the West was the only way to stop the Kemalist elite from dominating the political system. In other words, though the JP was more cautious about the West, nevertheless it had little choice but to look towards it.

The JP also attempted to improve Turkey's relations with the Muslim states, which Turkey had neglected since the Kemal era, in order to balance Turkey's dependency on

¹²¹ Nasuh Uslu, '1947'den Günümüze Türk - Amerikan İlişkilerinin Genel Portresi', (*The General Portrait of Turkish-American Relations Since 1947*), *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 209.

¹²² Mango, *Turkey*, p. 96.

¹²³ 'Solun Ardi Komünizm' (*There is Communism behind the Left*), *Yeni İstanbul*, 13 January 1965; 'Komünizmi Bulduğunuz Yerde Ezin, AP Komünizmin Karşısında' (*Destroy Communism When You See, JP Against Communism*), *Son Havadis*, 13 June 1965; 'Süleyman Demirel: Vatandaş Aşırı Soldan Şikayetçidir' (*Süleyman Demirel: People are not Happy with the Leftist Radicalism*), *Zafer*, 16 June 1965.

¹²⁴ Öztürk, *Türkiye...*, p. 663.

¹²⁵ Fethi Tevetoğlu, *Dış Politika Görüşümüz* (*Our Foreign Policy Perspective*), (Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaası, 1963).

the Western block. The JP's moderate Islamic ideology also played a crucial role and made such a relation durable. The JP also made efforts to improve relations with the other Third world countries, however Demirel did not consider these countries to be an alternative to the West arguing that Turkey had to maintain good relations with United States, Europe, Muslim countries and the Third World as he once asked:

'What would Turkey does any taking her place with the Third World or among the socialist countries? What interest would she have in it? Turkey's economic interests, her political interests, her defence requirements due to her geopolitical location and importance are in the policy she is pursuing today.'¹²⁶

In brief, Demirel's balanced foreign policy was **multi-dimensional** (*Çok Yönlü Dış Politika*). Moreover, similar to the Democrats' foreign policy, the JP focused on economic issues and perceived economic development as an inseparable part of foreign policy. The 1965 Party Programme declared that Turkey's foreign policy must contribute Turkish foreign policy.¹²⁷ The difference between the neo-Kemalists and the JP was that the JP, like the DP, was economy-minded and more pragmatic. These economic considerations also motivated the JP for economic integration with the European Community.

The Implementation of the JP's Multi-Dimensional Foreign Policy

Despite the resurgence of leftist-Kemalism and army pressures, during the period 1961-1973, the Democrat's successor, the JP, won the majority in all elections, either by itself or with the NTP (New Turkey Party). However, the Justice Party was prevented from forming a government until 1965. Instead İnönü formed a series of weak coalitions. Furthermore, even though the JP won the majority of votes itself and formed its own independent governments in 1965 and 1969, it was effectively prevented from exercising full authority by the well planned strategies of the radical wing of the RPP.¹²⁸ Also the Court of Constitution, established by the 1960 coup leaders blocked much JP legislation and apart from these obstacles the bureaucracy was very reluctant to carry out JP policies. Moreover, the JP was aware that the real power was in the army's

¹²⁶ Demirel cited in David Kushner, 'Ataturk's Legacy: Westernism in Contemporary Turkey', in Jacob M. Landau (ed.), *Ataturk and Modernization of Turkey*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), p. 235-236.

¹²⁷ *1965 Adalet Partisi Parti Programı (1965 Justice Party Programme)*, (Ankara: AP, 1965)

¹²⁸ Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Military, the State, and Politics', in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), *State, Democracy and the Military, Turkey in the 1980s*, (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 137-158, p. 143.

hands, was very cautious in its relations with the military and its supporters, namely the Kemalist bureaucracy.¹²⁹ Thus, although the JP was in power, the army and the Kemalist elite, bureaucracy still had much influence, as called 'hidden power' by the JP.¹³⁰ A final decision was taken by Kemalist-elitist-Jacobean bureaucracy, the intelligentsia and Army. Süleyman Demirel frequently complained about this structure, calling it *çoklu idare* (government by many) and claimed that with such a constitutional structure it was impossible to govern properly. Anti-JP coalition used Kemalism to attack the liberal policies as Demirel accused anti-capitalists and leftist in the Kemalist institutions of using Kemalism to mask their real aims and interests and to prevent the government from implementing the reforms.¹³¹

Secularism vs. Pragmatism?: Relations with the Islamic World

Thanks to Turkey's aloneness in international arena, the Cyprus Problem and the JP's cultural-ideological orientations, the JP began restructuring Turkey's policy vis-à-vis Muslim states. This shift was significant, because, as the first time in the republican Turkish history, a political party advocated the Arab arguments against the West and Israel in the Middle East in its party programme.¹³² As has been seen Turkey had strictly refused to join any conference, meeting or organisation based on common religious or Islamic-Ottoman cultural values during the Atatürk period, and similarly İnönü, the 27 May and Ürgüplü governments had never seen the Islamic solidarity as an alternative or a card to use against the West.¹³³ However now the JP was perceiving the Ottoman culture and Islam as an inseparable element of Turkish social and political life claiming Turkey's indifferent attitude to the Eastern world was damaging Turkey's national interests.¹³⁴ As a result, Turkey initiated a diplomatic campaign focusing on the Muslim states and the other Third World countries. High level meetings for instance arranged with the leaders of the influential Muslim states, like Iran and Pakistan, and

¹²⁹ Avner Levi, 'The Justice Party, 1961-1980', in Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 134-151, p. 145; Avner Levi, *The Justice Party of Turkey, 1961-1977*, unpublished PhD thesis, the Hebrew University (Jerusalem, Israel), 1983; Arcayürek, Cüneyt..., pp. 89-95.

¹³⁰ *Cumhuriyet* (daily, Istanbul), 25 August 1966.

¹³¹ *Milliyet*, 6 July 1969.

¹³² Öztürk, *Türkiye...*, p. 67.

¹³³ Kemal Kirişçi, 'Turkey and the Muslim Middle East', in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds.), *Turkey's New World, Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), pp. 39-58.

¹³⁴ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Vol. 2, 28. Session, 27 November 1965, pp. 16-82.

Turkish representatives were sent to attend various meetings including non-aligned Third World countries' and the Islamic states'.¹³⁵

According to Demirel, the main principles of Turkish foreign policy in his term would be a. Seeking additional measures and guarantees, b) searching new way and political development, c. To find new support from Turkey of Turkey.¹³⁶

Turkey had strictly refused to join any conference or meeting based on common religion and cultural values, as the Kemalist reforms aimed at a complete break with the Ottoman past. However the experience of 1960s proved that Ottoman culture and Islam were inseparable elements of Turkish social life and foreign policy. The successes of the DP and JP underlined the failure of the Westernist elite and the Cyprus crisis showed, Turkey's indifferent attitude to the Eastern world was harming Turkey's national interests. Thus even the foreign ministry bureaucracy, the champion of Westernism in Turkey for centuries, began to accept that Turkey was not only a European country but also an Asian, Middle Eastern, developing Muslim country. Hamit Batu, a senior Ministry official, in an article published by the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry accepted that:

'Turkey was admitted into the European Community because of its geopolitical and strategic situation. It is the only Muslim member of that community. It was affiliated with another culture. Its position in the European Community cannot be regarded as strong... Because of its past and present social personality, Turkey occupies a certain position in the eyes of the Asian and African countries, and should aim at maintaining it. This Asian-African policy should not be pursued only on a temporary basis to gain support for certain political causes. It should be pursued on a permanent basis to gain the 'friendship' and 'intimate concern' of the Asian and African countries.'¹³⁷

The Ministry's approach was closer to the JP's foreign policy because diplomats, unlike the neo-Kemalists, did not see the Third World or the communist world as an alternative to NATO. For them, Turkey's NATO membership was not an obstacle while the leftist-Kemalists argued that Turkey's NATO membership prevented good relations with the rest of the world. Despite the change in the Ministry's approach, the impact of the traditional Westernism also continued among the diplomats. Ambassador İközler reveals

¹³⁵ Mahmut Bali Aykan, 'The OIC and Turkey's Cyprus Cause', in *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, (Ankara University), 1995, Vol. XXV, p. 51.

¹³⁶ Arcayürk, Cüneyt..., p. 125.

¹³⁷ Hamit Batu, 'Turkey's Foreign Policy', *Bulletin of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry*, No. 6, March 1965, pp. 21-25. For Baykan, Batu's article a historical article that shows a remarkable change in

this mode of thinking in his memoirs:

'The only thing I can recall about Ambassador Olcay, Turkey's ambassador to India, was that he was radically admirer of the Western world. I do not know what was the reason: The missionary school he attended or the family roots? He was always disparaging the Asian nations. For example, once he confessed that the Pakistanis sicken him. For him the Indians were also disgusting... For instance he avoided shaking the hands of Indians.'¹³⁸

Under the light of the above information it can be argued that the JP's new foreign policy indicated a clear departure from the traditional approach. Though international developments forced for a new way, the JP's warm feelings about the Muslim world could not be explained only by referring to the external factors because the JP was referring to Muslim states as 'Turkey's brother countries' and declared that one of its main aims was to improve Turkey's relations with the Muslim states in the Middle East and Africa.¹³⁹

Turkey's practical aim was clear; to get support of Muslim countries against Greece in a platform where the Greeks were not represented and thus to counter-balance the Greek propaganda in the West and the UN.¹⁴⁰ Like Turkey, in these years the Arabs were also upset with the West's attitude vis-à-vis the Arabs and Israel in the Palestinian question, and seeking to establish an Islamic organisation to benefit from the religious solidarity. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia led the attempt to create political co-operation and solidarity based on the common Islamic values and to ensure Turkey's attendance at a future Islamic conference upholding such an idea.¹⁴¹ For the Kemalists this obviously would violate one of the main principles of Turkish foreign policy, namely secularism. However, Turkish statesmen did not refuse Faisal's invitation for such a conference. Even Turkish President Cevdet Sunay, a former general, met with Faisal to discuss the matter. Turkey remained uncommitted yet seemed to be supportive of the general idea

the official understanding.

¹³⁸ M. Yılmaz İkizer, *Şu Bizim Garip Hariciye ve Dış Politika, Anılar, Olaylar, (Our Strange Foreign Ministry and Foreign Policy, Memoirs and Events)*, (Istanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, n.d.), p. 73. Olcay then became the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

¹³⁹ *Hükümet Programı, (Government's Programme)*, (Ankara: Basbakanlık Devlet Matbaası, 1965), pp. 40-41. Also the programme stated that Turkey had supported Arabs in Arab-Israeli question and the Arabs could trust Turkey in future.

¹⁴⁰ *The Bulletin of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, / Dışişleri Bakanlığı Bülteni (The Bulletin)*. No. 4, January 1965, pp. 67-68.

¹⁴¹ *The Bulletin of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Dışişleri Bakanlığı Bülteni (The Bulletin)*, No. 24, September 1966, pp. 44-45.

of convening an Islamic conference in which Turkey would participate¹⁴² and viewed such a conference as a great advantage against Greece.¹⁴³

The Demirel government, for the first time in Republican history changed Turkey's stand vis-à-vis Israel and the Arabs and in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War announced that Turkey would not permit the United States to utilise Turkish bases to support Israel.¹⁴⁴ Also Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil advocated an immediate Israeli withdrawal at the UN General Assembly meeting and gave clear support to the Arabs¹⁴⁵ - the first time Turkey did not follow the United States and the other Western states in UN voting and supported the Arab argument.¹⁴⁶ Thanks to Turkey's pro-Arab policies, even Nasser's Egypt and Syria thanked Turkey and some Arab states including Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Libya supported Turkey in the Cyprus problem.¹⁴⁷ Domestically the religious, conservative groups enthusiastically supported the JP and even the leftist TIP and the Communist groups warmly welcomed the JP's pro-Arab Israel policy. The JP with the support of the left and right continued this policy.

However, despite consensus on the Arab-Israeli conflict, Turkey's participation in the first Islamic Conference caused a political crisis at home. The first attempts to organise an Islamic conference had failed but the Al-Aqsa mosque fire of 1969, started by some Zionists, changed the balance in the Middle East. The fire aroused great indignation among the Muslim nations against Israel and following the fire, Hassan II, the King of Morocco, invited all Muslim leaders, including Turkey, to an Islamic conference to show Muslim solidarity against Israel. According to the invitation to Rabat the two issues discussed would be the Al-Aqsa fire and the status of the city of Jerusalem. For

¹⁴² Aykan, *Ideology...*, p. 64.

¹⁴³ In the 1965 Jeddah Muslim Congress, Turkey enjoyed 36 Muslim countries' political support on the Cyprus issue as the Congress condemned the Greek attacks in Cyprus. *Cumhuriyet* (daily, Istanbul), 23 April 1965. Similarly same year Iran, Libya and Pakistan gave support to Turkey in the UN against the Greek initiative as a sign of Muslim solidarity. These goodwill gestures were welcomed in a isolated Turkey and inevitably affected Turkey's foreign policy. Nadir Nadi, *Cumhuriyet* (daily, Istanbul), 21 December 1965.

¹⁴⁴ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, (*The Records of Grand Assembly*), Birleşim 115, Oturum 1, 18, 1967, pp. 168-169.

¹⁴⁵ *The Bulletin of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, No. 33, 1967, p. 40 and pp. 55-56; *The Bulletin of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, No. 17, February 1966, p. 70.

¹⁴⁶ Kemal H. Karpat, *Milliyet* (daily), 23 June 1967; Bölükbaşı, *Türkiye ve...*, p. 5.

¹⁴⁷ Some of these declarations are: Turkey-Saudi Arabia Declaration (27 January 1968), Turkey-Libya Joint Declaration (31 January 1968) and Turkey - Irak Joint Declaration (1 May 1968): *The Bulletin of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, No. 40, 1968, pp. 49-63; *The Bulletin of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, No. 42, pp. 50-51; *The Bulletin of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign*

the Demirel-led JP the invitation was a perfect opportunity for Turkey to make its return to the Islamic world. İnönü opposed the invitation arguing that such a meeting would violate Kemalist secularist standing and the Turkish constitution because Kemal had refused all invitations for any meeting based on Islamic values. Moreover, İnönü argued that Turkish participation at the Rabat Conference would harm Turkey's neutrality vis-à-vis Israel and the Arab states.¹⁴⁸ The left saw Demirel's decision as an election-tactic,¹⁴⁹ but also the army expressed its unease. Furthermore some leftist-Kemalists argued that Turkey might risk its neutrality in the region by involving itself in Egypt-Saudi Arabia competition.¹⁵⁰ Turkey participated in the conference, but it was not represented by the President or Prime Minister, but by the Foreign Minister. Also the Turkish representative declared that Turkey was a secular state and that its participation should not be viewed as an anti-secular statement. Moreover, Turkey said that it could not discuss any other issue but solely the Al-Aqsa fire in the conference. In his response to the invitation, furthermore, Turkish President Sunay refrained from using the word of Islam and underlined Turkey's secular characteristic¹⁵¹ as Demirel argued 'Whatever the name of the conference is not important, its agenda is well known. The Al-Aqsa fire and the status of Jerusalem. That's all. It is not a religious meeting, but political. True Muslim states participate, but this does not make the meeting anti-secular.'¹⁵²

At the conference the Turkish delegate said that Turkey would support any document to promote the Arab position or criticise Israel, but opposed any full condemnation of Israel and opposed the Palestine Liberation Organisation's (PLO) participation into the conference as a full member.¹⁵³

The Turkish stance at the conference pleased neither Israel nor the Arabs. Also domestic opponent increased their criticism about the JP foreign policy. The only benefit for the JP was the conservatives' support domestically. Moreover, the Rabat Conference proved that NATO membership was not an obstacle for improving its relations with the

Affairs, No: 44, 1968, pp. 37-40.

¹⁴⁸ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, (*The Records of Grand Assembly*), 3, 1970, pp. 450-451.

¹⁴⁹ *Milliyet*, 19, 22, 26 September 1969; İlhan Selçuk, 'Ortadoğu'da Türkiye', (*Turkey in the Middle East*), *Cumhuriyet*, 2 October 1969.

¹⁵⁰ Kayhan Sağlamer, 'İslam Paktı ve Türkiye', (*Islamic Pact and Turkey*), *Cumhuriyet*, 20 February 1966.

¹⁵¹ İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, *Anılarım*, (*My Memoirs*), (İstanbul: Güneş, 1990), p. 63.

¹⁵² *The Bulletin of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, No. 60, 1969, pp. 19-20.

¹⁵³ *Cumhuriyet*, 4 October 1969.

developing countries and that despite its good relations with Israel Turkey had been invited and this invitation showed that Turkey was still considered a natural member of the Muslim world.

The Rabat Conference was followed by conventions of Islamic Ministers for Foreign Affairs at which the secretariat succeeded in drawing up a charter for the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.¹⁵⁴ However, Turkey did not send its Minister, but the General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jeddah. Turkish representative did not oppose the idea of establishing a General Secretariat for the organisation, however Turkey cautiously refrained from committing itself to regular participation in the conference. Also Turkish delegates pointed out the political difference between Turkey and the other Muslim countries.

In addition to the decision to participate at the Rabat Conference and the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, the JP also refused to utilise the NATO bases for United States forces to intervene the Jordan Affair as a part of its new eastern policy.¹⁵⁵

Demirel explained Turkey's position as follow:

'We live in a dangerous region. We have to be in good relations with the regional countries. The block we are in could not change this reality.'¹⁵⁶

All these were clear signs of the radical shift in Turkey's Kemalist foreign policy towards the Muslim world.

Relations with the West: the EEC and United States

Demirel suffered from the army and bureaucracy's obstinacy at home and feared a possible military intervention. In this context, he saw the West as a guarantee of safety for non-Kemalist political groups and Turkish democracy. Thus, Demirel attempted to fasten the integration process with the European Community. Further, the need for new financial assistance¹⁵⁷ and the need for political support after the disappointment with the United States had pushed Turkey into the EC. The Turkish economy was far from

¹⁵⁴ Landau, *The Politics...*, pp. 188-189.

¹⁵⁵ *The Bulletin of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Dışişleri Bakanlığı Bülteni*, No. 72, 1970, p. 27.

¹⁵⁶ Demirel, in Çaglayangil, *Anılarım*, pp. 125-126.

¹⁵⁷ Demirel clearly underscored need for foreign aid in his speech: Demirel in 'İktisadi Gelişme Var', *Son Havadis* (daily), 25 June 1965.

capable of competing with the EC economies, nevertheless, in the third year of the preparatory stage, in May 1967, the Demirel government demanded negotiations to start the transition stage to entry. This proves that the motive behind Demirel's EC policy was a political one more than economical. Although economic considerations, such as new concessions for Turkish agricultural and industrial exports; improved conditions for Turkish migrant workers; and financial aid were also important, but the main motive for entry was political. The negotiations concluded with the Additional Protocol on 22 July 1970 which became effective in January 1973. Thus the transitional stage was started.¹⁵⁸ The Protocol deigned a programme for the creation of a customs union and in order to reach a customs union, a strict preparation programme was planned, which would abolish Turkish tariff barriers for EC exports within 12 to 22 years. It also provided free access for all Turkish industrial goods except textiles and petroleum products while free movement of labour and capital between the EC and Turkey would be phased in between the 12th and 22nd year. Finally the second financial protocol would provide \$ 195 million over a five-year period.¹⁵⁹

Despite the change in the United States' Turkey policy, similar to the Democrats, neo-Democrats could not give up their Americanist ideas. They were more cautious in America policy,¹⁶⁰ but they still could not accept Turkish security without United States' support.¹⁶¹ Demirel stated:

'We must search a way not to demolish Turkish-American friendship. Also we should remember that the strongest relations are based on mutual interests rather than emotions.'¹⁶²

¹⁵⁸ Roswitha Bourguignon, 'The History of the Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Community', in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (eds.), *Turkey and the European Community*, (Opladen, Germany: Leske&Budrich, 1990), p. 54; Meltem Müftüler, *The Impact of External Factors on Internal Transformation: Turkish Structural Adjustment Process and the European Community*, PhD Thesis, The Temple University, Florida, 1992, p. 81.

¹⁵⁹ *Additional Protocol, Official Journal of the EC*, No. 293, 27 December 1972; Mehmet Ali Birand, 'Turkey and the European Community', *The World Today*, February 1978, pp. 52-61; Redmond, John, *The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community: Turkey, Cyprus and Malta?*, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), p. 27. Also see Mehmet Ali Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası: 1959-1985*, (*Turkey's Common Market Adventure*), (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1985).

¹⁶⁰ Arcayürek, Cüneyt..., p. 125.

¹⁶¹ 'Muarızlarımız Ne Yaparlarsa Yapsınlar, Gideceklerdir', *Son Havadis* (daily, Istanbul), 13 January 1965; İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, 'Türkiye'nin NATO'daki Yeri', (*Turkey's Place in the NATO*), in *Türkiye ve NATO*, (*Turkey and the NATO*), (Ankara: Türk Atlantik Andlaşması Derneği Yayınları, No. 1, n.d.), pp. 123-127.

¹⁶² *Haber* (daily), 2 May 1965.

In addition, Demirel saw the United States as a financial aid source for his economic reforms and the US as an ideological model for the new Democrats. For instance at the first congress of the JP Demirel had exhibited his picture with American President Johnson to underline his close ties to the US. Turkey's rush for an agreement with the EC and the agreement itself also showed Demirel's enthusiasm for integration with the West. Contrary to the communists, neo-Kemalists and the Islamists, Demirel, despite his Eastern policy, did not neglect the EC and United States. Therefore, the leftists and the Islamists blamed Demirel for selling Turkey to the West calling him as 'Morrison Süleyman'.¹⁶³

Conclusion: Towards a Multilateral Policy or Deviation from Kemalism

In the post-coup years two important factors started a chain-reaction process in Turkish foreign policy, which would continue until the 1980s. The first factor was external, the détente process and as a result of the détente the change in United State's Turkey policy. Turkey's security challenge remained the most important issue in the 1960s and Turkey was still exposed to the Cold War. However, after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the change in East-West relations became more visible and the détente process allowed United States strategies and at the same time Turkey lost confidence in the US.¹⁶⁴ The weakening Turkish fears about the Soviet threat in the beginning of the 1960s also helped the change. The second American shock came with the Johnson Letter, in which United States threatened Turkey not to intervene in the Cyprus problem. In addition, other European countries pro-Greek declarations let Turkey down, and forced the Turkish policy makers to search a new foreign policy. In the Cyprus crisis particularly Turkey turned its face to the Muslims states and the Third World. Moreover the Western attitude undermined the Kemalist and other Westernist schools and caused an ideological transformation in Turkish foreign policy. The second factor was internal, the military coup and disintegration process that it triggered. The disintegration as will be seen below nourished the ideological crisis and forced the ideological groups to find new approaches in foreign policy.

¹⁶³ Gerger, *Türk...*, 1998), p. 114.

¹⁶⁴ Karpat, 'Introduction', p. 8.

Coup and the Ideological Transformation in Foreign Policy

The European and American attitudes not only undermined Westernist assumptions in foreign policy, but also made the Turkish elite extremely sensitive to criticism from within the Western block. In fact, the West by undermining Westernism in Turkey caused an ideological crisis in Kemalism and other foreign policy schools. Moreover, the 1960 military's leftist orientation nourished socialist ideas among the Kemalists. This development led to a transformation in the RPP from pragmatic, realist and pro-Western Kemalism to an idealist, leftist and a more Western sceptic Kemalism. Although this ideology could not find opportunity to implement its policies, with Ecevit's government, this would influence Turkey's foreign policy in the 1970s. The 1960s also saw the start of the disintegration process in Turkish politics which made a suitable environment for the resurgence of the Ottoman schools of thought, such as Islamism and Turkism. As noted above, the neo-Democrats were no exception and similar to the Kemalists they had to set a new foreign policy understanding in the post-coup era. They were now more cautious about the West, and more understanding towards the east.

Finally, after the 1960 Coup, thanks to the 1961 Constitution's pluralistic approach Turkey witnessed a divergence of political and social ideas.¹⁶⁵ Islamists, Turkists, and the liberals composed the Right-wing, while the Kemalists (all of them), Marxists, Socialists and separatist Kurds composed the Left-wing of the political system. For Kili this new environment represented a 'struggle' after the Kemalist period;

'... since 1960 Revolution Turkish politics has been characterised by a "struggle" between ideologues, sharply different political views, and by the breakdown of elite unity.'¹⁶⁶

The effects of the Ottoman legacy was clear. The Islamists were suggesting a better relationship with the Islamic world, while the Turkists were dreaming of a Turkic world including all the Turkic peoples from the Balkans to China. The liberals advocated more freedom and integration with the Western political and economic system. The conservative-liberal Democrat Party tradition aimed to compromise all these approaches, which can be called a Turkish-Islam Synthesis with pro-Westernism. By

¹⁶⁵ Mohammad Sadiq, 'Intellectual Origins of the Turkish National Liberation Movement', *International Studies* (New Delhi), Vol. 15, 1976, pp. 509-529, p. 509.

¹⁶⁶ Kili, *Kemalism*, p. 2.

contrast the left-wing wanted neither the West nor the East. For them the Islamic world was the symbol of backwardness, while Western capitalism was the symbol of colonisation and exploitation of the Third World. They advocated a more balanced foreign policy. For them Turkey was a Third World country and it must co-operate with these countries. Also for them Turkey should improve its relations with the Soviet Union and must not rely on only the United States. In the midst of divergent ideologies Kemalism became the object of refutation as it represented the ideology of the establishment.¹⁶⁷ Islamists, liberals and Marxist heavily criticised the Kemalist (Mustafa Kemal's and İnönü's Kemalism) foreign policy. All these critics forced the governments to re-consider its foreign policy. In this trend the Marxist impact on Turkish foreign policy was significant.

¹⁶⁷ Sadiq, 'Intellectual...', p. 509.

CHAPTER IX

Neo-Kemalism vs. Kemalism

(1971-1980)

‘...the sources of imminent threat to Turkey changed considerably in recent years. Turkey does not see the Soviet Union as a threat...’¹

Bülent Ecevit, Prime Minister, 1978

With the 1971 coup a leftist government, headed by Bülent Ecevit came to power. Although he called his foreign policy ‘Kemalist’, Ecevit’s idealist, leftist foreign policy understanding ran counter to Atatürk’s pragmatist, realist policy. With his Islamist partner Necmettin Erbakan, Ecevit followed a radical foreign policy. This orientation constituted a dramatic shift in Turkish foreign policy in terms of both ideology and practices. However, Turkish foreign policy in the 1970s was not only shaped by one ideology, but was rather affected by a multitude of ideologies, from left to radical Islam. In what follows, this chapter will look at the ideological changes in the main political groups - leftist-Kemalists, Justice Party and the Islamists – before examining the implementation. A special emphasis will be placed on the Cyprus Crises and the attendant disappointment with the United States and the EC and their effect on Turkish foreign policy.

1971 Coup and the Disintegration in Turkish Politics

The Army as a ‘Political Power’

On 12 March 1971 the leading generals of the army presented Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel a memorandum demanding that he form a government that could take firm steps to maintain public order.² According to the memorandum, responsibility for the anarchy and socio-economic unrest in the country lay with the parliament and the government’s policies. Therefore, as the army saw it, Turkey needed a new, credible and strong government inspired by Kemalist principles.³ As Demirel rejected the ultimatum and resigned, President Cevdet Sunay asked Nihat Erim to form a

¹ Bülent Ecevit, ‘Turkey’s Security Policies’, *Survival*, Vol. 20, No. 5, September / October 1978, p. 203.

² Ali Geyikli, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, (*The Rise and Decline*), (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1987), pp. 509-510.

³ *Milliyet*, 13 March 1971; Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü, The Making of a Turkish Statesman*, (Leiden: Brill, 1998), p. 232.

government of respected public figures (elite-government)⁴ which he did. Having received a vote of confidence, the government declared martial law in the major provinces. A reported 4,000 terrorists were caught, leftist newspapers were closed down and some civil liberties were suspended. In the next two years strict anti-terrorist measures were maintained.

The military intervention increased the polarisation in Turkish political life and led to the disintegration of moderate political groups, both right and left. The radicals, Islamists, communists, ultra-nationalists and Kurds argued that it was impossible to reach their aims in a democratic system because the regime under the army's leadership would never allow different ideas in political life. The first effect of this disillusionment was the resurgence of the Islamist NSP (National Salvation Party), the ultra-Turkist NAP (Nationalist Action Party), as well as the rise of the radical left in many small parties. The second effect was more dramatic - the rise of terrorism, particularly leftist and Kurdish. The moderate conservatives and the liberals felt unable to challenge the regime, but the radical nationalists and Islamists continued to criticise the regime, and dramatically increased their popularity among ordinary Turks. At first martial law succeeded in suppressing terrorism yet success proved temporary. In a short time an undeclared war was started by the extremist left and the radical nationalists. Between 1978 and 1980 5,000 people were killed and over 14,000 people were injured in the clashes.⁵

The military intervention underlined the army's undeniable position in Turkish politics, buying it the title of SKP, (*Silahlı Kuvvetler Partisi* or Armed Forces Party) since it acted like a political party.⁶ The competing parties at the time were the Justice Party (right wing), Republican People's Party (leftist Kemalist) and Kemalist SKP, namely the army; all three were secularist and Kemalist, but each had a different interpretation of Kemalism. Still it was the army which set the tone – through its monopoly over the means of violence. At times, the RPP, as Kemal's party co-operated with the army

⁴ Paul B. Henze, *Turkey and Atatürk's Legacy*, (Haarlem, Netherlands: SOTA, 1998), p. 74-75

⁵ Andrew Mango, *Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role*, (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), p. 24.

⁶ Hikmet Özdemir, *Ordunun Olağandışı Rolü*, (*The Army's Extraordinary Role*), (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1994), p. 265.

against the liberal-conservatives, which in turn preferred it to the other two.⁷ But most of the time the army preferred to go it alone and hold power in its hands. The Army claimed that it was free of ideologies, except Kemalism, going so far as to argue that Kemalism was not an ideology but a unique idea that helped Turkey to adopt an advanced level of civilisation, *muasır medeniyet seviyesi*.⁸ As demonstrated by the İnönü era and the first military coup, this was not true. In each era, the new Kemalists reproduced a different Kemalism from Mustafa Kemal's acts and policies. In order to maintain their position or justify their ideas not only the army but also all political parties invoked Kemalism because it was impossible to succeed in the Turkish political system as an anti-Kemalist body.

RPP: From Kemalism to Radical Left?

The military intervention not only led to the disintegration of the main political groups but also demolished the consensus inside the parties. In addition to the coalition governments, there were coalitions inside the coalition parties, like the Republican People's Party. With the natural death of İsmet İnönü the disagreement in the party increased, and Bülent Ecevit, the new leader, transformed the party from Kemalism's home-base to a more leftist party. Ecevit's ideas were a reaction to the existing regime though he claimed his ultimate aim was to implement 'true Kemalism'.⁹ His slogan was 'This Order Must Change', and he argued that the existing economic and political order was exploitative and supported by the imperialist powers and their collaborators inside.¹⁰ As a result, Kemalism was discarded to some extent as an ideology. Surprisingly, as Karpas pointed out, the new RPP took a position which was diametrically opposed to the basic tenets of the Republican regime, in that it tended to reject the concept of nation (*ulus*) and the nation-state idea.¹¹ The party identified itself as the representative of the true-left and the party of ideals of true-socialism. Thus, the

⁷ For example the leaders of the 1960 and 1971 take-overs gave a clear preference to the RPP. For 1971 coup see General Muhsin Batur's memoirs: *Anılar ve Görüşler: Üç Dönemin Perde Arkası*, (*Memoirs and Ideas: The Hidden Side of the Three Periods*), (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1985).

⁸ Semih Vaner, 'Ordu' (*Army*), in Irvin Cemil Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (eds.), *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye* (*Turkey in Transformation Period*), (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1990), pp. 255-284.

⁹ Bülent Ecevit, *Atatürk ve Devrimcilik*, (*Ataturk and Revolutionism*), (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1969), pp. 2-14.

¹⁰ Bülent Ecevit, *Demokratik Solda Temel Sorunlar*, (*The Fundamental Problems in Democratic Left*), (Ankara: Ajanstürk, 1975).

¹¹ Kemal H. Karpas, 'The Military, the State, and Politics', in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), *State, Democracy and the Military, Turkey in the 1980s*, (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 147.

RPP established by Atatürk, who was very sensitive about the minority issue and made efforts to lessen the differences among the Turks, Kurds and the other ethnic groups, described the Alevis and the Kurds as suppressed minorities and demanded their votes, offering itself as a home to all radical leftist and ethnic groups claiming to be a minority. The hegemony of the left in the party was certain, nevertheless, the RPP consisted of three different political groups: Ecevit's followers, who were leftist, etatist, elitist and secularist; then, there were the Marxist, radical etatist, anti-religious groups; finally there were 'true Kemalists' early Republican and İnönü type Kemalists, anti-religious, elitist, against the liberal-conservatives but at the same time against socialism and Marxism.¹² In time, the Ecevit group would hold absolute power in the party. Although Ecevit and his friends named themselves Kemalists, as Çelik argued 'Kemalism's political demise became prominent in the gradual alienation of the RPP from the state ideology',¹³ and the new RPP produced a new type of Kemalism. Under this new Kemalism even the fundamental ideological tenets of Kemalism were questioned or changed, like populism; After 1972, the meaning of populism, one of the Kemalist six arrows, changed radically and became a reaction against the populism of the 1930s. Though Mustafa Kemal never accepted a classes-policy, neo-Kemalists underlined the class differences and attributed social injustice to class inequalities.¹⁴

The participation of the radicals in the party made RPP domestic and foreign policies more radical. Similarly, the deviation of the party from Kemalism alienated the army from the RPP. The worst effect of the disintegration in the RPP resulted in increasing tension in political and social life. Furthermore, the radical left's anti-Americanism and anti-capitalism led the RPP's leadership to believe that the West was against Turkey and undermining its welfare and social integrity. Therefore the RPP, under Ecevit, always blamed the West for Turkey's economic and political problems. As the RPP saw it, terrorism in particular was supported by Turkey's NATO allies and Ecevit constantly questioned the sincerity of the Europeans and the Americans. For the leftist radicals of the RPP, for example, the EC was a club of neo-imperialists seeking to exploit the Third

¹² For the rivalry between the different groups in the RPP see: Frank Tachau, 'The Republican People's Party, 1945-1980', in Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 108-109; Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, 'Class and Clientelism in the Republican People's Party', in Andrew Finkel and Nükhet Sirman (eds.), *Turkish States, Turkish Society*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 160-161.

¹³ Nur Betül Çelik, *Kemalist Hegemony from Its Constitution to Its Dissolution*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Essex, January 1996, p. 226.

World countries including Turkey. Most importantly, with the ideological shift in the RPP, Kemalist ideology lost its social and political ground in parliament. Thus politically Kemalism lost its popular support, although constitutional and other written power belonged to the Kemalist institutions and elite. All these developments made the Kemalist dilemma more obvious at home leading to another coup in 1980.

Ecevit's leftist policies undermined the Kemalist establishment and radicalised its foreign policy as witnessed in the Cyprus case; paradoxically, the new ideology put an end to the RPP's decline in the elections: Under Kemalist İnönü the RPP dramatically lost votes to the right-wing parties, declining from 36.7 % (1961) to 28.7 % (1965) and finally to 27.4 % (1969). With Ecevit's leftist-Kemalism the RPP made a surprise comeback, becoming the largest party in the 1973 elections with 33.3 % of the votes and 185 seats - 41 seats short of an absolute majority.¹⁵ Thus the RPP once more became the ruling party with its amended ideology.

In foreign policy, as noted, the RPP with the increasing role of the leftist elements became more radical¹⁶ and more wary of the West; For instance, the leftist Ecevit defied the US in the poppy-growing crisis, he then made a military operation in Cyprus despite America's disapproval. Moreover, Ecevit blamed the EC and the US for Turkey's domestic problems and adopted an uncompromising posture vis-à-vis the EC's attempts to improve relations with Turkey. It is certain that all these policies were not free of Ecevit's idealist radicalism and leftist ideology. As discussed, Ecevit had been deeply influenced by the 1960s leftist *Yön* movement and socialist ideas. For instance, he was against the close relationship between the West and Turkey. In his book, *Bu Düzen Değişmelidir*¹⁷ Ecevit advocated a lessening of foreign influence in Turkey, namely Turkey's alliance relation with the Western bloc. Ecevit also advocated greater independence and more friendly relations with the Third World and Soviet Union. For him, all these policies were Kemalist policies because Atatürk was a leftist and anti-imperialist.¹⁸ In a later-day interview with the author, Ecevit went further and charged the conservatives and the liberals of acting as proxies of the West and therefore failing

¹⁴ Güneş-Ayata, 'Class...', p. 161.

¹⁵ Dodd, *The Crisis...*, pp. 223-234.

¹⁶ Dodd, *The Crisis...*, p. 35.

¹⁷ Bülent Ecevit, *Bu Düzen Değişmelidir (This Order Must Change)*, (İstanbul: Tekin, 1969).

¹⁸ Ecevit, *Atatürk...*

to realise Turkish foreign policy interests.¹⁹ These words, as well as the differences between Ecevit and Demirel, show the impact of ideology in Turkish foreign policy.

Neo-Democrats' Ottomanism and Westernism

As noted earlier, the DP was closed down by the army which created many small parties who were presented as the real successors of the DP. The JP and NTP were relatively successful and the JP gained majority in all the elections between 1960-73. Yet it was clear that the political current, which was economically liberal, conservative in social issues, and partly Ottomanist in foreign policy was weakened by the Kemalist military and bureaucracy. This trend continued after the 1971 coup. When they saw that it was impossible to achieve their aims in such a political structure and with such moderate policies, the Islamists and the Turkists gradually left the JP. Contrary to the RPP and the left cases, the radicals crystallised the JP's ideological ground as the radical ultra-nationalists and the Islamists set up their own parties, NSP and NAP. Thus the JP without the extremes became the party of liberal democrats, free-market defenders, moderate Muslims, moderate Turkists and other liberals and conservatives. On the other hand, it was weakened and could not implement its long term policies. After the departure of the Islamists and the Turkists, the JP vote fell from 46.5 percent in 1969 to 29.8 percent in the 1973 elections.²⁰

In foreign policy, as will be discussed in the next sections, the JP was less radical, and more pragmatic than the RPP. Despite its conservative orientation, it insisted on Turkey's integration into the West, particularly the EEC.²¹ While the RPP argued that full membership in the EEC would harm Turkey's economy, independence and Kemalist principles, for the JP the EEC was the only solution to economic problems, instability, terror and Turkey's foreign policy isolation. Moreover, the members of the Justice Party viewed the army and the Kemalist elite as a direct threat both to their party and to liberal-democracy in Turkey, while the West was perceived as the guarantor of the democratic system's existence. The JP's liberal orientation in economic issues provided suitable ground for good relations with the West. Furthermore, the JP advocated Ottomanist patterns in relations with the region, the Islamic world, the Third

¹⁹ Author's interview with Bülent Ecevit (Prime Minister at that time), 21 July 1996, Ankara.

²⁰ Dodd, *The Crisis...*, p. 223.

²¹ Ercüment Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, (*Our Leaders and Foreign Policy*), (Ankara: Bilgi

World and the outside Turks. However, Demirel understood that neither the Muslim world nor the Third World could be an alternative for Turkey's relation with the West. Similarly, improvement of relations with Eastern Europe was virtually impossible as it was under communist rule, which left Western Europe and the United States as the only foreign policy destination for Turkey.

Return of the Islamists: Islam as Foreign Policy Ideology²²

Thanks to the military interventions and the failure of moderate policies, after the Ottomanists (DP, JP and others) Westernists (Kemalists) and the leftists, another Ottoman school of thought reappeared in Turkish political life: Islamism. The Islamists supported the DP and the JP until the 1970s, when they founded their own party, *Milli Nizam Partisi* (the National Order Party, NOP). Necmettin Erbakan, the Party's leader, accused the JP of being an instrument of Zionists, freemasons, foreign capital and the rich classes. For Erbakan, the JP had turned its back on Islam, hence the Muslims could not give it their vote any more. When the NOP was outlawed in 1972 by the Constitutional Court for violating the secularism article of the Constitution the Islamists quickly established the *Milli Selamet Partisi* (National Salvation Party, NSP). In a very short time, the NSP became the third major party with 11.8 percent of the total vote.²³

The NSP called its ideology *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook). This advocated a rapid industrialisation and Islamisation in politics and culture. For the NSP both were possible without foreign aid. From this perspective, Turkey was able to create a third economic model, and industrialise without following the capitalist model or receiving American economic aid. Similar to Ecevit's 'This Order Must Change', Erbakan attacked the existing order and used 'A Just Order will Come and People will be Happy' slogan. According to *Milli Görüş*, the Ottoman Empire was a grand imperial power, and its success was due to a combination of military power and Islamic values. That is to say, contrary to Westernist secularists, Islam was not the cause of Ottoman collapse but the Empire's real source of power. Erbakan argued that not Islam but rather cultural westernisation had been responsible for economic and political collapse. As the

Yayinlari, 1996), p. 126.

²² For a detailed account on NSP see Jacob M. Landau, 'National Salvation Party in Turkey', *Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 2, 1976, pp. 1-57; Also Türker Alkan, 'The National Salvation Party in Turkey', in Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli (eds.), *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East*, (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 79-102.

successor of the Empire, Turkey was a natural candidate for a super power status. To do so, argued the NSP, Turkey had to abandon its reliance on the West in cultural, economic and political terms, turn to the Islamic world and build a national industry.²⁴ As a modernised interpretation of Islam, *Milli Görüş* argued that Turkey had to pursue world leadership in foreign policy.²⁵ The NSP's slogan in foreign policy was 'a great Turkey once again'. Erbakan argued that Islam could offer the third way between communism and capitalism. For the NSP, the European Community was a Christian Club and its only aim was to destroy the Turks and Muslims.²⁶ In 1970, for example, Erbakan accused of EC of colonising Turkey: 'Turkey ought not to be in the Common Market of the Western states but in the Common Market of the Eastern states. If Turkey enters the Common Market under today's conditions it will become a colony.'²⁷ According to Erbakan 'Turkey's interest lies with the Muslim countries',²⁸ therefore the NSP defended Islamic solidarity in the Middle East and a co-operation against Israel and the American interests.²⁹ Erbakan argued that other Muslims had oil and financial power while Turkey had manpower. He further argued that if these sources of power could be united under the Turkish leadership the external powers, notably the US, would never enter the region.³⁰ In this context, the NSP criticised the government's Middle East policies and derided the other parties as followers of Satan, namely the Europeans and the Americans. For the NSP, Turkey's interest lay with the Muslim countries, instead of the Christians:

'To enter into a common market arrangement with the Muslim countries can be profitable to us even if it is considered from a purely economic point of view, because they have financial resources and markets to buy Turkish goods. Unfortunately, some of our so called intelligentsia and political elite are unable to see these realities. They would like to reduce Turkey to a province of Christian Europe to be dictated to by the EC. They wish to reduce this nation with its glorious past and unique culture to a serfdom of Europe. God willing we shall not allow it.'³¹

²³ Dodd, *The Crisis...*, pp. 223-224.

²⁴ Ahmad, *The Making...*, pp. 161-162.

²⁵ Muhammed Khan Kayani, *Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey His Political Thoughts*, (İstanbul: The Ummah, 1996), pp. 73-79.

²⁶ Kayani, *Islamist...*, pp. 65-70 (the sections of 'Zionists Handmade-EEC' and 'Why Zionists and Their Friends are So Desperate to Drag Us to the European Common Market'). Also see *Türkiye'nin Dış Münasebetleri* (*Turkey's Foreign Relations*), Milli Selamet Partisi Dış Münasebetler Parti Raporu / *National Salvation Party Report on Foreign Relations*, (Ankara, 1977).

²⁷ cited in D. Rustow, 'The Roses and the Thorns', in D. Rustow and Trevor Penrose, *The Mediterranean Challenge: V, Turkey and the Community*, (Sussex: Sussex European Papers, No. 10, 1981), p. 31.

²⁸ Kayani, *Islamist...*, p. 75.

²⁹ Tachau, 'The Republican...', p. 11; Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz...*, p. 145.

³⁰ Necmettin Erbakan, *Adil Düzen* (*Just Order*), (Ankara: 1991), p. 145.

³¹ Kayani, *Islamist...*, p. 79.

Despite its imperial rhetoric, the NSP was a reactionary movement, limiting its activities to attacks against the regime rather than producing an alternative economic or political model. However, as will be seen, its radicalism and ideology would become very effective in foreign policy matters. As a result of the disintegration of Turkish politics, the NSP became a key party and a partner to three coalition governments (the RPP-NSP Coalition, January 1974-September 1974; JP-NSP-NAP Coalition, March 1975-June 1977; JP-NSP-NAP Coalition, August 1977-January 1978). Thus it found the opportunities to influence Turkish foreign policy as seen in the Cyprus operation.³² In addition to the Cyprus issue, the other coalition parties had to consider the NSP's ideas on certain issues, such as Turkey-EC relations and economic relations with the other states because the NSP was very sensitive on defending Turkey's economic independence and saw this principle as the corner-stone of the coalitions.

Implementation: Realities vs. Ideologies

The disintegration of Turkish political life continued in the post-coup years and the period 1973 to 1980 saw five different changes of government.³³ After the 1973 elections the RPP formed a cabinet with the Islamist NSP.³⁴ The RPP-NSP coalition was ended with Ecevit's resignation on 18 September 1974. After Sadi Irmak's government, which could not get a vote of confidence from the Parliament, Süleyman Demirel formed another coalition with the Islamist NSP, ultra-Turkist NAP and the Reliance Party (RP) on 31 March 1975, which came to be known as the 'First Nationalist Front'.³⁵ After the 1977 elections, although Ecevit won 41.4 percent of the votes and 213 seats, he was again 13 seats short of a majority in parliament.³⁶ As a result he formed a minority government which collapsed in short time. After Ecevit's falls Demirel's JP formed the 'Second Nationalist Front' with the Islamists and the ultra-Turkists on 21 July 1977. This coalition too, did not last long and in a couple of months Ecevit was back in power with the support of the independents. In 1979 Ecevit

³² Mehmet Gök, 'Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Dış Politikasının İç ve Dış Kaynakları', in *Atatürk Türkiye'si'nde (1923-1983) Dış Politika Sempozyumu, Bildiriler*. (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1984), pp. 49-66, p. 60; Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 43.

³³ Dodd, *The Crisis...*, p. 17.

³⁴ Dodd, *The Crisis...*, p. 17 and 141.

³⁵ Davison, *Turkey...*, p. 170.

³⁶ Dodd, *The Crisis...*, p. 19.

resigned and the coalition was re-shuffled under Demirel.³⁷ During these years, polarisation and tension increased dramatically. Thousands of people were killed and no party could win a majority for a long period of time. There was no consensus on any policy. As Ahmad pointed out, the post-1973 years were the worst period for Turkey to be led by weak and indecisive governments totally lacking in direction. While the weak coalitions could not solve the serious problems and the system became more dependant on the small-radical parties, the army, by exploiting the weakness of the system, increased its powers in these years.³⁸

The domestic problems inevitably reflected on Turkish foreign policy. In the latter sphere, despite the existence of numerous schools of thought from Islamist Commonwealth, to Turkish Commonwealth to integration with the West to isolation, none was strong enough to be implemented. Therefore it is difficult to talk about a settled, coherent foreign policy framework. During this period, not only the ideologies but also the realities challenged the official foreign policy understanding. Turkey's inevitable reaction against the threats to Turkish security determined its foreign policy. Thanks to traditional cultural biases in the West, Turkey's defensive policies were perceived as aggressive in the EEC and United States. At this point, the US arms embargo and the EEC's insensitivity towards Turkey, its military ally and associated member, disappointed Turkey's Westernists and undermined the Kemalist regime and its foreign policy. As will be seen, Turkey solved its problems without any help from the West and despite the obstacles the West created. Therefore, the West was blamed for everything that went wrong in Turkey in the 1970s. All this inevitably affected Turkish foreign policy. In this framework, this chapter will deal with the changes in Turkish foreign policy by considering the ideological changes in Turkey and the changes in the international balance of power.

The Cyprus Crisis and an Isolated Turkey³⁹

³⁷ Dodd, *The Crisis...*, p. 21.

³⁸ Ahmad, *The Making...*

³⁹ For the Cyprus problem in the 1970s see Rauf Denktas, *The Cyprus Triangle*, (London: Rustem & Brother, 1988); Clement Henry Dodd, *The Cyprus Issue: A Current Perspective*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1995); Michael Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, (Edinburg: Q Press, 1979); Glen D. Camp, 'Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 95, 1980, pp. 43-60; Robert McDonald, *The Problem of Cyprus*, (London, Adelphi Papers, No. 234, 1989).

As has been seen, the Cyprus Crisis put to the test Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy ideology in the 1960s which failed to provide solid grounds for Turkey's external relations. The impact of the second Cyprus Crisis was even worse than the first.

While Turkey was preoccupied with internal violence, economic problems and military intervention, the problem in Cyprus was sustained and the West seemed indifferent to whether or not it was solved. The Western insensitivity encouraged the junta regime in Greece, headed by Colonel George Papadopoulos, which planned to unite the island with Greece.⁴⁰ The violence against Cypriot Turks living in the enclaves of the island was increasing dramatically. Also the Turkish Army was now ready for such an intervention, contrary to the 1960s. Apart from these factors, it can be said that the most important factor was domestic change. As noted, Ecevit had shifted Atatürk's Republican People's Party from the centre to the left, and a more sceptical view of the West, NATO and United States. Contrary to İnönü's character, Ecevit, as a poet, was an idealist. He believed in solidarity among the Third World and social democratic states. In the 1973 elections Ecevit campaigned by promising to create a welfare state model based on the Scandinavian example. He also focused on a more independent foreign policy with a limited role for NATO. In other words, with his third-worldism and leftist-Kemalism, Ecevit was not enthusiastic about co-operation with the United States. Not only the RPP but also the NSP did not approve of the American policy vis-à-vis Turkey and Greece. Thanks to the polarisation created by the coups, the Islamists had set their own party deserting the centre-right Justice Party. Similar to the leftists the Islamists were also against the capitalist-Western system. They severely criticised the EEC and the United States and blamed both of them for Turkey's economic and political failures. They were also opposed to the communist bloc and supported an Islamic regime for Turkey and an Islamic federation for the Muslim states. The election results forced Ecevit to form a cabinet with Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the NSP. This was the strangest government ever seen in Turkish politics, yet the similarities between these two parties cannot be ignored, particularly in foreign policy issues. There is no doubt that the RPP and the NSP's American scepticism, if not hostility, helped Turkey's tough reaction in Cyprus. To attract votes both parties competed for nationalist voters.

⁴⁰ This intention was supported by the Greek government and even the Greek leaders developed a scheme for assassinating the head of Cyprus: Sabahattin Ege, *How the 1960 Republic of Cyprus was*

Before the Cyprus crisis, the poppy-growing crisis erupted.⁴¹ The US had asked Turkey to cease poppy production entirely arguing that 80 percent of heroin illegally entering the United States had derived from poppies grown in Turkey.⁴² The Demirel government had resisted the American pressure, however the above party Erim government, following the 1971 Coup, agreed to shut down its poppy cultivation.⁴³ When Ecevit formed government in 1974, he with his Islamist partner Erbakan challenged the Americans⁴⁴ and in defiance of the threats from the United States, Ecevit lifted the ban on poppy-growing in the Aegean region of Turkey in March 1974. The problem was so serious that the United States recalled its ambassador to Washington and warned Turkey over its poppy-growing policy.⁴⁵ The US Seanto also frozen the 20 million American credits to Turkey.⁴⁶ In response Ecevit declared that Turkey belonged to the Turks and only the Turks could decide what they grew - not the Americans.⁴⁷ One of Ecevit's aims was to strengthen his a nationalist credentials as defender of Turkey's right to manage its own affairs.

Meanwhile the Greek soldiers made a coup in Cyprus against the Greek administration, which was seen in Ankara as Greece's direct intervention to the island. The coup leaders declared end of the Republic of Cyprus and proclaimed Cyprus Elen Republic.⁴⁸ That proved a major mistake that sparked the Cyprus war. The coup leaders publicly declared that Cyprus would be annexed to Greece in a short time. Still, the Turkish intervention was far from automatic. In the words of Henze, 'Ecevit was a very reluctant dragon'.⁴⁹ He first tried to persuade Britain to intervene⁵⁰ since, together with Turkey and Greece, Britain was the guarantor of the Zurich and London agreements which set

Destroyed, (İstanbul: Kastas, 1991), pp. 72-78; Paul B. Henze, *Turkey and Atatürk's Legacy*, (Haarlem, Netherlands: SOTA, 1998), p. 77.

⁴¹ J. Zeitner, 'The 1972 Turkish Opium War', *World Politics*, 136, No. 1, 1973, pp. 36-37. Also for the poppy crisis see James W. Spain, 'The United States, Turkey and the Poppy', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 8, Summer 1975, pp. 295-309.

⁴² Harris, *Turkey...*, p. 191; Uslu, '1947'den Günümüze...', p. 211.

⁴³ Uslu, *Türk - Amerikan...*, p. 237.

⁴⁴ Harris, *Turkey...*, p. 191; Uslu, '1947'den Günümüze...', p. 217.

⁴⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, 4 July 1974.

⁴⁶ Uslu, *Türk - Amerikan...*, p. 248.

⁴⁷ Uslu, *Türk - Amerikan...*, pp. 245-246.

⁴⁸ Andrew Borowiec, *The Mediterranean Feud*, (New York: Praeger, 1983). p. 6.

⁴⁹ Henze, *Turkey...*, p. 79.

⁵⁰ Niyazi Ahmet Banoglu, *Kıbrıs Dosyası (The Cyprus File)*, (İstanbul: Kervan Yayınları, n.d.), pp. 76-78; Faruk Sönmezoglu, 'Kıbrıs Sorununda Tarafların Tutum ve Tezleri', (*The Attitudes and the Arguments of the Sides in the Cyprus Problem*), in Ateş and others, *Türk Dış Politikasında Sorunlar*,

the political status of Cyprus's independence.⁵¹ British troops were already on the island, but the British government avoided any military action.⁵² When Ecevit understood that no country would solve the problem, the Ecevit government ordered the Turkish General Staff to move forces across the island and the Turks landed the troops on 20 July 1974. After a short-lasting cease-fire, the Turkish troops launched a second offensive on 14 August which resulted in getting control over 40 percent of Cyprus island.⁵³ Turkey, as a result, set up a *de facto* administration in the North. Now the island was in effect partitioned and the north of the island was Turkish and the south was Greek. For Turkey it was victory for justice, and Ecevit became the second hero after Atatürk.⁵⁴ So much so that his supporters' slogan was '*Dün Atatürk, Bugün Ecevit*'⁵⁵ (Yesterday Atatürk, Today Ecevit). By way of capitalising in the public mood, Ecevit resigned on 19 September 1974, called new elections.⁵⁶ However his plans did not work out as the parliament members refused to agree to new elections. As a result Demirel formed a new coalition, ironically searched Erbakan's support.

The Cyprus operation was viewed as a victory in Turkey, yet the situation was fundamentally different in Europe, the United States and Greece. The Cyprus 'victory' radically changed Turkey's position in the international arena. Moreover, as a result of the European and the American Cyprus policies Turkey's official Kemalist foreign policy understanding was also dramatically changed. Now the challenge did not come from a hostile ideology but from international realities, from external world. The next pages will focus on these changes.

(*The Problems in Turkish Foreign Policy*), (İstanbul: Der Yayınevi, 1989), p. 109.

⁵¹ For the British attitude vis-à-vis Turkey and Greece in the crisis see Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, 'British Policy During 1974 Cyprus Crisis', *Dış Politika*, Vol. 4, No.2-3.

⁵² Sönmezoglu, 'Kıbrıs...', p. 103.

⁵³ Ahmad, *The Making...*, pp. 164-165. Also see H. Fikret Alasya, *Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, (*The History of the Republic of the Northern Cyprus*), (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1987). For the details of the operation see İhsan Gürkan, '1974 Kıbrıs Barış Harekatı'nda Siyasal İradenin Oluşumu ve Askeri Uygulama', (*The Formation of the Political Decision and the Military Implementation in the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation*), in Sönmezoglu, *Türk...*, pp. 133-141; *Kıbrıs Barış Harekatı'nda Duran Taarruzlar ve Yapılan İşlemler*, (*The Stopped Attacks and the Actions Made in the Cyprus Peace Operation*), (Ankara: Milli Güvenlik ve Silahlı Kuvvetler Akademisi, 1991).

⁵⁴ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 165.

⁵⁵ Like Safa M. Yurdanur, *Dün Atatürk, Bugün Ecevit (Yesterday Atatürk, Today Ecevit)*, (İstanbul: Göl, 1974).

⁵⁶ Tachau, 'The Republican...', p. 112; Gürel, *Tarihsel...*, p. 86; Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 165.

The EC's 'Partial' Cyprus Policy⁵⁷

It will be recalled that in the 1960s, the Demirel government had seen the EEC as the guarantor of Turkish democracy. Therefore, although the Turkish economy was far from being able to compete with the EC economies, Demirel had demanded negotiations to start at the transition stage. The conservatives and the liberals were very enthusiastic over EC membership, but the EEC was reluctant to accept Turkey as full member and the first signs of this unwillingness appeared before the Cyprus operation. However, the most destructive factor was the European attitude to Turkey and Greece in the Cyprus crisis. Some of the EC countries, Britain and France in particular, were vehemently opposed to the Turkish position. The EC condemnation of Turkey peaked and deeply damaged Turkey-EC relations. For ordinary Turks, and Turkish politicians, the EC was giving unequivocal support to a military coup against the Turkish people's right to live in Cyprus, and backing 'murderers' rather than 'victims' in the name of Christian cultural values.⁵⁸ The EC's 'partial' Cyprus policies convinced the Turkish government that it had turned a deaf ear to the Turkish cause because the Turkish Cypriots were not Christian. Müftüler claims that the EC's Cyprus policy reminded Turkey of nineteenth century Euro-Christian discriminatory practices against the Muslim Turks.⁵⁹ Thus, the Community's attitude politically isolated Turkey from Europe in the 1970s. As a result, the EC's 'anti'-Turkish policies were seen in Turkey as a scapegoat for the problems of the Turkish economy and Turkey's other problems. In this environment, the old European image was evoked and new prejudices were added. The perception that the EC was anti-Turkey was strengthened among virtually all-political groups.⁶⁰ The smooth Greece-EC relations and the generous European economic aid to Greece,⁶¹ were particularly galling to many Turkish people, confirming yet again the EC's unjust and partial attitude towards Turkey.

With the double effect of Turkey's economic performance and the Cyprus problem, during the 1970s the EC rejected virtually all Turkish demands for economic aid,

⁵⁷ For Europe's role in the Cyprus problem see H. Gsangan, 'The EEC and Cyprus and Turkey', in D. Seers and C. Vaitsos (eds.), *Integration and Uneven Developments*, (London: Macmillan, 1980).

⁵⁸ Meltem Müftüler, 'Turkey and the European Community: An Uneasy Relationship', *Turkish Review*, Autumn 1993, pp. 31-41

⁵⁹ Müftüler, 'Turkey...', p. 36.

⁶⁰ Meltem Müftüler-Bac, *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe*, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 60-61.

⁶¹ For the process of the Greek membership since the 1974 operation see Loukas Tsoukalis, *The European Community and Its Mediterranean Enlargement*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980).

agricultural concessions, free movement of Turkish workers and political support for Turkey's external problems, notably Cyprus. The deepening economic crisis and the EC's negative attitude forced Turkey to postpone its obligations to the EC in 1977. The Ecevit government referred its demand to Article 60 of the Additional Protocol, the self-protection clause.⁶² It was obvious that Turkey needed fresh financial aid, however one of the problems was the RPP's anti-Western policies. For the RPP, like the Americans, the capitalist Europeans were also making efforts to undermine Turkish integrity.⁶³ For the leftists the European Community was the club of the rich capitalists whose aim was the establishment of a new kind of imperialism to exploit the third world. In other words, not only the European Turkish biases but also the leftist Ecevit's prejudices about the European Community negatively affected Turkey-Community relations. As a result, the Ecevit government requested a revision of the terms of the Association Agreement and asked for a five-year freeze in Turkey's commitments in 1979. Moreover, Ecevit requested a \$8 billion aid package from the EC.⁶⁴ Obviously Ecevit's demands were not realistic because, thanks to the global economic crisis, the EC was also suffering from economic problems. As a result the EC offered Turkey only \$600 million under the Fourth Financial Protocol.⁶⁵

When the liberal-conservative Demirel government came to power Turkey's attitude towards the EC changed dramatically.⁶⁶ True, the JP, too, was aware of the EC's negative Turkey policy and wary about the West; however it also thought that Turkey had no alternative to the West, which it needed for its economic and political development.⁶⁷ As a result of these ideological and pragmatic considerations, the Demirel government, on 30 June 1980, announced that Turkey would forward a formal

⁶² Müftüler, 'Turkey...', p. 36. For more information also see Sedat Laciner, **Turkey - European Union Relations, The Economic, Political and the Cultural Dimensions**, unpublished MA thesis, University of Sheffield (England), September 1997.

⁶³ For the details of the Turkish European mistrust in the 1970s see Müftüler-Bac, **Turkey's...** pp. 60-61.

⁶⁴ Esra Çayhan, **Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri ve Siyasal Partilerin Konuya Bakışı**, (*Turkey and European Union Relations and the Political Parties' Views on the Relations*), (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1997), p. 200.

⁶⁵ Attila Eralp, 'Turkey and the European Community in the Changing Post-War International System', in Canan Balkir and Allan M. Williams (eds.), **Turkey and Europe**, (London and New York: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1993), p. 30.

⁶⁶ Meltem Müftüler, **The Impact of External Factors on International Transformations: Turkish Structural Adjustment Process and the European Community**, unpublished PhD thesis, Temple University, 1992, p. 95; Çayhan, **Türkiye...**, p. 209.

⁶⁷ Yavuzalp, **Liderlerimiz...**, pp. 140-148.

application for membership by the autumn.⁶⁸ Almost all academics agree that if Turkey had been able to apply for full membership, the EC would not have easily rejected this *fait accompli* because of security and political considerations.⁶⁹ But the EC was 'lucky', for as will be seen in the next chapter, the Turkish army made a new military coup on 12 September 1980, and Demirel's initiative failed.

Turkish - American Relations and the Cyprus Crisis

Greece had withdrawn from military participation in NATO in the aftermath of the crisis while Turkey firmly committed to the alliance, however despite the Turkish trust in NATO, the Americans did not consider Turkey's loyalty to United States and NATO to be sufficient. Similar to the Europeans, the Americans viewed the operation as a clear occupation of a sovereign, independent state, and Turkey was the culprit. Worst of all, the American Congress imposed an arms embargo on 5 February 1975 against Turkey because of its use of American - supplied arms in the Cyprus operation.⁷⁰ As a matter of fact, both sides had used Americans-supplied arms, Greece having transferred the American arms before the operation. However, the Greek lobby in the Congress was so effective and the contextual problems in United States politics, like Vietnam issue and Watergate, helped to the Greek lobby's success.⁷¹ President Nixon had resigned during the Cyprus crisis, and the presidential effect on the Congress was extremely limited in these years. Although the American executive branches (President, Defence and State secretaries) claimed that they lacked power over Congress, Turkey was deeply disappointed. Now Turkey's closest ally, the United States, was carrying out an arms embargo against one of its loyalist allies. As has been seen, the Johnson Letter had even shocked the Turkish by demanding closer relations in the 1960s; the arms embargo of 1975-1978 was the final straw for Turkish-American relations. The embargo was an undeniable proof of the failure of Westernism for the Kemalists and the conservative-liberals.

⁶⁸ Müftüler, *The Impact...*, p. 95.

⁶⁹ Birand, *Türkiye'nin...*; Müftüler, *The Impact...*

⁷⁰ Kuniholm, *Turkey and...*, p. 57. Also see Albert Wohlstetter, 'The Strategic Importance of Turkey and the Arms Embargo', *Journal of International Relations*, No. 3, Summer 1978, pp. 101-109; Uslu, *Türk - Amerikan...*, p. 200.

⁷¹ For the role of the Greek lobbying in the American arms embargo Paul Yashihiko Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo*, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984) and Lawrence Halley, *Ancient Affections, Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy*, (New York: Praeger, 1985).

As a response to the American embargo, the Turkish Federate State of Cyprus was established on 13 February 1975.⁷² Despite the embargo decision, Demirel waited for the results of the Executive Branch's efforts to change the mind of the Congress. For example, as Paul Henze pointed out, President Ford never conceded the validity of the embargo against Turkey or its relevance to the process of a Cyprus settlement.⁷³ Also the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense were against the embargo.⁷⁴ In July 1975, Turkey, as a warning sign, declared that it abolished the Defense Co-operation Agreement of 1969.⁷⁵ Three months later, Prime Minister Demirel, a leading Westernist, ordered several American bases in Turkey closed when he understood that the US decision would not change.⁷⁶ Turkey's decisive attitude softened the US policies and a new agreement was signed on the status of the American bases in Turkey. Also with this agreement the US undertook to make \$ 1 billion-military aid to Turkey for four years. However the aid was conditional, and the agreement was still in force. Even the newly elected-President Jimmy Carter could not lift the embargo until 1978.⁷⁷

In 1977 the Süleyman Demirel government lost its majority in parliament and another Ecevit government came to power.⁷⁸ Although Demirel had taken some serious measures against the United States, he was a Westernist and had believed that Turkey's interest and future lay in good relations with United States. Also, similar to Menderes, Demirel shared the same values as the Americans, such as a free market economy, liberalism in politics and more religious freedom etc.⁷⁹ However, as has been seen, with the effect of the radicals, Ecevit identified its party as truly socialist and anti-capitalist. Hence, he, different from Demirel, chose to threaten the United States by sending friendly messages to the Soviet Union. In London, Ecevit said 'the sources of imminent threat to Turkey changed considerably in recent years.'⁸⁰ In his speech, Ecevit underlined the disadvantages of Turkey's dependency on the United States and argued

⁷² Hamza Eroglu, *Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti, Kuruluş, Anayasası ve Bağımsızlığı*, (*Turkish Federate State of Cyprus, Foundation, Constitution and Independence*), (Ankara: Tisa Matbaacılık, 1976).

⁷³ Henze, *Turkey...*, p. 85.

⁷⁴ House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, *Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo*, (Washington, D.C.: Print No. 3, June 1981), pp. 3-21.

⁷⁵ Gürel, *Tarihsel...*, p. 89.

⁷⁶ Uslu, '1947'den Günümüze...', p. 217; Gürel, *Tarihsel...*, p. 89.

⁷⁷ Gürel, *Tarihsel...*, p. 89.

⁷⁸ Dodd, *The Crisis...*, p. 223.

⁷⁹ See Chapter VIII of this thesis.

⁸⁰ Bülent Ecevit, 'Turkey's Security Policies', *Survival*, Vol. 20, No. 5, September / October 1978, p. 203.

that the Soviet Union was no longer a threat to Turkey. He further argued that Turkey needed a more independent course in foreign policy instead of the Cold War's global considerations. In his visit to Moscow, in July 1978, Ecevit repeated his arguments by saying that Turkey did not see the Soviet Union as a threat.⁸¹ Likewise, Ecevit in RPP's Parliamentary Group Meeting underlined the Turkish-Soviet friendship:

'...with the new economic relations with the Soviet Union, we found opportunity to balance some of our economy's structural problems (...) as you know the oil crisis has been increasing. Under the pressure of this crisis the Soviet Union provided 3 million ton oil to Turkey, and this is a clear sign of the Soviet friendship and enough to improve Turkish-Soviet relations in the recent years (...) We also solved the territorial sea issue between Turkey and the Soviet Union and this is another proof for the friendship.'⁸²

It can be said that these pro-Soviet words were a certain deviation from Turkey's pro-Western policy. It was not only a deviation from Westernism but also from Kemalist foreign policy understanding, as for Kemal the primary threat to Turkish security came from communist Russia. Moreover, Ecevit signed a political document with the Soviet Union.⁸³ The context of the signed document was relatively not very important for the relations between two countries in terms of economics and politics, but its timing was critical as the relations with the United States was very problematic in these years. Moreover, in the 1970s Turkish-Soviet relations improved dramatically in economic and political areas. By 1978, the Soviet Union was aiding 44 different development projects in Turkey and by the end of the decade Turkey received more Soviet assistance than any country in the third world except Cuba.⁸⁴ Also in the Ecevit period, Turkish export to the Soviet Union increased over 30 per cent.⁸⁵ Ecevit was threatening United States with the Soviet Union. These developments annoyed not only the Americans but also all NATO members. Moreover, Zürcher⁸⁶ claims that Ecevit's enthusiasm to re-orientate Turkish foreign policy towards the socialist and the Third World countries made him extremely unpopular in Washington. Zürcher further argues that 'President Carter's influential security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, especially seems to have

⁸¹ Ecevit explained the change as a part of a new defence understanding. For his new defence understanding and its impact on Turkish foreign policy and relations with the Soviet Union see M. M. Boll, 'Turkey's New National Security Concept: What It Means for NATO', *Orbis*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Fall 1979, pp. 609-632.

⁸² Ecevit in Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, pp. 132-133.

⁸³ *Tercüman* (daily, İstanbul), 24 July 1978; *Hürriyet* (daily, İstanbul), 24 July 1978.

⁸⁴ Bruce R. Kuniholm, 'Turkey and the West Since World War II', in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), *Turkey Between East and West, New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 45-69, p. 57.

⁸⁵ Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, p. 133.

⁸⁶ Zürcher, *Turkey...*, p. 290.

hated him.⁸⁷ However, Ecevit's tactics worked and on 1 August 1978 the US Congress abrogated the embargo.⁸⁸ Ironically, despite Ecevit's efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union, the first country (apart from Greece) to oppose the lifting of the American embargo was the Soviet Union. One of the effects of the arm embargo was that Turkey was now more determined to build its own arms industry. As a result some projects were initiated to produce tanks, war ships and war planes.

In spite of the lifting of the arms embargo, during the Ecevit period Turkish-American relations could not be restored. Ecevit claimed that the \$ 1 billion American military aid, agreed on in the March 1976 Agreement, was not enough and Turkey avoided signing the Defense and Economic Co-operation Agreement (DECA). On the other hand he continued to make efforts to improve relations, not least in the light of clear evidence of Soviet support for leftist terrorist organisations in Turkey.⁸⁹ Against this background, it can be argued that in Ecevit's United States and Soviet Union policies, his leftist, anti-capitalist ideology played a crucial role. However, it can also be said that Ecevit's RPP was too extreme to have a sufficient foreign policy ideology. That is to say, during these years Turkey suffered both from an ideological foreign policy and at the same time from lack of a sufficient foreign policy ideology. Similar to their EC policies, the comparison between Ecevit and Demirel's foreign policy clearly shows differences and ideology's impact on their foreign policy. When Demirel came to power a year later, the DECA agreement with the United States was easily signed. Nevertheless, as argued earlier, in the 1970s, it was not only the clash of the ideologies but the challenge of realities, which determined Turkey's foreign policy. This was the case not only in Turkish - American relations, but also in Turkish - European and Turkish - Greek relations.

⁸⁷ Zürcher, *Turkey...*, p. 290.

⁸⁸ Michael Boll, 'Turkey Between East and West: The Regional Alternative', *World Today*, Vol. 35, No. 9, 1979, p. 360; Uslu, *Türk - Amerikan...*, p. 201; Gürel, *Tarihsel...*, p. 90. It must be noted that apart from Ecevit's policies there were other reasons for lifting the arms embargo like the US' increasing need for the bases in Turkey as the tension between the US and the Soviet Union was increasing in the region.

⁸⁹ The Soviet Union was one of the sponsors of terror in Turkey. Apart from the financial and technical aid, the Soviet Union provided logistic and ideological support for Turkish leftist terrorists through the 1970s. For the details of the support see: Ihsan Bal, *Preventing Terrorism in Democracies: The Case of Turkey*, unpublished PhD. thesis, University of Leicester, 1999.

Turkish - Greek Relations

Turkish - Greek relations are a good example of Turkey's increasing fears in foreign policy. Greece had grown four times with Ottoman territories until 1918. Between 1918-1922 the Greek armies occupied almost half of Anatolia. Turkey gained its independent state after a bloody war against Greece. There is no doubt that the Turks were fighting a just war this time since their homeland was under occupation and they were struggling for independence. However the British and the French supported the Greeks, and Britain even encouraged them to occupy Turkish lands. Hence Mustafa Kemal's Turkey viewed the Greeks as the 'Golden child' of the West. This perception was underscored in the 1960s and the 1970s. From the Turkish perspective, in Cyprus the Greeks were the guilty part since they had destroyed the constitutional system and the Republic. However the EEC and the United States could not strike a balanced policy vis-à-vis Turkey and Greece and for the Turks, they partially supported the Greeks and blamed Turkey for everything that went wrong in the problem.⁹⁰ For the Turkish press, politicians and the public at large the Western anti-Turkish biases were still there. Worst of all, the European support encouraged the Greeks and relations between Turkey and Greece worsened. Before the Cyprus operation, the only problems between the two states was to be solved were the minorities status and Cyprus. Now the Greeks insisted on changing the *status quo* in the Aegean Sea, decided in the Lausanne.⁹¹ According to the Lausanne Agreement, Greece had disarmed the Aegean islands. However, thanks to bilateral mistrust and European encouragement, Greece made enormous efforts to change the Lausanne *status quo*. Lausanne however was one of the foundations of Kemalist foreign policy. Hence Turkey perceived these attempts as an attack on Turkey's integrity. Last but not least, Turkey's past experience with Greece nourished Turkish suspicion about the reliability of the West. As the Turks saw it, the West did not preserve the agreements signed by Greece, Turkey and Britain in the first Cyprus Crisis and gave a clear support to the aggressive side; similarly, in the 1970s, the West was not making any efforts to maintain the Lausanne Order in the Aegean and gave tacit support to Greece. Whether Turkey was right is debatable. However, it quickly responded to the Greek initiative in the Aegean and to the Western 'unreliability': in

⁹⁰ Gürel, *Tarihsel...*, pp. 75-97.

⁹¹ For a comprehensive discussion of the Greek - Turkish dispute over the Aegean Sea Andrew Wilson, *The Aegean Dispute*, (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper, No. 155, 1979-1980). Also see Hüseyin Pazarcı, 'Has the Demilitarized Status of the Aegean Islands Determined by the Lausanne and Paris Treaties Changed?', *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 1985-1986, pp. 29-46.

July 1975, a new army division, Fourth Aegean Army, was formed in the Aegean part of Turkey. Unlike the other three armies the Fourth Army was not directed against the Soviet Union but rather against a possible Greek attack.⁹² Moreover, unlike the other armies it was not assigned to NATO.

In this respect, Turkish - Greek relations can be considered as an exception to Turkey's foreign policy, because in the Ecevit or the Demirel years Turkey's Greece and Cyprus policies were not radically changed. No government could dare to shift Turkey's policies in this matter. However, the European and American support for Greece nourished mistrust among the Turks towards the West who viewed these actions as reaffirming Greece's privileged position as the golden child of the West.⁹³

Turkey and the Muslim World: Greater Deviation from Kemalism

Until 1973 Turkey's relations with the Muslim states and the Third World in general had been determined according to the government's ideological choices. While the right-wing governments were more enthusiastic for co-operation with the Muslim states, the Kemalists had doubts in terms of secularism. However as Turkey felt increasingly excluded from the West, it made efforts to gain the hearts of the Muslim states. With the rise of the Third World and with its disillusionment with the United States, Turkey sought better with the Arab, Muslim and Third World. Another factor was the oil crises and the rise of the pro-Islamist NSP in Turkish politics.⁹⁴ The economic crisis in Turkey⁹⁵ with the domestic factor and Turkey's isolation after the Cyprus Crisis forced Turkey to search for the friendship of the Arabs and other Third World countries. Although a few leftists, Kemalist-leftists and other hard-liner secularists opposed this shift by claiming that it ran counter to Kemalist principles, even the İnönü governments tried to develop the relations. Now both Ecevit and conservative Demirel saw relations with these countries as an important part of Turkish foreign policy. For the Demirel governments, Muslim states were brother states. Turkey and these countries shared a

⁹² Gürel, *Tarihsel...*, p. 86.

⁹³ Heinz Kramer and Friedmann Müller, 'Relations with Turkey and the Caspian Basin Countries', in Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer (eds.), *Allies Divided*, (London: Harvard University, 1997), p. 188.

⁹⁴ Kemal Kirişçi, 'Turkey and the Muslim Middle East', in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), *Turkey's New World, Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p. 39.

⁹⁵ Ecevit declared that the total of the Turkish export is less than Turkey's import: Bülent Ecevit, 'Turkey's Security Policies', *Survival*, Vol. 20, No. 5, September 1978, p. 204.

common cultural and religious heritage and this heritage could set a suitable ground for improved relations. Even the leftist Ecevit struck a similar cause, in 1974 for instance, with his Islamist coalition partner recognised for the first time the Palestinians' right to establish an independent state.⁹⁶ This eventually would result in the opening of a PLO office in Ankara in 1979. Turkey's problems with the West and the government parties' anti-Western attitude further contributed to Turkish-Arab relations. As a result Turkey even opposed the Camp David agreements although they were signed under American sponsorship;⁹⁷ supported establishment an EEC-like common market among the Muslim countries, began to contribute the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Conference) budget (1974) and finally became a full member of the Islamic Bank (1975). In another word, Turkey's role in the OIC conferences shifted from a hitherto reserved stance toward more active participation.⁹⁸ Turkey sought to lessen its dependence on the West by developing ties with the Islamic world, however it never showed any intention to leave the Western alliance. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War Turkish support for the Arabs became evident. Although in the 1960s Turkey did not give an open support to the Palestinians, it now did not permit the US to use its military facilities to ship aid to Israel. In 1974 Foreign Minister Turan Günes was sent as Turkish representative to OIC and Turkey started to contribute to the OIC budget. Moreover, Turkish representatives were dispatched to the Jeddah Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministries and Rauf Denktaş, head of the Turkish Cypriots, was invited to the conference as the leader of the Turkish people in Cyprus. Furthermore, the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Istanbul in 1976⁹⁹ and Rauf Denktaş gave a speech as 'the leader of the Turkish Muslim Community in Cyprus'. For its part the Conference mentioned its sympathy for Turkish Cypriot rights in Cyprus. 1976 Istanbul Conference was a historical turning point in Turkish foreign policy. In this conference, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil publicly underlined Turkey's Islamic character and called the Muslim world to support the Turkish Cypriots while Denktaş likened the Cyprus problem to the Palestinian issue.¹⁰⁰ The conference

⁹⁶ Mahmut B. Aykan, 'The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s'. *IJMES*, Vol. 25, 1993, pp. 95-97.

⁹⁷ Fahir Armaoğlu, 'Türk Dış Politikası' (*Turkish Foreign Policy*) in *20 Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914-1980*, (20th Century Political History, 1914-1980), (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası, 1983), p. 850.

⁹⁸ Mahmut B. Aykan, *Turkey's Role in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, 1960-1992*, (New York: Vantage Press, 1994), p. 75.

⁹⁹ Constantinides claims 'joining the 1976 Islamic Conference Organisation, Turkey opened its doors to Saudis who financed Islamist activities in Turkey.' Constantinides, 'Turkey:...', p. 332.

¹⁰⁰ Denktaş said 'Islamic world should not be divided. We must support the Cypriot Turks as did the

was favourable to the Turkish position and accepted Turkish Cypriot's participation in the next conference.¹⁰¹ As Aykan underscored 'the support Turkey elicited from the OIC on its Cyprus cause was perhaps the most notable achievement of that country from its economic and political co-operation with the OIC in the 1970s.'¹⁰² Caglayangil, also, met with Faruk Kadduni, head of the PLO delegation, to negotiate establishment of a PLO office in Ankara. Moreover, Istanbul and Ankara became home for ICO's two permanent institutions, namely IRCICA (Islamic History, Art and Cultural Research Centre) and SESRTCIC (Islamic Countries Statistics, Economical and Social Researches and Education Centre) which would be recognised as diplomatic missions of the ICO by Turkey in 1982. Despite the government's enthusiasm, the leftist press viewed Turkey's participation as part of an anti-secular and anti-Kemalist attitude. With the effect of this campaign President Fahri Koruturk did not join the Istanbul conference.¹⁰³

When Knesset (Israel's Parliament) declared Jerusalem as Israel's permanent capital on 30 July 1980,¹⁰⁴ Turkey blamed Israel and asked for cancellation of the relating act.¹⁰⁵ While Prime Minister Demirel accused Israel of not respecting international rules, his junior partner Islamist NSP increased the tension. As a result Turkey closed its consulate in Jerusalem as a part of its reaction to Israel.¹⁰⁶

Conclusion

The 1970s were years of crisis, political violence, terror, anarchy, instability and economic catastrophe for Turkey. An undeclared civil war was started and thousands lost their life. The military intervention and the terror fractured Turkish political life and radicalised party politics. In addition to the fragmented political structure, the old Ottoman schools of thought, like the Islamists and the ultra-nationalists, reappeared in the political arena. Another important political change was the RPP's deviation from Kemalism to leftism. Under Ecevit, Atatürk's party became the party of the radicals,

Palestinian Arabs, because there is a similarity between these two problems. ICO, **Final Declaration of the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers**, 12-15 May 1976, İstanbul.

¹⁰¹ *Milliyet* (daily, İstanbul), 17 May 1976.

¹⁰² Aykan, 'The OIC and...', p. 52.

¹⁰³ *Cumhuriyet* (daily, İstanbul), 14 May 1976.

¹⁰⁴ *Middle East Review*, Vol. 13, No. 3-4, 1981, p. 71.

¹⁰⁵ *Hürriyet*, 1 August 1980.

leftists, Kurds and other minority groups. As Karpas put it, on the eve of the 1980 take-over Kemalism as a state philosophy no longer had a formal, organised representation, only the army was left to secure Kemalism.¹⁰⁷

In foreign policy, as an extension of domestic developments, the traditional Ottoman approaches took their place. Islamists, together with the leftist Ecevit, firmly opposed United States and EC policies by accusing them of colonising Turkey. While the Islamists argued that Turkey could be a world leader if it would unite the Muslims against the Christians, the Turkists aimed to be the leader of the Turkish world. Though these groups were very small, the coalition system made them key factors in the formation of government.

The fragmentation of domestic politics was mirrored in this foreign policy. Ecevit advocated a leftist version of third-worldism and opposed American hegemony and European capitalism. Demirel, in contrast, argued that Turkey had no alternative but the West. For its part the JP sought to improve relations with the Muslim world, while the NSP suggested an Islamic Commonwealth, and the NAC a Turkish Commonwealth. Finally, the leftist groups prescription was based on Turkey's good relations with the Communist bloc. In a short time Turkey experienced several contradictory foreign policy understandings.

Another effect of the internal developments on foreign policy was the radicalisation of Turkey's foreign policy, as witnessed in Ecevit's foreign policy towards the EC and the United States. It can be said that Turkish foreign policy, for the first time in the Republican era, became idealist under the Ecevit rule.

Moreover, the Kemalist impasse reappeared in the foreign policy arena as well. Kemalism could not provide a suitable ideological framework for Turkish foreign policy makers in a vastly changed world. The failure of the Kemalist civilisation understanding and Westernism was confirmed by the American and European anti-Turkish attitude in the Cyprus crisis. In the past this worldview had prevented Turkey

¹⁰⁶ *Hürriyet*, 29 August 1980.

¹⁰⁷ Kemal Karpas, 'Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980', in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, (Berlin

from developing good relations with the Third World and the Muslim states. But now an isolated Turkey was forced to improve relations with these actors despite Kemalist secularism. Mustafa Kemal had chosen isolationism, now the world forced Turkey to an isolated position. Now Turkey needed not only time but also friends and economic aid, and its participation into the Organisation of the Islamic Countries helped in this respect, albeit at the expense of the Kemalist tradition.

Another deviation was in the Kemalist school of thought itself. Traditionally the political base of Kemalism, the Republican Party moved to a more leftist position. Gradually Kemalism was discarded from the RPP administration. The radical leftist RPP's foreign policies also can be considered as deviation from Kemalist foreign policy. At least it can be said that the Republican foreign policy was not inspired by the Kemalist principles but socialism and Ecevit's leftism. Contrary to Kemalist pragmatism, Ecevit, under the heavy influence of his ideology, underestimated the West's role in Turkish security. Another deviation from Kemalism was Ecevit's view that Russia, Turkey's traditional enemy since the 18th century, was no longer a threat to Turkey. In short, apart from the RPP no political party advocated a Kemalist foreign policy although all claimed that they were Kemalist parties in order to protect them from the army's wrath. Now Kemalism's home was the bureaucracy (e.g., the Organisation of State Planning) and constitutional institutions established by the military leaders in 1961 and 1971, such as the National Security Council, the Constitutional Court, and the army.

Foreign policy came heavily under the influence of ideological considerations. As has been seen despite a few differences, the Democrat Party and the Republican People's Party were able to agree on the main foreign policy principles, like integration with West or Russia as the primary threat. In the 1970s, the main parties had opposite foreign policy aims, like RPP's third-worldism, NSP's Islamic Commonwealth, the JP's pro-Westernism, and NAC's Turkish Commonwealth ideas.

Finally, although the 1970s can be considered the period in which ideology determined parties' foreign policies much more than ever, ironically Turkish foreign policy suffered

from an insufficient ideological framework for foreign policy. The rapid changes in power, the coalition system, the political violence and the economic crisis prevented the parties from carrying out their policies in an organised period. As a result, foreign policy orientation changed frequently and this weakened Turkey's position abroad. Just as third-worldist, leftist Ecevit aligned with the Islamist Erbakan, so the pro-Western Demirel aligned with Islamist Erbakan and ultra-Turkist Alparslan Türkeş. In time Turkey saw many versions of shifting coalitions.

In sum, after the Johnson Letter, there were attempts to lessen dependence on the United States. The Cyprus Crisis, the American arms embargo against Turkey and the Congress' anti-Turkish attitude worsened relations. Besides, the European Cyprus policies vis-à-vis Turkey and Greece were perceived as partial and anti-Turkish by the Turkish people. This in turn kindled anti-Western foreign policy understandings and led to reactionary policies, like Ecevit's third-world leftism and Erbakan's Islamism. Turkish policy makers wanted to counterbalance Turkey's dependence on the West by improving relations with the socialist states, the Third World and the Muslim world, yet these countries could not fill the vacuum created by the West. The Turks felt that they had no friends but themselves, which increased Kemalist scepticism. On the other hand, Atatürk's pragmatic, Westernist foreign policy understanding was abandoned. Although some groups, like Demirel's JP, argued that Turkey had no serious alternative in foreign policy to the West, the coalition system increased the effect of the marginal and radical groups. Consequently, during the 1970s ideology and idealism played a significant role in Turkish foreign policy and emotions sometimes left no room to realism and pragmatism. Not surprisingly, the social conflicts and the economic depression led to the third military intervention - 12 September 1980 coup.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ For the reasons of the 1980 breakdown: Dodd, *The Crisis...*, pp. 27-48.

CHAPTER X

Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism) vs. Kemalism

‘Many things have changed in Turkey... In foreign policy the days of taking a cowardly and timid position are over. From now we will pursue an active policy based on circumstances...¹ My conviction is that Turkey should leave its former passive and hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy... The reason I made this call is because we are powerful country in the region. Let me also point out that there are conservatives who prefer that no change should be made to these passive policies. The reason these circles accuse me of dragging the country into an adventure is because I generally prefer to pursue a more dynamic policy for our country.’²

Turgut Özal, President of Turkey.

The preceding chapters demonstrated that ideology played a crucial role in policy-making and implementation and many different approaches occurred until the 1980s: from Ecevit’s leftism to Demirel’s liberal-conservatism. Some of these alternative groups, like Menderes’ and Demirel’s, won majorities in elections, however the Kemalist civilian-military bureaucracy did not allow the elected governments to fully implement their program. That is to say there was a hidden cold-war between the Kemalists and others. With the rise of Turgut Özal, however, the balance of power changed dramatically against the Kemalists. As one of the greatest challenges to Kemalism, Özal fused the previous Turkism, Ottomanism and Islamism into a new kind of Ottomanism, or rather Özalism. Together with Kemalism, Özalism has become the most influential current in Turkish history, continuing on well after his demise.

This chapter first examines the factors underlying the Özalist approach, such as Özal’s personality, the 1980 coup and the isolation of Turkey, the economic boom, change in the socio-economic structure, globalisation of the Turkish economy and finally Kurdish separatism. A special emphasis will be laid on the ideological background of Özalist foreign policy, with a view to demonstrating the close relationship between Özal’s Ottomanist foreign policy and his domestic approach and its translation to foreign policy.

¹ Ahmad, **The Making...**, p. 201.

² **Milliyet**, 3 March 1991.

Return of Kemalism as Ideology and the Coup as Prelude of Özal Power

The developments of the 1970s literally invited the third military coup. After the terror and years of instability, the army intervened yet again on 12 September 1980³ with four distinct aims in mind: to suppress terrorism and radicalism; to restore economic growth and stability; to introduce a new constitution and legal arrangements that would stabilise the system and prevent anarchy; to re-establish civilian democracy on a Kemalist basis.⁴ In other words, in line with previous take-overs, the 1980 coup was not envisaged as a permanent military regime but aimed at the eventual restoration of civilian parliamentary rule once the army had put the government's house in order.⁵ The Army was not against the democratic political system but its results. Were the political system to be truly Kemalist, the army would not intervene in its affairs any more. Indeed, the constitution and other laws defined the army as the 'guardian of the regime'; however the rules had been re-written by the military leaders in 1960 and 1971. Similar to previous take-overs, General Kenan Evren, declared that the 1980 coup had been carried out in accordance with Article 34 of the military by-law, charging the army with the defence of the Republic, the Kemalist regime and unity. Hence it is arguable that the Turkish military intervention was fundamentally different from the Latin American and indeed most Third World coups since the Turkish Army has been legalist and based its acts on the 'law'.

Having suppressed the internal anarchy and terror, one of the first acts of the military rulers was to revive the Kemalist doctrine.⁶ For the army, left and right-wing ideologies were alien to the Turkish people, responsible for the 1970s' catastrophe. Only Kemalism (Atatürkçülük)⁷ was a suitable ideology for Turkey that could foster national unity. Accordingly, a massive Kemalist campaign was launched: Kemalist books were

³ For the coup see M. Ali Birand, *12 Eylül, Saat 04:00, (12 September, Hour: 04:00 am.)*, (İstanbul: Karacan Yayınları, 1984); James Brown, 'Military and Politics in Turkey', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 13, No. 2, Winter 1987; Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Demokrasi Dur, 12 Eylül 1980, (Democracy, Stop! 12 September 1980)*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990); William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988).

⁴ William Hale, 'Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective', in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), *State, Democracy and the Military, Turkey in the 1980s*, (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 166.

⁵ Karpaz, 'Military', p. 149.

⁶ For the military's Kemalism see: Kenan Evren, 'Atatürk Yılı Açılış Konuşması'. (*The Opening Speech of the Year of Atatürk*), in *Kemalizm ve Türkiye, (Kemalism and Turkey)*, 6, 52, January, 1981. pp. 5-8.

published; 1981 was named the 'Atatürk Year' and new institutions were established or financially supported to boost Kemalism in society. Streets, roads and buildings were re-named after Atatürk. The various institutions were consolidated in one central Supreme Atatürk Society. Kemalism had been restored as the state ideology while all others were swept away from power. Yet the 1980 Coup's Kemalism was very different from previous versions of Kemalism. It was a neutral and pragmatic ideology lacking unchangeable principles, instead arguing that what was good for the Turkish nation was good for Kemalism. Secondly, this new Kemalism, contrary to İnönü's autocracy, was loyal to democracy. Third, unlike Ecevit's Kemalism, it was pro-Western and pro-American. For Evren, the coup leader, the United States was the most important ally and the Soviet Union still posed the greatest threat to Turkish security.⁸ Finally, this Kemalism was capitalist in orientation viewing Turkey's future in the capitalist rather than socialist world.

The thing the generals understood least of all was the economy, and without economic success the coup could not be successful. Therefore, when Bülent Ulusu formed the first government, the Turkish National Security Council (NSC) announced that it would retain Turgut Özal, having been the spirit behind the last Demirel government's liberal economic reforms, as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs. In 1981 inflation dropped, exports increased rapidly, the GDP increased by 4.5 %. Tourism revenues and Turkish construction activities abroad increased dramatically. As a result the current account deficit was sharply reduced.⁹ Özal's and the army's liberal policies showed them as closer to the capitalist world and more conservative than previous Kemalist military take-overs. In other words, the 1980 coup was a conservative-capitalist interpretation of Kemalism. Secondly, thanks to the government's success in the economy and the suppression of terrorism, the NSC gained credit before the people and continued its reforms. The military restored the regime's ideology of Kemalism; restored the economic system as a free capital market, yet the political structure remained unsettled. Some generals like Nurettin Ersin viewed this as proof that 'Our social structure is not suitable for an advance and open democracy. We need an

⁷ 12 Eylül 1980 Coup leaders preferred to use 'Atatürkçülük' term instead of Kemalism.

⁸ *Milliyet*, 23 October 1984, *Tercüman*, (daily, İstanbul), 21 October 1984.

⁹ Ahmet Kılıçbay, *Türk Ekonomisi, Modeller, Politikalar, Stratejiler*, (*Turkish Economy, Models, Policies, Strategies*), (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası, 1991); Jeffry D. Lewis and Shujiro Urata, *Turkey:*

autocratic administration.¹⁰ However, the dominant opinion among the generals was that the civilian rule should be restored. American and European pressure gave further impetus to this view.¹¹ The NSC was ready to do that, yet before handing over power it wanted to guarantee its favoured political structure. In the autumn of 1982 the constitution, written by the military and its favoured academics, was put to a national referendum. With the referendum, Kenan Evren became the President and the NSC gained extraordinary powers over government and parliament. As one of its first move, the NSC banned all political activities. It did not initially abolish the two major political parties (RPP and JP) or arrest deputies, but a few party leaders were temporarily detained and some deputies associated with radical groups and Kurdish separatists were taken into custody.¹² However in a short time the NSC understood that it could not reshape the Turkish political system with the old parties, abolished the two and banned all old political leaders from re-entering politics. Evren and his friends did not want to repeat the DP case, where the banned parties had re-established themselves under different names after the 1960s and 1970s coups against the DP. According to the new rules, the chairmen, general secretaries and all other senior office holders in the former political parties could not join or have 'any kind of relations' with future political parties, or run for election (even as independent) for the next ten years.¹³ Moreover, the new constitution forbade political organisations based on religion, a religious sect, regional considerations or Marxism. Having banned the old politicians and ideologies, the NSC encouraged new names. Before the elections the moderate right-wings *Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi* (Nationalist Democracy Party, NDP) and the moderate left *Halkçı Parti* (Populist Party, PP) were established. The leader of the NDP was a former general and Evren had implied that this party was the army's choice. The NSC hoped that with these moderate and Kemalist right and a left party a permanent democratic system could be established, and it was sure for the victory of NDP. When Özal, as a prestigious bureaucrat, formed a new party - *Anavatan Partisi* or ANAP (Motherland Party, MP) - the army's plans were spoiled. As the architect of the economic reforms Özal was a well-known person now, both inside and outside the country. Evren

Recent Economic Performance and Medium-term Prospects, 1978-1990, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Working papers, No. 602), 1983).

¹⁰ Arcayürek, *Demokrasi...*, p. 150.

¹¹ İhsan D. Dağı, 'Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-1983: The Impact of European Diplomacy', in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), *Turkey, Identity, Democracy, Politics*, (London: Frank Cass, 1996). pp. 124-141.

¹² Karpat, 'Military...', p. 153.

indicated that the military did not favour Özal's party, yet the NSC could not ban the party, and in the first elections Özal's Motherland Party won 45 % of the votes and 212 of the 400 seats in parliament.¹⁴ Thus the 1983 elections marked the beginning of the Özal era, which would last for some 10 years and would transform Turkey economically, technologically, educationally and politically. For the first seven years the military rulers provided the President with special authority to protect the system they had established, hence Özal could not carry out all his ideas, particularly in the field of social and human rights and foreign policy. However, when the military gradually lost its power over government, Özal started to implement his revolutionary ideas.

During these years Özal also created a new foreign policy: Özalism or neo-Ottomanism, which in Çandar's words constituted the 'funeral' of Kemalism.¹⁵ It is true, as Özal accepted that he came from the same school as Bayar, Menderes and Demirel, and that Özalism can be viewed as a representative of the neo-Democrat or neo-JP current. However, as will be shown, despite the continuity of the democratic-liberal-conservative current since the Ottoman Empire, Özalism is distinguished from these currents in domestic and foreign policy term.

The Army's Foreign Policy (1980-1983)

Before moving to the Özal era, we need to explore the military's foreign policy, because it deeply affected Özalist foreign policy. As noted earlier, Turkey had been isolated from the EC, from the Third World and from the United States due to the Cyprus crisis the American arms embargo, and the Kemalist block on relations with the Muslim countries. In addition, the Kemalist legacy and Turkey's NATO membership prevented the improvement of relations with the communist bloc while internal problems (terror, economic collapse) and the oil crisis exacerbated Turkey's isolation so did the 1980

¹³ **Provisional Article 4**, William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p.260.

¹⁴ Üstün Ergüder, 'The Motherland Party, 1983-1989', in Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (eds.), **Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey**, (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1991), pp. 151-153.

¹⁵ Author's interview with Cengiz Çandar, 20 August 1999, İstanbul. Seufort and Weyland also analyse the social and political change in Turkey from Mustafa Kemal to Özal by focusing on people's attitude in Özal's funeral, and claim that the funeral clearly showed what has changed in Turkey's social and political structures in the Özal period: Günter Seufort and Petra Weyland, 'National Events and the Struggle for the Fixing of Meaning: A Comparison of the Symbolic Dimensions of the Funeral Services for Atatürk and Özal', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Fall 1994, Vol. 11, pp. 71-98.

military coup. The EC's reaction to the coup was very moderate in the first days because it stabilised the domestic situation. Yet when the military regime retarded the restoration of democracy, the EC toughened its policy towards Turkey. First the European Parliament suspended financial aid to Turkey on 22 January 1982. Then, the European wing of the Joint Turkish-European Parliamentary Committee was abolished. The Commission also froze the Fourth Protocol.¹⁶ In addition, the Western leaders and the press were severely criticising the Turkish generals. Nevertheless Evren never abandoned Turkey's traditional Western aims and Westernism remained at the core of Turkish foreign policy and Turkey continued to seek all possible ways to improve its relations with the Western Europe and the US. However these effort, particularly those with Europe mostly failed.¹⁷ The Us was the only major NATO ally not very critical of the coup leaders, yet the Americans could not help to break Turkey's isolated position in the world.¹⁸

Under these circumstances, the political isolation and Turkey's economic difficulties provided the basis for improved relations with the Arab world.¹⁹ As a result, ironically, the Kemalist generals saw the Muslim world as the only way to get away from this economic and political isolation. Bülent Ulusu, the Prime Minister of the military government, for example, announced that Turkey would continue to develop and consolidate its relations with the Muslim world. In December 1980 the Turkish Foreign Ministry declared the new government's decision to reduce diplomatic representation with Israel to a minimum level (from *charge d'affaires* to the level of second secretary) in order to underscore Turkey's support of the Arabs, as a member of the Islamic Conference.²⁰ For Soysal and Dalacoura, this policy underscored Turkey's joining to the Islamic policy in international arena.²¹ Turkey also argued that the main instability

¹⁶ Meltem Müftüler, 'Turkey and the European Community: An Uneasy Relationship', *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest*, Autumn 1993, Vol. 7, No. 33, p. 38; Çayhan, *Türkiye...*, p. 256.

¹⁷ Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz...*, p. 248.

¹⁸ Uslu, *Türk - Amerikan...*, p. 260.

¹⁹ Birol A. Yeşilada, 'Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East', in Attila Eralp, Muharrem Tümay and Birol Yeşilada (eds.), *The Political and Socio-economic Transformation of Turkey*, (Westport: Praeger, 1993), p. 175.

²⁰ Aykan, *Ideology...*, pp. 231-232; George Green, 'Turkey's Relations with Israel and Its Arab Neighbours', *Middle East Review*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1985, pp. 38-39.

²¹ İsmail Soysal, 'İslam Konferansı ve Türkiye', (*The Islamic Conference and Turkey*), *Dış Politika*. No. 11, 1984, pp. 16-30; Katerina Dalacoura, 'Turkey and the Middle East in the 1980s', *Millennium, Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 19, No.2, 1990, pp. 207-227.

reason in the Middle East was the problem of the Palestinians' political rights.²² In particular, Turkey looked for ICO members' support on the Cyprus issue and succeed in some degree.²³ In the military period, Turkey joined almost all ICO meetings. Even Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu participated at the third ICO summit and made a speech underlining change in Turkish foreign policy towards détente. The coup administration's policy towards the Muslim world can be considered as an exception in the Kemalist tradition.²⁴ Apart from the right-wing governments, Turkey – Muslim world relations as a first time in the Republican history improved under a Kemalist and military government and it reached its peaked; Turkey's economic and commercial relations with these countries grew in an unprecedented way in the main fields of trade, capital, investments and contracting in 1980-1984 era. The share of the Muslim countries in Turkey's total exports rose from 22.51 per cent (1980) to 45.79 per cent in 1983 paralleling notable decrease of the share of Western states.²⁵ The Iraq-Iran War in particular nourished Turkish export to these two countries: Thanks to the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline constructed in the 1970s, the trade between the two states increased and Turkey became a principal supply route for Iraq. Similarly Turkey also expanded its trade with Iran after 1980. By March 1982 the Turkish government had concluded a 1 billion dollar-commercial agreement with Iran and in the following years the trade grew larger.²⁶ Moreover, under the pressure of unemployment issue and the European reluctance towards Turkey, the coup government encouraged the businessmen and workers to work in the Arab states, like Libya and Saudi Arabia. So thousands of workers were sent to these countries. Turkey also saw these states as a fresh credit source when the Western financial centres limited credits to Turkey.²⁷ As a result, surprisingly Turkey-Muslim states relations were restored and improved under a Kemalist administration. These close relations confirm the argument of this thesis: Kemalism has also showed a dramatic internal evolution and there has been at least four different Kemalist approaches (Atatürk's, İnönü's, Ecevit's and 12 September Coup's). It is clear that 12 September's Kemalism differs from the previous Kemalists'

²² Ali Karaosmanoğlu, 'Turkey's Security and the Middle East', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 62, No. 1, Fall 1983, p. 163.

²³ Çigdem A. Kurt, 'The Reception and Evolution of the Cyprus Issue in the United Nations, 1954-1984', *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 1-2, 1984, pp. 47-83.

²⁴ For a different view see Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz...*, p. 246 and p. 248.

²⁵ Mahmut Bali Aykan, 'Turkey and the OIC, 1984-1992', *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 1993, Vol. XXVII, pp. 106-107.

²⁶ Harrison, *Turkey...*, p. 197.

²⁷ Aykan, 'Turkey and ...', p. 107.

understanding on secularism's role in foreign policy and in the relations with the Muslim world in particular. Even some leftist groups argued that the 12 September Coup Leaders were not true Kemalists, but undermined the real Kemalists principles.²⁸ Ugur Mumcu for instance saw them as conservative and pro-American rather than Kemalist.²⁹ For Mumcu, Mustafa Kemal was against religious connections while 12 September Coup leaders were in a very close co-operation with the Arab states on a religious understanding.³⁰

Apart from the Cyprus problem, another motive behind the shift in Turkey's Middle East policy was economic. Turkey bought over 11 million ton oil from the Middle East states in 1980, however it had no sufficient source to pay its oil-debts. Thus credit from Iraq, Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia became essential for the Turkish economy.³¹ Turkey's strategy in these years was to increase its export to the Middle East and to develop political relations with the region. Despite this, Turkey rejected basing its relations on a Third World approach or Islamic values. Turkish Foreign Minister Iltis Turkmen, for example, refused to sign some decisions of the 1981 Mecca Declaration regarding on embargo on Afghanistan, Islamic principles and values, and Third World movement.³²

Turkey - Israel relations can be considered a perfect reflection of Turkish-Western relations. Since the West had closed all doors down against Turkey, it needed new political support and economic markets. The Arabs offered money, markets and political support for Turkey, while Israel's effect on the West's Turkey policy was extremely limited. In these years Turkey's reputation among the European states was low. The only countries that the Turkish President could visit were Pakistan, the Arab world and the Balkans. In short, when Özal came to power he found a country isolated from both West and East. Turkey needed a radical shift in domestic and foreign policy in order to escape this political and economical isolation.

²⁸ Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, pp. 149-160.

²⁹ Uğur Mumcu, *Rabita*, (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1987).

³⁰ For his arguments Mumcu used the Rabita affair. For him, the Turkish religious officials outside Turkey were paid by the Rabitat Al-Islam, the Saudi Arabistan - based religious organisation, and the coup leader Kenan Evren had approved this connection. Mumcu, *Rabita*.

³¹ Anthony McDermott, 'Turkey's Search for Friends', *Middle East International*, No. 148, pp. 12-13.

³² *Cumhuriyet* (daily, İstanbul), 23 January 1981; *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı Bülent Ulusu'nun Üçüncü İslam Zirvesi Konferansı'ndaki Beyanatı* (Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu's Speech and declarations in the Third Islamic Summit), Mekke and Taif, 25-28 January 1981. Ankara Başbakanlık.

1980s as Prelude of Özalism and Factors Created Özalism

Özal's Personality

Turgut Özal's personality played a crucial role in the formation and success of Özalism. In the words of Zürcher, 'he had a foot in both camps: he had been a successful manager in the private industry in the 1970s and was very well connected in big business circles, which liked his liberalisation of the economy. On the other hand, he was an practising Muslim and was known to have connections with the *Nakşibendi* order of dervishes.'³³ In fact he had a foot in more than two camps. He was not only a successful businessman, and a religious person with good relations with religious sects: he was a successful bureaucrat and had very good relations with the IMF, the World Bank (between 1971-1973 Turgut Özal was adviser to the World Bank on special projects) and the US administration. He was a religious, nationalist, conservative, liberal politician, businessman, economist and bureaucrat.³⁴ Above all, Özal was a moderate who could do business with everyone regardless of their social or ideological background. For example, he was an Islamist NSP candidate for the Izmir province in 1978,³⁵ before becoming head of the economy under secular military rule.³⁶ Özal's other key feature was his Americanism. Having graduated from İstanbul Technical University in 1950 as an electrical engineer, Özal studied in the United States, and during these years became an admirer of the United States. In his view, the United States owed its success to its liberalism. Özal further argued that the United States and the Ottoman Empire were similar political structures: Both allowed different cultures and gave people freedom to exercise their religion, nationality and economic preferences. From this perspective, Turkey had to desert its authoritarian official understanding, namely the Kemalist state ideology.

³³ Heath Lowry, 'Challenges to Turkish Democracy in the Decade of the Nineties', *Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. V, Fall 1996, p. 95; Yeşilada, 'Turkish Foreign...', p. 178; Zürcher, *Turkey...*, p. 297.

³⁴ Özal was a member of the technical Advisory Board of the Turkish Prime Ministry, and from 1967 to 1971 was under-secretary of the State Planning Organisation; also after returning from United States to Turkey he was appointed under-secretary to the Prime Minister in 1979. On 12 September 1980 he was made Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic affairs.

³⁵ Lowry, 'Challenges...', p. 95.

³⁶ Thanks to his NSP membership, the radical leftists accused him of being Islamist while the Islamists labelled him as a traitor because of his departure from the NSP. *Milliyet*, 20 March 1994.

Coup, Isolation and Thirst for Economic Success

The military coups had put an end to the Menderes and Demirel governments. Ironically, the 1980 military coup provided a suitable political base for Özalist foreign, economic and domestic politics, though he was from the same school of thought as Demirel and Menderes. First, the coup eliminated Özal's political rivals by banning old politicians like Demirel, Ecevit, Türkeş and Erbakan. Secondly, Özal's co-operation with the Kemalist army legitimising his ideology in the system. Thus Özal gradually banished the military elements from politics. Third, the lack of political rivals granted Turgut Özal a respite to concentrate on the country's problems. Thus, Özal became one of the most creative and productive political figures in Turkish politics. Until the 1990s Özal won the election with new projects. Finally, the unique environment of the 1980s provided enormous public support for Özal's governments. For example, in the 1983 elections his Motherland Party (MP) scored an overwhelming victory, with 45 per cent.³⁷ Thus, MP received an absolute majority in the new assembly.

Economic Boom and Re-gaining of Confidence

In the 1980s, Turkey's political agenda was dominated by a high economic growth rate, and a revolutionary structural change towards an industrialised country. Thanks to Özal's liberal economic policies, the Turkish economy grew at an annual rate of over 5 %, the highest among the OECD countries.³⁸ The volume of Turkish exports rose from \$ 2,910 million in 1980 to over \$ 20 billion in the 1990s, with an annual increase of 15,6 %; a staggering 350 % increase in 10 years.³⁹ Moreover, the share of industrial products in Turkish exports rose from 41,1 % to 84 % in 1990. Now only 14 % of the exports were agricultural. Likewise, imports rose from \$ 7,909 million in 1980 to \$ 22.5 billion in 1990 (a 182% increase) while tourism leaped from a marginal industry to a major earner of foreign currency with a increase from \$212 million in 1980 to about \$3 billion in 1990.⁴⁰ For its part the Turkish construction sector dramatically increased its projects in the Middle East, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

³⁷ Dodd, *The Crisis...*, p. 95.

³⁸ R. Hine, 'Turkey and the European Community: Regional Integration and Economic Convergence', in S. Togan and V.N. Balasubramanyam, *The Economy of Turkey since Liberalization*, (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996), p. 146; Dodd, *The Crisis...*, p. 102.

³⁹ 'General Outlook of Turkish Economy', via internet, [http:// www.foreigntrade. gov.tr/ENGLISH?ECONOMYYECONO.htm](http://www.foreigntrade.gov.tr/ENGLISH?ECONOMYYECONO.htm), visited May 1997, p. 2.

⁴⁰ Anne O. Kruger and Okan H. Aktan, *Swimming Against the Tide: Turkish Trade Reform in the*

Despite this remarkable record, the real figures were even higher than the official statistics due to the underground economy. That is to say, Turkey in the 1980s was a miracle economy, or in the words of Mango 'a young tiger'.⁴¹ Moreover, the Turkish economy had by now been liberalised and globalised. The Turkish government adopted the EC's nomenclature for commodity classification and in 1988 initiated legislative adjustments for adopting EC legislation. The main aim was integration of the Turkish economy with the world economy. For some scholars, all these developments were 'the Özal revolution'.⁴²

The first effect of the economic success was the regaining of national confidence lost in the 1970s. Özal's slogan was 'again a great Turkey'. This also affected the conduct of Özalist foreign policy. With economic power, Turkey's foreign policy horizons were widened, as Turkey gradually became a regional power.

Change in Social and Economic Structures

Another effect of the economic boom was the radical change in economic and social structures. As noted earlier, economic power had been in the hands of the Kemalist bureaucracy and state-sponsored businessmen. Although the Menderes and Demirel governments supported the conservative Anatolian capital, their success was limited. Thanks to Özal's policies, the periphery, villagers, workers and traditional religious groups entered the economy, and as a result, strengthened their autonomy against the core, namely the bureaucracy, the military and the state-created industry. During these years, industrialisation of many towns increased immigration from the rural areas, and the portion of those who lived in urban areas rose to 75 %. These developments, together with the high economic growth, urbanisation and Özal's liberal reforms accelerated the restoration of democracy. Many non-democratic rules were abolished, and the masses gained legal rights to resist pressure from the establishment. When ordinary Turks and minority ethnic groups gained power they insisted on good relations

1980s, (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992), pp. 148-149.

⁴¹ Andrew Mango, 'Unfriendly Neighbours', *The World Today*, Vol. 50, No. 3, March 1994, pp. 60-61, p. 60.

⁴² Nicole and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled, Atatürk and After*, (London: John Murray Publishers Ltd., 1997), pp. 158-179.

with those with whom they shared common values, namely the Muslim and the Turkish worlds.⁴³

Re-emergence of Ethnic Pluralism and Its Impact on Foreign Policy Pressure Groups

Indeed, the restoration of democracy and a growing income enabled the political and ethnic minorities to join the democratic system fully. Bosnians, Albanians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Chechens and Turkmen in particular brought their problems to the foreign policy agenda.⁴⁴ No government could any longer ignore these groups because they sponsored or supported the main political parties both through financial assistance and voter power.

Already during the Ottoman epoch Turkey had been a migrant-country.⁴⁵ With the collapse of the Empire millions of the Ottoman subjects, particularly Muslims and Turks poured into Anatolia from Russia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece.⁴⁶ This trend continued throughout the Republican era. In addition to the Turkish and Kurdish population the number of Caucasian, Balkan and Russian immigrants was very high. However these people were not allowed to use their ethnic identity in politics, and were seriously warned not to interfere in the affairs of the country of their origin.⁴⁷ The early Republican policy was based on the Turkification of these people, and this policy continued until the end of the Cold War. In the 1980s the leftist and Kemalist groups perceived the outside Turks and the problems of the ethnic groups in Turkey as endangering Turkish independence. For them, any connection between Turkish citizens and any other country was unacceptable. However there were millions of them.

⁴³ For a comprehensive analysis of the internal social and economic factors' role in shaping Özalism see Hakan Yavuz, 'Değişen Türk Kimliği ve Dış Politika: Neo-Osmanlıcılığın Yükselişi', (*The Rise of the Neo-Ottomanism, The Changing Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy*), *Liberal Düşünce*, Vol. 4No. 13, Winter 1999, pp. 25-38.

⁴⁴ Lowry, 'Challenges...', p. 103.

⁴⁵ For the ethnic minorities in the Ottoman and Turkish period see: Peter Alford Andrews (ed.), *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, (Weisbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989); Server Mutlu, 'Population of Turkey by Ethnic Groups and Provinces', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Spring 1995, 12, pp. 33-60.

⁴⁶ Şule Kut, 'Yugoslavya Bunalımı ve Türkiye'nin Bosna - Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası, 1990-1993', (*Turkey's Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia Policy*), in Söylemezoğlu, *Türk...*, pp. 159-179.

⁴⁷ Lowry, 'Challenges...', p. 102-103.

By now their numbers had grown substantially.⁴⁸ According to Edward Shvardnadze, the President of Georgia, the number of the Georgians in Turkey was about 2 million,⁴⁹ while the number of the Bosnian Turks is estimated about 3-4 million and the number of the Albanian Turks is about 4 million.⁵⁰ There are similar number of Azerbaijanis and Chechens. Though most of these people had been Islamised and Turkified, they still spoke their language and had a different identity awareness.⁵¹ As a result, thanks to the democratisation and economic growth, each of these minorities came to its own lobbying organisations, publishing houses and established links with political parties. Particularly active were the Azerbaijanis and the Chechens. Another large migrant group, Balkan migrants, settled down in the Bursa, Adapazarı, Izmir and İstanbul provinces. Millions of them had come during the Ottoman years, like Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks, Bulgarian and Macedonian Muslims. With the exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece in the 1920s and in subsequent years, their numbers dramatically increased and they became an important pressure group.⁵² In the 1980s, the ethnic cleansing campaign in Bulgaria forced about 300,000 Bulgarian Turks and Muslims to move to Turkey which made the Balkan community as one of the biggest lobbies in Turkey.⁵³ As a result the Balkan migrants became one of the largest pressure group in Turkey. Though the Bulgarian Turks caused a great problem in Turkish-Bulgarian relations in the 1980s, they would become an important actor in improving the economic and political relations in the 1990s.⁵⁴ Apart from the Balkan and Caucasia migrants, there were Central Asian migrants as well, like the Kazaks and

⁴⁸ Belkıs Kümbetoğlu, 'Göçmen ve Sığınmacı Gruplardan Bir Kesit: Bulgaristan Göçmenleri ve Bosnalı Sığınmacılar', (*A Small Portrait of the Asylum Seekers and the Migrants: The Bulgarian and the Bosnian Migrants*), in Kemali Saybasili and Gencer Özcan (eds.), *Yeni Balkanlar, Eski Sorunlar*, (*The New Balkans, The Old Problems*), (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997), p. 229-230 and 255.

⁴⁹ *Milliyet*, 26 June 1996.

⁵⁰ Kut, 'Yugoslavya...', p. 178; Sezer cited in Stephanos Constantinides, 'Turkey: The Emergence of a New Foreign Policy The Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model', *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 1996, Vol. 24, Winter, p. 328.

⁵¹ Paul Henze, 'Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century', in Fuller and Lesser, *Turkey's...*, pp. 25-26.

⁵² For the exchange of the minorities see: Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929).

⁵³ Thomas Goltz, 'Thousands of Ethnic Turks Deported in Bulgarian Assimilation Campaign', *The Washington Post*, 15 June 1989, p. A34 and Marc Fisher, 'Refugees Describe Bulgaria's Campaign Against Turks', *The Washington Post*, 21 June 1989, p. A16. For the Bulgarian Turks migration to Turkey in the 1980s also see: Türkkaya Ataöv, *The Inquisition of the 1980s: The Turks of Bulgaria*, (Washington D.C.: 1990); Kemal Karpat, 'The Turks of Bulgaria', in Syed Z. Abedin and Ziyaeddin (eds.), *Muslim Minorities in the West*, (London: Grey Seal Books, 1995), pp. 51-66; D. Vasileva, 'Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return', *International Migration Review*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, 1992, pp. 342-352.

⁵⁴ Constantinides, 'Turkey...', p. 329 and Eric Roleau, 'Turkey: Beyond Atatürk', *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1996, p. 71.

Uygurs Turks, who came to Turkey after the communist revolution in China, and the Kyrgyzs and Afghanis, who came after the Soviet occupation.

The effect of all these ethnic groups on foreign policy was dramatic. With the increasing role of ethnic groups, Turkey's relations with the region intensified.⁵⁵ These ethnic pressure groups forced Turkish policy makers into a more sensitive foreign policy towards these countries. As a result, the problems in these countries became Turkey's own problems, as witnessed by the Bosnian War and the Nagorna-Karabagh problem between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Similarly, as will be seen, one of the most important factors would shape Turkey's Bosnia policy was the Bosnian Turks in Turkey.⁵⁶ In other words, the ethnic groups created their own foreign policy aims, which were different from the state's Kemalist foreign policy. Turgut Özal saw this change and sought to develop a foreign policy covering all these sector demands.

Globalisation of the Turkish Economy

Apart from the structural change and the rapid development of the Turkish economy, the share of exports in the economy was dramatically increased. In the first years, when the difficulties with the EC markets increased, Turkish businessmen focused on the Middle East countries, notably Iran, Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Thus, for the first time in Republican history, the Turkish economy became dependent on economic conditions in the Muslim world. In addition to the oil trade, Turkey attached great importance to export, tourism and the construction sectors. Moreover, in time, the European Community, became the first and most important export area for Turkish goods, with over a 50% share. In addition to the EC and the Middle East, trade with the US, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Russian Federation markets became vital for Turkish businessmen, and the dependant classes.⁵⁷ Thanks to the Özalist economic measures of the early 1980s, by abandoning its inward-oriented economic policies Turkey succeeded not only in diversifying its exports but also in becoming an important market for direct foreign investment.⁵⁸ The İstanbul exchange was now considered one of the most important financial markets in south-eastern Europe, together with that of

⁵⁵ Constantinides, 'Turkey...', pp. 328-330; Lowry, 'Challenges...', pp. 102-104; Yavuz, 'Degisen...', pp. 36-38.

⁵⁶ Sezer cited in Constantinides, 'Turkey:...', p. 328.

⁵⁷ Dodd, *The Crisis...*, p. 105; Ahmad, *The Making...*, pp. 206-207.

⁵⁸ Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, (New York: Rowman, 1998), p.

Athens. That is to say, contrary to the small Turkish market in the 1920s-30s, Turkey was now one of the most rapidly developing international markets, with billions-dollars of foreign investments. Hence, an isolationist policy, like Kemalist foreign policy of the early Republican years, was virtually impossible. Turkey became the third biggest market among the non-EC European countries, after Switzerland and Russia. All these factors affected and sometimes forced the Özal administration to improve Turkey's economic and political relations with the EC and other economic partners. Thus, for example, Turkey was very careful not to annoy Germany, its biggest economic partner. Similarly, contrary to the early Republican indifference towards the region Turkey's growing economic interests in the region and new export-oriented policies inevitably raised Turkish consciousness toward the Middle East.⁵⁹

In short, with the internationalisation of the economy, Turkish businessmen imposed their agenda on the state or manipulated the official foreign policy.

Kurdish Separatism and the Need for a New Identity⁶⁰

Kemalist nationalism let many Kurdish nationalists down after the Independence War. As a Turkist, Kemal sought to establish a homogeneous country and eliminated other ethnic and cultural differences from the state machinery. Kurdish was banned and Kurdish names of towns were changed into Turkish names. In the Seyh Sait Revolt (1925) and in the Dersim (Tunceli) Revolts (1937-1938), the Kemalist state suppressed the Kurdish-Islamist separatists by using violence.⁶¹ Many were hanged. The main factor that united the Kurds and Turks was Islam. The secular and nationalist Republicans undermined that, hence, the unrest in the region continued. Yet the separatists were too weak to launch a general riot. However, thanks to the anarchic environment of the 1970s, the separatist Kurds united groups and claimed an independence or autonomy for the Kurdish people. In 1980s the separatist Kurdish became a significant armed movement under the PKK's leadership. In a decade the PKK gathered about 10,000 armed men and thousands more sympathisers. By the late

164.

⁵⁹ Graham E. Fuller, 'Turkey's New Eastern Orientation', in Fuller and Lesser (eds.), *Turkey's*, p. 39.

⁶⁰ Kurdish separatism is an important and huge subject, however its details fall out of the scope and the limits of this study. Here the study just focused on its role in shaping Özalism. For a detailed account see William Hale, *Identities and Politics in Turkey*, unpublished SOAS seminar paper, 7 October 1999. pp. 1-15 and Bal, *Preventing...*; also see Gerger, *Türk Dış...*, pp. 164-171 and Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's...*

1980s, the Kurdish question dominated the political agenda, and all political parties searched for a solution. Kemalist Turkish identity, thus, was no longer satisfying for some parts of Turkish society, and the Kurdish problem underscored this problem. Kurds and other ethnic and political groups (Islamists, socialists etc.) demanded a new identity and citizenship definition that would include ethnicity, cultures, religion, political ideas and minority languages. Özal claimed that the main pillars of the Republic needed to be re-considered, notably Turkish citizenship, unity, individual rights and the state's rights and responsibilities.⁶² This policy created a Second Republican current in domestic politics.⁶³ In foreign policy matters it created neo-Ottomanism or Özalist Foreign Policy understanding.⁶⁴ This manifested itself in a wider identity abroad, Ottoman rather than Turkish covering all neighbouring Muslim peoples (like the Kurds in the northern Iraq) and all minorities in Turkey. For example, after the Gulf War Özal claimed that Turkey was the protector of the Iraqi Kurds and Turkmens in its capacity as the 'big brother' of these peoples, arguing that a federation between these peoples was possible under Turkish sponsorship.⁶⁵ Özal underlined his plans for the outside Kurds in his speech in Diyarbakir, a predominantly Kurdish region:

'The people in the south east region are our brothers. The people in the Northern Iraq are their brothers and should to be our brothers too. Turkey just neglected the events happened in Northern Iraq in the past.. For example, the Halabje incident. We said "that's outside our frontiers, it's nothing to do with us." This policy must be changed. Turkey's new policy should be as: if Baghdad commits another barbarity there, it will find us opposing it.'⁶⁶

This speech clearly underscores the huge differences between the traditional pacific policies and Özal's activist Kurdish policy. Moreover, the Özalist policy challenged the principle of non-involvement in the regional inter-state conflicts and domestic politics of the other countries. As Menderes did in the Iraqi Crisis of 1958⁶⁷, Özal threatened the neighbour countries with military intervention.⁶⁸ In sum, the Kurdish problem not only increased the political liberalism of Özalism but also nourished its Ottomanist elements.

⁶¹ Bal, *Preventing...*, pp. 142-148.

⁶² Turgut Özal, *ANAP Özal Arşivi*, Ankara, TÖ / 91456B-2.

⁶³ The leading Second Republicanists are: Mehmet Altan, Ahmet Altan, Asaf Savaş Akat, Ethem Mahçupyan.

⁶⁴ David Barchard names Özalism in general as neo-Ottomanism and claims that 'neo-Ottomanism is much more politically potent force in Turkey than Islam.' David Barchard, *Turkey and the West*, (London: Routledge, 1985), p. 91.

⁶⁵ Turgut Özal, *ANAP Özal Arşivi*, Ankara, TÖ / 92045A.

⁶⁶ Özal's speech in Diyarbakır, *Milliyet*, 9 December 1991.

⁶⁷ See Chapter VII of this study.

⁶⁸ Apart from Iraq, Özal had threatened Bulgaria in the 1980s for its treatment to the Bulgarian minority.

Ideological Background of Özalist Foreign Policy: Democrat, Western, Muslim and Turkish

A New Civilisation Understanding and Özalist Westernism

As mentioned Mustafa Kemal had aimed at creating a religious-free, European Turkey by changing the civilisational mode of the country, as he viewed Islam and Ottoman tradition as responsible for poverty, political corruption and economic collapse.⁶⁹ For Özal there was no compulsory relationship between progress and Western civilisation. Contrary to the positivist *İttihatçılar* and Kemalists, Özal argued that Western civilisation was not the only civilisation on earth, and that Turkey did not have to choose between either the European, Turkish or Islamic civilisations. For Özal, the Turks were European Muslims; therefore Turkey did not need to change its mentality or civilisational mode to be European. In his book '*Turkey in Europe, Europe in Turkey*',⁷⁰ he argued that Turkey had always been, still was, and would be a part of Europe. In brief, the main difference between Kemal and Özal's European vocation was that the former internationalised the European values while the latter did not see any problem with Turkish civilisation. For Özal, responsibility for Turkish backwardness lay in the lack of liberalism and scientific thinking. He formulated his understanding as '*çağ atlamak*' (skipping an age), whereby Turkey did not have to re-experience the enlightenment process undergone by the West because the fruits of the enlightenment could easily be adopted by today's Turkey. These, in his view, were liberalism, human rights, democracy, technological and scientific developments and Turkish culture was not an obstacle to receive all of them. Özal even claimed that if Turkey tried to re-experience the European positivist, autocratic past, it would never reach these aims. In other words, Özal's Western vocation, contrary to Atatürk's, was based on the assumption that the Europeans must accept the Turks as they were. Undoubtedly, the reason for this confidence was Özal's ideological background and dramatic economic performance, which led to the stability and co-existence between Islamic values and modernity witnessed in the 1980s.

For the issue see Türkkaya Ataöv, *The Inquisition of the 1980s: The Turks of Bulgaria*, (Washington, D.C.: 1990); Türkkaya Ataöv, 'The Bulgarian Quashing of Its Minorities'. *The Journal of Ankara University, The Faculty of Political Science*, January-December 1990, Vol. XLV, No. 1-4, pp. 1-10.

⁶⁹ See Chapter IV of this study.

⁷⁰ Turgut Özal, *Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey*, (Nicosia, Northern Cyprus: K. Rustem &

According to Turgut Özal, the Islamic awakening was also on advantage in integrating Turkey with the rest of Europe and the Western system because the Turkish version of Islam was different from the Iranian or the Arab Islam. He claimed that the Turkish Islamic outlook could provide peace between Muslims and the others, since religion and progress could go hand in hand.⁷¹ As a Westernist and a pious Muslim, Özal accommodated his Islamic understanding to Westernism:

‘I have demonstrated that Turkey has never abandoned secularism. In this context one can refer to Ghazali’s distinction between faith and reason. The Turks are aware that faith in itself does not affect secularism, nor does prevent him from being rational, provided that their respective realms are not encroached. In life today there is no difference in this respect between the Christian European and the Muslim Turk. Thus a synthesis has been achieved between the West and Islam, a synthesis which has put an end to the identity crisis of the Turks... the universal humanism created by secularised Islam, together with the concept of the brotherhood of mankind, a product of Turkish Sufism.’⁷²

For Özal, Turks do not need to be shamed of their civilisation, because Turkish civilisation was not a lower civilisation, but one of the many advanced civilisations in the world:

‘The Turks living in this territory for a thousand years, have inherited some part of culture of every civilisation which flourished here since prehistory. They have evolved a synthesis derived from the cultural legacy of Anatolia, from the culture they brought with them from Central Asia, and from the Muslim religion. Their talent for synthesis and their ecumenical character have enabled them to blend these three strands together.’⁷³

Apart from his different civilisation understanding, Turgut Özal, contrary to Kemalist Western scepticism, believed that Turkey could solve its security problem only through integration with the West, because Turkey and the Western countries were opposed to any possible conflict or instability. If Turkey managed to enter the EC, it would be far away from any war risk: ‘Like the founding members of the EC, we favour integration primarily in order to eliminate any possibility of war between the constituent nation-states. Turkey like all European countries, has suffered enormously from wars.’⁷⁴

Brother, 1991).

⁷¹ Nicole and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled, Atatürk and After*, (London: John Murray Publishers Ltd., 1997), p. 163.

⁷² Özal, *Turkey...*, pp. 296-297.

⁷³ Özal, *Turkey...*, p. 345.

⁷⁴ Özal, *Turkey...*, p. 343.

In line with this view, Özal made efforts to convince the Europeans to accept the Turks as Muslim Europeans into the European political system. On the other hand he tried to demolish the Turkish Western scepticism, were Turkey to be integrated with the West, it would be advanced in terms of democracy and economy:

‘Political integration with Europe will further ease the institutionalisation of democracy in the Turkish political system. A secular and pluralist culture has been gradually taking root in Turkey. Integration with the EC will only enhance its ability to persist into the twenty-first century.’⁷⁵

A New Look at the Ottoman Past and the Region

Kemal had sought to eradicate anything reminiscent of the Ottoman-Islamic past. For Özal, Turkey’s past was its most important advantage in entering the Western club. Moreover, while Kemal saw the Ottoman heritage as the source of problems in the region, Özal claimed that Turkey could solve the regional problems due to the Ottoman past. He even argued that the Ottoman heritage granted Turkey great power to control the region, saying that ‘Turkey cannot be prisoner of the *Misak-i Milli* (National Pact) borders’. He further implied that the only solution to the Kurdish problem and other matters in the Middle East was a federation between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, which was considered as the resurgence of the Ottoman Empire by the leftist groups in Turkey. For Özal, Ottoman political and cultural systems could be a perfect model for 20th century Turkey. For example, his *eyalet sistemi* (state system), the localisation of the administration, and the presidential system suggestions were all inspired by the Ottoman past.

Turkish Islam and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis

In spite of Kemalism’s anti-religion stance, Özal was known as a pious Muslim, if not an Islamist. As noted earlier, he was one of the candidates of Islamist NSP in the 1979 elections. However, his Islam was different from either the Kemalist or the NSP Islam. His friend and follower Cengiz Çandar spelled out the difference:

‘Republican secularism was inspired by French and Soviet atheism. Therefore, in the 1920s Republican secularism became atheism. In time, Kemalist secularism became an anti-religion and anti-Islam concept. When Turkish Islam, rooted in the Ottoman and Seljuki Islamic cultures was suppressed by the State, Arabic Islam, which is a less moderate, more radical version, became the leader in the world. Now when Özal and me visited the Turkish communities in the Balkans, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Central Asia, in Azerbaijan, in Kazakhstan, we saw a completely different Islam from the Arab version: a Turkified Islam. A more moderate Islam. An Islam which is suitable for

⁷⁵ Özal, *Turkey...*, pp. 330-331.

liberalism and democracy. I mean Turkish Islam is so different. Kemalists cannot accept that a country needs religion as well, because their ideology was an imported ideology and not suitable for Turkish cultural structure. We have to accept that Turkey is a Muslim country.'⁷⁶

In other words, Özal was against the Kemalist interpretation of secularism and Arab Islamism. He argued that Turkey needed an Anglo-Saxon secularism and a Turkish version of Islam, which was much more tolerant of other religious groups and more moderate than French and Soviet secularism, or rather atheism.⁷⁷ He searched for a middle-way between Islamism and Turkism, his aim being to formulate a religious understanding which was suitable for democracy, liberalism and capitalism.⁷⁸ The answer was *Türk-İslam Sentezi* (Turkish-Islamic synthesis).⁷⁹ Originally developed by the Turkist *Aydınlar Ocağı* (Hearts of the Enlightened Society), this synthesis was seen by Özal as the answer for 1980s Turkey, hence it became the guiding principle of his policies.⁸⁰ According to this approach, Islam held a special attraction for the Turks owing to a number of striking similarities between their pre-Islamic and Islamic cultures. 'They shared a deep sense of justice, monotheism and a belief in the immortal soul, and a strong emphasis on family life and morality.'⁸¹ However, despite these similarities, Turkish culture was not merely based on Islamic or pre-Islamic culture but on both of them. Therefore, Turkish Islam is more tolerant, more liberal and democratic than the other interpretation of Islam. Özal claimed that Turkish Islam could provide a peace between the Muslims and the others saying 'we learned that religion and progress could go together.'⁸² Özal was implying that Islam is montageable into the modern political system. In the light of this information, in Özal's foreign policy understanding Turkish Islamic mentality had an important role in Turkey's external relations.

Özalist Nationalism

Turkism constituted one of the main elements of Özalism. However, his Turkism was neither irredentist, like Enver Pasha's Turkism, nor isolationist, like Kemal's.⁸³ For

⁷⁶ Author's interview with Cengiz Çandar, 20 August 1999, İstanbul.

⁷⁷ Turgut Özal, *ANAP Özal Arşivi*, TÖ / 91002.

⁷⁸ Tapper, 'Introduction', p. 11.

⁷⁹ For Turkish-Islamic Synthesis see Aydınlar Ocağı, *Aydınlar Ocağı'nın Görüşü*, (*The Aydınlar Ocağı's View*), (İstanbul: 1973).

⁸⁰ Yeşilada, 'Turkish...', p. 177.

⁸¹ Zürcher, *Turkey...*, p. 303.

⁸² Pope and Pope, *Turkey...*, p. 163.

⁸³ For the transformation of Turkism in the Özal period also see Fuller, 'Turkey's...'. pp. 45-48; Yavuz, 'Değişen...', pp. 25-38.

Ottoman Turkists, the ultimate aim was a Turkish Empire covering all Turkish tribes who were under Russian, Chinese and Iranian rules. On the other hand, as a reaction to adventurist Turkism, Atatürk developed an isolationist Turkism, viewing the outside a danger for the Anatolian Turks. Hence Atatürk's Turkey had no interest in the outside Turks, and gave no support for Turkish resistance against any power, like the Azerbaijanis against the communist attacks in the 1920s. Conversely, for Özal Turkism was an important element in Turkish citizens' identity and in Turkish foreign policy particularly after the Cold War, when the new world order was based on economic alignment and solidarity among kin states. As a result Özal saw Turkism as one of the cornerstones of Turkish modernisation inside and of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. However, territorial nationalism or an irredentism did not match his Turkism. Özalist Turkism was a cultural concept aimed at economic and cultural domination of the Turks rather than territorial expansionism. The Turkish states were relatively poor and weak countries, therefore possible co-operation among them would be useful to overcome their problems. Özal saw Turkey at the heart of a possible Turkish bloc and he predicted that it would benefit from the leadership of a Turkish alignment.

Moreover, unlike Kemalist Turkism, Özalist Turkism was not a reactionary movement in domestic politics. As noted earlier, Atatürk's nationalism was a reaction to minority separatism, Western antagonism and Ottoman Islamism. However Özal's Turkism was not against the West or any minority group in Turkey. On the contrary, it was a search to accommodate all different ethnic and political groups under a wide Turkish concept. Özal's Turkism can be likened to Americanism in United States.

Liberalism and Americanism⁸⁴

As mentioned, during his studies in the United States Özal became an admirer of the American political, cultural and economic system. His dream was to make Turkey another America – his role model. It can be argued that Özal's ideology consisted of American secularism, American democracy, American capitalism and American liberalism. Therefore, Turkish-American relations were vital for Özal's domestic and

⁸⁴ For the ideology's role in Özal's policies and his Americanism also see Uslu, *Türk - Amerikan....* pp. 269-270.

external policies.⁸⁵ When comparing the American and the Turkish system, Özal argued that Turkey had a communist system in bureaucracy and economy. For him the Kemalist *etatist* principle was one of the culprits for the failure of the Turkish economy. He further argued that protectionism had made the Turkish industry inefficient, uncompetitive and expensive. Moreover, from the Özalist perspective there was a very close relationship between economic liberalism and democratisation. He gave special importance to individual rights in contrast to the Kemalist approach which gave the state the first priority. In 1979 Özal said:

‘A strong state does not mean a patriarchal state. The aim is not richness of the state but richness of the nation. If people are rich, it means that the state is rich. In economy or political spheres the state should not compete with the people, but support them. The people are not the servants of the state, but the state must be servant of the people.’⁸⁶

It can be said that one of the main pillars of Özalism, with its Turkism and Islamism, was liberalism and American-type democracy. For Özal, all these principles were compatible, not contradictory.

Özalism vs. Kemalism?

Against this backdrop it is hardly surprising that Özal was not happy with the Kemalist establishment and its principles. Çandar argues that although he was Prime Minister, then President of the Turkish State, Özal was an anti-state person:

‘He was opposed to almost all the principles of the regime dominating the state. While he was the President he opposed the state, and when he died he was buried not in a state cemetery. He now lies near by those who were hanged by the state, like Menderes.’⁸⁷

Çandar claims that Özal represented the people’s anti-Kemalist and anti-regime feelings, having attacked virtually all Kemalist principles, like secularism, etatism, nationalism and populism. His civilisational understanding was completely different from the Kemalist Western-centred civilisation understanding. Mustafa Kemal had dreamed of a Turkified, secular, Western society in Europe. Özal’s dream was of a Muslim, democratic, liberal, capitalist society with multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-

⁸⁵ Özal pursued an EC-type relation with United States in economics and politics.

⁸⁶ Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar, 2. *Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları (Second Republic Debates)*, (Ankara: Başak, 1993), 17.

⁸⁷ Personal interview with Cengiz Çandar, 20 August 1999, İstanbul.

and instruments for communication were removed by the EC. Also, the negative propaganda of Turkish deportees and exiles in Western Europe, who escaped after the coup, fortified the historical image of the Turks in European mind. Meanwhile, anti-European feelings in Turkey were dramatically increasing. Turkey was overcoming its problems despite the EC, and now the EC did not even want to listen to it. The second barrier to improved relations was the Greek factor. While Turkey had been isolated from Europe, Greece had become the tenth member of the Community. Greece, which had always viewed Turkey as a hostile country, used the EC as a weapon against Turkey.⁹⁰

The United States was more understanding than the EC. They even said that the Turkish military coup was no ordinary coup but a necessary intervention in politics. During Ronald Reagan's first administration, relations between Turkey and the United States improved significantly. However, in the second Reagan term, the international balance of power began to change. The rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, the gradual thaw in the US - Soviet Union relations, the impending Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, all this made Turkey's defence needs less urgent from the American standpoint. Under economic and social pressures, Congress cut the defence budget. The decreased American aid to Turkey worsened relations. In addition, the Greek and Armenian efforts in Congress harmed US-Turkish relations. Nevertheless, Özal continued his efforts to develop a special relationship with the United States.

Although, Özal continued to see integration with the West as a prime foreign policy goal due to its isolation from the West, he had to make efforts to develop relations with the region.⁹¹ Also, the growing Turkish exports forced Turkish policy makers to look at the neglected regions such as the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Middle East. Despite the crisis with Bulgaria and Greece in the late 1980s, Turkey's relations with these regions were improved, particularly in the economic sphere. In the pre-1989 era, Özal further attached great importance to the Middle Eastern Muslim countries, particularly in the economic matters. Turkey established very close economic relations with Iran, Iraq,

⁹⁰ Mehmet Ali Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası: 1959-1985, (Turkey's Common Market Adventure)*, (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1986), p. 412.

⁹¹ Turgut Özal, *ANAP Özal Arşivi*, Ankara, TÖ/Konuşmalar/84312, 84314-C.

Libya and Pakistan which had been neglected for a long time.⁹² These relations underlined Özal's ideological orientation and how he gave importance on economic relations. For Özal economy should be at the core of Turkey's relations with the Muslim states rather than politics or the military issue. He never visited any of these countries without a crowded businessmen group and made effort personally to improve the trade with the region.⁹³ In the first years of the Özal era, the 1984 Casablanca Islamic Summit constituted a turning point. Turkey as the first time in the Republican history, participated the conference at the presidential level. In the conference Kenan Evren was appointed president to the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Economic and Commercial Co-operation (COMCEC), one of the six specialised OIC committees.⁹⁴ Turkey thus in practice assumed a leading role in efforts to achieve co-operation among the Muslim countries challenging the Kemalist secularism and non-involvement religious meetings principles.

The last Turkish initiative in foreign policy, in the first Özal period, was its application for full EC membership.⁹⁵ According to Özal, there were three requirements for such membership: being European, democracy and a developed liberal economy. As he saw it, Turkey had met these criteria. Özal's enthusiasm for membership was not shared by the EC, notably by Germany.⁹⁶ As a result, the Community warned Turkey unofficially that the timing for membership application was not right.⁹⁷ Ignoring these warnings, Turkey applied for full-membership in 1987, being confident of the acceptance of its application.⁹⁸ Özal asserted that 'according to the written agreements, there is no other way, they can delay it, but they cannot refuse it.'⁹⁹ The Commission's response took

⁹² For the details of Özal's diplomatic visits to these countries see Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz...*, pp. 269-303.

⁹³ Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz...*, p. 269.

⁹⁴ Aykan, 'Turkey and...'.
⁹⁵ For Turkey - European Community relations see Canan Balkır and Alan M. Williams (eds.), *Turkey and Europe*, (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1996); Meltem Müftüler-Bac, *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe*, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997); A. Evin and G. Denton (eds.), *Turkey and the European Community*, (Opladen, Germany: Leske & Budrich, 1990); Werner Gumpel, *Turkey and the European Community*, (München: LDV, 1992); Erol Manisali (ed.), *Turkey's Place in Europe: Economic, Political and Cultural Dimensions*, (İstanbul: Logos, 1998); R. Pomfret, *The Mediterranean Policy of the European Community*. (London: Macmillan: 1986).

⁹⁶ Sevilay Elgün Kahraman, 'Rethinking Turkey-European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 5.

⁹⁷ Ali Bozer, 'Turkey's Relations and Prospects with the European Community', *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest*, Summer 1997, pp. 9-14, p. 10.

⁹⁸ Çayhan, *Turkey...*, p. 292.

⁹⁹ 'Turkey's EEC Full Membership Can Be Delayed But Not Refused', Interview with Turgut Özal, *Turkish Review*, Summer 1987, pp. 15-24, p. 15.

thirty months, which was more longer than that taken for the Greeks, Spanish and Portuguese applications. The EC Commission finally issued its opinion on 20 December 1989. The reluctance of the EC was clear though the Commission tried not to spell out its negative opinion.¹⁰⁰ For the EC the obstacles were economic gap, free movement of Turkish workers (paragraph 82)¹⁰¹, and the political problems, notably human rights issues (paragraph 9) and Turkey's problems with Greece.¹⁰² Hale argues that democratisation after the coup had partly been motivated by foreign policy considerations and thanks to the European refusal both the military and the government accepted that further liberalisation would be necessary condition for a better relations and eventual acceptance of Turkey into the Community.¹⁰³ However disappointed Özal, in contrast, argued that the real reason was neither liberalisation nor the political problems but cultural differences and European biases about the Turks.¹⁰⁴

Apart from bilateral relations, another significant development of the first Özal era was Turkey's enormous efforts to establish its own defence industry. There is no doubt that the main reason for this was the traumatic experience of the American arms embargo of the 1970s. Though the first coup leaders had attached great importance to a national defence industry, it was Özal who devoted huge budgets to defence development projects and encouraged Turkish businessmen to invest in the security industry. The humble efforts resulted in a sophisticated national defence industry in the late 1980s and Turkey became a supplier of anti-craft weapons, small arms, communication equipment, military vehicles and other equipment to NATO members and some other friendly countries, like Egypt and Pakistan. On 10 June 1987, in co-operation with an American consortium, an F-16 project was started and Turkey entered the aircraft industry as a producer. Some of the Turkish F-16s were exported to other countries, like Egypt. That is to say, despite Özal's Americanism, Turkey had learned the lessons of the arms embargo and realised importance of being independence on defence industry. As a

¹⁰⁰ Eralp, 'Turkey...', p. 36.

¹⁰¹ **European Commission: Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community**, SEC, 89, 2290 final, Brussels, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰² **Opinion.**

¹⁰³ William Hale, 'Generals and Politicians in Turkey: 1983-1990', **Turkish Yearbook of International Relations**, 1995, Vol. XXV, p. 18.

¹⁰⁴ 'Turkey's...', pp. 15-24. Müftüler-Bac shares Özal's ideas: 'The replacement of the ideological East-West conflict with ethnic, religious, and historical conflicts emphasised Turkey's non-Christian, and hence non-European character: Müftüler-Bac, 'Through...', p. 29. Also see the same author's 'Turkey's...', p. 64.

result, unlike Menderes and Demirel, Özal did not rely solely on the West in the security matters.

As has been seen, thanks to internal problems and the international environment Özal could not apply his principles to foreign policy as much as he wanted during this period. Nevertheless, with the growing exports, Turkey became much more directly connected with the world during the 1980s. Also the international developments in the 1980s prepared Turkey for the radical changes of the 1990s. In these years Turkey for the first time in Republican history turned its face towards its region, in contrast to Kemal's 'escape from the region policy' and Menderes' Cold-War-obsessed policies. Moreover, unlike previous policies, with the growing economic ties with the region, Turkey set permanent relations with its neighbours.

Post - Cold War and Neo-Ottomanist Foreign Policy After 1989¹⁰⁵

In the second period of his rule two important factors emerged. First, Özal felt increasingly free to focus on foreign policy issues, as the military's effect on politics decreased. Second, with the end of the Cold War, Turkey found itself facing a new environment -alone philosophically, politically, and militarily and uncomfortable in such an isolated position.¹⁰⁶ Thus Turkish leaders sought ways to extricate Turkey from its predicament.¹⁰⁷ As has been seen throughout this thesis, despite some differences, the path all Turkish governments have chosen was integration with the West. The axis of the Kemalists' (Atatürk, İnönü and the leftist-Kemalists) and liberal-conservative right-wing parties' (Democrat Party, Justice Party, Motherland Party etc.) foreign policy was a fully integration with the West. That is to say, except for the Islamists, the radical left and the ultra-nationalists, all political groups in Turkey solved Turkey's historically isolated position with integration with the West. Even these radical groups were arguing

¹⁰⁵ For post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy see: Kemal Kirişçi, *The End of Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviour*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1992); Andrew Mango, *Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role*, (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992); Clement H. Dodd (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy, New Prospects*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992); Yavuz, 'Turkish...', pp. 19-41.

¹⁰⁶ Many in the West, including some Western leaders, saw Turkey as no longer of vital importance claiming that the expensive Western ties constructed with Turkey to contain the former Soviet Union were no longer affordable. Steve Coll, 'The Turkish Question: How Important is it?', *The Washington Post*, 24 May 1993.

¹⁰⁷ Stephen J. Blank, Stephen C. Pelletiere and William T. Johnsen, *Turkey's Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs*, (Washington: Department of Defense, 3 December 1993) via the net. Part IV.

partly Westernism. Particularly for the Kemalists, integration with the Western world was a matter of life and death. It was not only base of Turkish security and foreign policy but also a security for the secular regime. Therefore the end of the Cold War made most Turks panic. The simplest explanation was that: 'Now the West does not need us. Hereafter they will not give any financial, political and military aid. Similarly, the EEC, which had implied cultural biases in its Turkey policy, will close down its doors to Turkey. Turkey separated from the 'civilised world' (the West), will be alone with the traditional enemy, Russia, and the regional conflicts, poverty, instability. Regional instability will undermine Turkish economy and integrity and all the foreign powers will work to disunite Turkey.'¹⁰⁸

Kemalists, who believed that the end of the Cold War threatened the Turkish economy, security and democracy, suggested returning to the early Republican policy of isolation. They further argued that after the Cold War the West's aim was to disintegrate Turkey as witnessed in Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. For the Kemalists and other isolationists, Kurdish problem and the European refusal of the Turkish application were clear signs for the Western intention. Kemalists (leftist and traditional) argued that separatist Kurds were encouraged by the EU countries.

Islamists, on the other hand, were happy with the developments, because for them the end of the Cold War confirmed their ideas. They, as a result, re-suggested a common market between the Muslim countries.

However, Turgut Özal's prescription was very different from the Kemalist and Islamist prescriptions. Özal saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity for Turkey. From his perspective, the collapse of the communist block freed the Turkish Republics and dissolved the system in neighbouring regions, which had prevented Turkey from developing good relations with these regions. In other words, now not only the Turks turned to these regions, but also the peoples of Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Albania, Kosova, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan and Uzbekistan turned towards Ankara. In the words of Sezer,

'new geopolitical developments mobilised mutual awareness and sympathy among the Turks of Turkey, their ethnic and linguistic kin in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and

¹⁰⁸ *Cumhuriyet* (daily, İstanbul), 27 December 1989; *Hürriyet* (daily, İstanbul), 2 January 1990.

the Balkan peoples of Muslim heritage who look to Turkey as a source of moral and material support in the formidable task of transition to post-communist societies.¹⁰⁹

One of the reasons for this mutual awareness was the eruption of regional conflicts, like Karabagh and the Bosnia crisis which motivated these countries to look for Turkey's support. Now there was no communist-capitalist competition, and therefore they could not get support from the superpowers. Thus, the cultural and ethnic similarities became important to get political and military support. Fuller argued 'neo-geopolitics' activated psychological and cultural dynamics among nations.¹¹⁰ Thus group identity of a cross-national and cross-cultural became very important in international relations. Especially in the Balkans and Caucasia these factors were more important due to these regions' multi-cultural structures. Apart from Fuller's neo-geopolitical formulation, Huntington argued that the end of the Cold War implied a clash of civilisations and cultures.¹¹¹ According to this approach, a cultural polarisation was inevitable and Turkey's region was the most dangerous in the world. Whether these theories are right or wrong falls out of the scope of this study, yet it is obvious that Turkey became an attraction centre for the Turks, Muslims and former Ottoman Empire's peoples. For example, while the Serbs took the Greek and Russian support Turkey appealed as a natural ally for the Muslim population of the former Yugoslavia. Likewise, in Caucasia in the face of Russian-Armenian co-operation the Azerbaijanis looked to their 'Muslim, Turkish brothers' for support. While in the wake of the Cold War, almost all leaders of the Turkic world, Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia rushed to Ankara for support over their economic and political problems.

Moreover, the strategic withdrawal of the Soviets changed the balance of power in the region. The centuries-old Turkish-Russian border ceased to exist. This was a development of historic significance for Turkey, because now the primary threat of Russia was relatively distant from Turkish borders, and the Russians were busy with their own domestic problems, and even they invited Turkish businessmen to their territories to contribute to Russian economic reconstruction. Furthermore, as the

¹⁰⁹ Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, 'Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region', in Mastny and Nation, **Turkey between East and West, New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power**, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), p. 73.

¹¹⁰ Graham E. Fuller, 'The New Mediterranean Security Environment: Turkey the Gulf, and Central Asia', in **RAND Conference Proceedings**, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), p. 45.

¹¹¹ Samuel P. Huntington, 'Clash of Civilisations', **Foreign Affairs**, Summer, 1993.

monolithic power of Russia on the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea was gone, now the littoral was divided among Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey and Russia.¹¹² Particularly the emergence of an independent Ukraine balanced the Russian power in the Black Sea and Turkey felt itself more comfortable on the straits question. Likewise, in Caucasia Soviet sovereignty was replaced by three different states: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. This new arrangement destroyed Russian domination in the region. Now in Caucasia Russia, Iran and Turkey became the dominant powers. Apart from the Black Sea and Caucasia, in the Balkans Soviet Union lost its previous strong position. The disintegration of Yugoslavia granted new friends to Turkey. Also, the ideological changes in Bulgaria, Romania and Albania changed these countries' attitude towards Turkey. Turkey and Bulgaria, for example, looked to increase co-operation.

Apart from security concerns newly established republics (like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) and the former communist states (such as Romania and Bulgaria) with limited economic and political resources looked to Turkey viewing it as economic and political model (Turkish model). Also they made efforts to lure Turkish investment to their countries because they could not finance all needs for structural changes in lack of Russian and Western aid. Under these circumstances, Turkey had a great opportunity to increase its investments and export to these states.¹¹³

The most important development for Turkey in the post-Cold War was the emergence of the Turkic world. When Turkish peoples in the Soviet Union were freed from 150 years of Russian rule, Turkey saw these Republics as a solution to its isolation. As the most advanced of them, Turkey dreamed of being the leading Turkish republic and to benefit from this position. The Turkish economy and ethnic structure were very suited to close co-operation with these regions and the West's indifferent policy towards Turkey also forced Turkish policy-makers to develop closer relations with its kin countries.¹¹⁴ Thanks to the West's attitude, even Turkish Westernists realised that cultural and religious differences were a crucial factor in Turkey's neglect by Europe and this weakened resistance to Özal's policies.

¹¹² Sezer, 'Turkey...', p. 72.

¹¹³ Author's interview with Fehmi Koru, 12 February 1999, Ankara.

¹¹⁴ Landau, *Pan-Turkism...*, p. 202.

Given this situation, for Turgut Özal despite its disadvantages the end of the Cold War offered Turkey many regional opportunities. Although the West was questioning Turkey's value, for Özal, the West could not neglect such an important country. Therefore, Özal made efforts to persuade the West of Turkey's post-Cold War importance locally and within the Islamic and Turkic world. Secondly, because Turkish businessmen played a crucial role in his foreign policy concept, Özal argued that the state had a duty to prepare the legal and political ground for Turkish economic enterprises in these regions. As such the Özal government took the initiative to set up EC-like regional co-operation institutions in the area surrounding Turkey, with an aim of stabilising Turkey's region for co-operation. Then he intensified his efforts to establish bilateral and multilateral links between Turkey, neighbouring countries, Turkey's kin states and the Muslim world. In Özal's plans, as will be seen in the Black Sea, Russia and the Central Asia cases, Eurasia in particular played a significant role, and he focused on to make Turkey an important actor in the region. One of the initiative to realise these aims was Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC).

Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC)¹¹⁵

The BSEC was a Turkish initiative and Özal's personal idea. Its main objectives were to stabilise the region by using economic means and to open new export destinations for Turkish enterprises.¹¹⁶ This 1990 proposal was greeted with enthusiasm by the Black Sea, Caucasia and the Balkan states and after a preparatory meeting in Ankara in 1990, working meetings were made in Bucharest (Romania), Sofia (Bulgaria) and Moscow (the Soviet Union) followed between December 1990 and July 1991.¹¹⁷ After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, apart from Turkey, Russia, Greece and Ukraine almost all-regional countries participated in the organisation: Romania, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Albania, Georgia, Moldavia, Bulgaria and Armenia. The BSEC Agreement was signed in İstanbul on 25 June 1992 by all parties.¹¹⁸ The agreement declared all

¹¹⁵ For Turkey's role in the BSEC see Nihat Gökyigit, 'Success of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone and the Role of Turkey', *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest*, Vol. Vi, No. 28, Summer 1992, pp. 7-10; N. Bülent Gültekin and Ayşe Mumcu, 'Black Sea Economic Cooperation', in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), *Turkey Between East and West*, (Oxford: Westview Press, Inc., 1996), pp. 179-201; Oktay Özüye, 'Black Sea Economic Cooperation', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Summer 1992.

¹¹⁶ Faruk Sen, 'Black Sea Economic Co-operation', *Aussen Politik*, vol. 44, no.: 33, 1993, pp. 281-287.

¹¹⁷ Türkkaya Ataöv, 'Expanding...', p. 58.

¹¹⁸ Gültekin and Mumcu, 'Black Sea...', p. 178.

members' support for the democratic values, basic freedoms, individual rights, social justice, economic freedom, security and stability in the region.¹¹⁹

The BSEC had a political as well as economic dimension but Özal hesitated from focusing on political matters because most of the countries in the region had serious political problems with each other (for example Azerbaijan and Armenia; Russia and Ukraine; Turkey and Greece). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia many regional countries faced economic catastrophe, and Özal also wanted Turkey, which lost its Arab market after the Iran-Iraq and the second Gulf War, to fill the economic vacuum. Özal also emphasised the cultural dimension of the BSEC. In almost all his trips to these countries Özal signed cultural protocols or agreements which covered education, language, science and art. As a result of these efforts, some countries sent their military and civil servants to İstanbul or Ankara to study, often funded by Turkey. Turkey also gave credits to poorer regional states, like Georgia, Azerbaijan and Macedonia. Contribution of these policies to BSEC was limited yet, thanks to Özalist policies, Turkey became a regional power-centre for many countries, like Ukraine and Bulgaria. Further, some countries saw Turkey as a balancing power against their traditional enemies. For example for Albania, Turkey became a fresh credit source and a balancing political support against Greece. Despite Russian scepticism over the BSEC, the economic needs of newly-emerging states and other former communist states nourished the organisation and a joint Black Sea Bank and a data bank were established; and even political and economic committees were formed in order to discuss the regional problems. All member in these discussions also agreed to improve transportation, communication in the region and trade between the members.

For some academics like Gençkaya, BSEC was a Turkish-led challenge to European integration.¹²⁰ However, as the Turkish under-secretary for Foreign affairs clearly stated, BSEC was not an alternative to the EC, but it was thought as an assistance factor for Turkey's integration with Europe.¹²¹ Furthermore, the EC member Greece's

¹¹⁹ Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism, From Irredentism to Cooperation*, (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 1995), p. 203. For the full text of the Bosphorus Declaration see 'Bosphorus Declaration', *Turkish Daily News*, 26 June 1992, p. 12.

¹²⁰ Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, 'The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project: A Regional Challenge to European Integration', *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 4, November 1993.

¹²¹ Sanberk said 'it is not an alternative policy: Özden Sanberk, *Cumhuriyet*, 26 May 1991. Özüye. another Turkish diplomat, also stated that the BSEC was a part of the pan-European integration project

application to the BSEC emphasised the BSEC's this character.¹²² In this context it can be said that the organisation's main character was complementing the regional integration projects like the European Community, rather than competing.¹²³ Also, contrary to the 1930s' Balkan Pact and 1950s' second Balkan Pact, BSEC was an economy-culture oriented organisation, rather than a security block.¹²⁴ Another characteristic of Özal's BSEC initiative was that, contrary to Atatürk's, İnönü's and Menderes' security-oriented regional policies, Özal formed such a policy for peaceful aims, like economic and cultural co-operation. Fourth, in establishing the BSEC Turkey played a leading role as a regional power, and as Uslu pointed out the BSCE can be considered as one of the most vivid proof for Turkey's new activist foreign policy.¹²⁵ Fifth, before Özal, Turkey had never perceived the Black Sea as a co-operation region. With Turkey's new Black Sea policy, apart from the Balkans and the Caucasia the Black Sea rim was perceived as a whole political entity by the Turkish policy makers. Finally, after the BSEC the trade between Turkey and the other members significantly increased, and Turkey hugely benefited from the emergence of the Black Sea as a new political and economic entity.

The Balkans and Turkey: The Resurgence of the Ottoman Empire?¹²⁶

Apart from the BSEC, the Balkans was a very important area for Özalist foreign policy as the former Ottoman territories and a place where millions of Muslim and Turkish minorities lived. Also apart from Turkey, there were four Muslim countries in the region: Kosova, Macedonia, Bosnia and Albania. That is to say historical and cultural similarities provided a suitable ground for co-operation, and this co-operation was viewed as an opportunity to end Turkey's aloneness in Europe. Moreover, after the

saying 'this is not a new compartmentalisation of Europe': Oktay Özüye, *The Independent*, 26 June 1992 and Özüye, 'Black Sea...', p. 51. Turkey also emphasised on many occasions that the BSEC was not an alternative but a supplement to the European Community: see Sen, 'Black Sea...', p. 286.

¹²² Özüye, 'Black Sea...', p. 52.

¹²³ Landau, *Pan-Turkism...*, p. 204.

¹²⁴ Levent Bilmen, 'The Regional Cooperation Initiatives in Southeast Europe and the Turkish Foreign Policy', *Perceptions*, September-November 1998, Vol. III, No. 3, p. 69.

¹²⁵ Uslu, *Türk - Amerikan...*, p. 356.

¹²⁶ For Turkey's policy in the Balkans in the post-Cold War era see Garreth Winrow, *Where East Meets West: Turkey and the Balkans*, (London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1993); J. F. Brown, 'Turkey: Back to the Balkans?', in Graham Fuller and Ian O. Lesser (eds.), *Turkey's New Geo-politics: From the Balkans to Western China*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 141-162; Berkan Ekinci, 'Yugoslavya'nın Dağılması ve Türkiye', (*The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and Turkey*), *Balkanlar*, (*The Balkans*), (İstanbul: Eren, 1993); Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, 'Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region', in Vojtech and Mastny (eds.), *Turkey...*, pp. 71-95; R. Craig Nation, 'The Turkic and Other Muslim Peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans',

disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the great Slavic block, which destroyed Ottoman predominance in the 19th century, now vanished. As a result, Muslim peoples and those states that had problems with Serbia and Greece, such as Macedonia and Albania, turned their faces to Ankara. Under the effect of these factors Turkey evinced a new interest and activism in the Balkans after the Cold War. Turkey, similar to its policies in other regions, first of all, tried to develop economic and cultural relations instead of the military or political groupings. For example Özal's first priority was to unite these countries with Turkey by using telecommunication and transportation systems. In this context an Albania-Bulgaria-Turkey highway project (the Balkan Highway Project) was significant. For Yinanç, this highway would connect all Balkan states into Turkey and lessen Turkey and the regional countries' dependence on Greece.¹²⁷ Turkey made efforts not to be seen as over-enthusiastic. As Çandar¹²⁸ has noted Turkey did not want to antagonise regional opponents, like Greece, however, perceived the growing friendship between Bulgaria, Albania, former Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey as a direct threat to its security and Greek academics and politicians referred Turkey's Balkan policy as 'containment policy.'¹²⁹ For the Greeks Turkey was surrounding Greece by using Muslims and former Ottoman subjects. According to the Greek perception Turkey's efforts created a Muslim-Orthodox competition in the Balkans.¹³⁰ Ironically Greece accused Bulgaria and Macedonia of being in a Muslim conspiracy. As a result Greece sought Serb and Russian friendship to balance Turkey. In spite of the Greek unrest, it can be said that the Özalist Balkan policy put an end to Turkey's isolated position in the Balkans, and in a short time even Greece understood that Turkey was not a new Ottoman Empire and its new Balkan policy was not based on a Muslim conspiracy against Greece, but a cultural and economic co-operation.

in Mastny and Nation (eds.), *Turkey...*, pp. 97-130; Kut, 'Yugoslavya...', pp. 159-179.

¹²⁷ Author's interview with Barçın Yinanç, 22 February 1999, Ankara. Also for the details of the project see M. Türker Arı and Sedat Laçiner, 'Balkan Seferinin Ardından', (*After the Balkan Visit*), *Uluslar arası İlişkilerde Olaylar ve Yorumlar*, December 1993, pp. 54-58 and *Cumhuriyet*, 16 December 1993.

¹²⁸ Personal interview with Cengiz Çandar.

¹²⁹ Stephanos Constantinides, 'Turkey: The Emergence of a New Foreign Policy the Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model', *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 24, 1996, pp. 323-334, p. 330; N. A. Stavrau, 'The Dismantling of the Balkan Security System: Consequences for Greece, Europe and NATO', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 1995.

¹³⁰ Emilja Simoska, 'Macedonia and the Myths of the 'Muslim Conspiracy' and 'Endangered Orthodoxy'', *Balkan Forum*, Vol. 1, No. 4, September 1993, pp. 189-196.

The Bosnian crisis demonstrated the Özalist policies' differences from the previous foreign policy understandings; when the crisis erupted, Turkey, with the pressure from Islamic and ethnic circles,¹³¹ felt that it had to follow a more active foreign policy.¹³² Özal arguing the arms embargo on Bosnia must be lifted immediately, even publicly stated Turkey's intention to intervene militarily in the Bosnian conflict in order to help the Muslims.¹³³ Furthermore, Turkey was the most enthusiastic supporter of the Bosnians in the diplomatic arenas. For instance, the Turkish delegation made great efforts to form a pro-Bosnian group organising Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics in the 1992 ECSC Helsinki Summit. In the summit, the Turkish Prime Minister also made negotiations with the Western leaders to get their support for Bosnia,¹³⁴ and argued that the NATO had to intervene to the conflicts in Yugoslavia in order to protect the Bosnians.¹³⁵ Turkey also sent \$ 22 million official aid to the Bosnians in 1992 and 1993.¹³⁶ In addition, Turkey, in the name of the Bosnians, was very active in the United Nations too.¹³⁷ Despite these efforts, the massacres in Bosnia could not be prevented. In this environment Turkey severely criticised the West and even many Turkish politicians, like Kamuran Inan, Ekrem Pakdemirli and Bülent Akarcali, accused the European states of being racist and anti-Muslim because they did not stop the Serbs.¹³⁸ As a result Turkey felt frustrated at the reluctance of the West attempted to use Organisation of Islamic Countries as a platform to support the Bosnians and to attract the Western attention to the problem.¹³⁹ President Turgut Özal, in his Balkan tour between 15-22 February 1993, tried to make the Croatians and Bosnians ally against the Serbs, and made efforts to persuade the Bulgarians, Albanians and Macedonians to use their air zones for Turkish military air planes.¹⁴⁰

¹³¹ Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer says there is an estimated 3-4 million Turks of Bosnian origin in Turkey. Sezer, cited in Constantinides, 'Turkey...', p. 328. Hakan Yavuz argues that Özal's Balkan policy was not only a result of neo-Ottomanism, but also at the same time an important reason of this approach: Yavuz, 'Degisen...', pp. 26-28.

¹³² Semih D. Idiz, 'President Özal's Balkan Crusade', *Turkish Probe*, Vol. 2, No. 15, 23 February 1993, pp. 10-11; Semih D. Idiz, 'Turkey Ponders the Balkan Quagmire', *Turkish Probe*, Vol. 1, No. 6, 22 December 1992, p. 9.

¹³³ *Milliyet and Hürriyet*, 30 January 1990.

¹³⁴ *Hürriyet*, 10 July 1992.

¹³⁵ Idiz, 'Turkey...', p. 9.

¹³⁶ Kut, 'Yugoslavya...', p. 170.

¹³⁷ Kut, 'Yugoslavya...', p. 169.

¹³⁸ *Zaman* 14-20 August 1992; *Turkish Daily News*, 15 August 1992.

¹³⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 1 July 1993.

¹⁴⁰ Kut, 'Yugoslavya...', p. 170.

Çalis argues that Özal's Balkan policy was in conformity with Turkey's traditional foreign policy.¹⁴¹ It is true Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin declared President Özal's announcements did not reflect Turkey's official policy,¹⁴² yet Çetin's words did not mean Turkey followed a traditional Kemalist policy in the Balkans but underscored the great competition and differences between the Kemalist approach and Özal's Ottomanist Balkan policy. Turkey had never set its foreign policy on a common religious and cultural values neither in the Balkans nor in the Middle East since Atatürk,¹⁴³ and the Kemalist elite were still reluctant to see Turkey involved in the Balkans.¹⁴⁴ However now, in addition to the defensive considerations, Turkey's Bosnia policy was based on religious and cultural solidarity and Özal was very enthusiastic for an active Balkan policy to make Turkey economically and politically a regional power. Turgut Özal, for instance, stated 'Turkey is responsible for looking after the well-being of the Muslims in the Balkans.'¹⁴⁵ Finally, all Turkish initiatives in the region Turkey had been defensive¹⁴⁶ and has never followed an active foreign policy in the Balkans except Özal's Ottomanist policies.¹⁴⁷ Thus Özal attempted to change another column of tradition Turkish foreign policy.

From the Adriatic to the 'Chinese Wall': Turkey as a Development Model for the 'Turkic World'¹⁴⁸

Turkey had no official relations with the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union and other Turkic peoples prior to 1989, despite common cultural, linguistic, and

¹⁴¹ Çaliş, *The Role...*

¹⁴² *Sabah*, 28 February 1993.

¹⁴³ Constantinides, 'Turkey:...', p. 328.

¹⁴⁴ J. F. Brown, 'Back to the Balkans?', in Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkey's New Geopolitics*, (Boulder: Westview, RAND, 1993), p. 153.

¹⁴⁵ Quoted in S. J. Blank, S. C. Pelletiere and W. T. Johnsen, *Turkey's Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs*, internet edition, (Washington: Department of Defense, 3 December 1993), Part III, p. 3.

¹⁴⁶ Bilmen, 'The Regional...', pp. 76-77.

¹⁴⁷ For a comprehensive account on Turkey's previous Balkan policies see Oral Sander, *Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye, 1945-65*, (*The Developments in the Balkans and Turkey, 1945-65*), (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası).

¹⁴⁸ For Turkey's policies on Central Asia and the Caucasus see: Bülent Gökay and Richard Langhorne, *Turkey and the New States of the Caucasus and Central Asia*, (London: Wilton Park, 1996); Bülent Aras, 'Turkey's Policy in the Former Soviet South: Assets and Options', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, NO. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 36-58; Stephen J. Blank, 'Turkey's Strategic Engagement in the Former USSR and US Interests', in Stephen J. Blank, Stephen C. Pelletiere, and William T. Johnsen (eds.), *Turkey's Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs*, (Charlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993); Reimani Gareth M. Winrow, *Turkey in Post - Soviet Central Asia*, (Brookings Institute, 1995); Reimani Hooman, *Rivalry in Central Asia: Iran, Turkey and Russia in Comparison*, PhD thesis, Queen's University of Kingston (Canada), 1996; Bilal Simsir, 'Turkey's Relations with Central Asian Turkic Republics', *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest*, Vol. 6, 1992.

religious ties to these peoples.¹⁴⁹ The causes for this were mainly Kemalist nationalism and isolationism understanding¹⁵⁰ and the Cold War circumstances. As Rouleau put it 'Mustafa Kemal distanced Turkey from Turkish-speaking populations, abroad, arguing that Ankara should not meddle in the internal affairs of foreign states, just as he had dissociated the young republic from the Islamic world.'¹⁵¹ Apart from Kemalism, Turkey as a small country could not challenge the Soviet Union for the Turkish diaspora in this country. The end of the Soviet Union freed the Turkic peoples under communist rule and five of them established their own independent states. Now there were seven Turkish states: Turkey, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Kemalism had clearly warned against any kind of Pan-Turkist foreign policy. Though Turkey was the first country to recognise these states and relations developed at a feverish pace.¹⁵²

Despite the discussion among pan-Turkists about the creation of a Union of the Turks,¹⁵³ Turkey chose not to establish a Turkish Commonwealth between these countries. The reason is debatable yet it can be said that the primary reason was not to provoke the Russians and other regional powers, like Iran. Özal concentrating on the relations with the outside Turks were economy, education and culture, hoped secular Turkey would provide a development model for these new emerging republics.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, Özal argued that the 'Turkish model' was much more suited to the region than the Iranian, Russian or Saudi models. He further argued that the Turkish model was better for Turkey, Turkic states, the West, even for Russia because it would stimulate development, secularism, democracy and stability in the region, and it would down play fundamentalism and conflict. To realise the Turkish model Özal needed to persuade the Turkic states, the Turkish public, the West and the Russians. As a first step, Özal added a new section to the Foreign Ministry and established new institutions with large budgets (\$406 million) to deal with relations with the Turkic world, like TIKKA (Turkish Development Assistance Agency), which is the first official institute in the

¹⁴⁹ Kemal H. Karpat, 'Turkish Foreign Policy: Some Introductory Remarks', *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Winter 1992-94, Vol. 6, Nos.: 1 & 2, pp. 1-19, p. 7.

¹⁵⁰ Gökay and Langhorne, *Turkey...*, p. 5.

¹⁵¹ Rouleau, 'Turkey:...', p. 20.

¹⁵² Sedat Laçiner and M. Türker Arı, '21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Cumhuriyetleri' (*Turkish Republics at the Threshold of the 21st Century*), *Milliyet* (daily, İstanbul), 4-10 May 1993.

¹⁵³ *Cumhuriyet* (daily, İstanbul), 16-20 January 1990.

¹⁵⁴ For an analysis of this model see İdris Bal, 'The Turkish Model and the Turkic Republics', *Perceptions*, September-November 1998, Vol. III, No. 3, pp. 105-129.

republican history to regulate the relations with the Central Asia and Caucasus.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, he frequently visited the Turkic republics and by 1993 had signed several agreements with these countries on areas ranging from health to education. Bilateral committees and organisations were also established. Moreover, Turkey granted about ten thousand scholarships to university students from the Turkic world, and sent some Turkish students to these countries.¹⁵⁶ TRT, Turkish national television, started to broadcast in the region under the name of *Avrasya* (Eurasia) and other private television stations followed the TRT move.¹⁵⁷ State-owned Turkish Airlines established regular flights to Baku, Alma Ati, Taskent, Ashkabad and Bishkek. While Turkish Eximbank and other Turkish banks gave about \$7 billion in credits to Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Krgyzstan.¹⁵⁸ Some former Soviet Republics, like Georgia and some Turkic autonomies in the Russian Federation also benefited from Turkish aid. Apart from state aid, Özal encouraged Turkish businessmen, religious groups, Turkists and media to invest in these countries. As a result, many Turkish businessmen and idealists poured into these countries and established their own businesses in these countries. Private aid programmes were inaugurated, particularly in the education, media, telecommunication and textile sectors, and private Turkish companies opened branches and increased their investment in these countries, especially in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.¹⁵⁹ In particular the ultra-Turkist and *Nurcu* religious groups, led by Fethullah Gülen, established their own business and media in Central Asia and Azerbaijan and Gülen group's daily newspaper *Zaman* became the second or third biggest newspaper in these countries.¹⁶⁰ As a result of these efforts Turkish people and media as a first time in the Republican history named some other countries as 'brother Republics'.¹⁶¹ This was a turning point in Turkey's sceptic world perception and underlined the effects of the new Turkist policies. Despite the welcome of the masses, Özal's Turkic policies confronted a weak leftist-Kemalist resistance in the first years of the post-Cold War era. Particularly Turkist, Islamist and

¹⁵⁵ Blank and others, *Turkey's...*, p. 3; Gökay and Langhorne, *Turkey...*, p. 33.

¹⁵⁶ Andrew Mango, *Türkiye'nin Yeni Rolü*, (*Turkey's New Role*), (Trs.: E. Yükselci and S. Demircan), (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1995).p. 118.

¹⁵⁷ For the effect of TRT in the region see Ali Yavuz Aybek, *Turkish Television to Central Asia: Perceptions of Turkish Avrasya Television in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan*, PhD thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1996.

¹⁵⁸ Landau, *Pan-Turkism...*, pp. 210-211.

¹⁵⁹ Landau, *Pan-Turkism...*, pp. 207-211; Fuller, 'Turkey's New...', p. 68.

¹⁶⁰ *Zaman*, 15 March 1992.

¹⁶¹ *Milliyet*, 15 March 1993.

Westernists features of Özalist policies disturbed the left and the leftist-Kemalists who opposed any support or privileged position for Turkic republics. The left viewed Özal as a 'servant' of American interests in Central Asia, and claimed his aim was to demolish socialist solidarity in the region. They also argued that Turkey's policies would provoke Russian anger and risk Turkey's independence and security. In spite of the opposition the resistance was so weak and their effect on the public was so limited.

Özal's efforts to revive the Turkic world were warmly welcomed by other Turkic peoples, and in his latest visit to Central Asia and Azerbaijan Özal was received by enthusiastic crowds and these states decided to meet annually under the banner of 'Turkic Summits', with the first held in Ankara.¹⁶²

Turkey's interest extended beyond the independent Turkic Republics and covered other Turkic tribes in the Russian Federation, China and the Balkans. In particular Crimean Tartars, Bashkir, Kazan Turks, Turks of Yakutistan (Russia), Uygurs of China, Gagavuz Turks of Moldavia and Volga Turks attracted interest from Turkey and Turkey made extreme efforts not to provoke the mainland countries by using economic and cultural investments.¹⁶³ As Landau pointed out 'Turkey's grand policy was to strive to institutionalise its relations with the "Turkic Brethren",¹⁶⁴ both in conjunction with other states and on Turkish-Turkic basis'.¹⁶⁵ Under this strategy, Turkey encouraged the Turkic republics to participate The Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO)¹⁶⁶ to improve the regional economic co-operation and with Turkey's encouragement and efforts the ECO was enlarged in 1992 by the admission of the Turkic-Muslim republics of the Soviet Union with Afghanistan.¹⁶⁷ The inclusion of the Central Asian republics

¹⁶² Landau, *Pan-Turkism...*, pp. 223-224.

¹⁶³ Lowry, 'Challenges...', pp. 102-106; Constantinides, 'Turkey:...', pp. 328-330; Hyman, 'Turkestan...', pp. 346-347;

¹⁶⁴ Turkic republics, s.l.

¹⁶⁵ Landau, *Pan-Turkism...*, p. 206.

¹⁶⁶ After Iraq's withdrawal, CENTO had replaced the Baghdad Pact in 1958 and the CENTO members decided to set up Regional Cooperation Organisation (RCD) between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan on 4 July 1964 in order to increase economic cooperation among the member countries. After the Iran Revolution 1964 in order to increase economic cooperation among the member countries. After the Iran Revolution CENTO was dissolved, however RCD survived as the only regional economic cooperation organisation between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. In 1985 the members changed the name of RCD to the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) underscoring the economic character of the new organisation. For the details see Ismail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Siyasal Bağlıları, 1945-1990*, (*Turkey's International Political Contracts*), Vol. II, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991), pp. 496-500. For the full text of ECO Agreement see the same study pp. 521-531. Also see Burke, *Pakistan's...*; Soysal 'The 1955 Baghdad...'; and Chapter VII of this thesis.

¹⁶⁷ Gökay and Langhorne, *Turkey...*, p. 18.; Sezer, *Turkey in...*, p. 85.

increased the ECO's importance in terms of politics and international trade, and the year 1992 became the busiest year of the organisation, which showed no real progress for a long time because of the Iraq-Iran War during the 1980s.¹⁶⁸ Iran in particular saw the ECO as an instrument to materialise its political-religious aims in the region, yet for Turkey the was not a religious or a political organisation, but an economic cooperation initiative. Isin Çelebi, Turkish State Minister for the Economic Affairs, for example, clearly declared how Turkey perceive the organisation:

‘The ECO is not going to be an Islamic Common Market. It is a regional economic cooperation organisation.’¹⁶⁹

In this context, Eco provided Turkey another economic instrument in order to implement its economy-oriented activist regional foreign policy.

In light of all this, Özal saw Central Asian republics as an opportunity, which had been ignored by the traditional foreign policy approaches, to strengthen Turkey's influence in international arena.¹⁷⁰ He was so optimistic and claimed that the 21st century would be a ‘Turkish century’ and adopted the slogan ‘*Adriyatik'ten Çin Seddi'ne*’ (From Adriatic to the Chinese Wall). This slogan was defining Turkey's new interest areas. Contrary to Kemalist isolationism, Özal argued that Turkey had vital interests in the Balkans, Middle East, Caucasias, Black Sea rim, Central Asia, even in Western China where a Turkish tribe, Uygurs, lives under the Chinese rule. In doing so Özal brought about a historical change in Turkey's relation with Turkic states. Moreover, the emergence of the Turkic world can also be viewed as a historical turning point for Turkish foreign policy, because Turkic World put an end to Turkey's isolated position in the world. It also helped Turkey to overcome its cultural isolation and identity crisis. Turks now did not have to be just European or Arab-styled Muslim. They had their own world, a Turkish world to which they can relate culturally, politically and economically without any dilemma. All this inevitably created a more active ‘Turkist’ foreign policy towards the East, and Turkey left its Kemalist isolationism. As has been witnessed in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflicts, Turkey's support to Azerbaijan on the basis of

¹⁶⁸ Davut Dursun, *İslam Dünyasında Dayanışma Hareketleri*, (*The Solidarity Movements in the Islamic World*), (İstanbul: Ağaç, 1992), p. 70.

¹⁶⁹ *Milliyet*, 22 January 1992.

¹⁷⁰ *Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal'ın III. İzmir İktisat Kongresi'ndeki Konuşmaları*, (*The President Turgut Özal's Speech in the III. Izmir Congress of Economics*), İzmir, 4 June 1992. (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık, 1992), pp. 11-12.

‘brotherhood’ underscored the dramatic change. Özal in this crisis threatened the Armenians with sending troops to the region saying ‘if we frighten the Armenians what can they do?’¹⁷¹

Turkey and Russia: From Potential Threat to Market

As has been shown throughout this study, historically not only Atatürk but almost all Turkish and Ottoman policy-makers, except the socialists, perceived the Russians as the greatest threat to Turkish security. The relations were often dominated by rivalry and war.¹⁷² The age of imperial competition ended with the First World War and the mutual enemies created mutual empathy and co-operation between Lenin and Mustafa Kemal in the post-war era. However Turkish-Russian co-operation was short-lived and Turkey turned its face towards the West. The Second World War and Stalin’s territorial claims over Turkey increased the mistrust, and finally Turkey’s participation to the NATO worsened the relations. Despite some efforts, as seen under the Ecevit governments in the 1970s, the relations could not be improved and the main priorities had been security issues.¹⁷³ As such, the end of the Cold War had significant security implications. A former American Ambassador to Ankara pointed out:

‘The threat of the past 400 years – Russia – has been virtually eliminated. Turkey is now more secure than it has been since the birth as a republic after the First World War’.¹⁷⁴

In reality, Russia was still a great potential threat to Turkey and was unhappy with Turkey’s activities among the Turkish, Turkic and Muslim peoples in Central Asia and Russian Federation. Yet the Turks were considered a lesser menace compared with the Iranian and Saudi efforts in the region. Moreover, Turkey went to great efforts not to antagonise Russia, and Özal was much more interested in the economic potential of the Russian Federation as an export and investment destination more than political issues. For Özal, Russia had more opportunity than the small Turkic Republics had. Therefore, Turkey could benefit from these two different markets by not provoking them. In another word, Turkey’s orientation was mainly in the economic realm towards the

¹⁷¹ Turgut Özal, **ANAP Özal Arşivi**, TÖ/Konuşmalar/92003-A,B,C; **Milliyet** (daily, İstanbul). 3-6 March 1992.

¹⁷² Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, ‘Turkish Russian Relations: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership’, **Turkish Studies**, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 61-62; George S. Harris, **Turkey, Coping with Crisis**, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 178.

¹⁷³ Sezer, ‘Turkish Russian...’, p. 61.

¹⁷⁴ Morton Abramowitz, ‘Foreword’, in Fuller and Lesser, **Turkey’s New Geopolitics, From the**

former Soviet Union countries in the Özal era.¹⁷⁵ Similarly, the former Soviet republics under the great economic depressions and the political problems caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union sought friendship and economic cooperation with the regional countries, including Turkey, rather than rivalry. As Ataöv noted, 'having a new and a different perception of each other, the Soviet Union and Turkey exhibited a desire to augment trade and investment possibilities.'¹⁷⁶

On 11 March of 1991 Özal paid an official visit to Russia with a delegation of businessmen and officials, which was the first presidential level visit to Russia for twenty-two years.¹⁷⁷ In this visit a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourness and Co-operation and some other agreements and protocols were signed.¹⁷⁸ This 1991 Treaty can be considered as the high point in Turkish-Russian relations. Moreover, unlike previous agreements the focus of these agreements was financial and economic, rather than political and security ones. After Özal's visit, Turkish Eximbank increased Turkish credits to Russia from \$300 million to \$400 million, and also gave a \$200 million credit to finance Russia's imports from Turkey. As a result, Turkish-Russian trade tripled in 1990 and by 1991 had reached \$2.5 billion.¹⁷⁹ The trend continued in the following years and Russia became the second biggest economic partner of Turkey with about \$5 billion trade. Özal hoped that the trade volume might reach \$ 10-15 billion by the end of the century. In addition to the official export-import figures, millions of Russians poured into İstanbul and other Turkish cities to make unofficial trade (especially *bavul ticareti* – 'suitcase-trade'). According to the state figures, in a short time, the unofficial trade climbed to the billions of dollars. Moreover, the Russia-Turkey natural gas pipeline increased economic dependency between these two traditional enemies. Turkish credits to Russia, which reached \$1.5 billion in 1993, and the bilateral agreements made more trade and Turkish investment in Russia possible. As a result of these policies Turkish construction and consumption sectors boomed in Russia. By 1993 the value of the Turkish construction sector in Russia was more than \$2 billion. Many Russian prestigious buildings, like hospitals, hotels later even parliament building

Balkans to Western China, (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. vii-xii, p. viii.

¹⁷⁵ Türkkaya Ataöv, 'Turkey's Expanding Relations with the CIS and Eastern Europe', in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), **Turkish Foreign Policy, New Prospects**, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), p. 80.

¹⁷⁶ Ataöv, 'Turkey's Expanding...', p. 91.

¹⁷⁷ Ataöv, 'Turkey's Expanding...', p. 91-92.

¹⁷⁸ Ataöv, 'Turkey's Expanding...', p. 91.

¹⁷⁹ Graham G. Fuller, 'Turkey's New Eastern Orientation', in Fuller and Lesser, **Turkey's...**, pp. 89-90.

and other cities were build by the Turkish firms, like ENKA and GAMA. The increasing dependency between Turkey and Russia decreased the tension in the relations and forced both sides to search friendship and co-operation. As a result Turkey's biggest fear became one of the biggest markets for Turkish exporters.¹⁸⁰

The Gulf War: Return of Activism and Özalism vs. Kemalist Bureaucracy¹⁸¹

By developing close relations with the Turkic world and Turkey's region, Özal did not challenge the United States or Europe. On the contrary, he made efforts to unite Turkish and Western interests. In other words, having provided legal and political frameworks at home and in the region for the Turkish economy, Turkey tried to persuade the West that Turkey was a regional power in the Balkans, the Middle East, Caucasasia, Black Sea and in the Central Asia; and with its democratic, secular and pro-Western system Turkey could be a good partner for the West. Özal meant that the West needed Turkey as a partner to defend its interests against instability, Islamic fundamentalism, unpredictable states (like Iraq, Iran), ethnic conflicts (like Yugoslavian crisis) and against Russia's unpredictable policies (as witnessed in Chechnya). In the first years the West ignored Turkey's arguments. However, the Gulf War provided the opportunity to show Turkey's importance.¹⁸² Also the Gulf War revealed the Kemalist bureaucracy's and army's unrest about Özalist foreign policy. Finally, the Gulf War showed the clear difference between Kemalist foreign policy and Özalist foreign policy. Therefore we now examine Özal's Gulf War diplomacy and his Middle East policy.

As has been seen, relations with the Islamic world and the Middle East had been an important indicator in the regime's Kemalist character. Even the neo-democrat Menderes and Demirel governments could not change its essence. Turkey's relations

¹⁸⁰ Gökay and Langhorne similarly argue that the essence of the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union unlike their past rivalry shifted towards a more co-operative point. Gökay and Langhorne, *Turkey...*, p. 33.

¹⁸¹ For the Gulf War and Turkey see: Philip Robins, 'Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis, Adventurist or Dynamic?', in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy, New Prospects*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), pp. 70-87; Necip Torumtay, *Orgeneral Torumtay'ın Anıları*, (*General Torumtay's Memoirs*), (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1993); R. Dannreuther, *The Gulf War: A Political and Strategic Analysis*, (London: Adelphi Papers, No. 264, 1992); William Hale, 'Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis', *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 4, 1992; I. Lesser, 'Turkey and the West after the Gulf War', *International Spectator*, Vol. 27, No. 1, January-March, 1992; Gözen, 'Türk...' pp. 286-302.

¹⁸² Gözen, 'Türkiye'nin II. Körfez Savaşı Politikası: Aktif Politika ve Sonuçları', (*Turkey's The Second Gulf War Policy: The Active Policy and Its Results*), in İhsan D. Dagi (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasında Gelenek ve Değişim*, (*Tradition and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy*), (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi,

with this region were based on these Kemalist principles:¹⁸³ Non-interference in the domestic affairs of Middle Eastern states; non-interference in disputes between the states in the area; non-interference in inter-Arab relations; non-interference in religious groupings. In another word, Turkish foreign policy became characterised by non-involvement and non-interference in the regional politics.¹⁸⁴ However, as he implied in the 1980s, Özal saw an active role in the Middle East and on many occasions he stated that Turkey would have to increase its involvement in the Middle eastern politics: 'It is impossible for us to refrain from playing a role in the Middle East.'¹⁸⁵ Despite his desire for activism, Turkey's relations with the Middle East were mainly economy-oriented until the Gulf War, except the relations with Syria.¹⁸⁶ Turgut Özal in these years personally played a significant role in mobilising Turkish business interests in the Middle East and also attracted Arab capital to Turkey.¹⁸⁷ Thanks to his efforts, Turkey's trade with the region grew dramatically and Turkey became an important exporter in the Middle East.¹⁸⁸

When the Gulf Crisis erupted, Turkey's initial reaction was within the traditional approach – Turkey did not approve of the invasion,¹⁸⁹ but saw it as merely a problem between two Arab states¹⁹⁰ and the principle of maintaining the *status quo* became the dominant consideration.¹⁹¹ However, as mentioned, Özal saw the crisis as an opportunity to show Turkey's value to the Western security system especially to the

1998), p. 198.

¹⁸³ For the principle see also: Gülnur Aybet, *Turkey's Foreign Policy and Its Implications for the West: A Turkish Perspective*, (London: RUSI, 1994) and Seyfi Taşhan, 'Contemporary Turkish Policies in the Middle East: Prospects and Constraints', *Dış Politika (Foreign Policy)*, Vol. XII, Nos.: 1-2, June 1985, pp. 12-20; Oral Sander, 'Turkey and the Middle East', *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest*, Winter 1987, pp. 47-62; A. Karaosmanoğlu, 'Turkey's Policy in the Middle East', *Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations*, Vol. 1, 1986, pp. 159-164.

¹⁸⁴ Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, (London: Pinter, 1991), pp. 65-67.

¹⁸⁵ *Hürriyet*, 19 January 1984.

¹⁸⁶ Turkey-Syria relations were dominated by the PKK problem and the water problem: Sedat Laçiner, 'Bir GAP Suda Fırtına', (*The Storm in the GAP*), *Milliyet*, 3-8 February 1993. The PKK problem in particular deeply affected Turkey's foreign policy in certain issues, however this study cannot focus on the issue because of its limit and scope. For a comprehensive analysis see Robert Olson, 'The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1991-1995: From the Gulf War to the Incursion into Iraq', *Journal of South East Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1995, pp. 1-30 and Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), esp. Chapter 6 (The Kurds and Turkish Foreign Policy).

¹⁸⁷ Kirişçi, 'Turkey and...', p. 40.

¹⁸⁸ Halis Akder, 'Turkey's Export Expansion in the Middle East, 1980-1985', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 41, No. 4, Autumn 1987.

¹⁸⁹ Bölükbaşı, *Türkiye ve...*, p. 93.

¹⁹⁰ *Milliyet* (daily, İstanbul), 3-4 August 1990.

¹⁹¹ Aybet, *Turkey's...*, p. 16.

United States. In the words of Ahmad 'Özal took matters into his own hands and placed the country squarely behind President Bush's policy.'¹⁹² Also, for Özal, the US-led anti-Iraq grouping was morally and legally right, and Turkey had to give clear support for the Alliance. In addition to the legal considerations, from the Özalist perspective, Turkish support for the Alliance was very important in order to show Turkey's strategic importance for the West. Moreover, Özal believed that Turkey would benefit from the post-war situation. 'The Middle East was in the midst of irreversible change and it was, therefore vital for Turkey to be in a position to take full benefit from future opportunities.'¹⁹³ For some, this benefit might be annexation of the northern oil-rich regions of Iraq. For Özal, for the first time in 100 years, Turkey might have backed the winning side in a war.¹⁹⁴ According to Özal, İnönü by not supporting the Allies in the Second World War risked Turkish security and prosperity,¹⁹⁵ now Turkey had to use this chance and support the winning side.

Özal was so determined and when he perceived parliament and the government as timid in taking initiative he bypassed both and carried out a secret telephone-diplomacy with the White House. Moreover by manipulating the public he created pressure on parliament in favour of the Western position.¹⁹⁶ Kemalist and leftist groups argued that such a policy might draw Turkey into a war and turn Turkey into an agent of American policy. On 8 August Turkey rushed to cut the oil pipelines, which carried 1.52 million barrels of oil a day between Turkey and Iraq and under Özal's influence parliament approved the government's request to send troops to the Gulf. Özal's personal role in cutting off the oil pipelines was viewed as a sign of deviation from Kemalism and his activism in foreign policy resulted in three important resignations from the government and bureaucracy. First Foreign Minister Ali Bozer resigned on 12 October 1990.¹⁹⁷ Defence Minister Sefa Giray followed Bozer on 18 December.¹⁹⁸ Not only the isolationist and cautious liberals and leftists but also the Kemalist Army was upset. Chief of the Staff Necip Torumtay criticised Özal's foreign policy as 'adventurist' and implied that the army was against such a foreign policy. Torumtay implied that Özal

¹⁹² Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 200.

¹⁹³ Robins, *Turkey...*, p. 71.

¹⁹⁴ Lawrence Friedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*, (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1993), p. 354.

¹⁹⁵ *Milliyet*, 20 October 1991.

¹⁹⁶ Gözen, 'Türkiye'nin...', p. 185.

¹⁹⁷ Gözen, 'Türkiye'nin...', p. 208.

endangered Turkish security for Western interests.¹⁹⁹ But now the balance of power was different than in previous years, and the Chief of Staff had to resign when he understood that he could not persuade civilians. For the Turkish press the resignation was a shock and underlined the civilian character of the regime and Özal's overwhelming influence on foreign policy matters.²⁰⁰ According to Özal, the generals were resisting the change:

'some generals are not keeping in step and are acting to preserve the *status quo*. While we are taking brave steps forward, they are trying to put brakes on.'²⁰¹

As Robins pointed out, on the other hand the opponents' considerations were different than Özal's;

'the Kemalist traditionalists were concerned that the end of the crisis would see a rapid closing of Arab ranks, leaving a legacy of deep suspicion towards Turkey, whose involvement in the crisis would be feared and resented as a resurgent neo-Ottomanism.'²⁰²

Considered Özalist activism as a threat for Turkish security, leftist Bülent Ecevit, for example, visited Baghdad to dampen the tension between Iraq and Turkey. Ecevit was followed by Islamist Necmettin Erbakan and the leftist-Kemalist Social democratic Populist Party's (SHP) leader Erdal İnönü.²⁰³ Despite these leftist, Kemalist and Islamist attempts, Özal managed to keep Turkey with the US-led alliance against Iraq and blamed the opponents of being İnönist and of not understanding the new circumstances in international politics.²⁰⁴ President Özal declared Turkey's new foreign policy position as:

'Many things have changed in Turkey... In foreign policy the days of taking a cowardly and timid position are over. From now we will pursue an active policy based on circumstances...'²⁰⁵ My conviction is that Turkey should leave its former passive and hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy... The reason I made this call is because we are powerful country in the region. Let me also point out that there are conservatives who prefer that no change should be made to these passive policies. The reason these circles accuse me of dragging the country into an adventure is because I generally prefer to pursue a more dynamic policy for our country.'²⁰⁶

¹⁹⁸ *Hürriyet*, 19 October 1990.

¹⁹⁹ Necip Torumtay, *Org. Torumtay'ın Anıları (Torumtay's Memoirs)*, (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1994).

²⁰⁰ *Milliyet*, 31 December 1990; *Hürriyet*, 1 January 1991.

²⁰¹ *Milliyet*, 7 December 1990.

²⁰² Robins, 'Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis, Adventurist or Dynamic?', in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy, New Prospects*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), p. 77.

²⁰³ Robins, 'Turkish Policy...', pp. 77-78.

²⁰⁴ *Milliyet*, 3 January 1991; *Zaman*, 4 January 1991.

²⁰⁵ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 201.

²⁰⁶ *Milliyet*, 3 March 1991.

Compared with Menderes and Demirel's timid attitude in the face of army opposition, Özal's self-confidence was significant. No doubt the main reason behind this confidence was the internal changes.²⁰⁷ As Özal expressed, his foreign policy was a result of his internal policies. Also, his opponents were in an ideological dilemma with the end of the Cold War bankrupting most of the leftist and Kemalist values. They were attacking Özal yet they had no prescription for the problems. For instance in the Iraqi Crisis they condemned Iraq for its invasion, yet they could not provide any policy towards Iraq and United States.²⁰⁸ Thus this ideological dilemma helped Özal.

Özal claimed that entering the Gulf War was a 'profitable move' saying 'this is the most profitable deal of my life. We are betting one getting three.'²⁰⁹ When the war begun on 17 January, Özal was able to get the extra powers from the Turkish Parliament: The parliament gave permit to deployment of Turkish forces in foreign countries, the deployment of foreign forces in Turkey and the utilisation of these forces.²¹⁰ Despite Özal's enthusiasm, due to public pressure, Turkey did not join the war actively, but gave a clear support to the alliance forces. It also allowed the American forces to use joint air bases (like İncirlik in Adana) in Turkey to bomb Iraqi forces.²¹¹ Turkey's importance was underlined by the war, and particularly the Americans understood that Turkey was a vital country for American interests in the Middle East as Robins noted:

'the action of President Özal in helping to isolate and confront the Iraqi regime greatly endeared him to the US administration and the White House. This in turn brought benefits on a wide front – from greater access to American markets for Turkish textiles to help in improving the quality of military hardware possessed by the armed forces. The US now appears to place greater value on the importance of Turkey than before.'²¹²

²⁰⁷ For the impact of Turkey's domestic changes on its foreign policy in the Özal period also see Fuller, 'Turkey's New...', pp. 38-40.

²⁰⁸ Except Bülent Ecevit and Mümtaz Soysal, who argued that Turkey should oppose the UN-led campaign, almost all opponents of Özal were in favour of implementing the UN decisions, including Erdal İnönü, President of the leftist-Kemalist Social Democrat Populist Party, Süleyman Demirel, leader of the right-wing The True Path Party and the former coup leader and former President Kenan Evren: *Milliyet*, 6-7-8- August 1990; *Hürriyet*, 8-9 August 1990. İnönü further suggested an international army against Saddam (*Hürriyet*, 7 August 1990) while Ecevit opposed any military action against Iraq: *Milliyet*, 26 December 1990.

²⁰⁹ *Hürriyet*, 16-17 January 1991. For some profit was Northern Iraq while Turkish press viewed the war as an opportunity for Turkey's EC membership: *Hürriyet*, 14 August 1990.

²¹⁰ Robins, 'Turkish Policy...', p. 79.

²¹¹ *Hürriyet*, 18 January 1991.

²¹² Robins, 'Turkish', pp. 85-86.

Moreover, after the Gulf War Turkey's importance as a regional power rose.²¹³ On the negative side, however, new troubles appeared, like the Kurdish problem. When the Kurdish rebellion against Saddam failed, some 700,000 people poured into the Turkish territories. Also the war created a power vacuum in Northern Iraq, which was filled by the PKK. Thus, the PKK gained a strategic base to attack Turkey and increased its authority in this region and south-eastern Turkey. On top of all this, the war caused an economic and political crisis in Turkey as Turkey lost an important market. Though Turkey asked for compensation from the West, the aid was limited. In conclusion it is hardly possible to argue Özal's strategy in Iraq worked perfectly and Turkey could not get most of the benefits Özal had expected while it was exposed to the bad effects of the Gulf War.²¹⁴ On the other hand, Özal's Gulf War policy vividly showed the differences between Özal's foreign policy and the previous approaches. Turkey, under Özal, abandoned its traditional pacific Middle Eastern foreign policy. Özal himself publicly declared that the main responsible the shift was his own foreign policy understanding and he accused the previous Turkish Middle Eastern policies of being pacifist and timid.²¹⁵

Post-war Developments

In June 1991, in a defeat for conservative-nationalists, the leading secular liberal Mesut Yılmaz was elected as the leader of MP. The October elections indicated the end of the Özal era as Demirel's *Doğru Yol Partisi* (True Path Party, TPP) emerged the winner with 27 per cent of the vote. Yılmaz's MP came second with 24 per cent. Surprisingly the leftist-Kemalist *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti* (The Social Democrat Populist Party, SDPP), that carried out an anti-war and anti-Özal campaign during the Gulf War fell to third place with 20.8 per cent. Özal continued to challenge the traditional foreign policy position and blamed the official understanding of being timid, isolationist, bureaucratic and useless, but the domestic changes limited his influence over the government and parliament. According to his close circle²¹⁶, Özal thought that he could not affect Turkish politics from the Presidential Palace, therefore he was making plans to return to politics as party leader in order to implement his radical policies including a new

²¹³ Kuniholm, 'Turkey and...', p. 62.

²¹⁴ Gözen, 'Türkiye'nin...', pp. 213-216.

²¹⁵ *Milliyet*, 3 March 1991 and Gözen, 'Türkiye'nin...', p. 189.

²¹⁶ Yusuf Bozkurt Özal, Turgut Özal's brother told me that Özal prepared a party program suggesting a more active foreign policy. Author's interview with Yusuf Bozkurt Özal, Ankara 15 December 1997.

foreign policy understanding, and a new human rights and nation-state concept, which was more tolerant to the Kurdish groups. However, in the spring of 1993 Turgut Özal died and never found an opportunity to carry out his ideas. His death increased the dilemma of Turkish foreign and internal politics. As Çandar pointed out Özalism continued its effect after Özal's death²¹⁷ and many parties including the MP, TPP and Islamist WP (Welfare Party) claimed Özal's heritage.

Conclusion: Neo-Ottomanism: An Alternative to Kemalist Foreign Policy?

The left and Kemalist groups²¹⁸ have accused neo-Ottomanism of being aggressive²¹⁹ while some European and Greek academics have called it an irredentist movement,²²⁰ and some in the Western press saw the Özalist policies as pan-Ottomanist, pan-Turkist, even pan-Islamist march of the Turks.²²¹ Yet despite its name, neo-Ottomanism is not an aggressive foreign policy and is not aimed only at the former Ottoman territories. It looks to the imperial Ottoman past but it is a product of a very different economic and social structure and is a reaction to a Kemalist isolationist foreign policy, not an irredentist, expansionist or aggressive foreign policy. In fact, neo-Ottomanism does not suggest a renewed interest in the former territories and people of the Ottoman Empire. But it aimed at a certain organic geopolitical, cultural, and economic relationship that had been absent during the Cold War and the early Republican years could re-emerge in the new suitable international and regional environment. In the words of Fuller, 'It suggests that the Turks may now come to see themselves once again at the centre of a world re-emerging around them rather than at the tail-end of a European world that is increasingly uncertain about whether or not sees Turkey as part of itself.'²²²

Moreover, because of Özal's obsession with the economy, his foreign policy focused on the economic aspects of external relations. For example for Özal, Turkey's export-

²¹⁷ Interview with Cengiz Çandar.

²¹⁸ Like Mümtaz Soysal, Erdal İnönü and Emin Çölaşan.

²¹⁹ Emin Çölaşan, *Hürriyet* (daily, İstanbul), 26 June 1992.

²²⁰ Stavrou views Ottomanist orientation as abandonment of the Kemalist philosophical basis of foreign policy arguing Turkish Balkan policy was based on common religion instead of secular considerations. Stavrou, 'The Dismantling', pp. 45-46. Also for Ottomanist irredentism see: Constantinides, 'Turkey', pp. 323-334;

²²¹ A. Zaman, 'Ottoman Heirs Seek New Balkan Role', *Sunday Telegraph*, 29 November 1992; D. Sneider, 'Turkey and Iran Play Out New "Great Game" in Asia', *The Christian Science Monitor*, 15-21 May 1992; R. Marthner, 'Horizon Shift to Central Asia', *Financial Times*, 24 May 1992.

²²² Graham E. Fuller, 'Turkey's New Eastern Orientation', in Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser (eds.), *Turkey's New Geopolitics*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 48.

import capacity was far more important than military capacity.²²³ For Özal Turkey needed time to develop its economy. Having developed its economy Turkey would have to follow an active foreign policy in order to protect its economic interests in the world. However this protectionism was not aggressive or isolationist. On the contrary economic interests played a crucial role in Özalist activism and Özal's compromise policy in Cyprus and in relations with Greece.²²⁴

For Çandar, Özal was against the militarist character of Turkish-Western relations:

'Turkey, until Özal, saw its relations as political or security relations. The West needed Turkey, and Turkey used the West's need to enter the Western society. For Özal, the only way to join the Western club was economy. He emphasised that the West has to accept Turkey as an equal partner if Turkey become a developed state. Further, Turkey will not need anybody if it success this.'²²⁵

Similarly, Özal's solution to Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Russian problems was to develop economic ties. As a result, Turkey, in the Özal period, searched for good relations with the promising foreign markets and focused on the economic matters more than political ones. Contrary to the independence-obsessed Kemalist foreign policy, with increasing economic power, Özal's Turkey re-gained its confidence in the world and pursued an internationalist foreign policy, because with rapid economic change not only the independence concept but also the national interest concept was changed. Now Turkey's interest was not in isolationism but in a close relationship with the world. In other words, Turkey's new economic interests had a crucial role in Özalist activism.

In addition to the economic aspects, neo-Ottomanism placed great importance in the cultural similarities of Turkey to the Middle East, the Balkans and the Central Asia. In this context, Islam, Turkism, and Ottomanism were three key concepts. Neo-Ottomanists argued that Turkey was a natural part of the Islamic, Turkish and Ottoman world and this provides a suitable ground for economic and political co-operation.²²⁶ They further argued that Turkey could be a perfect model for the countries in these regions. That is to say, contrary to Kemalist indifference and isolationist policies,

²²³ TRT, 22 November 1991, *Zaman* 23 November 1991; Hasan Cemal, *Özal Hikayesi (Özal Story)*, (Ankara: Bilgi, 1990), p. 294.

²²⁴ Süha Bölükbaşı, 'Türkiye'nin Yakınındaki Avrupa İle İlişkileri: Türk - Yunan Sorunları', (*Turkey's Relations With the Near Europe and the Turkish - Greek Problems*), in Attila Eralp (ed.), *Türkiye ve Avrupa, (Turkey and Europe)*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1997), pp. 264-265.

²²⁵ Author's interview with Cengiz Çandar.

²²⁶ Author's interviews with Fehmi Kuru, leading conservative columnist and Cengiz Çandar.

Özalist neo-Ottomanism was very keen to improve relations with these regions. While Kemal had strictly avoided from setting out relations based on the Ottoman and Islamic past, Özal particularly emphasised the importance of these values. For instance, Kemal had seen the outside Turks as a dangerous issue, although for the neo-Ottomanists the outside Turks with the Turkish diaspora in Europe were crucial to improve Turkey's relations with Germany, Russia and other states.

Integration with the West was another main pillar of neo-Ottomanism, and for Özal, neither the Islamic nor Turkish world was a viable alternative to the West. Özal argued that Turkey with its good relations with these regions would be integrated into the West.²²⁷ In other words, Turkist, Islamist and Ottomanist elements in Turkish foreign policy were part of Turkey's European integration aim, and Özal never gave up the European Turkey dream.

Moreover, as a result of his Americanism and ideological considerations, Özal attached a great importance to relations with United States. For him, the Americans could understand Turkey more than the Europeans. Also he argued that the American political model was more suitable for Turkey because of Turkey's unique social structure. In addition, for Özal, the American realist foreign policy suited Turkey's foreign policy priorities. In particular in the Middle East and Caucasia, he saw the United States as a natural ally for Turkey.

The Third World was not a very important issue for Özalist foreign policy. Unlike the socialists and leftist-Kemalists, Özal did not have an ideological framework for these countries. Muslim Third World states, however, had a special place in the Özalist policies. As noted earlier he restored relations with Iran, Iraq and other Muslim states in his early years. He also tried to demolish the historical mistrust between the Turks and Arabs, created partly by the Ottoman experiences, partly by Kemalist isolationism and Westernism. For example, Özal apologised to the Algerians for Turkey's pro-French policies during the Algerian Independence War.²²⁸ Özal saw the Third World countries as export destinations. In particular, the difficulties in the European and American

²²⁷ Turgut Özal, ANAP Özal Arşivi, T.Ö./90222

²²⁸ Fikret Ertan, 'Menderes'in ve Türkiye'nin Cesareti' (*Menderes' and Turkey's Courage*). *Zaman* (daily, İstanbul), 26 January 1999.

markets forced neo-Ottomanists to turn these countries, and in the Özal era, as has been seen, Turkey's trade with the African and Asian countries in particular dramatically increased.

In conclusion, unlike the Kemalist and leftist foreign policy approaches Özalism added new dimensions to Turkish foreign policy, like cultural and economic areas. National interest, independence and many more concepts of foreign policy were re-defined by Özalism. All these caused a multi-dimensional and internationalist foreign policy understanding. Özal did not see Islam, Turkism and Ottomanism as an obstacle to Turkey's integration into the West, but an important contribution to that. In brief, Özalist foreign policy was a clear deviation from Kemalism, however it was not an absolute rejection of the Kemalist approach. In the words of Fuller, 'it does not represent a wholesale rejection of Atatürk, but rather a recognition that not every idea and value of Atatürk has to be forever valid in Turkish consideration of the future.'²²⁹ In the light of this information it can be said that Özalism was a new approach and provided a new way in foreign policy. However Özal did not directly attack Kemalism. On the contrary Özal attacked Kemalist policies, but on the other hand he said that Atatürk was the greatest Turkish hero.²³⁰ Özal, instead of attacking Atatürk, attacked İnönü's Kemalism. He, in one of his speeches divided Turkish foreign policy history into two different periods: Atatürk and İnönü period.²³¹ According to this analysis, Atatürk symbolised a more pragmatic, active and brave period, while İnönü closed Turkey to the world with his extremely isolationist, pacific, bureaucratic and *etatist* policies. Despite the words, as discussed, Özal's critics were for Kemalist foreign policy, and Özal clearly declared that he was against the previous foreign policy understandings,²³² and, as discussed above, he proved these words with his own foreign policy implementations.

²²⁹ Fuller, 'Turkey's...', p. 47.

²³⁰ ANAP, **Turgut Özal'ın Konuşmaları** (*Turgut Özal's Speeches*), (Ankara: ANAP, Motherland Party n.d.).

²³¹ Gülistan Gürbey, 'Özal Dönemi Dış Politikası', (*Foreign Policy in the Özal Period*), in **Devlet ve Siyaset Adamı Turgut Özal**, (*Turgut Özal, as a Statesman and Politician*), (İstanbul: 20 Mayıs Kültür Vakfı, 1996), p. 78. Özal used Atatürk's Hatay policy as proof for his activism: Mehmet Barlas, **Turgut Özal'ın Anıları** (*Turgut Özal's Memoirs*), (İstanbul: 1994), p. 127.

²³² Hale, 'Turkey...', pp. 679-782.

CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the impact of Turkey's unique geopolitical location and past experience on its foreign policy, domestic politics, ideas and ideologies played a crucial role in this process. As shown by this study, Turkish foreign policy has not been constant but rather has changed virtually in every decade. These shifts can be explained in part by the vicissitudes of the international arena, notably the Second World War and the Cold War. However, an examination of the differences between the Atatürk, İnönü, Menderes, Ecevit, Demirel and Özal's eras reveals that these dramatic changes cannot be explained without referring to the role of ideas, ideologies and the impact of the domestic politics on Turkish foreign policy because, contrary to the traditional Kemalist explanations, Turkish foreign policy has been heavily influenced by domestic developments in Turkey. Moreover, Kemalism has not been the only ideology affecting Turkish foreign policy, but rather a multitude of ideas and ideologies like leftism, conservatism, Islamism, Ottomanism and Özalism. All these were discussed by this study and the main findings may be summarised as follows:

First of all, as discussed in Chapter II, III, IV and V, Kemalism did not constitute a separate foreign policy ideology. As a pragmatist leader, for Atatürk foreign policy issues were secondary to his main aim of transforming Turkish politics and society from an empire to a nation-state. To do so, he needed time, and foreign policy was one of the useful instruments to this end. This combined with Turkey's weaknesses led to a highly pragmatic foreign policy. Therefore, it can be said that Atatürk did not establish an unalterable foreign policy understanding in a rigid mould, but only ultimate aims. These aims, as discussed in detailed in Chapter IV, were mainly a homogeneous, secular, industrialised and developed nation-state on a defensible territory. Naturally his ideas regarding the domestic politics reflected on his foreign policy understanding. For instance in the Lausanne negotiations Mustafa Kemal's republican ideas mainly determined Turkey's position in the conference rather than the imperial considerations. The sole exception of Kemalist pragmatism was its Western-Eastern perception; Kemalist foreign policy has seen the Islamic and Eastern world in general as a source of

conflict and backwardness and viewed the West as the final destination for Turkey.¹ Hence ideology alienated Turkey-East relations while Turkey has been exposed to the negative consequences of naïve Kemalist Westernism. In summary, despite these exceptions, in the words of Harris, 'Atatürk's legacy in foreign affairs was not specific enough to answer all of the questions and needs of his successors.'² However his followers perceived Kemal's ideas as an ideology, which provides all the prescriptions Turkey need, including Turkish foreign policy issues. Thus Kemal's main principles became taboo and a guide-book for the Kemalists. In the İnönü period in particular with İnönü's own interpretation of Kemalism, the Second World War and the Russian threats to Turkey's territorial integrity after the Second World War increased Turkey's and the Kemalist regime's insecurity feelings. As a result, as discussed in Chapter VI, Kemal's and his friends' scepticism about the Western great powers, minorities and the opposition groups (Islamists, Ottomanists, socialists etc.) became one of the main characteristic of Kemalism. At the end of the one-party era, the Kemalists were considering any opposition to Kemal's ideas as an act of national treachery while the Kemalist elite and the army saw themselves as the guardians of the Kemalist republic.³ As Shaw and Shaw put it, RPP, which had been established by a pragmatic leader, Atatürk, was more than a political organisation, 'for many Kemalists it was a religion, way of life.'⁴ Similarly Agaoglu says 'the republic was a religion, a faith, not just a state regime'.⁵ In other words, pragmatic Kemalist understanding evolved into a more ideological approach and Kemal's domestic aims and fears deeply affected Kemalist foreign policy understanding after Mustafa Kemal. Between 1923 and 1945 this understanding confronted no serious challenge because the Kemalist elite enjoyed a monopoly under a single party tutelary regime. In this framework, this thesis further reached these conclusions for ideologies and ideas' effect on Turkish foreign policy in Atatürk and İnönü eras: First of all, as mentioned Turkey's foreign policy in these years was mainly a survival policy. Kemal's and İnönü's Westernism helped good relations with the West and Turkey always sought the West's friendship yet ideology played a limited role in Turkey's external relations with the European great powers, the Balkans and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, as Chapter V showed ideological

¹ Gökay, 'From Western...', pp. 259-269; Göle, *Modern...*, pp. 48-51; Rustow, *Turkey...*, p. 14.

² Harris, *Turkey...*, p. 180.

³ Robinson, *The First...*, p. 88; Lerner and Robinson, 'Swords...', pp. 19-44.

⁴ Shaw and Shaw, *History of...*, p. 403.

⁵ Ağaoglu, 'Vicdan Azabı Duymayanlara', *Son Posta*, (daily, Istanbul), 12 January 1931.

considerations deeply determined Turkey's relations with the Middle East and the Muslim countries in general. Kemal and İnönü's hard-line secularism and their Westernism (or West-East perception) prevented from establishing closer relations between Turkey and the Islamic countries. Except the defensive Sadabat Pact, Turkey opposed any meeting or integration based on the common Ottoman or Islamic past or cultural values, and as witnessed in the Fez Affair, Turkey's ideological attitude made a close co-operation difficult. Another example which showed the Kemalist ideology's impact on the relations was Turkish policy vis-à-vis Israel and the Arabs. Turkey became one of the first countries to recognise Israel in the İnönü period, and as Kılıç put it, İnönü government took the decision to emphasise Turkey's Western identity.⁶

When Soviet Union directly threatened Turkey after the Second World War, Turkey was forced to abandon its neutrality in foreign policy and to change its one-party regime to multi-party regime inside mainly to get the American support.⁷ These two factors, namely Turkey's western alignment and democratisation, opened a more pluralistic era in Turkey's foreign policy and many other ideological approaches, from Islamism to socialism, found opportunity to challenge the traditional Kemalist foreign policy understanding. The right-wing Democrat Party in particular represented the first serious challenge to Kemalism in foreign policy area and the DP era marked the end of absolute Kemalist hegemony. The Democrats, unlike Kemal, idealised democracy, liberalism and the people's traditional values such as Islam and the Ottoman past. The DP effectively continued İnönü's Western alignment policy and Turkey was accepted as a NATO member, however, the Democrat's ideological roots in time reflected on their foreign policy methods and aims, and at the end the DP deviated from the traditional foreign policy understanding in many cases.⁸ The first effect of the Democrats' ideology was seen in relations with the West. Contrary to the RPP's scepticism about the Western countries, as Köprülü declared, the DP identified Turkish national interests with the Western block's.⁹ The DP's naive Americanism not only determined Turkey's relations with the West but at the same time badly affected Turkey's relations with the newly-emerged Third World block. Turkey, thanks to the DP's Americanism acted as a

⁶ Kılıç, *Turkey and...*, p. 189 and Mango, 'Turkish...', p. 59.

⁷ Hale, 'Foreign Policy...', p. 94.

⁸ As discussed in Chapter VII in the literature it is frequently claimed that there was no change in foreign policy in the Menderes era. For an example see Hale, 'Foreign Policy...', p. 94.

⁹ Köprülü cited in *Cumhuriyet*, 25 December 1955 and Toker, *DP'nin Altın...*, pp. 160-175.

spokesman for the developed Western countries, although it was an underdeveloped country.¹⁰ Obviously Turkey's this attitude towards the Third World cannot be explained by the geographical or historical factors, because neither its location nor its history and economic power forced Turkey for such a policy, but the government party's ideas and perceptions about the world order and Turkey's interests. In other words, it can be argued that if another party, which had a different world view, was in power, like RPP Turkey's Third World policy would have been very different than the DP's policy towards the underdeveloped states. As a matter of fact that our claim would be proved after the 27 May Coup; the leftist İnönü and the Ürgüplü governments immediately abandoned Menderes' Third World policy and saw these countries as an important alternative to balance Turkey's Western connections. As it was detailed in Chapter VIII, naturally ideology was not the only reason and there were other reasons like the external factors¹¹ for this shift, yet it was certain that ideology had played an undeniable role in this change.

As witnessed in his Third World policy, Menderes' world order perception also affected his Middle Eastern policies and caused a great deviation from the Kemalist non-alignment and pacific Middle Eastern policies. As a result Menderes and his Foreign Minister Köprülü argued that Turkey could play a 'big brother' role in the Middle East in the name of the United States.¹² In this concern Turkey's Baghdad Pact initiative with the United Kingdom and the United States cannot be likened to Mustafa Kemal's defensive Sadabat Pact, because the Baghdad Pact was a part of an activist anti-Soviet plan while the Sadabat Pact was peaceful defensive measure against a possible attack. As Chapter VII argued the Baghdad Pact separated the regional countries into two different groups and contrary to Kemal's pacifism, Turkey played a significant role in this great power game. Apart from the Baghdad Pact, Menderes followed an activist, and even a militarist foreign policy approach in the Syrian and the Iraqi Crises. For example, when the pro-Western Iraqi government was overthrown, Menderes decided on a military intervention in 1958,¹³ and he repeated his activist, pro-Westernist attitude when the American troops landed in Lebanon and the British entered Jordan in 1958. Again, the DP's ideological considerations and perceptions played a significant role in

¹⁰ Gönlübol, 'A Short...', p. 7.

¹¹ Such as the Johnson Letter, the US' Turkish policy etc.

¹² Bağcı, 'Demokrat Parti'nin...', p. 93.

making DP's activist and even militarist foreign policy understanding. İnönü's criticisms about Menderes's Middle East policy support this claim: For İnönü, Menderes' Middle East policy with its aggressiveness and adventuristic character was a certain deviation from Kemalism.¹⁴ The 27 May Coup was a reaction to the DP policies and the coup leaders aimed to restore Kemalist understanding in foreign policy as well. However the leftist elements increased their influence on Turkish politics in the 1960s, and with the *Yön* movement leftist-Kemalism emerged as a new foreign policy school of thought. The leftist-Kemalists advocated new security strategies for Turkey outside of NATO and propagated rapprochement with the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Similarly other leftist groups, like the TIP, publicly criticised Turkey's alliance with the US and accused Turkey's Western allies of occupying Turkey economically and politically.¹⁶ These ideas affected the official policy, and the İnönü and Ürgüplü governments followed a more sceptical foreign policy towards the West while they sought partnership with the Third World countries. In these years Turkey abandoned its indifferent Third World policy and sent many delegations to improve Turkey's relations with the Latin American, African and Asian states. Furthermore Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Işık visited Moscow and Peking and sought close co-operation with the communist Soviet Union and China. All this radical shift can be considered as the impact of the ideologies. However it was not only ideology and the ideas which caused the shift, but the real changes also forced Turkey for a new foreign policy orientation. The Cyprus problem and the United States' disappointing Turkey policy was one of the most important reasons. The Johnson letter in particular increased anti-Americanism in Turkey and forced the Turkish policymakers to find new friends. However, under these circumstances while the leftist and Kemalist İnönü and Ürgüplü governments turned their face to the Third World countries and the Soviet Union, the right-wing Justice Party choose to improve Turkey's relations with the Muslim countries and focused on the religious solidarity. This difference vividly underscored the ideology's effect on Turkish foreign policy. Mustafa Kemal and İnönü had refused to join any religious meeting or organisation in the Middle East yet now Prime Minister Demirel was calling the Muslim countries as 'Turkey's brothers' and Turkey became an active member of the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) in these years. The Demirel government also for the first time in the republican history

¹³ *Cumhuriyet*, 29 July 1958.

¹⁴ İnönü, *TBMM Meclis Zabıtları*, 1958, pp. 844-845.

¹⁵ Soysal, 'Yalnızlık', *Yön*, No. 143.

changed Turkey's policy vis-à-vis Israel and Arabs and actively supported the Palestinians.¹⁷ This thesis argues that this dramatic shift in Turkey's Middle East policy cannot be explained by only the international developments or Turkey's location because under the similar circumstances İnönü and Ürgüplü governments did not see religious solidarity as a foreign policy card. They even attempted to improve Turkey's relations with the Latin American countries, but they never abandoned Turkey's secular and indifferent position in the Middle Eastern problems. In a short time, however, Demirel and his Foreign Minister Çağlayangil, as discussed in Chapter VIII, set their Middle Policy on religious solidarity with the Muslim states of the region claiming 'the Muslim countries are Turkey's brothers.'¹⁸ It can be claimed that the main reason for these differences between the neo-Democrat Demirel and the Kemalists and the leftists are rooted in the ideological considerations.

As the Chapter IX discussed, the 1970s were economic depression and social turmoil years for Turkey, and these increased radicalism and the role of ideologies in Turkish politics, and as a natural result of this in Turkish foreign policy. In the first years of the 1970s the Orthodox Kemalist RPP's transformation from the centre to the left was completed by Bülent Ecevit, and the RPP became a home for many radical political groups like radical leftists and the Kurds. Moreover when their parties (The NSP and the NAP) became the government partner, the radical Islamists and the ultra-Turkists increased their role in Turkish politics. Turkish Foreign policy was not immune from the changes in the domestic politics and different political groups affected Turkey's foreign policy in different degrees throughout the 1970s. Of course not all the aspects of Turkish foreign policy were changed, and a limited continuity was also observed. Turkey's location, historical factors, Turkey's social and economic structures and Kemalism, as a dominant ideology played a significant role in making Turkish foreign policy as witnessed in the previous decades. However the other ideologies also affected Turkey's external relations in an undeniable way. In the Cyprus problem and the poppy-growing crisis Ecevit publicly challenged the United States, which resulted in an arms

¹⁶ *Milliyet*, 27 May 1967.

¹⁷ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Birleşim 115, Oturum 1, 18, 1967, pp. 168-169. Also see Chapter VIII of this thesis.

¹⁸ For the examples see Chapter VIII of this study. As this chapter detailed, Turkey's activist policy in the OIC in particular provides vivid examples of Turkey's 'Islamist' policy in the region. Also see *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Birleşim 115, Session 1, 18, 1967, pp. 168-169 and *The Bulletin of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, No. 33, 1967, pp. 55-56.

embargo. Anti-Americanism became an important feature of Ecevit's RPP and the Turkish politics in these years while Turkey made attempts to improve its relations with the Soviet Union, the Third World countries and the regional states. Thanks to Ecevit's policies, different from Kemal's and İnönü's policies between 1920s and the 1940s, Turkey followed a more radical and activist foreign policy vis-à-vis the East and its region. It is true not only Ecevit's or the other groups' ideological backgrounds shaped Turkey's foreign policy, but the international developments, like the oil crises and the disappointing Western attitude to Cyprus problem in particular forced Turkey for a radical shift in its foreign policy. However, as detailed in Chapter IX, Ecevit with his Islamist partner Erbakan responded all these changes more radically compared to the previous İnönü and Demirel governments. In addition, the certain differences between the Ecevit and Demirel governments' policies in the 1970s showed the ideologies' impact on the policies. While Ecevit reacted to the West's 'anti-Turkish' policies by improving Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union and the Third World countries, the Demirel governments concentrated on the Islamic world. Under the Demirel governments Turkey's role in the Organisation of Islamic Conference shifted from a hitherto reserved position toward a more active participation while the Kemalist groups opposed Turkey's membership to the OIC claiming it contradicted with the secularism principle of Kemalism.¹⁹ Another example was Demirel's and Ecevit's attitudes towards the European Economic Community (EEC). Ecevit, who was very sceptical towards the EEC, freeze Turkey's commitments to the EEC in 1979. When the government, however, was changed and Demirel came to power Turkey in a couple of months announced that it would formally apply for full membership. Turkey was the same country and the EEC was the same organisation but the change of the power in Turkey had changed Turkey's EEC policy, and even solely this example proves that the ideological orientations of the Turkish governments deeply affected Turkish foreign policy.

Thanks to the 12 September 1980 military coup Turkey was isolated by the West. Turkey concentrated on the domestic problems and it was forced to make cooperation with its region. Ironically Turkey's relations with the Islamic world became closer under a Kemalist administration, because the generals saw the Muslim world as a way

¹⁹ Aykan, *Turkey's Role...*, p. 75.

to get away from the economic and political isolation.²⁰ As a result Turkey became an active IOC member in the 1980s. In addition, in the 1980s Turkish economy showed a miracle-like development and Turkey became the biggest exporter of its region, except the Soviet Union.²¹ The increasing trade with the regional states helped to increase Turkey's relations with the Middle East and the Balkans. Furthermore, the democratisation and the fast economic development changed the social structure of Turkey and the ethnic groups, like the Kurds, Bosnians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Chechens and Turkmens, became one of the important factors in Turkish politics, and as a result of this Turkey's relations with its region intensified. However the most important factor caused a radical change in Turkish foreign policy was the end of the Cold War. In the new international environment Turkey relatively lost its geo-strategic importance for the West compared with the Cold War years. The European Community (EC) furthermore refused Turkey's membership application and Turkey felt frustrated and humiliated at the reluctance of the Europeans to accept Turkey as an equal member.²² Under these circumstances Turkey lost the theoretical framework of its foreign policy and all these factors mentioned above provided a suitable ground for the Özalist foreign policy understanding. Özal publicly challenged the existed foreign policy understanding saying 'in foreign policy the days of taking a cowardly and timid position are over. From now we will pursue an active policy based on circumstances.'²³ Özal claimed that Turkey was now a strong country in terms of military, economy and politics and it had to play its role in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus.²⁴ As Turkish and Muslim country, he further argued that, Turkey must use the religious and kinship solidarity as an instrument of its foreign policy.²⁵ In this framework, while the Kemalists and the leftist groups saw the end of the Cold War as a great threat to Turkish security, Özal, as Chapter X showed, perceived all these developments as an opportunity to make Turkey a regional power. It can be argued that his activism and new foreign policy were rooted in his ideas while the secular Kemalist groups avoided to see the newly emerged Turkic and Muslim states as an alternative. As a result, it can be said that Özal abandoned the traditional foreign policies: First Turkey concentrated in the economic issues and made efforts to increase regional integration as witnessed in

²⁰ Aykan, 'Turkey...', pp. 106-107.

²¹ **General Outlook of...**, p. 2; Krueger and Aktan, *Swimming Against...*, pp. 148-149.

²² Landau, *Pan-Turkism...*, p. 202.

²³ Ahmad, *The Making...*, p. 201.

²⁴ *Milliyet*, 3 March 1991.

the Black Sea Economic Cooperation experience, which is mainly an economic organisation and different from the previous regional Turkish initiatives, such as the Sadabat Pact or the Baghdad Pact. Turkey in these years used the economic instruments to restore its relations with the Greeks and the Russians. Second Özal abandoned Kemalist pacifism and non-involvement principles as witnessed in the Balkans, Caucasus and in the Gulf War. In the Bosnian Crisis Turkey gave a clear support to the Muslim Bosnians, and Turkey's support for the Azerbaijanians in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflicts was based on 'Turkish brotherhood'.²⁶ Similarly according to Özal all the Turkic republics with Turkey were 'brother republics'.²⁷ As shown in Chapter X, Özal with his style and policies represented a clear deviation from the traditional Turkish foreign policy understanding. The international developments, like the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the domestic structural changes forced Turkey for a shift in its foreign policy, however Özal and his ideas cannot be ignored in this change. Finally this study has argued that Özalist foreign policy is one of the most vivid examples for the role of the ideas in Turkish foreign policy.

In conclusion, this study has explored the role of ideas and ideologies in Turkish foreign policy since the beginning of the republic to the end of the Özal years, comparing the different Turkish foreign policy approaches. This study accepts that Turkey's unique location, its history and international developments have deeply determined Turkey's foreign policy and left no manoeuvre area in many areas for the Turkish policy makers, as sometimes seen in the Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Greek relations. Also Kemalism, as the founding ideology of the modern Turkey has determined Turkey's external relations in many cases, as witnessed in Turkey's relations with the Muslim countries in the Kemal and İnönü periods. Thanks to these factors Turkish foreign policy has showed a limited continuity in regard to some issues and principles. For example, the Westernisation ideal has been the guiding principle of the Turkish Republic from its inception in 1923 to the present time, and the West has been seen as the final destination by the Turkish policy makers. Likewise, Turkey has remained true to the non-revisionist norms of Kemalism. However this is not enough to claim an unbroken ideological continuity. Rather, this continuity as mentioned stemmed from international

²⁵ See Chapter X of this study and Fuller, 'Turkey's New...', pp. 45-48.

²⁶ *Milliyet*, 3-6 March 1992.

²⁷ *Milliyet*, 15 March 1993.

developments and Turkey's geographical and historical features. Furthermore, even when the principles and aims remained unchanged the perception of these aims and principles by the governments changed, and this reflected on the implementation.

This study has also argued that the changes occurred in Turkish foreign policy since the 1920s could not be explained by only using the variables other than ideology and domestic factors mentioned above. This thesis has claimed that one of the most important factors has shaped Turkey's foreign relations is ideology and ideas. To prove this the thesis compared Mustafa Kemal's, İnönü's, Menderes', Ecevit's, Demirel's and finally Özal's foreign policy implementations and found that ideas, in addition to the other variables, has played an important role in Turkish foreign policy. The thesis also found that it is difficult to claim that Kemalism has been the only dominant ideology in foreign policy matters because Kemalism has faced many serious challenges, and anti-Kemalist and non-Kemalist approaches have not been only marginal or radical as seen in the Menderes, Demirel and Özal cases. It is also difficult to talk about a distinctive single Kemalist foreign policy ideology because Mustafa Kemal's, İnönü's, Ecevit's, and the 12 September Coup's Kemalisms showed certain differences as discussed in the relevant chapters, and the lack of consensus on the main principles of Kemalism resulted in incoherent and unpredictable policies in foreign policy, and made continuity difficult.

APPENDIXES

(All tables prepared by the author, Sedat LACINER)

Table of Main School of Thoughts

TURKISM (Ottoman)

Radical
(Pan-Turkist etc.)

Moderate
(Nation-State etc.)

Ideology

Pan-Turkist
Pan-Turkism based on race
Authoritarian in power
Islam as a culture of the Turks
Anti-Western powers
Enthusiastic for Westernisation
Modernist
Secular
Positivist

Anatolian Turkism
Homogeneous Turkish State
Authoritarian in power
Anti-religious
Sceptic Westernist
Enth. For Westernisation
Modernist
Secular
Positivist

Aims in General

Industrialised, Modern Country
An Empire
Monarchy
Powerful Turkish Empire
A Turkey in Eurasia
Secular, Positivist Society

Industrialised, Modern Country
Nation-State
Republican
A homogenous nation-State
A Turkey in Europe
Secular, Positivist Society

Methodology/Tools

Up-to-down
Idealistic/Romantic
Armed Struggle

Up-to-down
Pragmatic/Opportunist
Realist, legalist

Support

Military officers, press
Outside Turks, Germany

Elite, Army, Press, bureaucracy

Foreign Policy

Internationalist/Activist
Pan-Turkist
Anti-European
Aggressive
Imperial
Expansionist

Isolationist/Pacifist

Sceptic/pro-European
Legalist
National
Defensive

Representatives

Enver Pasha

Ziya Gökalp

Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk

Ottomanist Approaches
In the Ottoman Years

Secular

Moderate

Islamist



Ideology

Secular Ottomanism
Sceptic on religion
Cultural Westernism

Modernist

Liberalism
Mixed
Mixed

Modernist

Islamist Ottomanism
Religious
Just Western
Technology
Mixed

Methodology

Pragmatic
Up-to-down

Pragmatic
Down-to-up

Pragmatic/Idealist
Down-to-up

Support

Bureaucracy, Army

Press, Foreign powers

Palace, bureaucracy
Ethnic minorities

People, Religious
Elite, villagers
Press, religious
Groups.

<u>Aims (in General)</u>		
Save the Empire Secular Empire	Save the Empire A More Liberal Empire	Save the Empire Islamist-Ottoman Empire
Multi-religious	Multi-religious	Multi-religious
<u>Foreign Policy</u>		
Pro-Western Activist Imperial	Pragmatist Westernist Mixed Imperial	Pan-Islamist Activist Imperial

ISLAMISM

Moderate

Radical

<u>Ideology</u>	
Ottomanist Islamist Pragmatist/Idealist Religious Sceptic on the West Sceptic on Westernisation Modernist	<i>Ümmetçi</i> Islamist Idealist Religious Anti Western Sceptic on Westernisation Modernist/Traditional

<u>Methodology</u>	
Mixed	Down-to-up
<u>Support</u>	
Parliament, the Palace, press	Religious institutes, traditional groups, low-class, villagers, overseas Muslims

KEMALISM(S)



Leftist Kemalism

Atatürk's Kemalism

Isolationist / İnönist
Kemalism



Ideology

Anti-Capitalism
Secular
Democrat

Pluralist
Modernist
Anti-Religion
Positivist
Pro-Westernisation
Socialist Economy with
A Limited Liberalism
State-for-Class
Class-Minded

Capitalist
Secular
Moderate Autocrat

Ideological Monopoly
Modernist
Anti-Religion
Positivist
Pro-Westernisation
Mixed/Etatist

people-for-state
No Class

Mixed
Secular
Absolute
Autocrat
Monopoly
Modernist
Anti-Rel.
Positivist
Pro-Wester.
Etatist

people-for-state
No Class

Inspiring Country / Tradition

France
Soviet Union
Scandinavian States
Western Europe

Socialist Tradition

France
Soviet Union

French Revolutionary
Tradition

France
Soviet Union
Fascist Italy
NAZI Germany

French Trad.

Methodology

Idealist
Democrat
Down-to-up
Populist
Mixed

Pragmatic
Jacobean
Up-to-down
Elitist
Revolutionary

Mixed
Jacobean
Up-to-down
Elitist
Revolutionary

Support

Kemalist Class	Kemalist Class	Kemalist Class
Bureaucracy	Bureaucracy	Bureaucracy
The Army (Sometimes)	The Army	The Army
Press	Press	Press
Leftists	-	?
Working Class	The Party	The Party
Non-religious groups	Non-Religious grp.	Non-religious grp.
Alevis	Alevis	-
Radical Kurds	-	-
?	State-created Business	State-created Business
Soviet Union		
Socialist States		
European Leftists		

Foreign Policy

Activist	Isolationist	Isolationist
Anti-Western	Sceptical – Westernist	Over-Sceptical
		Westernist
Third Worldist	Pragmatic	Pragmatic
Idealist	Opportunist	Opportunist
Politics-Minded	Security-Minded	Security-Minded

Primary Threat

Imperialists	Communism, Imperialism	Nazism, Fascism
		Communism,
		Imperialism
United States	Russia, European powers	Italy, Russia, Germany

Friends

Soviet Union	Britain	Britain, France
Third World		
Arab World		

Representatives

Bülent Ecevit Mümtaz Soysal Cumhuriyet (1970s) Yön	Atatürk Cumhuriyet (1930s)	İsmet İnönü Cumhuriyet (1940s) Ulus
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THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ÖZALISM AND KEMALISM

Özalism

Kemalism



Ideology

Moderate Turkist
Democrat-Muslim
Islam as an inseperable element of Turkishness

Ottomanist
Modernist
Democrat
Capitalist/Free Market Economy
Liberal
State-for-people
Moderate

Anatolian Turkism
Anti-Religious
Islam is source of
backwardness
Anti-Ottoman
Modernist
Authocrat
Mixed Economy/Etatist

People-for-state
Jacobean / Radical

Inspiring Country / Tradition

United States
United Kingdom
Anglo-Saxon Liberal Political Tradition

France
Soviet Union
Jacobean Autocratic Etatist Trad.



Methodology

Pragmatic
Down-to-up
Evolutionary
Economy-oriented

Pragmatic/Realist
Up-to-down
Revolutionary

Support

Business Class
The Middle Class
Religious Leaders
Religious people
Ottomanists
Moderate Turkists
Villagers
Small Business

State-created business
Kemalist Class
Anti-religious groups

Leftists
Secular Turkists
Party
Bureaucracy
Army

Foreign Policy

Internationalist
Activist
Ottomanist
Economic Expansionism
Peaceful Turkism
Islam as a Foreign Policy Instrument
Westernist
Full Integration with West
Pro-American
Globalisation
Integration with the Turkic World
Integration with the Muslim Markets
Co-operation with the Region

Isolationist
Pacifist
Republican
Maintain Status quo
No Turkism
Anti-religious
Sceptical Westernist
Limited Integration with West

Maintaining Full Independence
Escape from the outside Turks
Avoid from the Muslims
Defensive Co-operation with the Region

Main Ideological Trends in Turkish Foreign Policy

Palace-Ottomanism	19 th Century
Islamist Ottomanism	II. Abdulhamid
Westernist-Turkism	1908-1918
Kemalism	1923-1938
Inönist Kemalism	1938-1950
Democrats	1950-1960
Neo-Kemalism	1960-1965
Neo-Democrats	1965-1971
Leftist-Kemalism	1971-1975
Neo-Democrats	1975-1977
Leftist-Kemalism	1977-1979
Neo-Democrats	1979-1980
12 September's Kemalism	1980-1983
Özalism-Neo-Ottomanism	1983-1993

Presidents

1923-1938	Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
1938-1949	İsmet İnönü
1950-1960	Celal Bayar
1960-1966	Cemal Gürsel
1966-1973	Cevdet Sunay
1974-1980	Fahri Korutürk
1981-1989	Kenan Evren
1989-1993	Turgut Özal

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Şükrü Sina Gürel, Turkish academics, politician and Minister for Cyprus Affairs in Ecevit governments, 15 December 1997, Ankara, Turkey.

Bülent Ecevit, Turkish politician, former president of the Republican People’s Party and Prime Minister of Turkey, 21 July 1996, Ankara, Turkey.

Fehmi Koru, the leading conservative columnist, 12 February 1999, Ankara, Turkey.

İlber Ortaylı, leading historian in the Faculty of Political Sciences, Ankara University, 14 December 1997, Ankara, Turkey.

Baskın Oran, Prof., expert on Turkish foreign policy, Ankara University, the Faculty of Political Sciences, 15 December 1997, Ankara, Turkey.

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